Dieppe Raid, worst lost of Allied Battles?

[parsifal]

The biggest single defeat for the CW forces in terms of losses and long term effects has to be the loss of Singapore. More than any other single event, it influenced the nature of the post world.

The longest retreat overland was Burma...the worst naval defeat was probably one of the unkown convoy battles....ther were many several times worse than PQ-17.

For the Americans, the worst naval defeat is probably Pearl, the worst air defeat, in the PI, the worst land defeat also the PI, except if you dont count the filipino forces as US...in which case probably their defeat on the Rapido in Italy in 1943 is probably the worst.

For the Russians, the worst land defeat is probably Kiev 1941, worst air defeat was probably the comprehensive drubbing they copped over Sevastopol in 1942, worst naval defeat is possibly the loss of the Battleship Marat

 

[buffnut453]

Interesting points Parsifal, although I think the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe had a significant impact on the postwar world.

In terms of battles that ought to have been won, I think perhaps Crete is one of the biggies. The precipitate withdrawal from the hills surrounding Maleme Airfield effectively lost the entire island for the Allies.

Interestingly, I don't think the Battle of Britain has been mentioned. Whilst I'm not suggesting that Germany would have mounted a hostile invasion of the British Isles, failure of Fighter Command over Southeast England would have exposed London and forced the evacuation of much of the government and would greatly increase the pressure on Churchill's cabinet to sue for peace. Thus the failure of the Luftwaffe to defeat Fighter Command had major consequences for the rest of the war by forcing Hitler to fight a 2-front war and ultimately providing the launchpad for the liberation of Europe.

 

[Glider]

I've been thinking about this and would like to present some more candidates for the worst Allied defeats of WW2;

Pearl Harbor - the carriers survived, but US losses in other surface units, personnel, and aircraft were heavy and required significant investment to repair. Obviously, these lost assets could not be deployed to assist the fight against the Japanese advance in early 1942.

A few years ago I went to a discussion on Pearl Harbour at the RUSI. What was interesting was that if you worked on the assumption that the Japanese attacked as and around the time they did. Then the best outcome for the USA was exactly what happened.
The worst outcome was if the USA had received about a days warning and the US Fleet had sailed. If this had happened then the vast majority of the major vessels in the US Fleet would have been sunk and the loss of life much much higher. The reason for the loss would be that the US Fleet would not have had a co ordinated plan, the vessels wouldn't have had their full war compliment of men and equipment and the ships not worked up to a war time peak of efficiency. Japanese losses would have been higher but the price more than worth it.
If the attack had happened a short while later the carriers would have been in harbour, the loss of ships would have been similar to a battle at sea but the loss of life considerably less than a naval battle.
As it was, the vast majority of the equipment lost was old and like the British Army after Dunkirk, the loss of life while tragic was minimised and the surviving men formed a core for the later expansion of the US Navy.

PQ-17 - a needless waste of lives and resources, IMHO, in a convoy that could (and should) have been saved.

Without an escort carrier PQ 17 was always going to suffer very heavy losses.

The Channel Dash - The British missed a brilliant chance to knock the two most powerful survivor of the Kriegsmarine out of the war, and avert the danger of another PQ-17 type disaster. Inexcusable given the level of British control over the Channel.

True to a point but at the end of the operation both vessels were damaged by mines so it wasn't a total disaster

Force Z - a needless squandering of two very powerful fleet units due to an institutional inability to grasp the significance of air power in naval warfare. Again, inexcusable given the lessons of Taranto, Bismarck and Pearl Harbor that should have already been learned.

Totally agree with you, absolute waste.

 

[timshatz]

Glider, good and accurate post about Pearl Harbor. The way it turned out was about as good as it could have gone for the US. Unfortunate to say it, but the defeat was not a crushing one. It just changed the focus of the war from a Battleship driven Naval War to an Aircraft driven one. It was going to happen anyway, but it happened faster this way.

One thought I'd had about Pearl Harbor was what if the Japanese, instead of the midget sub attack, had scheduled a liner to sail into Pearl Harbor on that date and started the attack by sinking it in the mouth of the harbor. 20K ton liner jammed in the narrows would shut up the Pacific Fleet (something like what was tried at Zeebrugge in WW1). It could've been bombed out of existance and followed up by a bombardment by the BBs of the Japanese attack force. Would've left Pearl wide open to a Japanese invasion and that would've done huge damage to the Allied war effort.

Always though the Japanese just didn't go far enough at Pearl. Also thought it wouldn't have made any difference in the end.

