Dieppe Raid, worst lost of Allied Battles?

[timshatz]

Worst Allied loss of the war is probably Fall Gelb, or Barbarossa on the Eastern front. Dieppe, in terms of casualties, and strategic impact, is really a very minor setback in the wider picture. A tragedy for sure, but not a point where the outcome of the war hung in the balance.

Agree with Bomb Taxi on this one. Dieppe was not critical to anything but the planning for Overlord. Learned what not to do (important part of learning what TO DO). Very helpful in that realm.

Worst loss has to be on the Eastern Front in terms of total losses. Almost anything in the first 6 months of the war resulted in stupendous losses to the Soviets. Only Russia could absorb such losses and keep going.

In terms of affecting the course of the war, strategically, that is harder:

Crete, mentioned already, is a good one (Lost the island and lost the advantage in Africa),

Singapore, not so much, that place was gonna fall no matter what happened.

Battle of France is a good one. Fight the Germans to a standstill in 1940 and the whole war is different.

Dessert war is more about logistics than anything else. Longer the lines of supply, the harder it is to get enough combat power to keep the advances going.

I guess I'd go with the Battle of France. Loss of France and the evacuation of forces from the Continent gave Germany the leisure to expand the war as she wanted and removed a major threat in France.

 

[davebender]

After a bit more thought I vote for French 1st Army Group. The BEF was only a portion of the huge Army Group destroyed in Belgium during May 1940. Germany must have bagged at least 50 Allied divisions in this fight which lasted only about two weeks. The cream of the British and French armies were among the destroyed divisions.

1st French Army.
2nd French Army.
7th French Army.
9th French Army.
BEF.
Belgium Army.

 

[BombTaxi]

Dave,

I'm still struggling with the notion that the BEF was 'destroyed' in 1940. True, they left all of their armour, artillery and MT behind. This was only a problem if Hitler was imminently going to invade England. As we have discussed many times here, the German war machine was not capable of doing so at this point. The most vital materiel element of the British force, i.e the fighter component of the Advanced Air Striking Force, was withdrawn without undue loss and participated successfully in the next major engagement with the Germans.

The most vital element of the BEF 'full stop', i.e the combat-hardened men who would form the nucleus of a victorious British army, were bought off largely intact, along with a substantial number of French troops who would flight alongside them.

The BEF was defeated. But given the facts stated above, how can you justify your claim that it was destroyed?

 

[michaelmaltby]

If you live to fight another day, are you "destroyed" ...?

MM

 

[imalko]

I believe Dave's point is this... BEF was destroyed as effective fighting unit at Dunkirk. Yes, those 300.000 men were not all killed or captured, but lost all of their armament and equipment during the evacuation.

"Live to fight another day..." Yes, they did, but what if that "another day" had come in summer 1940. I took a long time to re-equip and rearm those troops. Had the Germans been able to invade UK in 1940 I doubt that those 300.000 unarmed men would counted much for the defense.

 

[BombTaxi]

So, as I said, the whole concept of 'destruction' of the BEF depends on there being a credible risk to the British Isles after Dunkirk. BoB notwithstanding, there was no credible threat of invasion at any time after Dunkirk and therefore the loss of equipment is a militarily moot point, although the need to rearm obviously delayed the redeployment of the army into other theatres.

 

[davebender]

A military unit without equipment has been rendered combat ineffective. From a military perspective it has been destroyed, no matter how many or few personnel casualties were sustained.

 

[BombTaxi]

I think you quoted me slightly out of context there

What I'm getting at is that the BEF could have continued to resist - but it did not need to, and therefore the fact that it had lost all of it's heavy equipment was , in that sense, irrelevant. The loss of the AASF fighters or the total destruction of the Home Fleet by some means would have been a far more serious blow as this would actually have made a German landing technically feasible, although not physically possible.

