Fixing the Italian Military, 1933~1945 (7 Viewers)

[Shortround6]

Rather than rebuilding the Andrea Doria and Duilio or using those resources to build another Roma, perhaps a better use of the Regia Marina's resources would be to expedite the construction of larger aircraft carriers? Undertaking the effort to refit the Augustus into the Sparviero could've been done much earlier than it was historically, ditto with refitting her sister ship into the Aquila.

A total waste of resources. Only made necessary by a lack of cooperation between the navy and the air force.
Italy wanted to be a "world power" and world powers had aircraft carriers, right?

Timing is also way off. The old battleships were finished work in 1940. The Agustus/Roma (sistership) were in commercial service until Italy got into the war in 1940. By end of June 1941 Crete was in Italian/German hands and Italy had about 1000 miles they could put airfields on stretching from Sardina to Crete. Add in 200-300 miles for operational radius and where is this carrier (20kt speed) going to provide air support that land planes could not cover?

Only plus side was it kept hundreds of Italian workers from going to Russia or serving in North Africa?

 

[TM06]

A total waste of resources. Only made necessary by a lack of cooperation between the navy and the air force.
Italy wanted to be a "world power" and world powers had aircraft carriers, right?

Timing is also way off. The old battleships were finished work in 1940. The Agustus/Roma (sistership) were in commercial service until Italy got into the war in 1940. By end of June 1941 Crete was in Italian/German hands and Italy had about 1000 miles they could put airfields on stretching from Sardina to Crete. Add in 200-300 miles for operational radius and where is this carrier (20kt speed) going to provide air support that land planes could not cover?

Only plus side was it kept hundreds of Italian workers from going to Russia or serving in North Africa?

Yeah, the more I thought about it, the less it made sense. They might be useful in the earlier part of the Balkan campaign, specifically against Greece? But after that they're probably dead weight.

 

[don4331]

A total waste of resources. Only made necessary by a lack of cooperation between the navy and the air force.
Italy wanted to be a "world power" and world powers had aircraft carriers, right?

Timing is also way off. The old battleships were finished work in 1940. The Augustus/Roma (sister ships) were in commercial service until Italy got into the war in 1940. By end of June 1941 Crete was in Italian/German hands and Italy had about 1000 miles they could put airfields on stretching from Sardinia to Crete. Add in 200-300 miles for operational radius and where is this carrier (20kt speed) going to provide air support that land planes could not cover?

I agree with the timing being way off but my opinion is a lot of discussion in the thread is way off in timing. Starting with carrier as that won't seem to go away:

Italy is on the wrong side of the Spanish Civil war - not much choice, its going to side with the church in Rome, no matter right or wrong.

So, by '34, the writing is on the wall - Italy is opposing France and England.

The RN has never made it a secret that their carrier intentions: Carrier attack planes are to damage their opponent, slowing them down to where their capital ships could engage and destroy them. Well, maybe they leave it to their destroyers to complete the sink-ex.​

The Regia Marina needs a carrier to learn what it doesn't know about carrier aviation. Also, Regia Aeronautica has admitted that it can't effectively support the navy - fighters don't have the range/endurance/navigation skills to maintain coverage from sunrise to sunset.

A fleet carrier would be ideal, but you rarely make a perfect soufflé on your 1st attempt and Italy can't afford to scrap a fleet carrier size mistake. One of the last 2 classes of Condottieri light cruiser is not too far from IJN Hōshō -> an adequate for a prototype CL. Starting an identical hull a month after Emanuele Filiberto Duca d'Aosta is launched gets a hull in the water in early '36, and fitted out as a carrier in mid-'37. Something to train the crew, both the ship and aviation teams; to make mistakes and learn from. Ideally, you do 2 - so you can test alternate strategies and to maintain progress with issues are one are resolved. 2 - 9k ton CVLs still leaves enough tonnage for 2 - 21k ton (maximum allowed) Fleet CVs under the LNT '30, which is what is in place at the time in question.

I'm willing to delay one of the Littorio class a year to get the steel/resources for the carriers.

For fighters, the pilots can start training with Fiat CR.32s, but CR.42s/Macchi C.200s would be flying by the time the ship is ready. The historic choice, the Reggiane Re.2001 isn't ready in time. Macchi C.200 was operated as fighter bomber for much of its career; it will need to do as Regia Marina's attack aircraft.

The Regia Marina operates their force as a fleet (versus Kriegsmarine which are heavily, just raiders); the addition of a carrier provides immediate air support should they accidentally bump into a RN CV - a dozen fighters might keep a couple CAs from being sunk.

 

[Shortround6]

I agree with the timing being way off but my opinion is a lot of discussion in the thread is way off in timing. Starting with carrier as that won't seem to go away:

Italy is on the wrong side of the Spanish Civil war - not much choice, its going to side with the church in Rome, no matter right or wrong.

So, by '34, the writing is on the wall - Italy is opposing France and England.

