FAA Seafire vs Corsair

[yulzari]

Corsair was 100 times better than the Seafire, any version

I know which one was thrown over the side into the ocean at the end of the war………

 

[ThomasP]

Hey Wild_Bill_Kelso,

re "The 20mm has the HE shell burst but that isn't such a huge difference as to make up for that."

While the 20mm AP/I also had about 25%-30% more penetration than the .50 cal AP/I, the HE content was what made most of the difference. The increased penetration meant that the 20mm was more likely to reach something important, like the fuel tanks, engine, pilot, etc. The explosive content of the HE round meant that if it hit the fuel tank there was near zero chance of the self-sealing materials being effective, plus near misses to the pilot or other important items in the aircraft could still cause a mission kill or shoot down. 20mm HE rounds were often able to destroy enough skin and control surfaces to cause loss of aerodynamic control.

The USN switched over to 700-750 rpm 20mm cannon as soon as they reasonably could after the war, in spite of the fact that there were .50 cal variants that fired at 1300 rpm. The USAF took until the post-Korean War period to change over. If not for the large number of .50 cal guns left over after the war, along with around 500,000,000 rounds in storage, the USAF would have switched over to 20mm sooner.


re ammo loads for the Seafire

Seafire Mk IIC and Mk III had belt-fed versions of the 20mm, with 120 rpg.

 

[Shortround6]

The USN switched over to 700-750 rpm 20mm cannon as soon as they reasonably could after the war, in spite of the fact that there were .50 cal variants that fired at 1300 rpm. The USAF took until the post-Korean War period to change over. The USAF would have changed over sooner, but there were so many .50 cal guns left over after the war, and around 500,000,000 rounds in storage.

It is a bit more complicated than that. The M3 .50 cal did fire at 1200-1300rpm, but the M3 had to be built as such, it could not be converted with a parts kit. So all the .50 cal armed jet fighters got new build guns. The Jets were also using the M23 incendiary without the armor piercing core that the M8 API used. Much higher veleocity and much more incendiary material. However ALL USAAF night/all weather (except the F-82?) got 20mm guns or were planed for 20mm guns so the USAAF seemed to be of 2 minds.
But in either case they were not using left over WW II guns or leftover .50 cal ammo.
What the Piston powered planes got is another story.

And yes the USAAF did take the wrong path but it was not the surplus path.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

A lot of difference between "much better", twice as good, and 100 times better.

For some reason the Spitfire very, very rarely got two speed single stage superchargers, either Seafires or land based.
So for Seafires it was either a high flying single speed Merlin or a low flying single speed Merlin or a Griffon engine.
Not sure if fitting Merlin 32s to some Seafires was an attempt at engine standardization with the Barracuda?

In fact the longer engine mount would have helped the Seafires CoG issues (due to the weight of the arrestor hook)

 

[EwenS]

There are a few things about the Seafire operations at Salerno that usually go unmentioned but which had a big impact on the overall loss and damage figures.

Firstly, many of the pilots were inexperienced, being the product of the rapid increase in the size of the FAA in WW2. Added to that 6 of the 11 squadrons in Forces V had only begun to operate the Seafire from March 1943, with 2 of those having had fighter flights of Seafires added to their main equipment of ASW Swordfish in June (the Swordfish were ashore during Avalanche).

The Seafires on the fleet carriers in the Med in 1943 do not seem to have suffered anything like the losses suffered by Force V off Salerno. That includes the two squadrons on Illustrious & Formidable during that operation. The other fleet carrier operating Seafires at that time was Indomitable carrying some 40 in July 1943. But she was torpedoed and her 3 squadrons were transferred to the escort carriers Battler, Stalker and Hunter between the 11 & 28 August 1943 giving them very little opportunity to adjust to the much smaller flight decks before sailing for Avalanche (36 of the 106 Seafires deployed in Force V came from these 3 squadrons).

On top of that the carriers had little opportunity to work together prior to the operation. While the 4 CVE departed the UK together, they encountered a severe gale en route which prevented flying and forced Hunter back for repairs. So while 3 arrived at Gib on 9 Aug, Hunter only arrived on the 24th. They sailed from Malta for Avalanche late on 7th Sept. There was therefore very little time for them to work up as a group.

Unicorn, despite having the largest flight deck in Force V seems to have suffered the greatest losses. Crossing her stern has been described as being like falling off a cliff due to the airflow characteristics around her stern due to her aircraft maintenance ship design origins. Not good news for the Seafire with its fragile undercarriage.