Agree with the perspective on PQ17 and Force Z. But, in the scheme of things, relatively minor affairs in comparison to Pearl Harbor or Dunkirk.

 

[RabidAlien]

Am I remembering correctly, that Yamamoto recalled the 4th wave, targeted at the oil fields outside of Pearl, and the ammo dumps up at Ft. Shafter? I've always wondered how much longer the war would've dragged on, had the fleet returned to the devastation, plus no fuel/ammo.

 

[Freebird]

So, as I said, the whole concept of 'destruction' of the BEF depends on there being a credible risk to the British Isles after Dunkirk. BoB notwithstanding, there was no credible threat of invasion at any time after Dunkirk and therefore the loss of equipment is a militarily moot point, although the need to rearm obviously delayed the redeployment of the army into other theatres.

Well....
Actually the Germans could have possibly tried an Airborne invasion,
1.) Had the British not evacuated as many as they did, or
2.) had they know how weak the British army really was.

(They couldn't believe that the British would be so crazy as to send the bulk of their army to France, and therefore estimated the UK ground forces to be almost double of what there actually were )

A military unit without equipment has been rendered combat ineffective. From a military perspective it has been destroyed, no matter how many or few personnel casualties were sustained.

They key equipment was artillery, as the German's lack of ability to transport tanks in quantity cross channel meant that the shortage of AT wasn't critical.
Lack of military transport could be made up by civilian vehicles.
There was enough artillery to support the forces needed to repel an invasion.

I've been thinking about this and would like to present some more candidates for the worst Allied defeats of WW2;

The Channel Dash - The British missed a brilliant chance to knock the two most powerful survivor of the Kriegsmarine out of the war, and avert the danger of another PQ-17 type disaster. Inexcusable given the level of British control over the Channel.

The British did NOT control the channel at that point, Feb 1942, the German BC's stayed close enough to France to have complete air cover provided. It was also during the Fighter Command "bad times" from the fall of '41 to the summer of '42 when the British Spit V's were shown to be considerably outclassed by the newly arrived FW 190's. ("channel Dash" the RAF lost twice as many aircraft as the Germans, terrible ratios during "Jubilee")

As it turned out, it wasn't really a victory for the Kriegsmarine, the ships had been a constant threat on the French coast, but after the "Dash" they ceased to be a threat. Prince Eugen was torpedoed 10 days after the Dash, knocked out of action for a year. Gneisenau was also bombed in Feb '42, and never again returned to active service.

Force Z - a needless squandering of two very powerful fleet units due to an institutional inability to grasp the significance of air power in naval warfare. Again, inexcusable given the lessons of Taranto, Bismarck and Pearl Harbor that should have already been learned.

Actually the institution (The Admiralty) DID understand the need to have a carrier operating with Force Z, but were overruled by the Minister of Defence, who was responsible for quite a few bad plans during the war.

 

[buffnut453]

Actually the institution (The Admiralty) DID understand the need to have a carrier operating with Force Z, but were overruled by the Minister of Defence, who was responsible for quite a few bad plans during the war.

Freebird,

The intent was to provide Force Z with carrier support in the form of HMS Indomitable but she was damaged when she ran aground in the Caribbean. A fallback plan to use HMS Hermes instead of Indomitable was scuppered because she was too slow. The argument between Churchill and the Admiralty was over the despatch of Force Z (Churchill wanted it, the Admiralty didn't) not the actual composition of the force.

 

[parsifal]

Admiralty plans relating to the Far East centered arounfd a build up of the slow battleships at Ceylon, with a gradual upgrading of these ships in terms of their traqining and their AA capabilities, mostly. The Admiralty was loathe to adopt a forward defence strategy and was loathe to commit much in the way of carriers and very reluctant to commit fast battleships.

The general idea, as far as i can tell, is that the RN wqas going to base its defence around a fleet in being principal. It was believed that Singapore would hold, and could be re-supplied by sea.

Admiralty plans were more conservative than Churchills ideas,, but based on similar faulty assumptions about Japanese capabilities and in the end just as flawed as Churchills. The reality was that the British could not mount an effective defence in the far East, and prosecute the war in the far East, even defensively.

After the loss of the Prince Of Wales and the Repulsive, the british pretty much adopted the Admiralty plan, which the Japanese tore through with ease in April 1942. Truth was, with the forces aavailable and the forces the British were wiling to commit, there was no solution to the problem.

