Destroyers.....

[RCAFson]

The question is Was the 5in DP gun better for AA defence compared to the twin 4.7in RN destroyers gun. There is no doubt that all the RN officers who observed both in action believe that the result is yes, the 5in was a much better weapon. No one has even tried to quote an RN officer who believed that the twin 4.7 was even close to being as good as the 5in. We have opinions, theories but no quote from anyone at the time.

To base the defence against this on observations that the USN believed that the 5in wasn't as good as they liked is a different answer to a different question. I am very confident that the RN would have been absolutely delighted if their Heavy AA guns had shot down 18 percent of the suicide aircraft. To claim 39% of all kills in the period Jan - July is a remarkable achievement.

There's a huge difference between claims and actual kills. My look at USN AA kills as stated by Lundstrom leads me to believe that the actual 5in kill rate during 1942 was around 5 to 10%, at most, of total AA kills. After 1943 the USN began using VT ammo in large quantities, so one would expect an increase in 5in AA efficiency, but it seems to me that the decline from 1944 to 1945 was mainly due to increased accuracy of reporting and that the 39% claim for 1944 was greatly overstated.

However, if 5in AA was ineffective (and it was) in 1942 and if RN 4.7in AA was similary ineffective, then there would be a greater reliance on the CIWS, and thus the RN policy of of saving weight via lower elevation main armament but ensuring a heavy CIWS was justified, and that total RN AA efficiency and kill rates would actually decline if RN destroyers were equipped with MK37+5in/38 at the expense of their CIWS. This trade off is not something that anyone in the RN could have known, given how greatly inflated and misleading USN AA stats were during WW2 - especially given that RN AA kills seems to have been much more conservatively stated.

 

[Glider]

There's a huge difference between claims and actual kills. My look at USN AA kills as stated by Lundstrom leads me to believe that the actual 5in kill rate during 1942 was around 5 to 10%, at most, of total AA kills. After 1943 the USN began using VT ammo in large quantities, so one would expect an increase in 5in AA efficiency, but it seems to me that the decline from 1944 to 1945 was mainly due to increased accuracy of reporting and that the 39% claim for 1944 was greatly overstated.

However, if 5in AA was ineffective (and it was) in 1942 and if RN 4.7in AA was similary ineffective, then there would be a greater reliance on the CIWS, and thus the RN policy of of saving weight via lower elevation main armament but ensuring a heavy CIWS was justified, and that total RN AA efficiency and kill rates would actually decline if RN destroyers were equipped with MK37+5in/38 at the expense of their CIWS. This trade off is not something that anyone in the RN could have known, given how greatly inflated and misleading USN AA stats were during WW2 - especially given that RN AA kills seems to have been much more conservatively stated.

I don't disagree that there is a huge difference between claims and kills a difference that applies to all the armed forces of all the nations in the conflict.
The key point is that and I repeat myself here All the RN officers who observed both in action believe that the result is yes, the 5in was a much better weapon. No one has even tried to quote an RN officer who believed that the twin 4.7 was even close to being as good as the 5in. We have opinions, theories but no quote from anyone at the time.

I can see where you are coming from re the 1942/43 time period but you still have no quote from anyone to support you. You have your theory but nothing more. Few would deny that 4-6 20mm and a quad 2pd is better than 4-6 20mm normally carried by the USN by late 42.
Even in your papers when describing the air battles in 1942 there were a number of examples of the attacking aircraft turning away in the face of 5in fire. There were examples where the reccomendation was that the 5in should be retained for putting barrage fire up over the carriers. However I can find no examples of any RN report saying that the 4.7in helped in turning away Japanese air attacks (I do know of one where his happened using the 5.25). I find no examples of reports saying that the 4.7in actually helped when firing barrage fire over the carriers. Plenty saying that it should be able to, but none saying that it did.

What we do have is a lot of reports from RN officers saying that they wanted the 5in as its a lot better than what they had.

A key thing to remember is the effectiveness of the fire against the Japanese. In 1942 I am sure most will agree that they had the best trained and equipped naval airforces in the world.

 

[parsifal]

What we do have is a lot of reports from RN officers saying that they wanted the 5in as its a lot better than what they had.

And some of those officers said that after first hand observation of the 5/38 as opposed to their own 4.7s.

Ive seen some officers sing the praises of the 4.5, Ive seen some more or less say the 4in was good enough. Some officers are supportive of the 2 pounder, though less so than the 4.5. Ive never seen any officer say the 4.7 was okay. even Vians report on operations in Norway isnt glowing about the weapon.

And there are quite a few comments from RN officers that suggest they really liked the 5/38. Are all these officers wrong or idiots. It just beggars belief.