Then we have to add in the low winds experienced during the operation and a carrier group limited to 18 knots, the max speed of the CVE. Added to that the Seafire L.IIc being operated were incompatible with the US catapult gear (The Seafire XV which entered service from May 1945 was the first British aircraft designed for tail down launching US style. And RATOG was in the future.

All of this wouldn't have been a problem if the landings had gone as planned. Force V was scheduled to provide air cover for 1 day until an airfield could be built ashore. Ultimately it was tasked for 3 days.

In 1943 the only fighters available to the FAA were the Sea Hurricane, Martlet and Seafire with the Seafire being the fastest of the lot. The first Corsir squadron formed in June 1943 in the USA and the first squadron received Hellcats while in Northern Ireland in July.

I posted details of the story behind the acquisition of the P-40 drop tanks by the BPF last Oct on another thread. I'll repeat it here for simplicity.

"When the British Pacific Fleet formed in Nov 1944, Indefatigable was the only carrier with Seafires as its main fighter type. The others three were using Corsairs and Hellcats. Due to its short range and good performance at lower levels Indefatigable's Seafire squadrons were initially used to provide CAP for the Fleet. At that time only the 30 & 45 gal slipper tanks seem to have been available to them. However in June 1945 it became apparent that both Indefatigable and the newly arrived Implacable, also with Seafires, would need to play a far greater offensive role in upcoming operations over Japan itself. Why? Because Seafires would form a much greater proportion of the fighters on the carriers (Indomitable with Hellcats was in refit so it was going to be 2 with Corsairs and 2 with Seafires). Both ships then began looking for a solution to increase the range of their Seafire III.

Indefatigable, being in Australia at the time, after operation Iceberg, talked to the RAAF, and obtained a supply of 90 gal slipper tanks from them.

Implacable was in Manus in the Admiralty Is at the beginning of June 1945. Her Seafire squadrons experimented with the 30, 45 and 90 gal slipper tanks but they experienced problems with the connections on them. After talking to the Americans, it was discovered that there was a supply of 89 or 90 imp gal drop tanks (sources vary on the exact size) at a base in New Guinea that looked, from the drawings they were able to obtain, like they might prove suitable. A deal was done (currency changed hands - 2 "crates" of Johnny Walker whisky according to Commander Mike Crosley, the 880 squadron CO on Implacable) and a destroyer despatched to collect them. 100 "rusty" P-40 drop tanks were put aboard the carrier on her return to Manus on 17 June from Operation Inmate to Truk. The Seafire bomb racks were then modified by the ship's engineering staff to allow these tanks to be carried. That work was complete by the time she sailed for Japanese waters with the rest of the Fleet on 28 June 1945. And very successful they proved in July/Aug operations off Japan. But there was never an official clearance for the use of these tanks.


That is not to say that they 45 90 gal slipper tanks did not prove equally successful in these operations. Implacable was, by all accounts, a very happy and efficient ship. It is just that her air group has attracted much more attention. She carried official photographers and a film crew so there is much more coverage of her July/Aug operations off japan than probably any of the other RN carriers. And of course Mike Crosley and others who were serving aboard her have written their autobiographies covering the period."

There were constant improvements to the Seafire as each model came along. The Mk.XV, which entered production in late 1944, saw the introduction of the "sting" hook as seen on US aircraft to the production line around April 1945. A vast improvement to the undercarriage was made with the Mk.XVII which was both stronger and had a increased oleo stroke. It began to roll off the production lines in small numbers from April 1945 with the first squadron receiving them in Sept 1945.

While the Seafire attracts a lot of attention for Avalanche it receives very little for the rest of its wartime career when loss rates were much lower as experience was gained with them. So we have:-

Operation Torch - initial deployment in 5 squadrons
Operation Husky - 3 squadrons on Indomitable and 1 on Formidable
D-Day - operations from land bases in southern England for gunnery spotting
Operation Dragoon - 4 CVE with 4 squadrons
Operations in the Aegean between Sept & Nov 1944 with same 4 squadrons
Operations off Norway throughout 1944 that involved 4 squadrons
Operation Meridian off Sumatra and Iceberg off Okinawa with Indefatigable
Final operations off Japan in July/Aug 1945 with 4 squadrons on Indefatigable and Implacable where the Seafires took on an offensive role for the first time in the war against Japan
Operations in the East Indies in 1945 involving 3 squadrons.