You make it sound as if the BEF lost every tank and gun the British posessed. This is not the case. While the equipment still in the UK was old and inferior, it could still have been used to resist a German landing, had such a thing been physically possible. In any case, the Army was the third and last line of defence against invasion, and neither the Navy or RAF had suffered substantial losses in combat which would prevent them from defeating a German invasion before it was launched. Further resources could be, and were, withdrawn from Norway to bolster the UK's defences. In an extreme case, Britain could have abandoned East Africa to save the home islands. I think the case that Britain was teetering on the brink of disaster after Dunkirk is propaganda designed to exaggerate Britain's success in the BoB, and I think the idea that the remnants of the BEF were totally combat ineffective is also an exaggeration. While they would have offered a relatively weak resistance to any hypothetical German landing, they would have resisted nevertheless, with the weapons available to them.

 

[buffnut453]

Also bear in mind the vast majority of the BEF were PBI (poor bloody infantry) which didn't have much heavy equipment. Most of the Dunkirk evacuees literally could have been handed a new .303 rifle as they disembarked in the UK.

 

[timshatz]

Also bear in mind the vast majority of the BEF were PBI (poor bloody infantry) which didn't have much heavy equipment. Most of the Dunkirk evacuees literally could have been handed a new .303 rifle as they disembarked in the UK.

Read a story about recollections of Dunkirk. One was of a woman who lived outside the Ports where the British soliders returned (in England) after the evacuations. She lived near a railway line and remembers Soliders throwing away their rifles as the trains went by.

Maybe not destroyed, but very demoralized.

 

[Shortround6]

There is destroyed and there is destroyed.
An army that has been forced to retreat in haste and over/through obstacles (rivers, the channel, mountains, jungle) has been destroyed as a military force ONLY UNTIL it can re-equip/reorganize.
An army that has had to surrender is totally destroyed and needs to be replaced. While 200,000 men may have been a drop in the Bucket to the Russians, it was no such thing to the British or even the Germans.
A lot of the heavy weapons left behind in France were obsolete WW I left overs or items that wound up relegated to training status in just a few more months any anyway. Maltida I's, light tank MK VI's, some old and obsolete heavy artillery. The only real critical thing left behind were the 2pdr AT guns, the shortage of which, combined with some panzerphobia, kept the 2pdr in production for too long when they should have switched over to the 6pdr.

 

[parsifal]

A military victory isnt always the clear defeat of an enemy opponent. It can be a subtle affair, where the avoidance of total defeat is all that can be reasonably expected.
in the case of Dunkirk, the Germans had already won their victory, effectively, and all that remained was the capture of the Britih forces trapped in the pocket. Dunkirk was a victory, because it was a plan, successfully completed, that managed to avoid that outcome. In this the British had managed to to achieve their objective....to save as many of the personnel as possible. In fact, they greatly exceeded all expectations. It had been planned that when the operation began that perhaps 25000 men might be saved. When it ended, 330000 men had been rescued. The loss of the equipment was never a major issue for the British, it was not their objective to save this.

From the enemy perspective it was also a defeat. The stated German objective had been the total destruction of the pocket, and the death or capture of its personnel. They failed to achieve their stated objectives

Once the decision had been reached to effect an evacuation, the plan and its execution were done brilliantly. The on ground situation as of 26 May, when the operation began saw the british strung out some distance from the beaches. The withdrawal to the beach head was executed brilliantly and flawlessly, and managed to absorb the major shock of the Belgian surrender two days later......an event carried out without warning by the King of Belgium. The holding actions at Boulogne and Calais, from the 19 May to the 26May were criticasl to the defence of Dunkirk, and were the events principally responsible for the German defeat, whose objectives at that point had been the immediate and early capture of all the channel ports, so as to prevent the evacuation that eventually developed. As Churchill stated, in his cable to the commander of the defending force (principally 30 Brigade, under Brigadier Nicholson), although it arrived too late to be received...."Every hour that you continue to exist is of critical importance to the BEF....Government has therefore decided that you must continue to fight . Have the greatest possible admiration for your splendid stand. Evacuation will not (repeat not) take place".....but even this was not fully observed, as two small motor yachts (the Conidaw and the Gulzar) managed to sneak in and rescue about 200 survivors after the surrender, right under the noses of the Germans......Calais had cost the BEF 3500 men, but had gained 3 precious days for the defence lines behind Gravelines to be organized, and the evacautuion from Dunkirk to be commenced. Churchill later wrote "Calais was the crux to our success. Many other causes might have prevented the deliverance of Dunkirk, but it is certain that the three days gained by the defence Calais enabled the Gravelines line to be held and thereby enable the withdrawal to be carried out.

