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Lucky13
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On the other hand, it was realized that an air attack from the Gulf of Papua entailed the following principal disadvantages:
A hazardous, 100-mile flight over wild and unknown country and mountain ranges often obscured by clouds.
The probability that the attack would not prove as damaging or as decisive as one launched from the eastward, should it have been possible to effect the latter with the element of surprise.
It was considered, however, that the above disadvantages were outweighed by the aforementioned advantages, and the decision to approach from the south was reached late in the day of March 8th. March 10th was fixed as the day for the attack.
The decision reached, Admiral Brown notified the ships of his command of the change in plans. In the meantime, however, another decision had been made. This was that a special group of four heavy cruisers and four destroyers should be detached from the main body to remain in the vicinity of Rossel Island in the Louisiades in order to cover the carrier operations in the Gulf of Papua and to be in a position to intercept any enemy surface force which might move southward to attack Port Moresby. The special group likewise would be in a position to cover the arrival of American troops in New Caledonia. Rear Admiral Grace, R. N., commander of the ANZAC squadron, was given command of the group, which consisted of the Australia, Chicago, Astoria, Louisville, and the Anderson, Hammann, Hughes, and Sims.
Admiral Grace was ordered to take up a position southeastward of Rossel Island at a distance not less than 600 miles south of Rabaul. He was to rendezvous with the main body at 0100 (G. C. T.) on March 14 at "point pig" (lat. 15°00' S., long. 159°00' E.) and to direct the two fueling groups built around the Neosho and Kaskaskia to do the same. The two oilers, under terms of the orders applying to the original Rabaul-Gasmata attack plan, had been assigned separate fueling rendezvous stations, both of which were several miles eastward of "point pig."
The approach to the Gulf of Papua throughout the 9th was without incident. The ships steered a northerly course, roughly paralleling the Australian coast.
Obviously, however, the attack as planned entailed a flight across the Papuan Peninsula, no ordinary body of land from an aviator's point of view. It was common knowledge that the Owen Stanley Range, which
forms the backbone of the peninsula, contained mountain peaks as high as 15,000 feet and that the interior, besides being rugged, was largely unexplored jungle. Charts available to the fleet showed nothing of the interior behind the shore line. Furthermore, in order to launch the planes within effective striking distance it would be necessary to take the task force into narrow water abounding in coral reefs, the positions of many of them doubtful. To secure better information concerning waters to be navigated and the terrain to be flown over, as well as to gather weather data, two planes were sent out. Comdr. Walton W. Smith, of Admiral Brown's staff, flew to Townsville, Australia, and Comdr. William B. Ault, of the Lexington air group, to Port Moresby. These officers brought back information which contributed a great deal towards success.
It was learned that the best pass over the mountains, the highest point of which was at an altitude of about 7,500 feet, happened to be on a direct line between the point in the Gulf of Papua from which it had been hoped that the carriers could launch their planes and Salamaua, and that this pass was most likely to be free of clouds between the hours of 0700 and 1100. Consequently, course and speed were set in order that the launching point would be reached at about 0800 on the 10th.
THE ATTACK
Task Force BAKER arrived at its assigned station in the Gulf of Papua during the early morning hours of the 10th and began launching planes from a position about 45 miles distant from the shore line at the mouth of Freshwater Bay. Because weather was to be a prime factor, Comdr. Ault flew a scout bomber into a position about midway across the peninsula at the highest point of the pass to be traversed by the attack group. Responsibility for carrying out or abandoning the attack was placed in his hands. He remained on station between Mount Chapman and Mount Lawson, broadcasting weather and operational information on both the planes and the surface units, until all planes had returned.
