Fall of Singapore - 75 Years Ago Today

[buffnut453]

Just wanted to remind folks that Singapore surrendered on this day 75 years ago. In memory of those poor Malays, Chinese, Indians, Brits, Aussies, Kiwis and others who suffered through the fighting of the Malayan Campaign, were let down by shoddy senior military and civilian leadership in Singapore and, having endured the ignominy of surrender, then faced years of imprisonment, and often death, in the most inhumane of circumstances.

 

[Old Wizard]

 

[mikewint]

January 17, 1942
The British blow up the causeway linking Malaya and Singapore to stop the Japanese from
entering

January 30 & 31, 1942
British troops completely withdraw from Malaya into Singapore. In just 55 days, the Malay
Peninsula was lost. The siege of Singapore begins

February 1, 1942
The Japanese troops repair the destroyed causeway and reach Singapore

February 5, 1942
The Japanese attack Pulau Ubin, drawing the British to move to that region

February 8 & 9, 1942
The Japanese land in northwest Singapore

February 10, 1942
The British Royal Air Force withdraw the small number of aircraft from Singapore to prevent
Japanese capture

February 11, 1942
The Japanese 5th Division attacks Indian, Chinese, and British troops along Choa Chu Kang
and Bukit Timah Roads

February 13, 1942
The battle between the 1st and 2nd Malay Regiment and the Japanese begins at Bukit
Chandu, lasting two days

February 14, 1942
After the fall of Bukit Chandu, the Japanese attack Alexandra Barracks Hospital, killing more
than 320 people

February 15, 1942
General Yamashita Tomoyuki and his aides discuss if they should continue fighting or wait
for the British to surrender at the Battle Box, a bunker at Fort Canning, before proceeding to
Ford Motor Factory

February 15, 1942 – 5.00 pm
The British surrender party led by Lt-Gen Percival arrives at Lt-Gen Yamashita's
headquarters at Ford Motor Factory

February 15, 1942 – 6.10 pm
The British surrender at Ford Motor Factory

February 15, 1942 – 8.30pm
British and Japanese troops cease combats, and all guns fall silent

February 16, 1942
Japanese victory parade on the streets of Singapore
Sir Shenton Thomas, Governor of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for the
Malay States, gives the last broadcast in Singapore
Singapore is renamed "Syonan-to" or "Brilliant South Island"

February 18, 1942
First round of executions take place at Changi Beach

 

[Shinpachi]

Mind what you did, Mike.

 

[mikewint]

No hands in war are ever clean but there are limits
On Feb 14, at about 13:00, the Japanese broke through and they advanced towards the Alexandra Barracks Hospital. A British lieutenant—acting as an envoy with a white flag—approached the Japanese forces but was killed with a bayonet. After the Japanese troops entered the hospital, a number of patients—up to 50 in total—including those undergoing surgery at the time, were killed along with doctors and members of nursing staff. The following day about 200 male staff members and patients who had been assembled and bound the previous day, many of them walking wounded, were ordered to walk about 400 m to an industrial area. Anyone who fell on the way was bayoneted. The men were forced into a series of small, badly ventilated rooms where they were held overnight without water. Some died during the night as a result of their treatment. The remainder were bayoneted the following morning.

The Japanese sought vengeance against the Chinese and to eliminate anyone who held any anti-Japanese sentiments. Suspicious of the Chinese because of the Second Sino-Japanese War Japanese authorities ordered thousands of young Chinese men killed in the Sook Ching massacre.

Numerous British and Australian soldiers taken prisoner remained in Singapore's Changi Prison. Many died in captivity. Thousands of others were shipped out on prisoner transports known as "hell ships" to other parts of Asia, including Japan, to be used as forced labour on projects such as the Siam–Burma Death Railway and Sandakan airfield in North Borneo. Many of those aboard the ships perished.

The Sook Ching was a systematic purge of perceived hostile elements among the Chinese in Singapore by the Japanese military during the Japanese occupation of Singapore and Malaya, after the British colony surrendered on 15 February 1942 following the Battle of Singapore. The massacre took place from 18 February to 4 March 1942 at various places in the region. The operation was overseen by the Kempeitai secret police and subsequently extended to include the Chinese population in Malaya. The figures of the death toll vary. Official Japanese statistics show fewer than 5,000 while the Singaporean Chinese community claims the numbers to be around 100,000. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's first prime minister, said that the estimated death toll was "Somewhere between 50,000 to 100,000 young men, Chinese".

