Douglas MacArthur vs Husband E. Kimmel Walter Short

[pbehn]

But, crucially, the Chain Home system AND the critical C3 infrastructure were in place and thoroughly tested before the onset of war. Development of an integrated C3 infrastructure commenced in 1937 and US forces in Hawaii hadn't achieved even that by the end of 1941. Yes, the US wasn't at war when the Japanese attacked but neither was Britain when the Chain Home system was developed and integrated. It's still an incredible oversight by the US military not to have even a rudimentary radar and C3 infrastructure by the end of 1941 given the knowledge of what had already happened in Europe and during the Battle of Britain.

Worse than that, the Chain Home system was not particularly advanced even in 1939, the C3 system used everyday technology of the time. I believe the British were obliged to divulge how such things worked under the terms of Lend Lease, but even if it wasn't shown to the US it is a pretty simple thing to figure out, just needing a lot of effort getting it all working.

 

[Zipper730]

And the newly installed radar towers lack a comm link to the main bases at Oahu-nor were the enlisted or commissioned officers involved with that new technology properly trained.

Why?

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

Why?

We should have studied the British radar installations "Chain Hope" in the BoB 1940-and schooled our Armed Forces in the ways the Brits were detecting incoming Luftwaffe aircraft-- but we didn't-- One of the many mistakes Hermann "Fat Boy" Goering made was underestimating the effectiveness of British Radar- "Forewarned is also Forearmed" Words of wisdom..

 

[Zipper730]

We should have studied the British radar installations "Chain Hope" in the BOB 1940 and schooled our Armed Forces in the way the Brits were detecting incoming Luftwaffe aircraft-- but we didn't

I thought we did? When did Gordon Saville begin re-structuring our radar configurations and set-ups?

 

[oldcrowcv63]

It's still an incredible oversight by the US military not to have even a rudimentary radar and C3 infrastructure by the end of 1941 given the knowledge of what had already happened in Europe and during the Battle of Britain.

It's especially interesting considering that the Carriers had already begun implementing such a system. In the First Team chapters 4 & 5 Lundstrom describes the fighter description system employed by the USN carriers, during the early raids and the Bougainville operation, of February, 1942. While far from fully developed, he explicitly states that the FD system was based upon the British model and experience. Considering the time to train and develop a Fighter direction system, I believe this suggests efforts to implement it that predate Pearl Harbor. How much before, I don't know for certain, but would expect at least a few months. Considering the rather sleepy state of the nation and much of its leadership (with some important exceptions) that may represent a furious pace for the prewar time... The first Tizard mission meeting occurred in late August 1940 and according to the website below, FD development was in full swing by march of 1941. I don't know what was being done by the army at PH, but I would be surprised if it was nothing. According to Bartsch (Doomed at the Start) , even the PI air defenser forces on Luzon had a rudimentary FD system well before PH.
From:
The Beginnings of Naval Fighter Direction - Chapter 5 of Radar and the Fighter Directors - Engineering and Technology History Wiki

"By March 1941 some of the heavy combatants that had been equipped with the CXAM radar were gaining experience in its use. In that month the CO of the carrier Yorktown reported that with the CXAM used in practice exercises, combat air patrols "have been quickly and reliably directed to intercept." The report also noted that the Fighter Director Officer (FDO) had hardly any room to work, that he needed a trained team of supporting plotters, and he needed a central radar plotting room where he could develop a complete tactical picture. The report continued to say that the chief petty officer radar operators provided their "unrelated and heterogeneous ranges and bearings" by sound powered phone to the bridge, Flag Plot, Air Plot, and Sky Control with no correlation among the various reports. It concluded, "Consequently there must be provided a RADAR plotting team with adequate facilities for assimilating and segregating vital information." "