I note a degree of criticism about the Seafire's performance at high (20,000 ft) altitudes. When it was drawing up specifications for fighters in 1940 the spec that led to the Firefly sought an aircraft with a max speed at an operational height of 15,000ft and the Firebrand spec at 15-20,000ft because that was where the FAA expected to fight. As it turned out the vast majority of the of work asked of FAA fighters occurred below 10,000ft. Why? Because the targets were shadowers and medium level and low level torpedo bombers. The conclusion reached was that it was better to catch low level fast recce aircraft before they could report the position of the fleet. Early Seafire Ib proved incapable of catching Ju88s so that led to the development of the L.IIc where the "rate of climb and initial acceleration were far in excess of any other naval fighter produced during the war..." (The Seafire The Spitfire that went to Sea by David Brown). With that in mind the FAA chose to have about half of the Seafire IIc and most of the Seafire III delivered with engines rated for maximum performance at low levels, those being Merlin 32 and 55M. And also why the next development was to Griffon engined variants with similarly low rated engines.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Hey Wild_Bill_Kelso,

re "The 20mm has the HE shell burst but that isn't such a huge difference as to make up for that."

While the 20mm AP/I also had about 25%-30% more penetration than the .50 cal AP/I, the HE content was what made most of the difference. The increased penetration meant that the 20mm was more likely to reach something important, like the fuel tanks, engine, pilot, etc. The explosive content of the HE round meant that if it hit the fuel tank there was near zero chance of the self-sealing materials being effective, plus near misses to the pilot or other important items in the aircraft could still cause a mission kill or shoot down. 20mm HE rounds were often able to destroy enough skin and control surfaces to cause loss of aerodynamic control.

The USN switched over to 700-750 rpm 20mm cannon as soon as they reasonably could after the war, in spite of the fact that there were .50 cal variants that fired at 1300 rpm. The USAF took until the post-Korean War period to change over. If not for the large number of .50 cal guns left over after the war, along with around 500,000,000 rounds in storage, the USAF would have switched over to 20mm sooner.


re ammo loads for the Seafire

Seafire Mk IIC and Mk III had belt-fed versions of the 20mm, with 120 rpg.

Thank you for saving me a post! A 20 mm shell was a 100 times better than a 50 cal!

One of my favorite reports, which I recommend everyone one TRULY interested in the subject should read, " Aircraft Vulnerability in World War II" by the Rand Corporation states the following:
"Serious damage is defined as that which had no significant influence on effective operation of the aircraft as a military weapon, slight damage as that which had no significant influence.
The above table shows that of the damage on returned aircraft approximately one-third of damage due to anti-aircraft fire, one-fourth of damage due to .30 and .50 caliber fire, and two thirds of damage due to 20mm fire was serious."
This data is presented in the table "Degree of Damage to USN Aircraft by Japanese Action September 1944 - August 1945". Note that much of the 20mm must have come from the Oerlikon based weapons used by the Japanese Zero which had much less penetrating power than the Hispano.
In the interest of fairness (there's a concept) I further parsed the data for the .50 from the .30. 40% of the damage due to .50 caliber fire was serious. This was still significantly less than the destruction caused by the 20 mm.

 

[EwenS]

In fact the longer engine mount would have helped the Seafires CoG issues (due to the weight of the arrestor hook)

It would also have added to the difficulties of deck landing them due to the view over an even longer nose. When the Mk.XV came along the Griffon had a lower thrust line which did not cause so much of a problem.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

IIRC the only US carriers to venture into the Med operationally in WW2 were:-

Wasp in April / May 1942 ferrying Spitfires to Malta. She retained at least 11 of the 27 F4F-4 of VF-71 during these operations, having left the rest of her airgroup ashore at Hatston in the Orkney Islands. They only flew CAP and had no engagement with the enemy.

The CVEs Kasaan Bay and Tulagi in Aug 1944 for Operation Dragoon. They took the Hellcat equipped VF-74 (32 F6F-5/3N) and VOF-1 (26 F6F-5) into action over Southern France.

Ranger took the F4F-4 (24 aircraft) equipped VF-4 with her while operating with the Home Fleet between Aug & Nov 1943.

And this ignores all the CVE operating in the Atlantic with composite squadrons containing F4F-4/FM-1/FM-2 from in the ASW role from early 1943, as well as the US carriers involved in Operation Torch in Nov 1942.

