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30 to 40mph faster then other fighter aircraft during 1940. Superior climb and firepower too plus three times the internal fuel capacity of Me-109 and Spitfire.
Why are people splitting hairs over Fw-187 aerial performance? It's fantastic compared to contemporary fighter aircraft when powered by normal DB601 engines.
Why are people splitting hairs over Fw-187 aerial performance? It's fantastic compared to contemporary fighter aircraft when powered by normal DB601 engines.
Wikipedia gives 3700 kg, empty, for the Fw-187A-0 (Jumo 210), 3300 seem pretty low for DB version.
That was the two seater version with the extra weight being for the extra crew member (100kg about with his weight, clothing, and gear), the extra armor, the rebalancing of the aircraft after extending the cockpit, and the greater overall size of the cockpit in the two seat version.
On discovering that there were Fw 187s with Db 601 engines being produced, the RAF put in place a couple of emergency programs.
First, was the aforementioned Whirlwinds, so experimentally being equipped with Merlins.
Secondly was the plan to put the Griffon in the Spitfire, but the engine wasn't ready. So Rolls-Royce got all the Buzzards they could find and converted them into detuned R engines, and called them Griffon Is. Spitfires with Griffon Is became known as the Spitfire 1G. They go from having 1000-1200hp to around 1800hp....
2 x 20mm FF cannon plus 4 MG (all on centerline) worked just fine for Me-110C. It will work just fine for early production Fw-187 too.
There were plans in place for a Whirlwind II with belt fed Hispanos and uprated Peregrines able to use 100 Octane fuel and +12 lbs boost (original Peregrines were limited to 87 octane fuel and +6lbs boost). With the developed Peregrines top speed was c. 380-400 mph. There was no way the Whirlwind could take Merlins without an extensive redesign.
Much as I personally like the idea of a MK II Whirlwind, there is little the British can do during Aug-Nov IF the Fw 187 takes them by surprise. It takes too long to change things. IF, on the other hand, the FW 187 is used in Poland or featured in German propaganda in the Fall or winter of 1939, there is time for the British to shuffle priorities a bit, Not full MK II but something.
I am afraid the Buzzard idea is a none starter. About 100 built, They are now 9-10 years old and there are considerable differences between the Buzzard and the "R", Time spent rebuilding and redesigning these old engines is time NOT spent on currant engines.
??? Please provide some references - apart from an unreferenced Wikipedia article - to prove this one.
With a decision making process like this it's incredible that Germany managed to carry on until 1945
Cheers
Steve
Mr Shortround 6
1)It s very much preferableto have 60 rpg and the performance to do something good with them, than have 180 rpg and be useless because you have not the performance to point them at the enemy or to just survive
2) 8 sec are plenty of time to explode 2 Spits.
3) Do you believe that Bf 110 gunners were able to change drums during a high G s dogfight?
To everyone that doubts Fw187 performance
Mr DonL has answered all the questions you raise,in previus threads. Do some searching in the forum s archieve s
Fw 187 ,single seat, could not only grossly out perform the current british fighters. It s power and wing loadings suggest that its sustained turning rate should be very competitive, especially at higher altitudes. Also its rate of roll was near that of 109
However , winning a campaign, is not just a matter of aircraft types. Fw 187 would cause great increase in RAF casualties, but germany overall could not bomb england into submission..
Hmmm,
while I like the view of the Falke, I have my doubts to whether or not it may have been a benefit in BoB.
Principal reasons:
[A] - timeline.
prototype with jumo-210:
Bf-110A0 prototype first flight (with Jumo-210): june 1936
Fw-187V prototype first flight (with Jumo-210): june 1937
prototype with Db-600:
Fw-187V first flight (with Db-600): may 1939
Bf-110V first flight (with Db-600): May 1936 (previous to Jumo-210 equipped -110)
for comparison:
Me-210 prototype first flight (with Db-601): Sep 1939
Service evaluation:
Fw-187A0: 1940
Bf-110C0: 1938
for comparison:
Ekdo-210: 1940
-thus, in my opinion, the Fw-187 seems to be capable of replacing the Me-210 in timeline but not the older Bf-110. I have severe doubts that any number of Fw-187 could be aviable at BoB times other than a small, combat evaluation unit in the latter stage of BoB with roughly inconsequential effect -and that only if given a high priority by RLM.