I think we need unequivocal evidence that officers though the British AA suites as superior to anything around. I would accept that there is evidence that the Brits had a workable system, but I simply dont think many people saw it as a great system, or that the US system operationally was a dud. Its true I think that there were teething problems, but that is a long way from proving or showing the system was a failure....

 

[RCAFson]

And some of those officers said that after first hand observation of the 5/38 as opposed to their own 4.7s.

Ive seen some officers sing the praises of the 4.5, Ive seen some more or less say the 4in was good enough. Some officers are supportive of the 2 pounder, though less so than the 4.5. Ive never seen any officer say the 4.7 was okay. even Vians report on operations in Norway isnt glowing about the weapon.

And there are quite a few comments from RN officers that suggest they really liked the 5/38. Are all these officers wrong or idiots. It just beggars belief.

I think we need unequivocal evidence that officers though the British AA suites as superior to anything around. I would accept that there is evidence that the Brits had a workable system, but I simply dont think many people saw it as a great system, or that the US system operationally was a dud. Its true I think that there were teething problems, but that is a long way from proving or showing the system was a failure....

RN contact with the 5in/38 was very limited.

I don't really care what officers thought - it is the results that they obtained that matters. One of the huge problems is that the USN was reporting great things about the 5in/38 that simply weren't true and this must have swayed opinion in both navies; something along the lines of: "...Gee we got hammered in Norway and Crete yet the USN appears to be shooting the Japanese out of the Pacific skies...their system must be better..." The other problem is that if a staff study states that a 40deg gun and a heavy CIWS is better than a 80deg gun and a light CIWS, it doesn't mean that line officers will agree, even if the study is correct. The average RN destroyer officer probably thought his weaponry was inadequate to the task, and he was right, but that doesn't mean that an alternate FC system and a reliance on a HA 5in gun as in MK33 or Mk 37 USN destroyers would have produced better results - and there is no evidence that USN destroyers were doing better than RN destroyers in 1942.

 

[RCAFson]

I can see where you are coming from re the 1942/43 time period but you still have no quote from anyone to support you. You have your theory but nothing more. Few would deny that 4-6 20mm and a quad 2pd is better than 4-6 20mm normally carried by the USN by late 42.
Even in your papers when describing the air battles in 1942 there were a number of examples of the attacking aircraft turning away in the face of 5in fire. There were examples where the reccomendation was that the 5in should be retained for putting barrage fire up over the carriers. However I can find no examples of any RN report saying that the 4.7in helped in turning away Japanese air attacks (I do know of one where his happened using the 5.25). I find no examples of reports saying that the 4.7in actually helped when firing barrage fire over the carriers. Plenty saying that it should be able to, but none saying that it did.

.

There are numerous examples here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38377.pdf
of Luftwaffe and IAF aircraft refusing to come through the gunfire put up by the destroyer screens.

 

[parsifal]

There are numerous examples here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38377.pdf
of Luftwaffe and IAF aircraft refusing to come through the gunfire put up by the destroyer screens.

The heavy losses for Destroyers to air attack dont support what you are suggesting here, in my opinion.. Just comparing the RN fleet destroyers to the USN Fleet destroyers would suggest the Axis were less frightened of penetrating of British screen than they were the USNs....granted the RN was in action for longer and fighting with their backs to the wall for longer. We dont know the numbers of enemy a/c that entered RN combat zones, but we do have some figures for the USN. They say more than 7000 enemy aircraft entered their battle zones.. These enemy aircraft intrusions managed to sink 24 US Destroyers (along with other ships).

We dont know the numbers of enemy aircraft that entered British screens. We do know that about 1200 sorties entered BPF airspace in 1945, comparedf to over 10000 faced by the USN. In both cases, the majority of aircraft never entered the flak zones of the two fleetsbut that iis still a heck of a lot of aircraft. Not all of these were kamikazes, and not all were able to enter the defensive screens of the two forces.

However, for the entire war (1939-45, the British lost 56 DDs to air attack, according to Janes war loss section in the 44-45 edition (published after the war). By comparison the USN suffered the loss of 24 DDs to air attack. The RN was much smaller, and suffered on the defensive for a lot longer than the USN, however, on the other hand, unlike the germans, the Japanese continued to pour vast proportions of their air strength into anti shipping operations until the very end. Over 12000 sorties against allied shipping in 1945 alone, involving well over 6000 aircraft. And thats in 1945 only. In terms of total DDs (fleet DDs) the USN had about twice as many as the RN during the war, roughly speaking.