There was the fighting around the Torch landing, when the USN engaged the Vichy French for a short but violent engagement, and both sides claimed a fair number of casualties. That is probably where most of the 27 F4F victories in the Med come from.

 

[EwenS]

There was the fighting around the Torch landing, when the USN engaged the Vichy French for a short but violent engagement, and both sides claimed a fair number of casualties. That is probably where most of the 27 F4F victories in the Med come from.

Then someone's geography is a bit off. During Operation Torch, the US carriers (Ranger, Sangamon, Suwannee, Santee and Chenango) never entered the Med. They covered the US Western Task Force landings in Morocco on the Atlantic coast.

The Centre and Eastern Task Forces were covered by British carriers.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Hey Wild_Bill_Kelso,

re "The 20mm has the HE shell burst but that isn't such a huge difference as to make up for that."

While the 20mm AP/I also had about 25%-30% more penetration than the .50 cal AP/I, the HE content was what made most of the difference. The increased penetration meant that the 20mm was more likely to reach something important, like the fuel tanks, engine, pilot, etc. The explosive content of the HE round meant that if it hit the fuel tank there was near zero chance of the self-sealing materials being effective, plus near misses to the pilot or other important items in the aircraft could still cause a mission kill or shoot down. 20mm HE rounds were often able to destroy enough skin and control surfaces to cause loss of aerodynamic control.

You are overstating the case there. I know for a fact that numerous US and UK fighters operating in the Med and the Pacific survived multiple 20mm cannon strikes and flew home. The cannon shell explosion caused more damage but it was not going to automatically destroy a well built plane.

This guy's 79th FG P-40 was hit with six 20mm cannon shells and made it back, including 3 in the wings (where there is a fuel tank) and one right behind the armor plate where he was sitting (where there is another fuel tank). He made it back and survived the war.

Conversely, aircraft like the Hellcat, Corsair, P-40, and P-51 which had the typical six .50 cal armament had very little trouble shooting down Axis fighters, particularly in the Pacific where most of the Naval combat was taking place. There is no getting around that six guns shoot more bullets than two guns.

The USN switched over to 700-750 rpm 20mm cannon as soon as they reasonably could after the war, in spite of the fact that there were .50 cal variants that fired at 1300 rpm. The USAF took until the post-Korean War period to change over. If not for the large number of .50 cal guns left over after the war, along with around 500,000,000 rounds in storage, the USAF would have switched over to 20mm sooner.


re ammo loads for the Seafire

Seafire Mk IIC and Mk III had belt-fed versions of the 20mm, with 120 rpg.

Apparently some of the later Seafire marks that had the belt fed guns had ammunition left out to save weight.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I know which one was thrown over the side into the ocean at the end of the war………

Corsairs were still being used by multiple nations through the Korean War and into the 60s. Were Seafires?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

There are a few things about the Seafire operations at Salerno that usually go unmentioned but which had a big impact on the overall loss and damage figures.

Firstly, many of the pilots were inexperienced, being the product of the rapid increase in the size of the FAA in WW2. Added to that 6 of the 11 squadrons in Forces V had only begun to operate the Seafire from March 1943, with 2 of those having had fighter flights of Seafires added to their main equipment of ASW Swordfish in June (the Swordfish were ashore during Avalanche).

The Seafires on the fleet carriers in the Med in 1943 do not seem to have suffered anything like the losses suffered by Force V off Salerno. That includes the two squadrons on Illustrious & Formidable during that operation. The other fleet carrier operating Seafires at that time was Indomitable carrying some 40 in July 1943. But she was torpedoed and her 3 squadrons were transferred to the escort carriers Battler, Stalker and Hunter between the 11 & 28 August 1943 giving them very little opportunity to adjust to the much smaller flight decks before sailing for Avalanche (36 of the 106 Seafires deployed in Force V came from these 3 squadrons).

On top of that the carriers had little opportunity to work together prior to the operation. While the 4 CVE departed the UK together, they encountered a severe gale en route which prevented flying and forced Hunter back for repairs. So while 3 arrived at Gib on 9 Aug, Hunter only arrived on the 24th. They sailed from Malta for Avalanche late on 7th Sept. There was therefore very little time for them to work up as a group.

Unicorn, despite having the largest flight deck in Force V seems to have suffered the greatest losses. Crossing her stern has been described as being like falling off a cliff due to the airflow characteristics around her stern due to her aircraft maintenance ship design origins. Not good news for the Seafire with its fragile undercarriage.