The Burma Railway, also known as the Death Railway. Forced labor was used in its construction. More than 180,000 Southeast Asian civilian laborers and 60,000 Allied prisoners of war worked on the railway. During its construction well over 100,000 Javanese, Malayan Tamils of Indian origin, Burmese, Chinese, Thai and other Southeast Asians, who had been forcibly drafted by the Imperial Japanese Army to work on the railway, died in its construction. Western deaths numbered 12,621 Allied POWs who died during the construction. The dead POWs included 6,904 British personnel, 2,802 Australians, 2,782 Dutch, and 133 Americans.

Sandakan, North Borneo. As on the Burma Railway the prisoners were forced to work at gunpoint, and were often beaten whilst also receiving very little food or medical attention. In August 1943, Officers were relocated and conditions for the remaining prisoners deteriorated sharply. Any rations given were further reduced, and sick prisoners were also forced to work on the airstrip. In January 1945, with only 1,900 prisoners still alive, the advancing Allies managed to successfully bomb and destroy the airfield. It was at this time with Allied landings anticipated shortly that camp commandant Captain Hoshijima Susumu decided to move the remaining prisoners westward into the mountains to the town of Ranau, a distance of approximately 260 kilometers.

The first phase of marches across wide marshland, dense jungle, and then up the eastern slope of Mount Kinabalu occurred between January and March 1945. The Japanese had selected 470 prisoners who were thought to be fit enough to carry baggage and supplies for the accompanying Japanese battalions relocating to the western coast. In several groups the POWs, all of whom were either malnourished or suffering serious illness, started the journey. Although the route took nine days, they were given enough rations for only four days. Any POWs who were not fit enough or collapsed from exhaustion were either killed or left to die en route. Upon reaching Ranau, the survivors were halted and ordered to construct a temporary camp. By 26 June, only five Australians and one British soldier were still alive."
The second marches
A second series of marches began on 29 May 1945 with approximately 536 prisoners. The new Sandakan camp commander, Captain Takakuwa Takuo, ordered the prisoners towards Ranau in groups of about fifty with accompanying Japanese guards. The march lasted for twenty-six days, with prisoners even less fit than those in the first marches had been, provided with fewer rations and often forced to forage for food. Only 183 prisoners managed to reach Ranau.

Approximately 250 people were left at Sandakan after the second march departed. Most prisoners were so ill that the Japanese initially intended to let them starve to death forcing many to scavenge in the surrounding forest for food. However, on 9 June 1945 it was decided to send another group of 75 men on a final march. The remaining men were so weak that none survived beyond 50 kilometres. As each man collapsed from exhaustion, that man was shot by a Japanese guard. All remaining prisoners left at Sandakan who could not walk either were killed or died from a combination of starvation and sickness before the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945.

 

[Capt. Vick]

Is it true that the British had more troops than the Japanese?

 

[buffnut453]

Yes, it is true. However, numbers aren't the whole story. A fair proportion of the British forces were Indian Army units that were poorly trained due to the rapid expansion of that organization in 1940. Units had been milked of SNCOs and JNCOs to form new units, and many new recruits could barely operate a rifle and lacked combat discipline. Also, Malaya being a peninsula is incredibly hard to defend because the seaward flanks are always exposed, allowing infiltration and providing multiple potential landing points that had to be defended (eg the Endau landing on 26 Jan 42). The decision to defend multiple locations simultaneously prevented Percival from massing his forces, with the result that they were defeated piecemeal as they were committed to the battle. Finally, the British had no tanks whereas the Japanese did, using them as a fist to punch through defensive positions on the main road south from Thailand. None of this excuses the lack of adequate preparation by some (most) British commanders who seemed content to undertake a minimum of training due to the "impenetrable nature of the jungle." The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were a notable exception to the lack of Army preparedness in Malaya, and the Australians performed a superb ambush action in Muar but these pockets of strong resistance were inadequate to stem the Japanese advance.