The loss of the two BBs off the malaysian coast was only avoidable, if the british were prepred to abandon the whole of the Far east and retreat back to India. As Churchill well realized, this was politically and militarily unnacceptable. Hence, he was prepred to risk these high value ships, in an effort to contain Japanese agression as far forward as posible. What the British underestimated (not just Churchill, but the whole command) was the effectiveness of the japanese air arm. It outnumbered the CW by a considerable margin, in terms of local supariority, and enjoyed huge training advantages. The efficiency of the Japanese air forces had not been anticipated. For that matter the efficiency of all arms of the Japanese military had been underestimated....It had been expected that Singapore could hold out for at least 6 months....time enough for releif convoys to be organized....in the event it took less than two months...and the speed of the Japanese advance had been completely un-anticiapated.


In just the same way as it is wrong to blamer Hitler for all the failings of the german armed forces, it is equally wrong to blame Churchill for the British failings in East Asia. He had other fish to fry, and did an excellent job overall, in my opinion.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Parsifal - would it be fair to say that the British underestimated Japan's capabilities more than the US had?

MM

 

[timshatz]

MM, don't know if the US or Brits really underestimated the Japanese that much. I think the General Staffs of both Countries knew the Japanese would rampage for about a year (maybe the British knew it more than the US), at the very least, the Japanese would be very hard to stop in the first year with both the US and British forces facing Germany.

The US were trying to build up their Pacific forces, especially in the Phillipines, but that was a long way from where they wanted to be.

 

[rgallant]

I think it was as much prejudice as under estimation which amounted, to the same thing. I have never understood the US prejudice against the Chinese and by extension the Japanese.

They both considered them threat and yet assumed that their technology was far behind their own. When you add that to the Japanese fighting the Chinese and doing fairly well, they would tend to assume that was a result of the Chinese incompetence.

Considering the British involvement, with the Japanese prior to WW II you would think they would had a better understanding of the ability of the Japanese.

Perhaps the simplest explanation is an unwillingness to accept that the day of the battleship and by extension the great ship to ship battles was over. After all the military's of any country are not known for being novel and forward thinking, it is the nature of an organizations who's top most members tend to be older and more set in their ways.

Up to the point of Pearl Harbour and beyond there had not been very many huge successful air strikes against surface navies. So the various Navies had no reason to assume anything would be significantly different.

 

[BombTaxi]

On the contrary RG, the Allies should have had a very clear idea of the power of aircraft against ships after the RN's strike on Taranto, over a year before Pearl Harbor, and the FAA's action against Bismarck earlier in 1941.

I'm sure there was an element of genuine racial bias against the Japanese in both British and American thinking, but neither side had any excuse for thinking the Japanese were incompetent as they had a solid combat record stretching back nearly 40 years prior to WW2. I think there was a ceratain degree of hubris among both the Americans, who thought their fleet would secure certain victory, and the British, who felt Singapore was impregnable and would provide a home for their own battle fleet.

 

[rgallant]

Bismark and Taranto, speak to my point about few successful attacks against major surface units. Although the Bismark was damaged by the torpedo attacks she was not destroyed, nor was her primary armament effected. And in the end she was sunk by surface action not aircraft.

Taranto although it was a great success, especially considering the type of aircraft used, was not overwhelming. 3 battleships damaged, 2 of which were repaired and a destroyer. This during a night raid.

The thing to remember the Italians were still a viable fighting force after this attack.

So the grand takeaway for these events is that aircraft can damage heavy naval units, but it takes a heavy naval unit to finish the job. In reality not the correct conclusion but strictly looking at the outcomes a viable one.

Add that to all navies being run by people who believed that battleships were king of the seas, and could only be countered by battleships and you can see why they were blindsided.

 

[Freebird]

Freebird,

The intent was to provide Force Z with carrier support in the form of HMS Indomitable but she was damaged when she ran aground in the Caribbean. A fallback plan to use HMS Hermes instead of Indomitable was scuppered because she was too slow. The argument between Churchill and the Admiralty was over the despatch of Force Z (Churchill wanted it, the Admiralty didn't) not the actual composition of the force.

The Hermes wasn't too slow, at 25 knots she was few knots slower than the PoW's 28 knots, or the Repulse's 29 knots. Had she been following Force Z she would have been within 25 - 50 miles, or about 5 - 10 minutes flight time. The Admiralty did have a plan to send a proper fleet, but Churchill insisted on the rather foolish idea of sending the PoW to scare the Japanese, as he boasted that the PoW could "Catch and Kill any Japanese ship"
However you are also correct, the Admiralty thought it was a daft idea, and it turned out that they were correct.