Then we have to add in the low winds experienced during the operation and a carrier group limited to 18 knots, the max speed of the CVE. Added to that the Seafire L.IIc being operated were incompatible with the US catapult gear (The Seafire XV which entered service from May 1945 was the first British aircraft designed for tail down launching US style. And RATOG was in the future.

All of this wouldn't have been a problem if the landings had gone as planned. Force V was scheduled to provide air cover for 1 day until an airfield could be built ashore. Ultimately it was tasked for 3 days.

In 1943 the only fighters available to the FAA were the Sea Hurricane, Martlet and Seafire with the Seafire being the fastest of the lot. The first Corsir squadron formed in June 1943 in the USA and the first squadron received Hellcats while in Northern Ireland in July.

I posted details of the story behind the acquisition of the P-40 drop tanks by the BPF last Oct on another thread. I'll repeat it here for simplicity.

"When the British Pacific Fleet formed in Nov 1944, Indefatigable was the only carrier with Seafires as its main fighter type. The others three were using Corsairs and Hellcats. Due to its short range and good performance at lower levels Indefatigable's Seafire squadrons were initially used to provide CAP for the Fleet. At that time only the 30 & 45 gal slipper tanks seem to have been available to them. However in June 1945 it became apparent that both Indefatigable and the newly arrived Implacable, also with Seafires, would need to play a far greater offensive role in upcoming operations over Japan itself. Why? Because Seafires would form a much greater proportion of the fighters on the carriers (Indomitable with Hellcats was in refit so it was going to be 2 with Corsairs and 2 with Seafires). Both ships then began looking for a solution to increase the range of their Seafire III.

Indefatigable, being in Australia at the time, after operation Iceberg, talked to the RAAF, and obtained a supply of 90 gal slipper tanks from them.

Implacable was in Manus in the Admiralty Is at the beginning of June 1945. Her Seafire squadrons experimented with the 30, 45 and 90 gal slipper tanks but they experienced problems with the connections on them. After talking to the Americans, it was discovered that there was a supply of 89 or 90 imp gal drop tanks (sources vary on the exact size) at a base in New Guinea that looked, from the drawings they were able to obtain, like they might prove suitable. A deal was done (currency changed hands - 2 "crates" of Johnny Walker whisky according to Commander Mike Crosley, the 880 squadron CO on Implacable) and a destroyer despatched to collect them. 100 "rusty" P-40 drop tanks were put aboard the carrier on her return to Manus on 17 June from Operation Inmate to Truk. The Seafire bomb racks were then modified by the ship's engineering staff to allow these tanks to be carried. That work was complete by the time she sailed for Japanese waters with the rest of the Fleet on 28 June 1945. And very successful they proved in July/Aug operations off Japan. But there was never an official clearance for the use of these tanks.


That is not to say that they 45 90 gal slipper tanks did not prove equally successful in these operations. Implacable was, by all accounts, a very happy and efficient ship. It is just that her air group has attracted much more attention. She carried official photographers and a film crew so there is much more coverage of her July/Aug operations off japan than probably any of the other RN carriers. And of course Mike Crosley and others who were serving aboard her have written their autobiographies covering the period."

There were constant improvements to the Seafire as each model came along. The Mk.XV, which entered production in late 1944, saw the introduction of the "sting" hook as seen on US aircraft to the production line around April 1945. A vast improvement to the undercarriage was made with the Mk.XVII which was both stronger and had a increased oleo stroke. It began to roll off the production lines in small numbers from April 1945 with the first squadron receiving them in Sept 1945.

While the Seafire attracts a lot of attention for Avalanche it receives very little for the rest of its wartime career when loss rates were much lower as experience was gained with them. So we have:-

Operation Torch - initial deployment in 5 squadrons
Operation Husky - 3 squadrons on Indomitable and 1 on Formidable
D-Day - operations from land bases in southern England for gunnery spotting
Operation Dragoon - 4 CVE with 4 squadrons
Operations in the Aegean between Sept & Nov 1944 with same 4 squadrons
Operations off Norway throughout 1944 that involved 4 squadrons
Operation Meridian off Sumatra and Iceberg off Okinawa with Indefatigable
Final operations off Japan in July/Aug 1945 with 4 squadrons on Indefatigable and Implacable where the Seafires took on an offensive role for the first time in the war against Japan
Operations in the East Indies in 1945 involving 3 squadrons.