The first plane left the deck of the Lexington at 0749, and the Yorktown began launching about 20 minutes later. At about 0840 the entire combined striking group--104 planes--was in the air. Aside from Comdr. Ault's plane, the Lexington group was composed of 18 scout bombers (SBD-3) of Scouting Squadron TWO, 12 bombers (SBD-3) of Bombing Squadron TWO, 13 topedo planes (TBD-1) of Torpedo Squadron TWO, and 8 fighters (F4F-3) of Fighting Squadron THREE. Yorktown planes in the air included 17 bombers (SBD-3) of Bombing Squadron FIVE, 13 scout bombers (SBD-3) of Scouting Squadron FIVE, 12 torpedo planes (TBD-1) of Torpedo Squadron FIVE, and 10 fighters (F4F-3) of Fighting Squadron FORTY-TWO. The planes carried a total weight of 38 tons of bombs and torpedoes, six 1,000-pound, seventy-nine 500-pound, 110 100-pound, sixteen 30-pound bombs and 13 torpedoes.
Capt. Frederick C. Sherman, commander of the Lexington and senior air officer, reported later that he was anxious to test the performance of both torpedo planes and torpedoes. Because of some doubt as to the ability of the TBD's to carry torpedoes over the mountains and return, however, he directed that only the Lexington torpedo squadron carry this weapon. The Yorktown VT squadron carried a substitute armament of two 500-pound bombs each.
The carriers launched on a course 088.5° at 25 knots speed. Weather conditions were excellent, with unlimited ceiling and visibility and a wind of nine knots. The sea was smooth.
Six fighters from each carrier, five bombers from the Lexington and four bombers from the Yorktown were kept in the air over the task force throughout the action for defensive purposes.
In order that they might have the maximum amount of fuel for the operation, the fighters of the attack group were landed after all planes were in the air and reserviced. They were then launched again and because of their superior speed were able to overtake the other planes en route to the objectives.
It is believed that the enemy ships present at Lae and Salamaua when our attack began consisted of five transports, two cargo vessels and a covering force of two cruisers and four destroyers. These vessels were attacked by the Lexington group and by three squadrons of the Yorktown group somewhat later. However, another enemy force was approaching the scene from the eastward, being about 25 miles distant when our first planes entered their dives. The composition of the second enemy force has never been determined exactly, but it is believed to have included at least one cruiser, four destroyers, a seaplane carrier (Kamoi), and six transports. The cruiser and destroyer steamed ahead to the Salamaua area to defend or rescue personnel already under attack. The cruisers and destroyers were attacked by the Yorktown dive bombers and the seaplane tender by Torpedo Squadron FIVE. The transports subsequently were attacked by Army B-17 heavy bombers, with undetermined results.
That surprise had been achieved was attested by the fact that no enemy fighter opposition was encountered at any time during the attack.
ACTION OF THE LEXINGTON GROUP
The Lexington group attacked first at 0922. Scouting Squadron TWO proceeded to a position 16,000 feet above Lae, its mission being to dive bomb shipping there. Three large enemy transports were at Lae, one unloading at the dock and two anchored a half mile off shore. Three divisions of scouts, each plane armed with one 500-pound bomb and two 100-pound bombs, attacked these ships. According to plan, the 500-pounders were dropped first and the smaller bombs later on "opportunity" targets. The planes also strafed the transports with their fixed .5o-caliber machine guns. The transport at the dock and one of the two in the harbor were sunk. The third was set afire and subsequently beached itself east of Lae.
Two pilots pulled out of their initial dives when their windshields and sighting telescopes fogged-over. These two planes later made glide bombing attacks on a cruiser which was underway. A 500-pound bomb struck the cruiser, which was believed to be of the Kinugasa class, aft of its second stack. A few seconds later a large explosion occurred within the ship and she last was seen heading toward the beach east of Lae burning fiercely. Photographs taken a half hour later by the Yorktown planes did not show the ship in the area, and she is believed to have sunk.
Other scout planes dropped 100-pound bombs on a small auxiliary, possibly a mine sweeper, and the vessel caught fire and lost headway.
The squadron made additional attacks off Salamaua. A 100-pound bomb hit on the stern of a frantically maneuvering destroyer apparently set off depth charges, and a second explosion occurred. The ship was left afire and sinking rapidly.
One plane of Scouting Squadron TWO was lost. Ensign Joseph Philip Johnson, pilot, and J. B. Jewell, aviation radioman, third class, were shot down from 200 feet altitude by shore-based antiaircraft fire. The plane crashed in flames into the water east of Lae.