Admiralty plans relating to the Far East centered arounfd a build up of the slow battleships at Ceylon, with a gradual upgrading of these ships in terms of their traqining and their AA capabilities, mostly. The Admiralty was loathe to adopt a forward defence strategy and was loathe to commit much in the way of carriers and very reluctant to commit fast battleships.

correct. And rather pointless it turned out to be.

The general idea, as far as i can tell, is that the RN wqas going to base its defence around a fleet in being principal. It was believed that Singapore would hold, and could be re-supplied by sea.

Could have and should have held on. The Admiralty plan was sound, but they didn't count on the whole thing falling apart.

Admiralty plans were more conservative than Churchills ideas,, but based on similar faulty assumptions about Japanese capabilities and in the end just as flawed as Churchills. The reality was that the British could not mount an effective defence in the far East, and prosecute the war in the far East, even defensively.

No I don't agree. The Americans British dropped the ball, but the tools were there.

After the loss of the Prince Of Wales and the Repulsive, the british pretty much adopted the Admiralty plan, which the Japanese tore through with ease in April 1942. Truth was, with the forces aavailable and the forces the British were wiling to commit, there was no solution to the problem.

If the PoW Repulse had been withdrawn right after Pearl, they would have made a huge difference in "Java Sea" which was fought by Japanese cruisers without air support

The loss of the two BBs off the malaysian coast was only avoidable, if the British were prepred to abandon the whole of the Far east and retreat back to India.

Not at all. The 2 ships could have formed the backbone of a ABDA fleet with a couple of US carriers.

As Churchill well realized, this was politically and militarily unnacceptable. Hence, he was prepred to risk these high value ships, in an effort to contain Japanese agression as far forward as posible.

He was dithering about what to do, and when the order to withdraw was finally sent the two ships had already been lost

What the British underestimated (not just Churchill, but the whole command) was the effectiveness of the japanese air arm. It outnumbered the CW by a considerable margin, in terms of local supariority, and enjoyed huge training advantages. The efficiency of the Japanese air forces had not been anticipated. For that matter the efficiency of all arms of the Japanese military had been underestimated.

The admiralty were well aware of Japanese capabilities, which is why they didn't want to risk these valuable ships in a pointless show of force.

In just the same way as it is wrong to blamer Hitler for all the failings of the german armed forces, it is equally wrong to blame Churchill for the British failings in East Asia. He had other fish to fry, and did an excellent job overall, in my opinion.

No, I'm putting the blame for the Force z debacle squarely on his shoulders. It was his plan, and pushed forward over Admiralty objections.

 

[parsifal]

Hi FB

The points you are making are valid, but the conclusions you draw from those "basic statistics" are wrong. Essentially what you are doing is an argument similar to something I saw some years ago, that said, the germans won WWII because their losses were lower.....

Whilst the Admiralty, and Churchill had seen the reports on Japanese capabilities, I very much doubt they believed them, or at the very least took them seriously enough. In 1940 there were reports that the Italians were competent at night fighting. Some parts of the Admiralty believed them, but operational commanders like ABC did not. In war there are always conflicting intell reports....the trick is in knowing what is true and what isnt. The most recent faux pas in intell has to be that which absolutely and positively confirmed the Iraqis possessed WMDs......


In the case of the japanese prior to December 1941, there were reports about how skilled and how well equipped they were, but I dont believe anyone....not just Churchill, took them seriously enough....

Now your supposition that a withdrawal of Fce Z to Java would have made a big difference....well we will never know for sure....i'll concede that, but I have participated in so many simulations of that particular scenario, and it hardly ever turns out well for the allies. The basic mistake you are making in your calculations is that whereas the allies are permitted to make variations to their plans and force structure, the japanese are not. Whereas the Japanese are being strait jacketed into acting historically, the allies are given a free hand to react in the best way to the historical threat. Trouble is, for every action there is usually a reaction....if the allies have battleships in their line up, you can rest assured the Japanese will bring up their battlewagons as well, and even more likely, deploy their carriers to the battle zone as well. In the simulations I have played along these lines, the allied defeat is usually even greater than historical when they play the "last stand at Java" variant. There is usually no escape for an even larger proportion of the allied fleet.