 

[drgondog]

We have a good idea what the Allies learned from Dieppe:

- can't attack an urban port
- beware of rocky beaches
- tanks can be problematic
- don't let officers go ashore with "plans"
- don't handcuff enemy prisoners
- surprise is hard to achieve
- etc. etc

My question is: what did the Germans learn from Dieppe?

My guess is: not much. They had to feel pretty smug about their defense. And THAT in itself may have spelled problems later on - in June '44.

Thoughts on this ....?

MM

Rommel certainly did not display over confidence as demonstrated from his infrastructure investments as well as flooding and mining likely airborne DZ's.

Had he been on-site during the opening hours and had access to 10th Panzer as a mobile reserve - it could have been very bad. The weather was bad enough that daylight movement would have been feasible.

Another aspect of placing Rommel in tactical command of the 'west wall' is that he was one of few German High Command that had a healthy respect for US troops and equipment. He had no illusions that his troopers had the individual 'strength of 10' that Hitler and Goering and other seemed to harbor.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... Rommel certainly did not display over confidence as demonstrated from his infrastructure investments as well as flooding and mining likely airborne DZ's."

Very true, Dd.

MM

 

[RabidAlien]

Rommel was also working (or trying to) with a shortage of supplies such as mines and concrete and steel for his bunkers (not a solid enough wall in his opinion), Ost battalions (not quite as motivated as the average German grunt), as well as a very short timeline: he'd only been on the Atlantic Wall for, what, 6 months? Had he started a year in advance, the outcome of Overlord may very well have been entirely different. The battle for Omaha was a close thing, as it was.

 

[Jabberwocky]

Dunkirk gets my vote. British propaganda says the BEF was saved at Dunkirk. In actuality the 3 BEF army corps were destroyed as combat units.
2,472 out of 2,794 total artillery pieces lost. (I assume this number includes AT and AA guns)
63.879 out of 66,618 total motor vehicles lost.

Where are those figures from? The soliders saved during the Dunkirk evacuation were reorganised and rearmed over a period of about 4-5 months over the summer/fall of 1940. The notion that the BEF returned to an England bereft of equipment to rearm them is a fallacy.

The British summary of assets and losses post Dunkirk (06-Jun-1940) gives 1,346 artillery pieces lost, and another 607 AT guns lost (including 109 25 mms), for a total of 1953 'tubes' lost. 615 tanks (including 331 Mk IV light tanks) were also lost.

At the same time, the survey of equipment in the UK shows stocks of 1066 artillery pieces and 333 AT guns, as well at 688 tanks (including 408 light tanks).

The forces saved from the BEF can be broadly said to have been re-armed by late Sep-1940, although there were still heavy shortages of artillery (field/medium guns were at just 35-55% of establishment) and AT guns and heavy mortars.

2 pounders were at just a quarter of establishment by the end of Aug-1940 and around 30% of establishment at the end of Sep-1940. To ease the problem, the British Army re-organised its AT batteries into 3 x 16 instead of the earlier 4 x 12. However, many units in 1940 were unofficially adjusted, with either 3 x 12 or even 4 X 8 2 pounders.

That said, the BEF had also been down on AT gun establishment too: about 20% of BEF AT batteries were equipped with the 25 mm Hotchkiss AT gun.

British production in Jun-1940 was enough to equip about 1.5 divisions per month. By the end of August, this was up to enough to equip about 2 divisions per month.