That's all interesting but it sounds to me like a lot of excuses. There were issues with carriers, issues with training, problematic weather, crew experience, all of that was commonplace. It's great that they finally found some useful external tanks for the Seafire but the Corsair and Hellcat could also carry external fuel tanks. - in fact they carried two, how many did the Seafire carry? The bottom line is that the Seafire's range and endurance was completely inadequate for a carrier based fighter. It meant that they were constantly having to land to refuel and couldn't escort bombers on long range strikes.

I note a degree of criticism about the Seafire's performance at high (20,000 ft) altitudes. When it was drawing up specifications for fighters in 1940 the spec that led to the Firefly sought an aircraft with a max speed at an operational height of 15,000ft and the Firebrand spec at 15-20,000ft because that was where the FAA expected to fight. As it turned out the vast majority of the of work asked of FAA fighters occurred below 10,000ft. Why? Because the targets were shadowers and medium level and low level torpedo bombers. The conclusion reached was that it was better to catch low level fast recce aircraft before they could report the position of the fleet. Early Seafire Ib proved incapable of catching Ju88s so that led to the development of the L.IIc where the "rate of climb and initial acceleration were far in excess of any other naval fighter produced during the war..." (The Seafire The Spitfire that went to Sea by David Brown). With that in mind the FAA chose to have about half of the Seafire IIc and most of the Seafire III delivered with engines rated for maximum performance at low levels, those being Merlin 32 and 55M. And also why the next development was to Griffon engined variants with similarly low rated engines.

Being able to climb fast is nice, but it isn't true that all recon aircraft fly by at 10,000 ft, nor are all aircraft that can sink ships low and slow torpedo bombers. Dive bombers were also a major problem, both in the Med and the Pacific. The Japanese Ki-46 for example often flew by at 20,000 ft and at quite a good clip, posing a challenge for Allied fighters to intercept. Nor was that the only fast and relatively high flying Japanese aircraft by the late war. The Germans of course had the Ju 88 and others.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Then someone's geography is a bit off. During Operation Torch, the US carriers (Ranger, Sangamon, Suwannee, Santee and Chenango) never entered the Med. They covered the US Western Task Force landings in Morocco on the Atlantic coast.
View attachment 675075

The Centre and Eastern Task Forces were covered by British carriers.

You would be wrong, my geography is just fine. I think you are trying to pick nits. I believe the Torch Landings were considered by the US War Department to be part of the MTO or "Mediterranean Theater of Operations" which is not constrained by the specific boundaries of the Mediterranean Sea. And that is what I pointed out the F4F victory claims in the MTO were likely attributed to.

 

[EwenS]

Corsairs were still being used by multiple nations through the Korean War and into the 60s. Were Seafires?

The last RN combat operations with Seafires were on 25th Sept 1950 during the Korean War by the Seafire FR.47 of 800 squadron on HMS Triumph. Seafire F.17 & FR.47 lingered on until the end of 1954 in second line and RNVR squadrons.

France continued to use Mk.III then Mk.XV until 1950. Burma used denavalised F.XV between 1951 and 1954 and Ireland between 1947 & 1954. Canada used F.XV until 1948 with some lingering as trainers until the early 1950s.

Once WW2 wound down the only users of the F4U in its various guises were:-
USN & USMC - front line use of the Corsair ended in Dec 1955 with reserve units ceasing in 1957.
France - between 1952 & 1964 in wars in Vietnam, Algeria and finally Suez.
Argentina (1956-1968)
El Salvador (1957-1976)
Honduras (1956-1979) with the latter being the last user. Most famously used in the "Soccer War" of 1969

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Look, let me cut to the chase.

The Spitfire was an excellent land based fighter, especially as an interceptor and short range air superiority fighter.

The Seafire was this same land based fighter hastily made into a carrier fighter, because the Sea Hurricane and Sea Gladiator could no longer do the job.

Not being designed to fly from a carrier, it was not structurally strong enough for landings (I remember something about a 'fish plate' being bolted on?) and did not have a slow enough approach speed. The earlier ones (until Seafire III) could not be made with folding wings so fewer of them could be stored on a carrier.

As a short range interceptor, it had very little endurance. Much less than any purpose built carrier fighter.

With the added naval gear, it was slow, slower than a Bf 109 or MC 202 / 205, slower than a Ki-61, and not much faster than a Ki-43 or A6M, which made it vulnerable.