It cannot be said that the axis were hesitant to penetrate RN controlled airspace with those losses. im sure that it happened , but as a general trend, naa, not possible. There may be reasons for it, but it is simply misconstruing the true picture to suggest that the RN could cuccessfully deny or scare off German attacks to a greater extent than anybody else.

 

[parsifal]

RN contact with the 5in/38 was very limited.

Not in the Pacific, where it was observed first hamd over a very long period of time. Im not in a position to say too much about Europe, but would be surprised if it was true there either

I don't really care what officers thought - it is the results that they obtained that matters.

Really. Apart from demonstrating incredible disrespect and breathtaking arrogance, I would simply suggest that these men were in a better position to observe what was happening than you are. Or me for that matter.

One of the huge problems is that the USN was reporting great things about the 5in/38 that simply weren't true and this must have swayed opinion in both navies; something along the lines of: "...Gee we got hammered in Norway and Crete yet the USN appears to be shooting the Japanese out of the Pacific skies...their system must be better..."

USN misreporting was no worse or better than the RN. Both made errors in overclaiming. However even allowing for that, the USN was shooting down many times the number of aircraft than the RN ever even claimed.....In 1945 they shot down at least 900 enemy aircraft which is about 3 times the entire wartime tally for the RN. They suffered losses in Destroyers about half that suffered by the RN, despite being subjected to what I thin is obviously a much higher number of enemy sorties. I dont think the men making these observations were swayed by what they read so much as what they saw. And in that regard they have an immeasurably better understanding of the real situation than you or i can ever hope to achieve.

The other problem is that if a staff study states that a 40deg gun and a heavy CIWS is better than a 80deg gun and a light CIWS, it doesn't mean that line officers will agree, even if the study is correct.

But those same line officers observed the relative success of the USN, the relative lack of success of their own AA, and realized the truth. Then they wrote it down, and told their bosses. their bosses believed them and started to make changes as the line officers had recommended. that isnt the disgruntled rumblings of a couple of junior officers or chairbound admirals who dont know what they are talking about. Its the mark of a couple of highly respected commanders, who observed what was happening and passed that information up the chain as they should. the command structure responded to their advice and began to make changes....being to adopt US methodss and techs. Thats not anything like what you are now trying to argue. thats a command system working as it should......the support commands listening to what the frontline is sayin and passing experience gained to the planners for appropriate action. in this case steps were being made to respond and rectify the obvious waknesses in the British defences.

I just cannot fathom why you are seriously attempting to argue along these lines. its a nonsense, and deep down I think you know it....

The average RN destroyer officer probably thought his weaponry was inadequate to the task, and he was right, but that doesn't mean that an alternate FC system and a reliance on a HA 5in gun as in MK33 or Mk 37 USN destroyers would have produced better results - and there is no evidence that USN destroyers were doing better than RN destroyers in 1942

.

These were not a couple of disgruntled 2 ringers , they were flag officers observing for themselves the far more efficient US systems at work for themselves. They couldnt comment on the 1942 situation, but they could see for themselves what the results were in 1945. It wasnt a case of being disgruntled. Rawlings and frasers reports heaped great praise on certain weapons and told it like it was for others. They highlighted the great success of the airborne deterrent, they mentioned the ability of the 4.5s to engage (whilst the 4.7s remained silent, or had no effect) , they knew they needed the Bofors because of what they had seen in TF58. Package this how you like, the facts are the people in a position to know do not support your rather extreme views on this subject.

 

[Glider]

There are numerous examples here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38377.pdf
of Luftwaffe and IAF aircraft refusing to come through the gunfire put up by the destroyer screens.

First of all do you seriously expect the Gazette to say our AA guns were not up to the job. Secondly can you tell me where there is an example of the attacking aircraft turning away. I have seen a number of comments such as theenemy pressed home their attack, one where the Beaufighters withdrew but the enemy bombers dropped their bombs, but so far none that have turned away.

 

[Glider]

If I can give a few examples

29 A very heavy determined and skilfull dive bombing attack enveloped the fleet

32 a second attack developed on the Illustrious

39 dive bombers attaked Southampton

48 Three of the aircraft pressed on through the barrage of the destroyers (note these were TB)

50 Another TB dropped his torpedo 500 - 1000 yards off the bow of the Nelson one of this unit was shot down by the destroyers, claimed by the Laforey a destroyer armed with DP guns

54 A TB attack deflected by the destroyers fire

55 Three of those that turned away came back one of which was shot down by the Ark Royal and Nelson

85 Some enemy aircraft turned away when fire was opens, probably CR 42 (can you blame them)

108 Zulu heard four aircraft buit only saw one that was so close the guns could not track fast enough

26 page 4496 High Level bombers attacked. As uual the bombers were not seen until they reached bombing position and gunfire was ineffective

31 page 4496 the only success I can find. The gunnery of the fleet failed to score any known kills but did much to break up the attack
However this was a fleet and we do not know which HAA were involved.