tactical use
In BoB, Fw-187 replacing Bf-110 would be primarely assigned to close escort for bombers. Remember, we are changing A/C, not tactics. Used in this capacity, the airplane would be tied to slow bombers, exposing it´s rather poor low speed handling, large target size, poor initial acceleration and low speed roll rate. This is approximately the same tactical limitation which assured the complete failure of the Bf-110. Instead of doing high cover at it´s high cruise speed, exhibiting zoom-climbs, superior dive capabilities and playing the strength of it´s stable weapon platform with concentrated heavy armement, the Fw-187 finds itselfe in no better position than the Bf-110, arguably even in a worse one because the Bf-110 has a rear gunner to at least cover some blind arcs and give opportunity of warning from beeing jumped.
Thus, in my opinion, the presence / absence of the Fw-187 has no effect unless the tactics are drastically changed. It´s not the best plane for dogfighting a single engined A/C like the Hurricane and Spitfire, either. Keep in mind, a twin engined fighter A/C has to be limited in agility compared to a single engined one.
The solution to BoB is not another, more expansive twin engined fighter but
[A] rejection of close escort tactics
a larger number Bf-109, equipped with drop tanks to increase range and endurance
Luftwaffe tactics were influenced by their fighters. The Bf 110 proved too vulnerable to the nimble single-engined RAF fighters. This meant the bulk of fighter escort duties fell on the Bf 109. Fighter tactics were then complicated by bomber crews who demanded closer protection. After the hard-fought battles of 15 and 18 August, Göring met with his unit leaders. During this conference, the need for the fighters to meet up on time with the bombers was stressed. It was also decided that one bomber Gruppe could only be properly protected by several Gruppen of 109s. In addition Göring stipulated that as many fighters as possible were to be left free for Freie Jagd ("Free Hunts": a free-roving fighter sweep preceded a raid to try to sweep defenders out of the raid's path). The Ju 87 units, which had suffered heavy casualties, were only to be used under favourable circumstances.[89] In early September, due to increasing complaints from the bomber crews about RAF fighters seemingly able to get through the escort screen, Göring ordered an increase in close escort duties. This decision shackled many of the Bf 109s to the bombers and, although they were more successful at protecting the bomber forces, casualties amongst the fighters mounted primarily because they were forced to fly and manoeuvre at reduced speeds.[90]
The Luftwaffe consistently varied its tactics in its attempts to break through the RAF defences. It launched many Freie Jagd to draw up RAF fighters. RAF fighter controllers, however, were often able to detect these and position squadrons to avoid them, keeping to Dowding's plan to preserve fighter strength for the bomber formations. The Luftwaffe also tried using small formations of bombers as bait, covering them with large numbers of escorts. This was more successful, but escort duty tied the fighters to the bombers' slow speed and made them more vulnerable.
By September, standard tactics for raids had become an amalgam of techniques. A Freie Jagd would precede the main attack formations. The bombers would fly in at altitudes between 16,000 feet (4,900 m) and 20,000 feet (6,100 m), closely escorted by fighters. Escorts were divided into two parts (usually Gruppen), some operating in close contact with the bombers, and others a few hundred yards away and a little above. If the formation was attacked from the starboard, the starboard section engaged the attackers, the top section moving to starboard and the port section to the top position. If the attack came from the port side the system was reversed. British fighters coming from the rear were engaged by the rear section and the two outside sections similarly moving to the rear. If the threat came from above, the top section went into action while the side sections gained height to be able to follow RAF fighters down as they broke away. If attacked, all sections flew in defensive circles. These tactics were skilfully evolved and carried out, and were extremely difficult to counter.[91]
Adolf Galland noted:
We had the impression that, whatever we did, we were bound to be wrong. Fighter protection for bombers created many problems which had to be solved in action. Bomber pilots preferred close screening in which their formation was surrounded by pairs of fighters pursuing a zigzag course. Obviously, the visible presence of the protective fighters gave the bomber pilots a greater sense of security. However, this was a faulty conclusion, because a fighter can only carry out this purely defensive task by taking the initiative in the offensive. He must never wait until attacked because he then loses the chance of acting.
We fighter pilots certainly preferred the free chase during the approach and over the target area. This gives the greatest relief and the best protection for the bomber force.[92]