Excluding Spitfires and Hurricanes, best fighter for Malaya 1940-41?

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I'd think strictly speaking of the best available fighter here, exclusive of all the problems with early warning or lack thereof etc, the best choice would be one that had at least one distinct advantage to the oposition. I'm thinking Tomahawk or Mohawk for there superior dive speed, preferably the former if posible.
Of course utilizing this advantage would be contingent on having pilots trained in tactics to take advantage of this.
 
Speaking of the p36/Mohawk im curious if anyone here knows of the latest front line use of them durring the war. I've tried internet searches a couple times for an answer but to no avail.
 
Four squadrons of the latest Spitfire Mark V won't save the day. Ten squadrons, radar directed, and operating from protected airfields, from where they would escort six or more squadrons of Beaufighters might have made a difference. But with such terrible leadership of the land campaign, the RAF won't save the battle.

Since Malaya is the size of England, perhaps a force the size of Fighter Command would have been more appropriate? A reasonable force to defend what is now Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei? My guess is whatever it took to defend the UK in WW2. So I guess all the races needed to be involved.
 
Since Malaya is the size of England, perhaps a force the size of Fighter Command would have been more appropriate? A reasonable force to defend what is now Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei? My guess is whatever it took to defend the UK in WW2. So I guess all the races needed to be involved.

Size of force is not just dependent on the size of the area to be defended. It also must consider the scale of the threat and the criticality of the defended territory to strategic success. There was no need to replicate Fighter Command to defend Malaya and Singapore but you needed more than just 4 squadrons of fighters. The usable Japanese fighter force aligned against Malaya and Singapore outnumbered the RAF fighters by almost 4-to-1...and that's before we consider any Japanese bomber forces.

As important as sheer aircraft numbers, you also need the defensive infrastructure to support operations: early warning systems and processes, logistics, all-weather runways, adequate personnel accommodation etc. Many of the forward airfields in northern Malaya were little more than cleared areas of rainforest with little in the way of physical infrastructure. It's challenging to perform even second-line maintenance activities when you don't have a hangar to put the aircraft in. In northern Malaya, groundcrew resorted to crude shelters to cover the cockpit and engines because doing the work in the open was so difficult. Imagine how difficult it is to strip an engine in 100-degree heat with tropical downpours every day when the ground below you is just grass with no concrete in sight. Such operations were accomplished at Henderson field but that was one airfield helping defend a small salient, as opposed to the infrastructure needed to support a robust defence of an entire country. Even in Singapore, the RAF resorted to repurposing aircraft packing crates to augment tented accommodation because there weren't enough barrack blocks for the increase in personnel during 1941. Shoestring doesn't even begin to describe the defensive deficits that Far East Command had to overcome.
 
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Size of force is not just dependent on the size of the area to be defended. It also must consider the scale of the threat and the criticality of the defended territory to strategic success. There was no need to replicate Fighter Command to defend Malaya and Singapore but you needed more than just 4 squadrons of fighters. The usable Japanese fighter force aligned against Malaya and Singapore outnumbered the RAF fighters by almost 4-to-1...and that's before we consider any Japanese bomber forces.

As important as sheer aircraft numbers, you also need the defensive infrastructure to support operations: early warning systems and processes, logistics, all-weather runways, adequate personnel accommodation etc. Many of the forward airfields in northern Malaya were little more than cleared areas of rainforest with little in the way of physical infrastructure. It's challenging to perform even second-line maintenance activities when you don't have a hangar to put the aircraft in. In northern Malaya, groundcrew resorted to crude shelters to cover the cockpit and engines because doing the work in the open was so difficult. Imagine how difficult it is to strip an engine in 100-degree heat with tropical downpours every day when the ground below you is just grass with no concrete in sight. Such operations were accomplished at Henderson field but that was one airfield helping defend a small salient, as opposed to the infrastructure needed to support a robust defence of an entire country. Even in Singapore, the RAF resorted to repurposing aircraft packing crates to augment tented accommodation because there weren't enough barrack blocks for the increase in personnel during 1941. Shoestring doesn't even begin to describe the defensive deficits that Far East Command had to overcome.

I think you'll find that Malaya alone generated one seventh of the profit generated by the British Empire. To me that justifies 2 Battleships and a carrier permanently on station, and an army and air force one third the size of what we had in the UK. So, what's that 230 front line fighters with a similar number in reserve? 850k troops, or one third of the Indian Army? Malaya was a valuable asset.
 