Conversely, on the air side of things, the British forces was considerably outnumbered - something like a 5-to-1 ratio which, coupled with the lack of early warning, made it difficult for the defending fighters to respond adequately given the limited numbers available. The forward location of RAF airfields provided tempting targets for the IJAAF, indeed they were the main focus of Japanese air attacks during the first few days of the war. Lack of warning and, again, poor command decisions resulted in many RAF aircraft being destroyed on the ground, further worsening the force ratio relative to the IJAAF.

 

[parsifal]

The myth that the Japanese outnumbered the allies by air and sea continues.....Often 25th army outran its air support and operated devoid of any aircrcover. what is true is that at critical point in the campaign the Japanese concentrated their resources to great effect. Concentration of force is not superiority of numbers in a raw sense. its intelligent use of forces for maximum advantage.

"The reasons for Japan's conquest of Malaya and Singapore are numerous. Many writers identify as key to the campaign the total military failure of Percival and the British. Without question, the defenders contributed to their own defeat. They underestimated their enemy. Their intelligence was poor. They fatally dispersed their forces. Their training was inferior. They had no tanks, and their use of their air assets was poor in terms of distribution and application. . And their leadership was uninspired. But to reason that Malaya was lost merely by the mistakes of British-led defenders does great disservice to the tremendous accomplishments of the Japanese military forces in this campaign.

Japan dominated their unprepared enemy. Early on they achieved near total supremacy of the sea, and their air support was both targeted and effective. . They effectively achieved the principles of mass and economy of force by concentrating their outnumbered forces and gaining local superiority along the axes of attack. They were highly trained and hardened by previous combat experience. The Japanese command structure ensured unity of effort, through coordination and proper sequencing of assaults to gain their objectives. Through sound intelligence, careful planning, realistic assessment of risks and enemy morale, and aggressive (though sometimes imprudent) use of initiative, Yamashita was able to secure one of Japan's greatest victories, and inflict one of Great Britain's most devastating defeats.

Through a series of complicated and coordinated maneuvers, Yamashita was able to strike at weak allied defense points with concentrated force. He used the dense jungle to his advantage by overtaking and pushing the enemy off the roadways, severely limiting enemy defensive options, and forcing a choice between a near hopeless fight or surrender. British attempts to defend the entire Malay Peninsula unwittingly assisted Yamashita's efforts, and only heightened

Finally, Yamashita's sweeping 700 mile advance through Malaya attacked, and broke, the will of Singapore's defending forces and citizens.

Equally important was Yamashit'a employment of Sun Tzu's theories in each phase of the campaign. From extensive use of intelligence, including in-country spies in both Malaya and Singapore, to imaginative use of deception to achieve surprise, Sun Tzu's influence is apparent. The Malayan Campaign was characterized by other Sun Tzuian principles, such as use of the indirect approach through rapid and deep flanking and enveloping movements, employment of minimum force, advantageous use of terrain, and speed--"the essence of war"".

The essence of the Japanese victory and the British defeat:

First, aggressive leadership is a force multiplier. Yamashita's bold and decisive leadership was instrumental in keeping his forces constantly advancing toward their ultimate objective: Singapore. His firm control and clear understanding of own and enemy force capabilities heavily contributed to the success of his calculated risks. His positive outlook boosted morale and led to positive results. Although some choices were risky, his confidence inspiring and aggressive leadership allowed him to seize the initiative and reap big rewards. Unquestionably, Yamashita's leadership, which permeated every aspect of operational planning and execution, was a key to victory.

In contrast, Percival's timid and indecisive leadership produced the opposite effects. By nearly all accounts, Percival was a superb administrator, but certainly not a natural leader. He had difficulty making firm decisions, and those made were often too late. His desire for excessively detailed planning was partly to blame. Percival insisted on following rules and regulations to the letter, no matter how unreasonable or bureaucratic. He was not a forward-looking thinker. For example, he did not insist that his troops train, or become knowledgeable in jungle warfare, even though Singapore bordered dense jungle. A direct result of Percival's poor leadership was that British morale plummeted when the Japanese used their flanking tactics and turned the jungles into highways whilst the british plodded on in the belief that Jungles were impenetrable barriers