 

[RCAFson]

First of all do you seriously expect the Gazette to say our AA guns were not up to the job. Secondly can you tell me where there is an example of the attacking aircraft turning away. I have seen a number of comments such as theenemy pressed home their attack, one where the Beaufighters withdrew but the enemy bombers dropped their bombs, but so far none that have turned away.

Yes, I absolutely expect Admirals, such as Cunningham and Somerville to speak their mind.

8. The remarks of the Commanding Officer,
H.M.S. JAGUAR are of considerable interest,
in particular his practice of firing 4.7-mch barrage
over the stern of a ship attacked by
dive bombers. The idea is now under development
in the Mediterranean Fleet with a view
to the destroyer screen putting an " umbrella
barrage " over the fleet.

31. The torpedo bombers approaching low
down from ahead were engaged with barrage
fire by the destroyer screen. This fire appeared
effective and on coming within range the enemy
split into two groups of three, one group altering
course to port, the other to starboard. One
of the starboard group followed by one of the
port group attacked FEARLESS who was
stationed in the starboard bow position on the
screen. The remaining two aircraft,of the port
group pressed home their attack on the port
bow of the convoy which took avoiding action.
There is no clear record of any torpedoes havmg
been dropped by the remaining two aircraft of
the starboard group, but MANCHESTER
observed two tracks from port and one from
starboard before a final torpedo approaching
from port hit her.

71. At 0615 two T/B aircraft were sighted
by NESTOR on the port quarter. Barrage
fire was opened and the aircraft crossed astern
making off in the general direction of the
-convoy. At 0650 two more T/Bs were sighted,
this time on the port bow. Barrage fire was
again opened and the aircraft crossed' ahead
and made off towards the convoy. Thinking
that SYDNEY STAR was about to fee attacked,
NESTOR made a '' (Help '' signal, in consequence
of which 'HERMIONE was detached
Tty Rear-Admiral Commanding, i8th Cruiser
Squadron at 0700 to join NESTOR and SYDNEY
STAR.
Approach to, and Arrival 'at Malta, z^th July
(D.4).
- 72. At 0705 when some 60 miles west of
Gozo, a half-hearted attack was carried out
l>y 3 T/B aircraftx on the main convoy and
~ escort. Torpedoes were released at long range
when the destroyer screen opened fire. Ships
took avoiding action, but no tracks were seen.


41. An unknown number of torpedoes was
dropped about 5,000 yards on the port beam
of the.convoy, which altered course -to 040°
at 1304, turning to 075° three minutes later.
Three of the six attackers tried to approach
over the port wing of the screen, ibut unable
to face the barrage put up by the destroyers
they dropped their torpedoes at the port wing
s'hip, LANCE, who had considerable difficulty
in avoiding them, two torpedoes passing very
close.

47. A group of aircraft splitting into two
formations was reported by R.D.F. closing
from the eastward at 1327. Destroyers on the
starboard wing of the screen opened fire at
1329, when 6 or 7 T/Bs (B.R.20) were seen
approaching very low from the starboard bowand,
beam.
48. Three of the aircraft pressed on through
the barrage of the starboard wing destroyers,
and carried out a most determined attack on
NELSON, who was swinging to starboard to
comb the tracks. One aircraft dropped its
torpedo about 450 yards 20° on NELSON'S
starboard bow, passing over the ship at about
200 feet height. This aircraft was almost certainly
shot down astern of NELSON by
SHEFFIELD and PRINCE OF WALES.

54. Six minutes after the end of the second
attack, R.D.F. reported a group closing from
the S.E. and diving. At 1345 a formation of
10 or ii S.79S were sighted yery low about
10 miles to the southward. These split up
into two groups when they came under fire from
the escorting ships on £he starboard side of
the convoy, and 7 or 8 retired to the southwest
and disappeared.

