Dream liner down in India on air port

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If it does prove to be the case I would think it was a mistake (at least hope it was a mistake)

Agreed, that is what I am leaning towards. Would not be the first time. Look at the TransAsia crash in Taiwan in 2015. Aircraft lost an engine, pilot accidentally cut fuel to the good engine. Killed everyone.
 
I don't have any pictures of the DC-9 after the emergency landing but here is a link to the accident report. It goes into more details I left out about the bad decisions made even after bringing the aircraft to a stop. I had forgotten about the F/O injuring himself with the crash axe attempting to break open the clear view window when they could not open the doors because the engines were still running and the outflow valve automatically closes with no power so the fuselage was still pressurized.

It was one of the few times I was embarrassed to work for the company. I still shake my head about it. Both Flight crew members were fired shortly afterwards.

 
I don't have any pictures of the DC-9 after the emergency landing but here is a link to the accident report. It goes into more details I left out about the bad decisions made even after bringing the aircraft to a stop. I had forgotten about the F/O injuring himself with the crash axe attempting to break open the clear view window when they could not open the doors because the engines were still running and the outflow valve automatically closes with no power so the fuselage was still pressurized.

It was one of the few times I was embarrassed to work for the company. I still shake my head about it. Both Flight crew members were fired shortly afterwards.

A knowledgeable passenger showed the crew how to depressurize the aircraft. LOL.
 
Known facts not in dispute:- Electrical failure evidenced by the RAT deploying and the U/C retraction sequence being interrupted. Slats were deployed as evidenced by post crash photos, and just discernible on high quality vids. Some form of simultaneous engine failure or thrust roll-back. Because the slats were definitely deployed then the flaps were extended to some degree, presumably to what the crew required (note 787s on take-off can have very little flap deployed, but must have slats deployed).

De-bunked:- no flaps, U/c not up (selected but interrupted), bird strike (ZERO evidence on the ground or in vids).

The FSOV on each engine is powered by the EEC (FADEC) which is powered by a Permanent Magnetic Alternator (PMA) located on the accessory drive of the engine, completely independent from the rest of electrical system of the aircraft. The Spar valve for each engine is powered by the Main battery on the Hot Battery Bus (and thus always powered) and is commanded by the EEC to open or close. The engine cutoff switches and fire switches are connected directly to the EEC. So a complete AC electrical system failure will NOT cause both engines to shut down. And neither will a DC electrical system failure. Even if the engine is windmilling, the PMA can provide power to the EEC and the main battery will power the spar valve and engine igniters (through the standby inverter) allowing the EEC to attempt to relight the engine.
 
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Preliminary report should be released tomorrow by the AAIB in India. Industry insiders don't hold out much hope that the report will be factual with no bias. All the data from the combined FDR and CVR has been downloaded and analysed so that needs to be published. The track record of India on these reports is quite appalling.
What is clear is that from about 400' after lift off the pilots had no time to recover the situation and all they could do was fly the aircraft into the ground without stalling. That they did.
 
NO report issued today! Very concerning and disappointing.
The NTSB has threatened to leave the investigation due possibly some coverup by the Indian authorities as reported in the Wall Street Journal. It appears some info was leaked which suggests the fuel levers were moved to cut off.
We really need the report to be released.
 
Apparently the switches are designed that they cannot be accidentally switched off either.

My own experience, critical switches like this are either covered by hinged block, or have lift-to-unlock toggles. Aircrew must take positive action in order to actuate changes in position for this sort of thing in many cases. I don't know if that applies here. But I'm pretty sure accidental nudging, that sort of thing, isn't happening on fuel cutouts.
 
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My own experience, critical switches like this are either covered by hinged block, or have lift-to-unlock toggles. Aircrew must take positive action in order to actuate changes in position for this sort of thing in many cases. I don't if that applies here. But I'm pretty sure accidental nudging, that sort of thing, isn't happening on fuel cutouts.
Exactly!
You don't cut off both engines "accidentally".
 
My own experience, critical switches like this are either covered by hinged block, or have lift-to-unlock toggles. Aircrew must take positive action in order to actuate changes in position for this sort of thing in many cases. I don't if that applies here. But I'm pretty sure accidental nudging, that sort of thing, isn't happening on fuel cutouts.

That would be correct.
 
BBC are commenting on switches may have been installed without the locks/guards on 737's and its the same switches used in 787's.


But investigators are also zeroing in on what they describe is an interesting point in the report.

It says in December 2018, the US Federal Aviation Administration issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) highlighting that some Boeing 737 fuel control switches were installed with the locking feature disengaged.

While the issue was noted, it wasn't deemed an unsafe condition requiring an Airworthiness Directive (AD) - a legally enforceable regulation to correct unsafe conditions in a product.

"The same switch design is used in Boeing 787-8 aircraft, including Air India's VT-ANB which crashed. As the SAIB was advisory, Air India did not perform the recommended inspections."
 
BBC are commenting on switches may have been installed without the locks/guards on 737's and its the same switches used in 787's.

Even if this aircraft had switches installed from that same batch that went into the Max's, it would not cause a cascading failure of both. One or the other, not one then a second later the other.

Adding this SAIB from a different airframe into the report is a deflection maneuver.
 
BBC are commenting on switches may have been installed without the locks/guards on 737's and its the same switches used in 787's.


But investigators are also zeroing in on what they describe is an interesting point in the report.

It says in December 2018, the US Federal Aviation Administration issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) highlighting that some Boeing 737 fuel control switches were installed with the locking feature disengaged.

While the issue was noted, it wasn't deemed an unsafe condition requiring an Airworthiness Directive (AD) - a legally enforceable regulation to correct unsafe conditions in a product.

"The same switch design is used in Boeing 787-8 aircraft, including Air India's VT-ANB which crashed. As the SAIB was advisory, Air India did not perform the recommended inspections."

The guards are secondary. Even without the guard you cannot "accidentally" shut them off.
 

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