Third, acquire the best possible knowledge of the enemy through intelligence. The intelligence aspect of Japanese operations was accomplished in a near flawless manner. Through knowledge of the mind and capabilities of the enemy, Yamashita effectively used deception in his operational planning. Accurate intelligence allowed thorough knowledge and preparation of the battlefield, which minimized Japanese casualties. His awareness of British vulnerabilities significantly hastened their defeat. ,

Flexibility in planning is the fifth lesson: military objectives are best achieved through flexible and dynamic application of force at the decisive point. A commander must embrace flexibility as the key to adapting to the environment, changes in the enemy situation, and unforeseen events on the battlefield. Rigidity is normally only beneficial in commitment to an objective. The 25th Army was able to respond to unforeseen situations and overcome difficulties through innovative responses. This flexibility during their blitzkrieg- like advance, and their attack of points vital to the defending force, made their march through Malaya unstoppable.

Finally, logistic support is vital to virtually every campaign. General Yamashita had serious logistic concerns that, given minor changes, could have cost him the campaign, and meant a much earlier defeat of Japan in World War II. An important historical lesson is that logistic support is the lifeline of a campaign.

 

[Wildcat]

Kranji war cemetery, Singapore. The final resting place of many..

 

[buffnut453]

Parsifal,
I entirely agree with the points you make. To purely blame the defenders does a disservice to the operational and tactical acumen of Yamashita and his subordinate commanders. One must also remember that an attacker has the luxury of knowing where and when to attack and, if correctly led, possesses the innate potential to modify the attacking style and location based on the defender's response. Defence is a much harder challenge, particularly the type of retreating defence that Percival was trying to achieve so that he could buy the necessary time for needed reinforcements. Focused intervention on resupply routes, either using airpower or stay-behind forces would have greatly aided the defenders but, alas, they weren't used to full effect.

Wildcat,
Thanks for sharing those photos. Singapore is on my list of "must visit before I die" locations. The AWM is also on that list.

Cheers,
Mark

 

[parsifal]

Singapore was a bitter pill for Australia, an event that forced us out of the nursery, and more than any other single event, smashed the myth of white supremacy across the world.

We live with the consequences of the fall of Singapore to this day.

For shinpachi it was a proud moment in IJA military history, but there were terrible moments in the aftermath of the event, meted out particularly on the ethnic chinese of Singapore. Relations with the chinese remain strained to this day between Japan and china ostensibly because of that wartime experience. Singapore exists as a nation because of the mistreatment of ethnic chinese, and this can be traced all the way back to WWII

 

[mikewint]