Three others tried to work round the starboard
bow, and the convoy was turned away
60° to port. These aircraft were turned away
by the gunfire of the screening destroyers,
having dropped their torpedoes well outside the
screen. One torpedo narrowly missed
LIGHTNING, but they dropped at too great
a range to be a danger to the convoy. One
of these aircraft was shot down by fighters
as it retired.
•*•-
55. Of the 7 or 8 aircraft who turned away
when first fired at, 3 returned from astern
of the convoy at 1354, two of which retired
again on being fired at. The third pressed
on to attack ARK ROYAL, but was shot down
by the combined fire of that ship and
NELSON, while still 1,000 yards from ARK
ROYAL and before he had dropped a torpedo.
56. At 1358 one' aircraft, seen right ahead
of NELSON, dropped a torpedo outside the
screen. COSSACK was able to avoid this
torpedo by the warning given by hydrophone
effect on her A/S set.
57. At this time (1359) one C.R-42 was seen
to be diving on the starboard wing destroyers,
and performing aerobatics over them, evidently
to make a diversion for the T/Bs. In so far
as the destroyers expended a large amount of
ammunition he succeeded, but after six minutes
was either shot down or failed to pull out from
a dive. None of the destroyers reported being
machine-gunned.
58. Result of Third Attack.,—Two more
enemy T/Bs and one C.R-42 fighter were shot
down, and no further damage inflicted on H.M.
Ships or convoy.
It was most noticeable that this attack was
hot pressed home with the same 'determination
as the first two attacks. Of the 10 or so
S.79s which originally approached, only four
fired torpedoes, and these were dropped at too
great a distance to endanger the convoy. The
only aircraft of this group to close within effective
range was destroyed before its torpedo was
dropped.
34. This attack was followed by a large
number of torpedo bombers which came in in
formation of 5 or 6 on the port bow, port\
beam and finally on the starboard .(quarter.y
None of these attacks were pressed home and
no aircraft penetrated the destroyer screen.
35. All dropped their torpedoes well outside
the screen and outside range of the convoy.
Several destroyers on the port side were near
missed by torpedoes. One tocpedo bomber was
probably shot down by ships' gunfire.

Anytime a TB attacked a destroyer it was a success for the destroyer screen since it had less chance of hitting a destroyer than a merchant ship, and indicated that the fire from the destroyers deterred the attackers from pressing through.

 

[RCAFson]

Not in the Pacific, where it was observed first hamd over a very long period of time. Im not in a position to say too much about Europe, but would be surprised if it was true there either

There were instances of RN and RAN destroyers working with USN ships, but by and large the USN and RN worked independently.

Really. Apart from demonstrating incredible disrespect and breathtaking arrogance, I would simply suggest that these men were in a better position to observe what was happening than you are. Or me for that matter.

Sorry, but from 70 years on we have access to far more information about the "big picture" than those on the spot. The other fact is that there was a great divergence of opinion within the RN (and USN) regarding the value of HA guns and destroyer armament, as the excerpts from March and USN Action Reports show. There is a general belief prevalent now that those RN officers who advocated 40deg guns along with an AA FC system were wrong, but in the main I believe that this stems from the highly inaccurate reports being issued by the USN in 1942 regarding the efficacy of their 5in/38 guns and destroyer FC systems - the reality appears to be that they were no more successful or accurate than their RN counterparts.

USN misreporting was no worse or better than the RN. Both made errors in overclaiming. However even allowing for that, the USN was shooting down many times the number of aircraft than the RN ever even claimed.....In 1945 they shot down at least 900 enemy aircraft which is about 3 times the entire wartime tally for the RN. They suffered losses in Destroyers about half that suffered by the RN, despite being subjected to what I thin is obviously a much higher number of enemy sorties. I dont think the men making these observations were swayed by what they read so much as what they saw. And in that regard they have an immeasurably better understanding of the real situation than you or i can ever hope to achieve.

Sorry, but USN overclaiming was much worse than RN overclaiming, and USN overclaims were staggeringly inaccurate and optimistic:

At Coral Sea they claimed 49 AA kills of which about 37 were claimed by the USN carrier TG and they got 3. DDs in the CV screen claimed 11.
At Midway they claimed 20 AA kills and got 3. DDs claimed 8.
At Eastern Solomons they claimed 30 and got 4. DDs claimed 5.
At Santa Cruz they claimed 127 and got ~25. DDs claimed 22.
Yet the actuality is that USN destroyers probably shot down no aircraft in the first 3 actions and only a handful at Santa Cruz.

The RN claimed 740 AA kills by Dec 31 1942 - I don't know the number for the entire war. But the number of attacking sorties was much higher against the RN than the USN:
HyperWar: HyperWar: War at Sea 1939-1945, Vol. II: The Period of Balance (UK--History of the Second World War)
HyperWar: HyperWar: War at Sea 1939-1945, Vol. II: The Period of Balance (UK--History of the Second World War)
HyperWar: HyperWar: War at Sea 1939-1945, Vol. II: The Period of Balance (UK--History of the Second World War)
The above three tables show ~10,000 sorties against shipping around the UK alone, and when we add in the number of sorties flown against the RN in the Med and Arctic, the number would grow much higher.