I think you'll find that Malaya alone generated one seventh of the profit generated by the British Empire. To me that justifies 2 Battleships and a carrier permanently on station, and an army and air force one third the size of what we had in the UK. So, what's that 230 front line fighters with a similar number in reserve? 850k troops, or one third of the Indian Army? Malaya was a valuable asset.
Indeed, and one hopelessly neglected. Apparently the rubber plantation owners refused to release the necessary labour nor land easements for defensive works to be constructed. When the Japanese took the place they found tons of ready mix concrete just waiting to be built into pill boxes. Malaya should have been a modern day Lines of Torres Vedras, grinding the Japanese down through successive lines of defence whilst British naval supremacy prevented amphibious flanking attempts.

Canada was producing both Hurricanes and Valentines (with excellent American diesel engines), and both could have been quickly railed to Vancouver to shipment to Malaya, but both instead went to Russia. Though to make it in time the tanks need to start perhaps six months earlier, as it wasn't until 27 May 1941 that the first of 1,400 Valentine tanks rolls off the production line at CPR's Angus Shops in Montreal. See details here CPR Set-off Siding - Foundation Library Article. But Canadian Hurricanes would be very feasible to get to Malaya in time - In Jan. 1940 the first Hawker Hurricanes began rolling off CC&F's plant in Fort William Ontario. Imagine this below image at Singapore in summer 1940 when the first Canadian Hurricanes arrive.

761657F6-7FBC-4F21-A6A1-80681F5E6917.jpeg


There was a carrier on station in the Indian Ocean, the little HMS Hermes, and submarines at Singapore until they were recalled to the Mediterranean. Had Ark Royal, Glorious and Courageous not been lost I'd like to send Hermes home and see these three permanently in the Indian Ocean, imagine them at Singapore. Hopefully with Sea Hurricanes, not Fulmars.

lSkLK0um_YdVBIG7pzRqGUOvavR_eMWj1E_0NsLYH-w.jpg?width=704&height=368.jpg
 
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buffnut453 buffnut453 good points. I assume the IJAF operating first from occupied French airstrips and then from captured British ones were equally challenged.

Yes, but it's a different proposition when you are attacking at the time and place of your choosing than the problem of defending against an attack the time and location of which are unknown. The IJAAF fighters only deployed to French Indochina just a few days before the offensive began. They then rapidly advanced into Thai airfields as well as those abandoned by the RAF. They didn't stay in one place for long and didn't need to maintain sizeable forces behind as they advanced. In short, they could afford to make do with minimal maintenance because, if all went to plan, they'd have ample downtime after victory to reconstitute the force.
 
I think you'll find that Malaya alone generated one seventh of the profit generated by the British Empire. To me that justifies 2 Battleships and a carrier permanently on station, and an army and air force one third the size of what we had in the UK. So, what's that 230 front line fighters with a similar number in reserve? 850k troops, or one third of the Indian Army? Malaya was a valuable asset.


Trouble is that at the end of 1941 the British had been fighting a war in Europe for two years and it was not going well, tensions were rising in the far east and they did have two battleships on station, although arriving just in time to go into action.
The Japanese moved faster than expected and the expected help from the US was not going to arrive as the US had troubles of their own. In mid and late 1941 it was the US deployment of it's first fast battleships to the Atlantic (even if the US was not at war) that allowed the British to plan for and actually deploy capital ships to the far east. After Pearl Harbor (and the invasion of the Philippines the expected US navy deployments to the far east did not happen.
 
Indeed, and one hopelessly neglected. Apparently the rubber plantation owners refused to release the necessary labour nor land easements for defensive works to be constructed. When the Japanese took the place they found tons of ready mix concrete just waiting to be built into pill boxes. Malaya should have been a modern day Lines of Torres Vedras, grinding the Japanese down through successive lines of defence whilst British naval supremacy prevented amphibious flanking attempts.

Canada was producing both Hurricanes and Valentines (with excellent American diesel engines), and both could have been quickly railed to Vancouver to shipment to Malaya, but both instead went to Russia. Though to make it in time the tanks need to start perhaps six months earlier, as it wasn't until 27 May 1941 that the first of 1,400 Valentine tanks rolls off the production line at CPR's Angus Shops in Montreal. See details here CPR Set-off Siding - Foundation Library Article. But Canadian Hurricanes would be very feasible to get to Malaya in time - In Jan. 1940 the first Hawker Hurricanes began rolling off CC&F's plant in Fort William Ontario. Imagine this below image at Singapore in summer 1940 when the first Canadian Hurricanes arrive.

View attachment 559202

There was a carrier on station in the Indian Ocean, the little HMS Hermes, and submarines at Singapore until they were recalled to the Mediterranean. Had Ark Royal, Glorious and Courageous not been lost I'd like to send Hermes home and see these three permanently in the Indian Ocean, imagine them at Singapore. Hopefully with Sea Hurricanes, not Fulmars.