 

[BombTaxi]

I've been thinking about this and would like to present some more candidates for the worst Allied defeats of WW2;

Pearl Harbor - the carriers survived, but US losses in other surface units, personnel, and aircraft were heavy and required significant investment to repair. Obviously, these lost assets could not be deployed to assist the fight against the Japanese advance in early 1942.

PQ-17 - a needless waste of lives and resources, IMHO, in a convoy that could (and should) have been saved.

The Channel Dash - The British missed a brilliant chance to knock the two most powerful survivor of the Kriegsmarine out of the war, and avert the danger of another PQ-17 type disaster. Inexcusable given the level of British control over the Channel.

Force Z - a needless squandering of two very powerful fleet units due to an institutional inability to grasp the significance of air power in naval warfare. Again, inexcusable given the lessons of Taranto, Bismarck and Pearl Harbor that should have already been learned.

 

[Jabberwocky]

I've been thinking about this and would like to present some more candidates for the worst Allied defeats of WW2;

Pearl Harbor - the carriers survived, but US losses in other surface units, personnel, and aircraft were heavy and required significant investment to repair. Obviously, these lost assets could not be deployed to assist the fight against the Japanese advance in early 1942.

PQ-17 - a needless waste of lives and resources, IMHO, in a convoy that could (and should) have been saved.

The Channel Dash - The British missed a brilliant chance to knock the two most powerful survivor of the Kriegsmarine out of the war, and avert the danger of another PQ-17 type disaster. Inexcusable given the level of British control over the Channel.

Force Z - a needless squandering of two very powerful fleet units due to an institutional inability to grasp the significance of air power in naval warfare. Again, inexcusable given the lessons of Taranto, Bismarck and Pearl Harbor that should have already been learned.

The Battle of France - France essentially eliminated as an independent combatant, the Low Countries occupied, Britain thrown off the continent at great expense to her Army. Allies suffer around 1/3 of a million casualties to the 100-120,000 of Germany.

 

[buffnut453]

Force Z - a needless squandering of two very powerful fleet units due to an institutional inability to grasp the significance of air power in naval warfare. Again, inexcusable given the lessons of Taranto, Bismarck and Pearl Harbor that should have already been learned.

The tactical loss of Force Z came at the end of a long stream of more strategic failures, key of which was the fallacy of being able to reinforce Singapore if Britain was engaged in a European conflict. To be fair, Force Z was supposed to include the carrier HMS Indomitable but she was damaged when she ran aground leaving the already unbalanced Force Z without organic airpower and highly vulnerable. Then there was the shocking miscommunication between Phillips and AHQFE regarding the provision of air power. It was a confluence of events but had massive strategic impact. I still wonder whether Japan would have pursued its invasion plans had a portion of the US Pacific Fleet sortied to Singapore and hooked up with Force Z in late Nov 41.

 

[parsifal]

The tactical loss of Force Z came at the end of a long stream of more strategic failures, key of which was the fallacy of being able to reinforce Singapore if Britain was engaged in a European conflict. To be fair, Force Z was supposed to include the carrier HMS Hermes but she was damaged leaving the already unbalanced Force Z without organic airpower and highly vulnerable. Then there was the shocking miscommunication between Phillips and AHQFE regarding the provision of air power. It was a confluence of events but had massive strategic impact. I still wonder whether Japan would have pursued its invasion plans had a portion of the US Pacific Fleet sortied to Singapore and hooked up with Force Z in late Nov 41.

Actually the carrier was the Indomitable, and she hit an uncharted rock enroute.


The defeat of Force Z was part of a much bigger malaise affecting the Far eastern Commands at this time, and in many ways the myths that drove it continue to garner traction to this day.....the japanese fought even worse than the italians....the most modern aircraft available to the japanese were the old A2Ns....if they did win a battle it only because they cheated....aircraft unfit for service in Europe would be more than adequate to deal with anything the Japanese possessed, less than 200 aircraft were sufficient to defend the maly barrier....that kind of thinking