But those same line officers observed the relative success of the USN, the relative lack of success of their own AA, and realized the truth. Then they wrote it down, and told their bosses. their bosses believed them and started to make changes as the line officers had recommended. that isnt the disgruntled rumblings of a couple of junior officers or chairbound admirals who dont know what they are talking about. Its the mark of a couple of highly respected commanders, who observed what was happening and passed that information up the chain as they should. the command structure responded to their advice and began to make changes....being to adopt US methodss and techs. Thats not anything like what you are now trying to argue. thats a command system working as it should......the support commands listening to what the frontline is sayin and passing experience gained to the planners for appropriate action. in this case steps were being made to respond and rectify the obvious waknesses in the British defences.

I just cannot fathom why you are seriously attempting to argue along these lines. its a nonsense, and deep down I think you know it....

IMHO they observed the number of AA kill claims made by the USN, and then they drew the wrong conclusions:

These were not a couple of disgruntled 2 ringers , they were flag officers observing for themselves the far more efficient US systems at work for themselves. They couldnt comment on the 1942 situation, but they could see for themselves what the results were in 1945. It wasnt a case of being disgruntled. Rawlings and frasers reports heaped great praise on certain weapons and told it like it was for others. They highlighted the great success of the airborne deterrent, they mentioned the ability of the 4.5s to engage (whilst the 4.7s remained silent, or had no effect) , they knew they needed the Bofors because of what they had seen in TF58. Package this how you like, the facts are the people in a position to know do not support your rather extreme views on this subject.

The only way to make a valid comparison in 1945 would have been to assemble an RN fleet of equivalent size to the USN fleet, equip it with weapons and FC of comparable vintage and then subject it to comparable levels of attack. There is no way to do that, except theoretically. Without access to RN action reports we can't say what the 4.7in guns were doing. RAN Tribal class were using their 4.7in guns to engage IJ aircraft in the Pacific.

 

[vinnye]

The Crete missions were near suicide missions to recover troops that should not have been sent there in the first place, but never mind - just my opinion.
Given the total air supremacy of the LW - who were pretty good at their job, having had a bit of practice, I am surprised that any RN ship got out! From Wiki :
Force C met up with Rear Admiral Rawling's Force A1 at the Kithera Channel where more air attacks inflicted damage on both forces. A bomb struck HMS Warspite and then the destroyer Greyhound was sunk. King sent HMS Kandahar and HMS Kingston (F64) to pick up survivors while the cruisers Gloucester and Fiji provided anti-aircraft support. "The Rear Admiral Commanding, 15th Cruiser Squadron was, however, not aware of the shortage of antiaircraft ammunition in Gloucester and Fiji...", which were down to 18 and 30 percent of their AA ammunition, respectively, four hours before they were detached to support the destroyers.[52] Gloucester was hit by several bombs at 15:50, several hours after being detached, and had to be left behind due to the intense air attacks. The ship was sunk with 700 ratings and 22 officers losing their lives.

It was a mistake sending the cruisers back to cover the rescue of the survivors of Greyhound. If I remember correctly, the usual procedure was to send a destroyer at night to pick up survivors.
Admiral Cunningham criticized King's decision making during these actions.

 

[RCAFson]

HMAS Arunta:

 

[parsifal]

Good find. I note that the Aruntas report says she fired 60 rounds of 4.7 from 1641 to 1642. i wouldnt read too much into the times....having filled out these very after action reports myself, you tend to just put any duration that kind of fits. She might have been firing for 3 minutes, or 2 minutes, or 1 minute. Its usually a guesstimate that number. The number of rounds is more accurate, and i note that the two 4in HA threw out as much lead as the 4 x 4.7s, in the same time.

According to this report, the Arunta by this time (January 1945) had 6 x 40mm guns. Thats what i understoodas as well (which makes wiki wrong....it says they were not fitted until September 1945). It also says this intruder was brought down by the combined fire of the entire TG. Acoupe of things to note here. Arunta had been working with the Americans since 1942, and had by January 1945, been fully converted to their methods. They had partially re-equipped with US equipment (the Bofors) and did not claim this shoot down as entirely theiur own. It was brought down by the combined fire of the entire TG. Thats an American TG incidentally.

These were exactly the recommendations that had been made by Rawlings and Fraser, incidentally....people whom you think dont know what they are doing.