Churchills insistence on sending the ships to singas was a calculated risk, and a bad one in the finish, but there was no other alternative, realistically that I could see prior to 1941. Deployment into the NEI was not an option at that point because of Dutch attitudes to the japanese....It was really a case of either abandoning the far East, or trying the frighten the Japanese with a big stick. The bluff failed, miserably as it turned out, but no-one believed or anticviapted the total loss of ships at sea as actually happened. In this regard, British experiences had actually worked against them. Though they had the taranto experiences and the Bismarck affair to go by, in point of fact, up to that point no ship bigger than a light cruiser had been lost outright to airpower, and in situations where sea control was allied, or even disputed, the British had managed to get damaged ships out of trouble....aka the Illustrious exerience in January 1941. If Bismarck had been a British ship, she would have survived the aerial attack, because support ships would have been on hand to get her back to port....I am certain the same assumptions were being made by the british in their Far eastern calculations.....the trouble with this thinking of course was that the seas in the Far east at that point werent even disputed, they were completely controlled by the Japanese, though nobody on the allied side was prepared to concede that at that point, least of all Churchill and the Admiralty

 

[buffnut453]

No, I'm putting the blame for the Force z debacle squarely on his shoulders. It was his plan, and pushed forward over Admiralty objections.

So Adm Phillips' refusal to contact Singapore and seek air support after he knew Force Z had been spotted had nothing to do with the loss of PoW and Repulse?

 

[Freebird]

So Adm Phillips' refusal to contact Singapore and seek air support after he knew Force Z had been spotted had nothing to do with the loss of PoW and Repulse?

Yes, indeed, that was a major tactical mistake. Without a doubt, had he radioed for help (breaking strict orders for radio silence) as soon as they were spotted, the two ship would probably have survived. However the fact remains that the mission was a fool's errand in the first place.

Hi FB
Now your supposition that a withdrawal of Fce Z to Java would have made a big difference....well we will never know for sure....i'll concede that, but I have participated in so many simulations of that particular scenario, and it hardly ever turns out well for the allies. The basic mistake you are making in your calculations is that whereas the allies are permitted to make variations to their plans and force structure, the japanese are not.
Whereas the Japanese are being strait jacketed into acting historically, the allies are given a free hand to react in the best way to the historical threat.

After they got the news about the Pearl Harbour attack, the ships should have been withdrawn.

Churchills insistence on sending the ships to singas was a calculated risk, and a bad one in the finish, but there was no other alternative, realistically that I could see prior to 1941.

If they were determined to send Force Z, they should have at least had the Hermes with 18 SeaHurri (or even Fulmars) as escort.

What they should have done was to provide Malaya with a better balanced defence.

In any event, I don't want to drag this thread offTop with a long debate about Singapore, so I'll post on the other thread. better to reply to me there. 8)

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww...rcraft-singapore-make-difference-25590-2.html

 

[ivanotter]

Here is a slightly different take on the french 1940 campaign.

According to Len Deighton (Blitzkrieg), the Germans lost the French campaign.

The entire concept was intended to destroy (as in gone) BEF and the french army.

It was not accomplished despite tactical victory. BEF and a good part of the french army sailed away to fight another day. A strategic defeat.

It is of course possible to speculate about the outcome if Germany had managed to trap the entire BEF, No evacuation, etc. 300,000+ troops as POW's, etc. Would Churchill's government have fallen? suing for peace?

I think we must distinguish between strategic and tactical issues.

Ivan

 

[Glider]

Freebird
The only suggestion I would make is that once they heard the news re Pearl Harbour they should have been sent to join the US fleet. They would have been of assistance if only as additional escorts to the US carriers until the USA could get their fleet back together again.
Both ships were pretty fast and despite the headline top speeds being slower than the US Carriers, their cruising speeds would have been similar. If nothing else they would have taken some of the heat out of the attacks by the Japanese aircraft..

 

[Freebird]

Freebird
The only suggestion I would make is that once they heard the news re Pearl Harbour they should have been sent to join the US fleet. They would have been of assistance if only as additional escorts to the US carriers until the USA could get their fleet back together again.
Both ships were pretty fast and despite the headline top speeds being slower than the US Carriers, their cruising speeds would have been similar. If nothing else they would have taken some of the heat out of the attacks by the Japanese aircraft..

Indeed, that was my thought too.
Or send the PoW to the Med to replace the Queen E. that knocked would be out of action for 18 months by the Italian frogmen.

There is no doubt that the loss of 3 battleships in Nov/Dec (with 2 more crippled) prompted the British to rush the Anson Howe into service. The Allies would have been better served if the British had concentrated instead on finishing the Implacables ASAP