The RN has never made it a secret that their carrier intentions: Carrier attack planes are to damage their opponent, slowing them down to where their capital ships could engage and destroy them. Well, maybe they leave it to their destroyers to complete the sink-ex.​

The Regia Marina needs a carrier to learn what it doesn't know about carrier aviation. Also, Regia Aeronautica has admitted that it can't effectively support the navy - fighters don't have the range/endurance/navigation skills to maintain coverage from sunrise to sunset.

A fleet carrier would be ideal, but you rarely make a perfect soufflé on your 1st attempt and Italy can't afford to scrap a fleet carrier size mistake. One of the last 2 classes of Condottieri light cruiser is not too far from IJN Hōshō -> an adequate for a prototype CL. Starting an identical hull a month after Emanuele Filiberto Duca d'Aosta is launched gets a hull in the water in early '36, and fitted out as a carrier in mid-'37. Something to train the crew, both the ship and aviation teams; to make mistakes and learn from. Ideally, you do 2 - so you can test alternate strategies and to maintain progress with issues are one are resolved. 2 - 9k ton CVLs still leaves enough tonnage for 2 - 21k ton (maximum allowed) Fleet CVs under the LNT '30, which is what is in place at the time in question.

I'm willing to delay one of the Littorio class a year to get the steel/resources for the carriers.

For fighters, the pilots can start training with Fiat CR.32s, but CR.42s/Macchi C.200s would be flying by the time the ship is ready. The historic choice, the Reggiane Re.2001 isn't ready in time. Macchi C.200 was operated as fighter bomber for much of its career; it will need to do as Regia Marina's attack aircraft.

The Regia Marina operates their force as a fleet (versus Kriegsmarine which are heavily, just raiders); the addition of a carrier provides immediate air support should they accidentally bump into a RN CV - a dozen fighters might keep a couple CAs from being sunk.

Italy needed better cooperation between the Regia Aeronautica and the Regia Marina.
Starting a ship building race between Italy and Britian is starting a losing race of epic proportions.

RN needs carriers for advantages in areas where they don't have land support. RAF promised more than they could deliver but the RN was not supposed to operate their carriers in range of land-based air. Actual war experience was not what was planned for. RN wanted aircraft for the recon, and strike in areas that were hundreds of miles away from shore bases.
Italian navy was never going to reach areas like that. The Italian navy with carriers or without was never going to get through the Suez Canal or get through Gibraltar. Any hopes/dreams of the Italian surface fleet operating outside of the Med was delusional. Spending resources on those dreams was a mistake.

The RN laid down five 22-23,000 ton carriers between 1935 and 1937. They laid down 2 more in 1939, construction delayed by other war work. Italy has no hope of matching even 1/2 of that schedule. Granted the RN was planning on retiring many of the older carriers but an aggressive building program by the Italians could/did change that. The LNT was pretty much dead in the late 30s. Italy may have desired 1-2 carriers to extend their reach into the eastern and western med but with Sardinia, Sicily, Libia and the Dodecanese Islands in Italian possession Italy was far from having to rely on mainland Italy for Air support.
With proper doctrine/planning and much less cost Italy could have provided air support for it's navy over a large percentage of the med.

 

[yulzari]

One might remember that the French navy was to take the Allied lead in the Mediterranean, releasing some of the Royal Navy into the Atlantic. That was fine, until it wasn't.

 

[EwenS]

Italy needed better cooperation between the Regia Aeronautica and the Regia Marina.

Undoubtedly. As I've noted before (see lot #285 on page 15 of this thread) the RA had no offensive TB force until after Italy joined the war in June 1940, and initially the RM was hampered by lack of RA maritime recce to find RN ships, something that didn't begin to improve until after the July 1940 Action off Calabria.

Starting a ship building race between Italy and Britian is starting a losing race of epic proportions.

RN needs carriers for advantages in areas where they don't have land support. RAF promised more than they could deliver but the RN was not supposed to operate their carriers in range of land-based air. Actual war experience was not what was planned for. RN wanted aircraft for the recon, and strike in areas that were hundreds of miles away from shore bases.
Italian navy was never going to reach areas like that.

Not a fair characterisation of the RN position. Look at where the RN expected to operate in wartime both in WW1 and throughout the inter-war period. The North Sea and the Med. And I think you have an unrealistic idea of the distances involved.

At its widest the North Sea is some 360 miles wide between Scotland and the Skagerrak. North and South of that it is narrower. Look at the WW1 experience. The Battle of Jutland was fought just 60-75 miles from the Danish coast. In 1918 the carrier Furious and a cruiser squadron made a sweep towards German waters and came under air attack by land based aircraft (possibly the first time a carrier came under air attack). Later that year aircraft from Furious attacked the Zeppelin sheds at Tondern which meant getting close to shore to launch the Sopwith Camels. As the war was ending the RN was planning a torpedo bomber raid on the German fleet in its base at Wilhelmshaven. That too would have meant getting close to the German coast.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/september/tondern-raid-strike-fighter-centennial

In the central Med, Crete to the Libyan coast is about 200 miles. Sardinia to Algeria is about 140 miles. Malta lies about 90 miles south of Sicily and about 220 miles north of Tripoli, Libya. In the early 1930s the RN carrier force (up to 3 carriers) was exercising a strike on a fleet at anchor (shades of what was dusted down as part of the planning for the Taranto raid). Operation Judgement, the raid on Taranto in Nov 1940, was a long range operation for the RN at the time with the launch point about 170 miles south east of Taranto near Corfu. The Swordfish dispensed with their TAGs for that mission and carried overload fuel tanks.

