Buff and Michael, I totally agree with you and your points. In the US Army it's known as a Cluster Fork
In terms of sheer numbers the British had a massive superiority. Percival had 85,000 troops (essentially 70,000 front-line troops at least on paper) while Yamashita had about 36,000. Yamashita had actually refused a larger force preferring a smaller more maneuverable army. One thing that I found particularly interesting from my time in Vietnam was that the Japanese forces also used bicycle infantry. The Japanese soldier carried 36kg of supplies a massive load in the heat, humidity, and jungle. But the bicycles easily carried this load and could move swiftly through the jungle. The Allies, however, carried only 22kg per man but had to move on foot through the jungle in uniforms that were totally unsuited to such an environment, i.e. bare arms and knees with heavy leather boots. Yamashita was also equipped with light tanks (over 200) while the British having thought the terrain made them impractical, had no tanks, and only a few armored vehicles, which put them at a severe disadvantage. Another interesting note is that when the tires wore out on the bicycles the Japanese continued to ride on the steel rims. The clatter of hundreds of steel rims on the roadway sounded like tanks and defending troops often turned and ran fearing an armored attack was coming.
IN THE AIR
Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, commander in chief Far East, remarked incredulously, "We can get on alright with (Brewster) Buffaloes out here…. Let England have the Super-Spitfires and Hyper-Hurricanes."
During the month of December 1941, a total of 51 Hawker Hurricane Mk II fighters were sent to Singapore, with 24 pilots. They arrived on 3 January 1942, by which stage the Brewster Buffalo squadrons had been overwhelmed. However, like the Buffalos before them, the Hurricanes began to suffer severe losses in intense dogfights.
During the period 27–30 January, another 48 Hurricanes arrived on the aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable. However, many of the Hurricanes were subsequently destroyed on the ground by air raids. The lack of an effective air early warning system throughout the campaign meant that many Allied aircraft were lost on the ground during a series of Japanese attacks against airfields. By the time of the invasion, only ten Hawker Hurricane fighters remained to provide air cover to the Allied forces on Singapore.
BY SEA
To block the Japanese invasion force the British had dispatched Force Z, consisting of the battleship HMS Prince of Wales, the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and four destroyers which had sailed north out of Singapore on 8 December. However Japanese land based aircraft found and sank the two capital ships on 10 December, essentially leaving the east coast of the Malayan peninsula exposed and allowing the Japanese to continue their amphibious landings. The Japanese thus used the sea to easily sail around any defensive lines and attack from the rear.
ARTHUR PERCIVAL, Commanding Officer in Singapore
Decorated for bravery during WWI he had been relegated to the backwaters of the British Empire while Britain was fighting for its life in Europe. His subordinates called Percival "Rabbit" behind his back because of his bad overbite and his personality as a military leader. Percival had a "gift for turning out neatly phrased, crisp memoranda on any subject…. He was excellent in any job which did not involve contact with troops."
Resident minister Duff Cooper, reported to Churchill that Percival was:
"A nice, good man ... calm, clear-headed and even clever. But he cannot take a large view; it is all a field day at Aldershot to him. He knows the rules so well and follows them so closely and is always waiting for the umpire's whistle to signal ceasefire and hopes that when the moment comes his military dispositions will be such as to receive approval." In short Percival had no lack of courage but was simply lacking in the dynamism required in a modern military commander
Beyond any doubt Percival had seriously underestimated the Japanese, and he implemented an unimaginative defense of Malaya. Compounding his problems were his poor relations with his own staff. He got along poorly with Gordon Bennett, the commander of 8 Australian Division, which is unfortunate as the Australians, though not completely trained, were probably, the best troops in the reserve. Bennett was prejudiced against the British military hierarchy. Furthermore, like all commanding Commonwealth officers, Bennett had the option to discuss orders from Percival with the Australian government if he disagreed with them, thus giving him considerable freedom of action. Percival could have sacked him but did not. As for Bennett and Heath, their relationship was even worse as both were hot-tempered and easily angered.