As for "by and large the RN and USN worked independantly". Are you serious? Operations by cruisers Australia, Canberra, hobart, Perth, Shropshire, Leandertroopships Kanimbla, Manoora, the operations off palembandg and Sumatra. Look at the strikes into Java, the battles of Coral Sea, Overlord, Husky gosh the list goes on and on. this statement is so staggeringly incorrect I am genuinely shocked

 

[RCAFson]

Good find. I note that the Aruntas report says she fired 60 rounds of 4.7 from 1641 to 1642. i wouldnt read too much into the times....having filled out these very after action reports myself, you tend to just put any duration that kind of fits. She might have been firing for 3 minutes, or 2 minutes, or 1 minute. Its usually a guesstimate that number. The number of rounds is more accurate, and i note that the two 4in HA threw out as much lead as the 4 x 4.7s, in the same time.

In terms of weight of metal the 6 x 4.7in fired 3000lb and the 2 x 4in 1050lb but the lethal radius of each 50lb 4.7in burst would have been considerably greater than a 35lb 4in burst.

According to this report, the Arunta by this time (January 1945) had 6 x 40mm guns. Thats what i understoodas as well (which makes wiki wrong....it says they were not fitted until September 1945). It also says this intruder was brought down by the combined fire of the entire TG. Acoupe of things to note here. Arunta had been working with the Americans since 1942, and had by January 1945, been fully converted to their methods. They had partially re-equipped with US equipment (the Bofors) and did not claim this shoot down as entirely theiur own. It was brought down by the combined fire of the entire TG. Thats an American TG incidentally.

Yes, it was the combined fire of the TG, and we would have to read the Action Reports of all the engaged ships, to see how many kill claims this one aircraft engendered...not every skipper might have been as modest as Arunta's. The Bofors were probably power worked UK designed Mk VII single mounts of UK or Cdn origin. The Bofors was not originally US in design and most Commonwealth Bofors were built in the Commonwealth. In any event, I think we can all agree that Arunta had a very considerable CIWS. This appears to be Arunta in 44/45 and the Mk VII (actually theymight be Mk V Bofin mounts)Bofors are plainly visible:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f5/HMAS_Arunta_SLV_AllanGreen_1.jpg

The sponson mounted Bofors have superior arcs of fire yet the quad pom-pom fired 192 rounds or 48/barrel. The 3 Bofors fired 131 rounds or 43.7/barrel. Total weight of metal = 346-326lb (HV shell weight = 1.7 or 1.8lb) for the pom-pom and 262lb for the Bofors.

These were exactly the recommendations that had been made by Rawlings and Fraser, incidentally....people whom you think dont know what they are doing.

I don't want to put words into people's mouths, that they might not have said or whose comments might be taken out of context. In any event, their opinions were shaped by the reports that they read as well as by what they saw.

As for "by and large the RN and USN worked independantly". Are you serious? Operations by cruisers Australia, Canberra, hobart, Perth, Shropshire, Leandertroopships Kanimbla, Manoora, the operations off palembandg and Sumatra. Look at the strikes into Java, the battles of Coral Sea, Overlord, Husky gosh the list goes on and on. this statement is so staggeringly incorrect I am genuinely shocked

If we consider the total number of destroyer sorties conducted by the RN and USN, we would find that the number of sorties where they operated in company with one another would be exceedingly small.

 

[RCAFson]

Actual average rate of fire for a Mk 37 equipped Gleaves class destroyer, USS Edison:

A total of 362 rounds were fired, 74 at the shore battery, 20 in the first engagement, and 268 in the second destroyer engagement, of which it is estimated that 200 rounds were fired at the first destroyer and 68 at the second. All firing was director-controlled, rapid, continuous fire. The average gun range for the first firing was 9,500 yards, for the second 14,000 yards, and for the third 12,500 yards... ...It is particulary pleasing that the guns maintained a sustained rapid fire of 268 rounds (average 68 rounds per gun) at an estimated rate of at least 12 shots per gun per minute without casualty.[1]
[1]United States Navy, AntiAircraft Action Summary, July 1942 to Dec 1942 (Information Bulletin No. 22), p.161-163
USS Edison (DD-439) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

and here's the quote from HMS Kimberly's action report at Narvik from March:

"Salvos fired about 180 in all...drill to guns very good, great part of the action a loading interval of about 5 seconds was achieved..."

The actual quote is somewhat longer and details minor problems with ejected casings and problems with communications, as would be expected from such an intensive amount of gunfire. The report also states that "...the loading numbers were fairly exhausted at the end but no loading delays occurred...D.C.T. firing was used..."