A hazardous, 100-mile flight over wild and unknown country and mountain ranges often obscured by clouds.
The probability that the attack would not prove as damaging or as decisive as one launched from the eastward, should it have been possible to effect the latter with the element of surprise.
It was considered, however, that the above disadvantages were outweighed by the aforementioned advantages, and the decision to approach from the south was reached late in the day of March 8th. March 10th was fixed as the day for the attack.
The decision reached, Admiral Brown notified the ships of his command of the change in plans. In the meantime, however, another decision had been made. This was that a special group of four heavy cruisers and four destroyers should be detached from the main body to remain in the vicinity of Rossel Island in the Louisiades in order to cover the carrier operations in the Gulf of Papua and to be in a position to intercept any enemy surface force which might move southward to attack Port Moresby. The special group likewise would be in a position to cover the arrival of American troops in New Caledonia. Rear Admiral Grace, R. N., commander of the ANZAC squadron, was given command of the group, which consisted of the Australia, Chicago, Astoria, Louisville, and the Anderson, Hammann, Hughes, and Sims.
Admiral Grace was ordered to take up a position southeastward of Rossel Island at a distance not less than 600 miles south of Rabaul. He was to rendezvous with the main body at 0100 (G. C. T.) on March 14 at "point pig" (lat. 15°00' S., long. 159°00' E.) and to direct the two fueling groups built around the Neosho and Kaskaskia to do the same. The two oilers, under terms of the orders applying to the original Rabaul-Gasmata attack plan, had been assigned separate fueling rendezvous stations, both of which were several miles eastward of "point pig."
The approach to the Gulf of Papua throughout the 9th was without incident. The ships steered a northerly course, roughly paralleling the Australian coast.
Obviously, however, the attack as planned entailed a flight across the Papuan Peninsula, no ordinary body of land from an aviator's point of view. It was common knowledge that the Owen Stanley Range, which
forms the backbone of the peninsula, contained mountain peaks as high as 15,000 feet and that the interior, besides being rugged, was largely unexplored jungle. Charts available to the fleet showed nothing of the interior behind the shore line. Furthermore, in order to launch the planes within effective striking distance it would be necessary to take the task force into narrow water abounding in coral reefs, the positions of many of them doubtful. To secure better information concerning waters to be navigated and the terrain to be flown over, as well as to gather weather data, two planes were sent out. Comdr. Walton W. Smith, of Admiral Brown's staff, flew to Townsville, Australia, and Comdr. William B. Ault, of the Lexington air group, to Port Moresby. These officers brought back information which contributed a great deal towards success.
It was learned that the best pass over the mountains, the highest point of which was at an altitude of about 7,500 feet, happened to be on a direct line between the point in the Gulf of Papua from which it had been hoped that the carriers could launch their planes and Salamaua, and that this pass was most likely to be free of clouds between the hours of 0700 and 1100. Consequently, course and speed were set in order that the launching point would be reached at about 0800 on the 10th.
THE ATTACK
Task Force BAKER arrived at its assigned station in the Gulf of Papua during the early morning hours of the 10th and began launching planes from a position about 45 miles distant from the shore line at the mouth of Freshwater Bay. Because weather was to be a prime factor, Comdr. Ault flew a scout bomber into a position about midway across the peninsula at the highest point of the pass to be traversed by the attack group. Responsibility for carrying out or abandoning the attack was placed in his hands. He remained on station between Mount Chapman and Mount Lawson, broadcasting weather and operational information on both the planes and the surface units, until all planes had returned.
