DerAdlerIstGelandet said:
Second of all the Japs were a far more effective fighting force then you give them credit. Guadal Canal did not go on for 6 months because the Marines and the Navy wanted it to.
A harbringer of things to come was the vicious fight over New Georgia. Here the Japanese garrison planned to be on the defensive and knew there would be no relief. They used jungle cover to devestaing effect. There were more US footsoldier casualties here in eight weeks of fighting than all of the six months of fighting over Guadalcanal.
Before any offensive action could really begin in the Pacific, the USN had to deploy enough Essex class carriers to smother any Japanese air attacks that might be thrown at them. This was not going to happen untill late 1943. The building of the carriers was already on emergency schedule, so no wishfull thinking was going to alter the fact, that they would not be ready before that time.
In addition, as amply demonstrated by the Japanese army throughout the Pacific war, its easy to move the divisions forward to their operational area, but it was hell keeping them supplied. Even with no fighting, both the allied and Japanese forces whole units lost a lot of combat strength just from the climate and disease. New Guinie was called the "Green Hell" for a reason.
Aemebic dysentary and malaria were rampant. The heat, rain and humidity tore at material with no respite. And the comments from the soldiers of the swarms of jungle insects is almost unprintable.
Untill 1944 when the supply train finally caught up with demands, the numbers of ground units that were forward deployed had to be kept at a rational level. Most of the harbors and anchorages were pitifull compared to Europe. Untill they were developed, there was going to be no full scale offensives in the PTO and CBI. Also think of the ships needed to keep just a division equiped. A ship sailing from San Franscisco needed one full month to get to Australia. Then another month to sail back. The logistics requirements of fighting in the PTO/CBI in 1942/43 were incredible.
Several years ago there was a couple of books that dealt with this, "Touched by fire" and "victory at sea". Both well written and it gives you a peek at the difficulties of fighting in that that area of the war. Something like 2/3rds of all the resources commited to the PTO had to be just in supply. Not the actual weapons of war, but cargo ships, personell, etc. Think of the tonnage needed to keep an eight carrier task force and a one division landing force supplied for one month.
The only scenario I see of an early defeat of Japan was to hit their maritime trade right in the choke point between the Philipines/ Formosa/China. And that would mean the USN solved the torpedo problem very early, and used agressive wolf pack tactics from the onset.
The pacific war was far different from the European war.
(Just my two cents worth)