 

[parsifal]

The key here are twofold. Edisons report says "at least" which means they never went lower than. it does not mean that the average sustained raof was 12 rpm. By definition, because it never dropped beloiw 12rpm, will be higher, over a sustained period. Fedhala incidentally was open water, and the conditions were rough. from memory also the types of targets at the beachead kep changing....were there not surface targets, land targets and airborne targets all present. if so, it may well be that Edison was changing from AA to HE to SAP at various intervals, and this may well have affected the rof. maybe not....would have to look more closely

Before I make any comment about Kimberley, would need to see the Action Report. And once again, entirely irrelevant, because it is an engagement in the hoirizontal plane....low angle gunfire against a surface target. No argument about sustained rof against surface target and could use contact fusing. In the vertical, its an entirely different matter, wher there were problems with the rammers above 30 degrees and fusing still had to be by hand fusing, because of the timers to be set. Also problems of slow turret traverse and elevation not a factor in a statis shoot, or against a relatively static surface target. The snippet you did provide, suggest s a certain relief that there werent any stoppages, which in fact suggest that they expected stoppages but they didnt happen.

 

[Glider]

Yes, I absolutely expect Admirals, such as Cunningham and Somerville to speak their mind.




Anytime a TB attacked a destroyer it was a success for the destroyer screen since it had less chance of hitting a destroyer than a merchant ship, and indicated that the fire from the destroyers deterred the attackers from pressing through.

We all indicated that the RN DD would be of some use against torpedo bombers, I couldn't find any high level, medium level or Dive bomber attack that was turned back by the fire of the destroyers. All the examples you gave were torpedo bombers. As I said I am aware of one report when the 5.25 guns forced high level bombers to turn away but that is an exception.

It is of course against these targets that the HA gun is of assistance

 

[RCAFson]

The key here are twofold. Edisons report says "at least" which means they never went lower than. it does not mean that the average sustained raof was 12 rpm. By definition, because it never dropped beloiw 12rpm, will be higher, over a sustained period. Fedhala incidentally was open water, and the conditions were rough. from memory also the types of targets at the beachead kep changing....were there not surface targets, land targets and airborne targets all present. if so, it may well be that Edison was changing from AA to HE to SAP at various intervals, and this may well have affected the rof. maybe not....would have to look more closely

Before I make any comment about Kimberley, would need to see the Action Report. And once again, entirely irrelevant, because it is an engagement in the hoirizontal plane....low angle gunfire against a surface target. No argument about sustained rof against surface target and could use contact fusing. In the vertical, its an entirely different matter, wher there were problems with the rammers above 30 degrees and fusing still had to be by hand fusing, because of the timers to be set. Also problems of slow turret traverse and elevation not a factor in a statis shoot, or against a relatively static surface target. The snippet you did provide, suggest s a certain relief that there werent any stoppages, which in fact suggest that they expected stoppages but they didnt happen.

Edison was firing at surface targets, just as Kimberly was. Again there are no additional difficulties in loading either the 5in/38 or the power rammed 4.7in twin at higher angles and both mounts had machine fuze setters, although the integral hoist-fuzesetters on Edison were theoretically more efficient. Conditions at Casablanca were quite calm.

The other key factor is that in surface fire, Kimberly would have 50% more firepower than Edison, and equal or greater AA firepower up to 40deg elevation depending on the rates of fire:
RPM-Kimberly / RPM-Edison / totals K-E

12 / 12 / 72-48 (50% advantage to Kimberly)
10 / 12 / 60-48 (25% advantage to Kimberly)
12 / 15 / 72-60 (20% advantage to Kimberly)
10 / 15 / 60-60 (tie)

and I have discounted Kimberly's 4in entirely, but it would certainly break any ties...

 

[RCAFson]

We all indicated that the RN DD would be of some use against torpedo bombers, I couldn't find any high level, medium level or Dive bomber attack that was turned back by the fire of the destroyers. All the examples you gave were torpedo bombers. As I said I am aware of one report when the 5.25 guns forced high level bombers to turn away but that is an exception.

It is of course against these targets that the HA gun is of assistance

Here's bit of info I gleaned from Amazon:

Note that Jaguar used controlled fire against the DBs prior to their attack on Illustrious. This is an extract from Jaguar's Action Report, and is from The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys.

The fact that Luftwaffe DBs were not turned back on this occasion (or any other) doesn't mean that the 4.7in fire was ineffective, since for all we know it might have been worse without it. The big problem was that Illustrious was not at the centre of a T.G. as per the USN carriers in the Pacific, rather she was detached with a relatively small screen. The larger part of the RN destroyers were covering the convoy itself, which reached Malta with no losses, IIRC, on this occasion. If Illustrious was screened by a flotilla of destroyers as per the USN CVs, a whole lot more firepower would have been concentrated on the DBs, prior, during and after their attacks.