It was better than nothing, and brave pilots made the best of it, but it does not compare as a carrier aircraft to the F6F, F4U, or even IMO to the F4F, nor the A6M.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The last RN combat operations with Seafires were on 25th Sept 1950 during the Korean War by the Seafire FR.47 of 800 squadron on HMS Triumph. Seafire F.17 & FR.47 lingered on until the end of 1954 in second line and RNVR squadrons.

France continued to use Mk.III then Mk.XV until 1950. Burma used denavalised F.XV between 1951 and 1954 and Ireland between 1947 & 1954. Canada used F.XV until 1948 with some lingering as trainers until the early 1950s.

Once WW2 wound down the only users of the F4U in its various guises were:-
USN & USMC - front line use of the Corsair ended in Dec 1955 with reserve units ceasing in 1957.
France - between 1952 & 1964 in wars in Vietnam, Algeria and finally Suez.
Argentina (1956-1968)
El Salvador (1957-1976)
Honduras (1956-1979) with the latter being the last user. Most famously used in the "Soccer War" of 1969

Ok I stand corrected. I still think that a f***-ton more F4U were used post WW2 and it remained in use much longer. Note the French seemed to ditch the Seafire long before they did the Corsair.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

You are overstating the case there. I know for a fact that numerous US and UK fighters operating in the Med and the Pacific survived multiple 20mm cannon strikes and flew home. The cannon shell explosion caused more damage but it was not going to automatically destroy a well built plane.

View attachment 675077
This guy's 79th FG P-40 was hit with six 20mm cannon shells and made it back, including 3 in the wings (where there is a fuel tank) and one right behind the armor plate where he was sitting (where there is another fuel tank). He made it back and survived the war.

Conversely, aircraft like the Hellcat, Corsair, P-40, and P-51 which had the typical six .50 cal armament had very little trouble shooting down Axis fighters, particularly in the Pacific where most of the Naval combat was taking place. There is no getting around that six guns shoot more bullets than two guns.

Apparently some of the later Seafire marks that had the belt fed guns had ammunition left out to save weight.

You seem to have a tenuous grasp on statistics. There are examples of people being shot in the head without suffering permanent damage, but it is not typical. Poon Lim survived 133 days drifting in the Atlantic on a life raft with no supplies but the vast majority of people adrift at sea don't last any near that time. Tsutomu Yamaguchi survived both Hiroshima and Nagasaki but thousands didn't. Outliers do not constitute the general trend.
The statement that American fighter had very little trouble shooting down Axis fighters is pure nonsense. What is your basis for that statement?
I learned in high school when someone says "I know for a fact" to discount what comes next.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey Wild_Bill_Kelso,

re "Apparently some of the later Seafire marks that had the belt fed guns had ammunition left out to save weight."

What are your sources for this?


re "You are overstating the case there. I know for a fact that numerous US and UK fighters operating in the Med and the Pacific survived multiple 20mm cannon strikes and flew home. The cannon shell explosion caused more damage but it was not going to automatically destroy a well built plane."

First, I never said that the 20mm "going to automatically destroy a well built plane". And you can apply the same rational to aircraft being hit by .50 cal, ie there were many (more) German and Japanese aircraft that made it home with multiple .50 cal hits.

Second, you seem to be of the opinion that what we are telling you about the effectiveness of the 20mm vs the .50 cal is our "opinion". This is not the case - what we are telling you is the opinion of the USN, the USAAF, the RAF, the RN/FAA, the Luftwaffe, the IJN, the IJA, the VVS, the Swiss, . . . . They ALL came to the same conclusion(s). (I think the Italians can be said to have thought the same way also, but I do not know enough about them to say for sure.)

 

[pbehn]

I know which one was thrown over the side into the ocean at the end of the war………

Whether planes were thrown over the side could depend on whether they were Lend Lease or whether the carrier was to be used as a hospital

 

[33k in the air]

The statement that American fighter had very little trouble shooting down Axis fighters is pure nonsense. What is your basis for that statement?

Depends on what one exactly means by "very little trouble."

If it is meant as saying the .50-cal was entirely sufficient for shooting down Axis fighters, then the statement is clearly true, because American fighters shot down plenty of Axis fighters during the war using only that caliber.

Shooting down four-engine heavy bombers with only .50-cal weaponry is a different proposition, and not one American fighters really had to face.