Buff and Michael, I totally agree with you and your points. In the US Army it's known as a Cluster Fork
In terms of sheer numbers the British had a massive superiority. Percival had 85,000 troops (essentially 70,000 front-line troops at least on paper) while Yamashita had about 36,000. Yamashita had actually refused a larger force preferring a smaller more maneuverable army. One thing that I found particularly interesting from my time in Vietnam was that the Japanese forces also used bicycle infantry. The Japanese soldier carried 36kg of supplies a massive load in the heat, humidity, and jungle. But the bicycles easily carried this load and could move swiftly through the jungle. The Allies, however, carried only 22kg per man but had to move on foot through the jungle in uniforms that were totally unsuited to such an environment, i.e. bare arms and knees with heavy leather boots. Yamashita was also equipped with light tanks (over 200) while the British having thought the terrain made them impractical, had no tanks, and only a few armored vehicles, which put them at a severe disadvantage. Another interesting note is that when the tires wore out on the bicycles the Japanese continued to ride on the steel rims. The clatter of hundreds of steel rims on the roadway sounded like tanks and defending troops often turned and ran fearing an armored attack was coming.
IN THE AIR
Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, commander in chief Far East, remarked incredulously, "We can get on alright with (Brewster) Buffaloes out here…. Let England have the Super-Spitfires and Hyper-Hurricanes."
During the month of December 1941, a total of 51 Hawker Hurricane Mk II fighters were sent to Singapore, with 24 pilots. They arrived on 3 January 1942, by which stage the Brewster Buffalo squadrons had been overwhelmed. However, like the Buffalos before them, the Hurricanes began to suffer severe losses in intense dogfights.
During the period 27–30 January, another 48 Hurricanes arrived on the aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable. However, many of the Hurricanes were subsequently destroyed on the ground by air raids. The lack of an effective air early warning system throughout the campaign meant that many Allied aircraft were lost on the ground during a series of Japanese attacks against airfields. By the time of the invasion, only ten Hawker Hurricane fighters remained to provide air cover to the Allied forces on Singapore.
BY SEA
To block the Japanese invasion force the British had dispatched Force Z, consisting of the battleship HMS Prince of Wales, the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and four destroyers which had sailed north out of Singapore on 8 December. However Japanese land based aircraft found and sank the two capital ships on 10 December, essentially leaving the east coast of the Malayan peninsula exposed and allowing the Japanese to continue their amphibious landings. The Japanese thus used the sea to easily sail around any defensive lines and attack from the rear.
ARTHUR PERCIVAL, Commanding Officer in Singapore
Decorated for bravery during WWI he had been relegated to the backwaters of the British Empire while Britain was fighting for its life in Europe. His subordinates called Percival "Rabbit" behind his back because of his bad overbite and his personality as a military leader. Percival had a "gift for turning out neatly phrased, crisp memoranda on any subject…. He was excellent in any job which did not involve contact with troops."
Resident minister Duff Cooper, reported to Churchill that Percival was:
"A nice, good man ... calm, clear-headed and even clever. But he cannot take a large view; it is all a field day at Aldershot to him. He knows the rules so well and follows them so closely and is always waiting for the umpire's whistle to signal ceasefire and hopes that when the moment comes his military dispositions will be such as to receive approval." In short Percival had no lack of courage but was simply lacking in the dynamism required in a modern military commander
Beyond any doubt Percival had seriously underestimated the Japanese, and he implemented an unimaginative defense of Malaya. Compounding his problems were his poor relations with his own staff. He got along poorly with Gordon Bennett, the commander of 8 Australian Division, which is unfortunate as the Australians, though not completely trained, were probably, the best troops in the reserve. Bennett was prejudiced against the British military hierarchy. Furthermore, like all commanding Commonwealth officers, Bennett had the option to discuss orders from Percival with the Australian government if he disagreed with them, thus giving him considerable freedom of action. Percival could have sacked him but did not. As for Bennett and Heath, their relationship was even worse as both were hot-tempered and easily angered.
Lt. Gen. Lewis Heath, commanding III Indian Corps. Heath's relations with Percival were acrimonious from the outset. After fighting began Percival lost all confidence in Heath but did not sack him
GORDON BENNETT commander of the Australian 8th Division
Bennett, at 54 years of age, was not up to this task physically, after an extensive medical examination Alf Derham, the 8th Division's senior medical officer observed:
"He is not robust even for his age, gets overtired easily, and seems to feel the effects of the strain unduly. It is my opinion as a medical officer that he is too old for active service in the field and that he would not stand the strain of operations for more than a few weeks at most."
It was not merely Bennett's physical condition that was too fragile for active command in the field, according to his chief of staff, Colonel Jim Thyer:
"Between the wars he was a civilian and did not study military tactics, but rested on his World War I laurels. He was moved by hunches and believed in the stars. He was tremendously ambitious and had his head in the clouds, which is the last place a good battle commander's head should be."
Bennett also acquired among some of his fellow officers a reputation as a jealous, prickly, and querulous individual. His relationships with his senior officers were unhappy and some of them attempted at one stage to have him recalled on medical grounds. Bennett's dislike of regular officers was unabated and was felt within his command. Bennett's dealings with British senior officers and especially with Lieutenant General A. E. Percival, were similarly antagonistic
This was the commander assigned with halting Yamashita's advance down the Malay Peninsula at Johore.
As an example, before the invasion Yamashita and his officers stationed themselves at Istana Bukit Serene and the Johor state secretariat building (high ground with essentially a bird's eye view of Singapore) to plan for the invasion. Although advised by his top military personnel that Istana Bukit Serene was an easy target, Yamashita was confident that the British Army would not attack the palace because it belonged to the Sultan of Johor. Yamashita's prediction was correct; despite being observed by Australian artillery, permission to engage the palace was denied by their commanding general, Gordon Bennett.