View attachment 559203
I think India would also justify, 2 carriers, four battleships in the Indian Ocean and the other 2/3 of the Indian Army for defence. The RIAF was a paltry 10 squadrons, I'd allocate twice what I suggested for Malaya. So we defended the UK, kept control of the Med and Suez, but lost the 'Jewel in the Crown' and our most valuable Far Eastern asset, just bonkers. There were only Uganda and Gold Coast in Africa that made a nett profit for us, so sheer Imperial lunacy had run amok.
 
Indeed, and one hopelessly neglected. Apparently the rubber plantation owners refused to release the necessary labour nor land easements for defensive works to be constructed. When the Japanese took the place they found tons of ready mix concrete just waiting to be built into pill boxes. Malaya should have been a modern day Lines of Torres Vedras, grinding the Japanese down through successive lines of defence whilst British naval supremacy prevented amphibious flanking attempts.

Canada was producing both Hurricanes and Valentines (with excellent American diesel engines), and both could have been quickly railed to Vancouver to shipment to Malaya, but both instead went to Russia. Though to make it in time the tanks need to start perhaps six months earlier, as it wasn't until 27 May 1941 that the first of 1,400 Valentine tanks rolls off the production line at CPR's Angus Shops in Montreal. See details here CPR Set-off Siding - Foundation Library Article. But Canadian Hurricanes would be very feasible to get to Malaya in time - In Jan. 1940 the first Hawker Hurricanes began rolling off CC&F's plant in Fort William Ontario. Imagine this below image at Singapore in summer 1940 when the first Canadian Hurricanes arrive.

View attachment 559202

There was a carrier on station in the Indian Ocean, the little HMS Hermes, and submarines at Singapore until they were recalled to the Mediterranean. Had Ark Royal, Glorious and Courageous not been lost I'd like to send Hermes home and see these three permanently in the Indian Ocean, imagine them at Singapore. Hopefully with Sea Hurricanes, not Fulmars.

View attachment 559203
I'm afraid that deploying Ark Royal, Courageous and Glorious would be supplying 3 target ships for the Japanese to sink. They were the finest torpedo pilots, planes and torpedos for a good portion of the war. Sea Hurricanes, Fulmers and Swordfish vs Zeroes, Val's and Kate's is not a winning proposition. All British anti shipping aircraft should be land based. (Not sure when the Beaufighter was first available, but I would love to have seen how they did in a Midway type scenario against an aircraft carrier. I think it would have done well)
 
I think India would also justify, 2 carriers, four battleships in the Indian Ocean and the other 2/3 of the Indian Army for defence. The RIAF was a paltry 10 squadrons, I'd allocate twice what I suggested for Malaya. So we defended the UK, kept control of the Med and Suez, but lost the 'Jewel in the Crown' and our most valuable Far Eastern asset, just bonkers. There were only Uganda and Gold Coast in Africa that made a nett profit for us, so sheer Imperial lunacy had run amok.
I agree India deserves more. We need to remember that Malaya was not a true British colony, unlike India, Singapore and Hong Kong. Malaya was still a semi-independent sultanate, albeit with British trade treaties. If Malaya was profitable for Britain it was from privately owned rubber plantation, not from any sort of imperial tributes.
 
I agree India deserves more. We need to remember that Malaya was not a true British colony, unlike India, Singapore and Hong Kong. Malaya was still a semi-independent sultanate, albeit with British trade treaties. If Malaya was profitable for Britain it was from privately owned rubber plantation, not from any sort of imperial tributes.
The Straits Settlements were a British colony, Malaya was made up of independent Sultanates as you say. North Borneo and Sarawak were colonies, Brunei was not. India was 75% British, the rest Princely states, which I think brings me back to what I mentioned in another thread that we should have retained Tiger, Erin, the Iron Duke class and Agincourt instead of scrapping them then modernising them to form the basis of a permanent Far East Fleet to deter Japan.
 
The Straits Settlements were a British colony, Malaya was made up of independent Sultanates as you say. North Borneo and Sarawak were colonies, Brunei was not.
i was in Singapore and KL last year for work and almost took a tour to Sarawak to visit the White Raja sites.

As an ex-pat Brit and Canadian I find the colonial sites fascinating. In 2016 I spent I think six hours at the former fortress in Hong Kong, where my Canadians had their last stand.
 
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i was in Singapore and KL last year for work and almost took a tour to Sarawak to visit the White Raja sites.
I had a stopover in Singapore in 1987, they all seemed proud to have been a British colony, which was a surprise. Visited the Sultans palace in Johore too. Then Kenya in the Summer where the old folk thought things were better under British rule.
 
another thread that we should have retained Tiger, Erin, the Iron Duke class and Agincourt instead of scrapping them then modernising them to form the basis of a permanent Far East Fleet to deter Japan.

that would have either violated the treaties or caused the treaties not to be agreed to in the first place.
England was near broke after WW I and welcomed the treaties as way to get out of another arms race. Perhaps they should have stayed in and tried to bankrupt Japan,
However a motley collection of obsolete WW I Battleships of dubious value aside from showing the flag was not likely to change the situation much.
The Tiger stayed in Service until 1931-32 when the Hood came back from refit.

