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Certainly things had already started to turn the RAF's way by this point. Luftwaffe fighter strength had already begun its precipitous decline.
After the first month or so of fighting, Luftwaffe front line strength was down by about 50 109s. The RAF was up by about 150 or so.
Only the Wood and Dempster figures aren't sourced, and are quite close to the RAF's estimates of German sorties.
Hooton, who sources his figures from the Luftwaffe records, shows 4,050 Luftwaffe fighter sorties 2 - 8 September.
RAF sorties of course included those in the north, not in the battle area, as well as a lot of standing patrols.
but some units were transferred to others arms (nightfighters, for example)
It was becoming clear there was no place in the new night fighter organisation for the Bf 109, and gradually the pilots of III/NG 1 [renamed from II/NG 1] converted to the Bf 110, only 1 staffel of single seaters remaining until October [1940], when that was itself disbanded.
Initially this group had Me 109 aircraft. Since they were found unsuitable for the purpose because of their small time in air capacities and their inadequate equipment for blind navigation, re-equipment of the group's squadrons with Me 110 aircraft commenced in December 1940.
Nope, the Luftwaffe front line strength was certainly not down by about 50 109s. The RAF was increasing its strenght while the Luftwaffe was not attacking it with concentrated effort, that is not very surprising is it?
You are pulling another statistical stunt, comparing the 29 June figures for the entire Tagjagd (which soon 'lost' a unit of 109 that was transferred to the Nachtjagd)
with the 10 August figures that only include units engaged against England only.
In other words, the Luftwaffe started hammering the RAF after lull in July.
Hmm, the German bomber strenghts stayed pretty much the same during the whole Battle, starting it with almost 1400 bombers on strenght, and finishing it with a little over 1400.
Actually Wood and Dempster's sources are also matching the figures by Hooton, 'who sources his figures from the Luftwaffe records', and the only reason of difference is that W+D counts 'fighter' sorties which are that, sorties flown by fighters (SE and TE) in an air superiority role, and counting Jabo's amongst bomber sorties (properly, IMHO) while Hooton counts the Luftwaffe air superiority and fighter-bomber sorties as 'fighter' sorties.
None of this transition to the 110 seems to have occured in the time period we are discussing, though.
There were certainly 109 equipped night fighter units during the Battle, usually operating a mix of 110s and 109s. These were transformed from existing daylight fighter units, 109 units as well. So those 109s 'missing' from the daylight fighter lists were not 'lost', but sent to other duties.
No, there were no night fighter units formed with 109s in the period we are discussing. 1 NG1 (iirc) formed with 109s on 22nd June 1940, before the 29th June strength figures.
In July the RAF got stronger as the Luftwaffe got weaker.
In August, the RAF briefly got a bit weaker, the Luftwaffe got a lot weaker.
In July the RAF got stronger as the Luftwaffe got weaker. In August, the RAF briefly got a bit weaker, the Luftwaffe got a lot weaker.
RAF serviceable aircraft 13th August - 579 Spitfires and Hurricanes
7th September - 621 Spitfires and Hurricanes
In contrast the Luftwaffe. Serviceable SE fighters 13th August - 853
7th September - 658
Fighter Command aircrew 10th August - 1,396
7th September - 1,381
Bf 109 pilots fit for duty 1st August - 869
1st September - 735
So, between Adlertag and the switch to London, RAF serviceable Spitfire and Hurricane strength increased by 42, Luftwaffe 109 strength decreased by 195.
In terms of pilots, FC aircrew (not just pilots) decreased by 15, Luftwaffe 109 pilots by 134.
Who was getting hammered?
It wasn't just the Luftwaffe fighters that were getting hammered.
KG strength 13th August, 1,482 on hand, 1,008 serviceable
7th September 1,291 on hand, 798 serviceable.
That's a decline in bomber strength of 191 total, 210 serviceable, in three and a half weeks.
Whether they gave up any 109s during the period I don't know, it depends how fast they transitioned. Personally I doubt the numbers would have been substantial, if any, but it's certainly not true that missing 109s during the BoB can be accounted for by aircraft transferred to the night fighter units.
Interesting, I have seen references to this elsewhere. Can you please provide me a scan/shot of that page where he mentions this (OK in a PM too!), I would like to read his own words.
on 28/09/40 the LW have 712 Bf 109 serviceable (with 676 ready pilots) , all the luftwaffe not only versus england
Whoops...be careful of merging 'England' and 'Britain' with the Basket around...
...are members of the forum aware that 'Basket' is an old, now-fogotten word for a type of sword (cutlass, I believe)?
Obviously the numbers of single engine ,single seat fighters were comparable, depending on the source ,date ect.
This is what one source (Deighton) has to say about the fighter strengths (Total and Combat Ready) on 1 July 1940
In terms of numbers of available fighters, just before the battle started, on 29th June 1940, the balance was:
Bf 109 - 1,107 (856 serviceable)
Spits and Hurris - 678 (490 serviceable) (both numbers approx)
...
Both sets of numbers are total fighters deployed in Europe.
Breaking the numbers down in to those deployed in/outside the battle area is more difficult. I believe 90% or so of the 109s were deployed along the Channel coast, about 60% of the Spitfires and Hurricanes.