Once Singapore Island fell, Bennett was at the centre of the excuses for the controversial fall. He accused the British commanders of a "retreat complex". The 8th Division and its physically and mentally unfit commander were accused, in turn, by the British commanders of looting, rape, fighting their way onto evacuation ships, and other breaches of discipline. After Percival surrendered, 15 Dec, Bennett escaped that night with a few junior officers. They commandeered a sampan and sailed to Sumatra. Arriving in Melbourne on 2 March, Bennett stated that he had escaped because Australia needed his expertise in fighting the Japanese. In June 1942 the British took the final step in the search for scapegoats for the fall of Singapore, Wavell publicly held Bennett responsible for the debacle.
WINSTON CHURCHILL
Although the Chiefs of Staff in August 1940 recommended reinforcing Malaya and Singapore, Churchill vehemently objected. American military and naval experts endorsed the warning and expressed the view that Singapore should be given priority over Egypt. But Churchill decided to concentrate on Europe. Therefore the desired air force strength of 300 to 500 modern aircraft was never reached in the Malayan theater. The Japanese invaded with over 200 tanks, while the British Army in Malaya did not have a single one. Churchill himself had diverted some 350 older-model tanks from Malaya to the Soviet Union following the German invasion, as a show of good faith between the Allies. As these older infantry and cruiser tanks were more than a match for the light and medium Japanese tanks used in the invasion of Malaya, their presence could well have turned the tide of battle.
Japanese military assets had always been undervalued by the Western democracies. Though they had been sent, the presence of the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser HMS Repulse was, by no means, a satisfactory replacement for a large British fleet with aircraft carrier fighter protection, nor could it deter aggressive Japanese movements long enough for additional vessels to arrive. Finally, Churchill had already decided to have the United States guarantee the safety of British garrisons in the Far East; however, America was waiting for Japan to act as the aggressor before taking an active military stance. Then came 7 December.

 

[buffnut453]

For shinpachi it was a proud moment in IJA military history, but there were terrible moments in the aftermath of the event, meted out particularly on the ethnic chinese of Singapore. Relations with the chinese remain strained to this day between Japan and china ostensibly because of that wartime experience. Singapore exists as a nation because of the mistreatment of ethnic chinese, and this can be traced all the way back to WWII

While there were undoubtedly evil perpetrators of war crimes among the Japanese military, we should also remember that the rank-and-file Japanese soldier was often as much a victim of their leaders as were the Allied soldiers they fought against. Extremely harsh discipline dehumanized many soldiers while inept tactical leadership later in the war, particularly the tendency to keep re-attacking an objective using the same approach even after it had proven a failure, resulted in massive casualties for no operational gains. I'm not excusing the war crimes (which were heinous) but simply reflecting that the average Japanese citizen had little say in Tojo's ascension to the pinnacle of power while the military cliques silenced any opposition in the most bloody fashion. Sadly, that same average Japanese citizen ended up suffering the consequences, including death, maiming, malnutrition and losing loved ones either through conscripted military service, Allied air attacks or, sometimes, at the hands of his/her own countrymen.

 

[Graeme]

Sandakan, North Borneo.

Our local memorial...

 

[Graeme]

Although the Chiefs of Staff in August 1940 recommended reinforcing Malaya and Singapore, Churchill vehemently objected. American military and naval experts endorsed the warning and expressed the view that Singapore should be given priority over Egypt.

We tried as well...

 

[buffnut453]

Malaya and Singapore were reinforced during 1940 and 1941. Additional troops were deployed and the RAF expanded from a few biplane flying boats and a couple of squadrons of Vildebeests to bring in Catalina flying boats, 2 squadrons of Hudsons, 4 squadrons of Blenheims and 4 squadrons of Buffalos. The problem was the overall vulnerability caused by the terrain and lack of adequate training and tactics...but even then it's doubtful whether those changes would have resulted in a different outcome. When the British Government belatedly allowed Brooke-Popham to use his discretion when ordering MATADOR, it essentially gave CINCFE the latitude to declare war on Japan...that wasn't a decision to be taken lightly, and I can understand his unwillingness to respond until there was positive proof that Japan was attacking. Unfortunately the warning and communications systems were inadequate to allow a suitable response and Yamashita never allowed the British to regain the initiative.