Lt. Gen. Lewis Heath, commanding III Indian Corps. Heath's relations with Percival were acrimonious from the outset. After fighting began Percival lost all confidence in Heath but did not sack him
GORDON BENNETT commander of the Australian 8th Division
Bennett, at 54 years of age, was not up to this task physically, after an extensive medical examination Alf Derham, the 8th Division's senior medical officer observed:
"He is not robust even for his age, gets overtired easily, and seems to feel the effects of the strain unduly. It is my opinion as a medical officer that he is too old for active service in the field and that he would not stand the strain of operations for more than a few weeks at most."
It was not merely Bennett's physical condition that was too fragile for active command in the field, according to his chief of staff, Colonel Jim Thyer:
"Between the wars he was a civilian and did not study military tactics, but rested on his World War I laurels. He was moved by hunches and believed in the stars. He was tremendously ambitious and had his head in the clouds, which is the last place a good battle commander's head should be."
Bennett also acquired among some of his fellow officers a reputation as a jealous, prickly, and querulous individual. His relationships with his senior officers were unhappy and some of them attempted at one stage to have him recalled on medical grounds. Bennett's dislike of regular officers was unabated and was felt within his command. Bennett's dealings with British senior officers and especially with Lieutenant General A. E. Percival, were similarly antagonistic
This was the commander assigned with halting Yamashita's advance down the Malay Peninsula at Johore.
As an example, before the invasion Yamashita and his officers stationed themselves at Istana Bukit Serene and the Johor state secretariat building (high ground with essentially a bird's eye view of Singapore) to plan for the invasion. Although advised by his top military personnel that Istana Bukit Serene was an easy target, Yamashita was confident that the British Army would not attack the palace because it belonged to the Sultan of Johor. Yamashita's prediction was correct; despite being observed by Australian artillery, permission to engage the palace was denied by their commanding general, Gordon Bennett.
Once Singapore Island fell, Bennett was at the centre of the excuses for the controversial fall. He accused the British commanders of a "retreat complex". The 8th Division and its physically and mentally unfit commander were accused, in turn, by the British commanders of looting, rape, fighting their way onto evacuation ships, and other breaches of discipline. After Percival surrendered, 15 Dec, Bennett escaped that night with a few junior officers. They commandeered a sampan and sailed to Sumatra. Arriving in Melbourne on 2 March, Bennett stated that he had escaped because Australia needed his expertise in fighting the Japanese. In June 1942 the British took the final step in the search for scapegoats for the fall of Singapore, Wavell publicly held Bennett responsible for the debacle.
WINSTON CHURCHILL
Although the Chiefs of Staff in August 1940 recommended reinforcing Malaya and Singapore, Churchill vehemently objected. American military and naval experts endorsed the warning and expressed the view that Singapore should be given priority over Egypt. But Churchill decided to concentrate on Europe. Therefore the desired air force strength of 300 to 500 modern aircraft was never reached in the Malayan theater. The Japanese invaded with over 200 tanks, while the British Army in Malaya did not have a single one. Churchill himself had diverted some 350 older-model tanks from Malaya to the Soviet Union following the German invasion, as a show of good faith between the Allies. As these older infantry and cruiser tanks were more than a match for the light and medium Japanese tanks used in the invasion of Malaya, their presence could well have turned the tide of battle.
Japanese military assets had always been undervalued by the Western democracies. Though they had been sent, the presence of the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser HMS Repulse was, by no means, a satisfactory replacement for a large British fleet with aircraft carrier fighter protection, nor could it deter aggressive Japanese movements long enough for additional vessels to arrive. Finally, Churchill had already decided to have the United States guarantee the safety of British garrisons in the Far East; however, America was waiting for Japan to act as the aggressor before taking an active military stance. Then came 7 December.