Without the treaty the Japanese might have completed several of their post WW I battleships/battle cruisers before finances caused them to stop. Even an early 1920s battleship/battle cruiser would have been in a totally different league than pre WW I battleships you are proposing to keep, not to mention the international ramifications. Keeping the Agincourt (or trying to pay Turkey for her rather than handing her over) might have helped tip the balance of Turkey going over to the central powers when WW II came along.
 
that would have either violated the treaties or caused the treaties not to be agreed to in the first place.
England was near broke after WW I and welcomed the treaties as way to get out of another arms race. Perhaps they should have stayed in and tried to bankrupt Japan,
However a motley collection of obsolete WW I Battleships of dubious value aside from showing the flag was not likely to change the situation much.
The Tiger stayed in Service until 1931-32 when the Hood came back from refit.

Without the treaty the Japanese might have completed several of their post WW I battleships/battle cruisers before finances caused them to stop. Even an early 1920s battleship/battle cruiser would have been in a totally different league than pre WW I battleships you are proposing to keep, not to mention the international ramifications. Keeping the Agincourt (or trying to pay Turkey for her rather than handing her over) might have helped tip the balance of Turkey going over to the central powers when WW II came along.
Tiger was on a par with the Kongo class before they were upgraded to Battleships. Iron Duke class had central turret space below which could have housed more powerful boilers. Washington Treaty doesn't insist on scrapping, just demilitarisation, so remove half the guns in 1931/32. Japan walks out the League of Nations, then 33-36, you rebuild Tiger and the Iron Duke class suitable for WW2 in the Far East, honour is satisfied. America won't do anything as we were giving them favourable trading terms in the Empire at that time. Should have given Erin and Agincourt to the Indians after WW1 so that they had a navy.
 
Tiger was on a par with the Kongo class before they were upgraded to Battleships. Iron Duke class had central turret space below which could have housed more powerful boilers. Washington Treaty doesn't insist on scrapping, just demilitarisation, so remove half the guns in 1931/32. Japan walks out the League of Nations, then 33-36, you rebuild Tiger and the Iron Duke class suitable for WW2 in the Far East, honour is satisfied. America won't do anything as we were giving them favourable trading terms in the Empire at that time. Should have given Erin and Agincourt to the Indians after WW1 so that they had a navy.
Tiger or Iron Duke aren't needed for defending Malaya other British territory in the Indian-Pacific. Just use the warships you have better. Don't use Courageous for ASW, for example.

The Eastern Fleet that deployed to Ceylon in March 1942 or an equivalent should have deployed to Singapore in Summer 1941. When Japan invaded FIC in Sept 1940 the game was up, everyone in Britain's military leadership should have known and prepared for the coming attack.
 
It is not about honor or keeping one's word, it is about trying to hang on to ships that were obsolescent in 1922 and totally obsolete in the 1930s.

If the R class (newer ships) only got minor referbs between the wars the chances of these relics getting any real improvements are very slim indeed.

just about all of them, if not all, were coal fired or mixed fired at best (oil sprayed on the coal fires) which makes for very slow refueling. Yes ships were converted to oil firing but that meant new boilers and on battleships that means cutting holes (or taking out the rivets) in multiple decks, some of the armored decks. A major rebuild.
There is only so much money in the budget, if you are spending money on these ships, what aren't you spending it on? new Cruisers or Destroyers? The Nelson or Rodney?

Most of these pre war ships had max elevation on the guns of 15 to 20 degrees, by the end of WW I 30 degrees of elevation was pretty much the standard.
WNBR_15-42_mk1_Vanguard_SN_trt_pic.jpg

HMS Vanguard with old turrets modified to higher elevation. Notice the "eyebrows" in the turret rook needed for the extra elevation.
By the early 1920s new battleships were often being designed with 40 degrees or more of elevation for even more range.

the First two KGVs were laid down Jan 1st 1937 and ordered in mid 1936. Would refurbing these old battleships cut into the KGV class?

Amagi class battlecruiser.
download.jpg

10-16 in guns and a speed of 30 kts as planned in 1919. Guns elevate to 30 degrees, 41,200 tons.
they planned 4, due to treaties they scrapped 2 and one was converted to a carrier and the other wrecked on the stocks by an earthquake.

Tosa class battleship
only 39,900 tons. 10-16 in guns only 26.5 kts but thicker armor.

even if only 4 of these ships (or their successors ) are completed it throws the idea of fareast British fleet of pre WW I junkers in the trash bin.
 

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