Shortround6
Lieutenant General
You might want to check out the HMS Hermes, 3 squadrons of shore based Hurricanes weren't enough.
FAA aircraft
- Thread starter renrich
- Start date
You might want to check out the HMS Hermes, 3 squadrons of shore based Hurricanes weren't enough.
36feet10inches
Staff Sergeant
Interesting debate this, my interest in British naval aviation is quite new and I don't consider myself well informed to participate, however I have noted from the bit of reading I've done that what works over land doesn't necessarily work over water!
pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
yeah and beside that they couldn't deflection shoot .
- Thread starter
- #24
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Of course PB you are right, they were not trained in deflection shooting. They also had outdated aircraft and they did not carry enough aircraft to be able to put up an effective CAP and still have an effective strike force and the British carriers were not very habitable in the Pacific hot weather and probably suffered, as the IJN carriers did in slow strike launching times because of not being able to start and warm up engines on the hangar deck. Add to that that their doctrine was not to attack land targets so they were not well suited to fight against the Japanese and probably would have suffered unacceptable losses with little success.
pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
The FAA was built to fight in the Atlantic I think the Brits underestimated the Japanese as much as the US
- Thread starter
- #26
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
PB, agree that all parties underestimated the Japanese, probably in part because of racism and a lot of Anglos died as a result. Interesting that the same underestimating seemed to be present in the design and manufacture of automobiles.
parsifal
Colonel
Yet Swordfish, and Albacores did just that against hard manouvering targets (except carriers because there werent any) up to and including battleships thoughout those critical early years......Bismarck for example was hit by Swordfish wahist manouvering at nearly 30 knots.
Swordfish were remarkably tough machines, and able to operate in poor weather conditions and at night, mostly because the crews were trained for it, but also because the aircraft were set up for that purpose. Taranto was delivered in the dead of night, as was the attacks on Bismarck. Somervilles illstarred defence against the IJN during its raidsw into the Indian Ocean were based on the idea of attacking the Japanese at night. This explains why the japanese retreated each time night fell....they had a healthy respect for the British carrier borne night capability. night strikes undertaken by the FAA is something neither the USN or the IJN ever really treained for until the latter part of the war, and USN carriers refused to operate north of Arctic Circle. These niche capabilities enjoyed by the RN actually went a long way to offsetting their appraent lack of perfomrance, and these poor weather capabilities are often overlooked in the straight up performance assessments
- Thread starter
- #28
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Are you saying that the Swordfish from Ark Royal attacked Bismarck in the dead of night? That is interesting. I never realised that until now. My source does say that the attacks took place from 2047/2125 on 26 May. Would it be dark at those latitudes at those times? If it was very poor visibility, that probably accounts for the Swordfish being able to execute a successful attack. The TBDs at Coral Sea and Midway had a very difficult time getting into position for successful runs and slow as they were, they had a speed advantage over the Swordfish.
parsifal
Colonel
Having not been in those northern latitudes Ive not witnessed the effects of twilight . However they were not that far north either.....about 500 miles from Brest (roughly). Ive trained south of Tasmania, in the southern hemisphere, which is roughly similar latitude only south of the equator, and it is dark by 2000 most of the year.
The Swordfish were assisted to the target by the cruiser Sheffield, which was unfortunately the target of the first strike. This occurred as a result of crew inexperience and failing light. The second strike, delivered by the experienced crews off the Ark Royal were again guided onto the target by the shadowing cruisers, then illuminated by flares. There was always an aircraft detailed to drop flares and provide assistance to the remaining aircraft of the squadron by radio direction. I used to believe that ASV might have been used during the Bismarck operation, but I now am doubtful. ASV radar was fitted early in 1941, such that by the latter part of the year, Swordfish were using it to itercept Italians merchant convoys crosssing the ditch . They planned to use it in the Indian Ocean operations, and it was used in Madagascar. RDF was used more or less all the time after 1943 when Swordfish were more or less used exclusively on ASW patrol. An ASV equipped aircraft could not carry torpedoes, but it could carry other stores like flares and I believe 5" rockets.
I dont believe that Swordfish were demonstrably more vulnerable than more modern torpedo aircraft (except the very fast types like the C6 Saiun or the heavily protected TBF), as it wqs frequently airborne when German airborne twin engined fighters were about. What was lacking in the RN were sufficient fighters to protect the strike aircraft. In the early part of the war, airstrikes were seldom provided with any escort, there being insufficient to even provide adequate protection for the carriers themselves.
The RN was as surprised as anybody to find that fleets, and carriers in particular could operate in waters dominated by LBA. They reduced the risks by approaching at high speed by night, hitting the target, and then running like hell to get out of SE fighter rqange at least. The carriers were ffrequently attacked by longer ranged TE aircraft, of all types and nationalities, but in these situations the limited CAPs available were usually able to deal with the threat. There was a momentary lapse of caution in January 1941, which almost cost the RN the illustrious. Formidable was deliberately sent into enemy controlled airspace by day in May 1941, and was heavily damaged as well. I dont believe that the swordfish groups attached to either of those carriers were suffering excessive losses in either of those actions
The Swordfish were assisted to the target by the cruiser Sheffield, which was unfortunately the target of the first strike. This occurred as a result of crew inexperience and failing light. The second strike, delivered by the experienced crews off the Ark Royal were again guided onto the target by the shadowing cruisers, then illuminated by flares. There was always an aircraft detailed to drop flares and provide assistance to the remaining aircraft of the squadron by radio direction. I used to believe that ASV might have been used during the Bismarck operation, but I now am doubtful. ASV radar was fitted early in 1941, such that by the latter part of the year, Swordfish were using it to itercept Italians merchant convoys crosssing the ditch . They planned to use it in the Indian Ocean operations, and it was used in Madagascar. RDF was used more or less all the time after 1943 when Swordfish were more or less used exclusively on ASW patrol. An ASV equipped aircraft could not carry torpedoes, but it could carry other stores like flares and I believe 5" rockets.
I dont believe that Swordfish were demonstrably more vulnerable than more modern torpedo aircraft (except the very fast types like the C6 Saiun or the heavily protected TBF), as it wqs frequently airborne when German airborne twin engined fighters were about. What was lacking in the RN were sufficient fighters to protect the strike aircraft. In the early part of the war, airstrikes were seldom provided with any escort, there being insufficient to even provide adequate protection for the carriers themselves.
The RN was as surprised as anybody to find that fleets, and carriers in particular could operate in waters dominated by LBA. They reduced the risks by approaching at high speed by night, hitting the target, and then running like hell to get out of SE fighter rqange at least. The carriers were ffrequently attacked by longer ranged TE aircraft, of all types and nationalities, but in these situations the limited CAPs available were usually able to deal with the threat. There was a momentary lapse of caution in January 1941, which almost cost the RN the illustrious. Formidable was deliberately sent into enemy controlled airspace by day in May 1941, and was heavily damaged as well. I dont believe that the swordfish groups attached to either of those carriers were suffering excessive losses in either of those actions