The first plane left the deck of the Lexington at 0749, and the Yorktown began launching about 20 minutes later. At about 0840 the entire combined striking group--104 planes--was in the air. Aside from Comdr. Ault's plane, the Lexington group was composed of 18 scout bombers (SBD-3) of Scouting Squadron TWO, 12 bombers (SBD-3) of Bombing Squadron TWO, 13 topedo planes (TBD-1) of Torpedo Squadron TWO, and 8 fighters (F4F-3) of Fighting Squadron THREE. Yorktown planes in the air included 17 bombers (SBD-3) of Bombing Squadron FIVE, 13 scout bombers (SBD-3) of Scouting Squadron FIVE, 12 torpedo planes (TBD-1) of Torpedo Squadron FIVE, and 10 fighters (F4F-3) of Fighting Squadron FORTY-TWO. The planes carried a total weight of 38 tons of bombs and torpedoes, six 1,000-pound, seventy-nine 500-pound, 110 100-pound, sixteen 30-pound bombs and 13 torpedoes.
Capt. Frederick C. Sherman, commander of the Lexington and senior air officer, reported later that he was anxious to test the performance of both torpedo planes and torpedoes. Because of some doubt as to the ability of the TBD's to carry torpedoes over the mountains and return, however, he directed that only the Lexington torpedo squadron carry this weapon. The Yorktown VT squadron carried a substitute armament of two 500-pound bombs each.
The carriers launched on a course 088.5° at 25 knots speed. Weather conditions were excellent, with unlimited ceiling and visibility and a wind of nine knots. The sea was smooth.
Six fighters from each carrier, five bombers from the Lexington and four bombers from the Yorktown were kept in the air over the task force throughout the action for defensive purposes.
In order that they might have the maximum amount of fuel for the operation, the fighters of the attack group were landed after all planes were in the air and reserviced. They were then launched again and because of their superior speed were able to overtake the other planes en route to the objectives.
It is believed that the enemy ships present at Lae and Salamaua when our attack began consisted of five transports, two cargo vessels and a covering force of two cruisers and four destroyers. These vessels were attacked by the Lexington group and by three squadrons of the Yorktown group somewhat later. However, another enemy force was approaching the scene from the eastward, being about 25 miles distant when our first planes entered their dives. The composition of the second enemy force has never been determined exactly, but it is believed to have included at least one cruiser, four destroyers, a seaplane carrier (Kamoi), and six transports. The cruiser and destroyer steamed ahead to the Salamaua area to defend or rescue personnel already under attack. The cruisers and destroyers were attacked by the Yorktown dive bombers and the seaplane tender by Torpedo Squadron FIVE. The transports subsequently were attacked by Army B-17 heavy bombers, with undetermined results.
That surprise had been achieved was attested by the fact that no enemy fighter opposition was encountered at any time during the attack.
ACTION OF THE LEXINGTON GROUP
The Lexington group attacked first at 0922. Scouting Squadron TWO proceeded to a position 16,000 feet above Lae, its mission being to dive bomb shipping there. Three large enemy transports were at Lae, one unloading at the dock and two anchored a half mile off shore. Three divisions of scouts, each plane armed with one 500-pound bomb and two 100-pound bombs, attacked these ships. According to plan, the 500-pounders were dropped first and the smaller bombs later on "opportunity" targets. The planes also strafed the transports with their fixed .5o-caliber machine guns. The transport at the dock and one of the two in the harbor were sunk. The third was set afire and subsequently beached itself east of Lae.
Two pilots pulled out of their initial dives when their windshields and sighting telescopes fogged-over. These two planes later made glide bombing attacks on a cruiser which was underway. A 500-pound bomb struck the cruiser, which was believed to be of the Kinugasa class, aft of its second stack. A few seconds later a large explosion occurred within the ship and she last was seen heading toward the beach east of Lae burning fiercely. Photographs taken a half hour later by the Yorktown planes did not show the ship in the area, and she is believed to have sunk.
Other scout planes dropped 100-pound bombs on a small auxiliary, possibly a mine sweeper, and the vessel caught fire and lost headway.
The squadron made additional attacks off Salamaua. A 100-pound bomb hit on the stern of a frantically maneuvering destroyer apparently set off depth charges, and a second explosion occurred. The ship was left afire and sinking rapidly.
One plane of Scouting Squadron TWO was lost. Ensign Joseph Philip Johnson, pilot, and J. B. Jewell, aviation radioman, third class, were shot down from 200 feet altitude by shore-based antiaircraft fire. The plane crashed in flames into the water east of Lae.