So the RN historically was prepared to go where an enemy was. That did not restrict it to operating hundreds of miles from an enemy shore.

What changed in the mid-1930s was that the performance of land based bombers improved significantly in terms of speed, range and weapon carrying capability. Following the Abyssinian Crisis of 1935, the RN reassessed the type of carrier it felt it needed. From that came the armoured carriers of the Illustrious class. These were designed to protect the air group from air attack, including by land based bombers, so that it would be in a position to fight back when it encountered an enemy fleet.

The Italian navy with carriers or without was never going to get through the Suez Canal or get through Gibraltar. Any hopes/dreams of the Italian surface fleet operating outside of the Med was delusional. Spending resources on those dreams was a mistake.

But exactly how much did they spend on this idea? The answer is not much. The ships they actually built were designed for operations in the Med and lacked the range for operations out with that theatre.actually Littorios class as designed 4,580 @ 16 knots, 3920 @ 20 knots & 1770 @ 30 knots.

The RN laid down five 22-23,000 ton carriers between 1935 and 1937. They laid down 2 more in 1939, construction delayed by other war work. Italy has no hope of matching even 1/2 of that schedule. Granted the RN was planning on retiring many of the older carriers but an aggressive building program by the Italians could/did change that.

Argus became a Queen Bee auxiliary as a result of her 1936-38 refit freeing up Treaty tonnage to build Ark Royal. Eagle was to be retired altogether by 1942 with Indefatigable seen as her replacement.

1939 RN planning looking forward to war in 1942, envisaged Furious as a training carrier with Hermes, Courageous & Glorious reduced to trade protection ships, the latter pair with smaller air groups than carried inter-war.

The Italians weren't trying to match the RN. They were trying to at least match the French.

The LNT was pretty much dead in the late 30s. Italy may have desired 1-2 carriers to extend their reach into the eastern and western med but with Sardinia, Sicily, Libia and the Dodecanese Islands in Italian possession Italy was far from having to rely on mainland Italy for Air support.
With proper doctrine/planning and much less cost Italy could have provided air support for it's navy over a large percentage of the med.

But as the RN found, relying on calling up fighters from shore bases to protect a fleet at sea couldn't be relied on. Expecting a permanent CAP to be maintained from shore was prohibitive in terms of cost and numbers of aircraft required.

One of the main reasons for Force V at Salerno was to provide dawn / dusk air cover when land based air cover from Sicily wasn't available but attacks could be expected.

So the Italian Navy had every reason to consider that it needed one or more carriers, which it had been trying to get throughout the inter-war period (my post #285 again).

Fixing the Italian Military, 1933~1945

Sorry I was not clear. The Re 2000 was basically P-35 in form/shape and construction but with a better engine. The engine in the P-35 was only good for 850hp at 8,000ft so performance even in the teens was poor. P-35A (ex Swedish aircraft) had a later engine that was good for 1050hp at 7700ft...

ww2aircraft.net

 

[Shortround6]

Undoubtedly. As I've noted before (see lot #285 on page 15 of this thread) the RA had no offensive TB force until after Italy joined the war in June 1940, and initially the RM was hampered by lack of RA maritime recce to find RN ships, something that didn't begin to improve until after the July 1940 Action off Calabria.

Not a fair characterisation of the RN position. Look at where the RN expected to operate in wartime both in WW1 and throughout the inter-war period. The North Sea and the Med.

effective range of aircraft, both carrier and land increased significantly during the interwar years.
RN had carried based single seat fighters in the 20s and most of the 30s. Doctrine (?) restricted their operation radius to visual distance from the carrier.
When the Skua showed up it's radio/navigation equipment allowed for much greater range. While useful aircraft vs snoopers and strike aircraft it was not up to taking on single seat fighters. This was excused in many books (without quoting actual memo's or letters?) by claiming it was not intended to go up against shore based fighters. A smokescreen? The RN was asking for single seat fighters but they didn't get them for several years and the Sea Hurricanes and Seafires were substitutes for the over-speced fighters that never materialized (Firebrand).
RN has a history of fighting where it needed to, despite not being properly equipped.
At some point in the 1930s the RN must have been planning on fighting the Japanese, at least contingency plans. Only the US had any significant carrier forces. French Bearn was joke and the Germans and Italians had plans on paper. Sweden had the Gotland but 6-10 Hawker Osprey float planes don't sound like a serious threat to the RN.

But as the RN found, relying on calling up fighters from shore bases to protect a fleet at sea couldn't be relied on. Expecting a permanent CAP to be maintained from shore was prohibitive in terms of cost and numbers of aircraft required.

None of combatants in WW II had very good cooperation between their navies and air forces from WW I to the start of WW II. For those nations that even approached good cooperation during WW II it seemed to take several years after the shooting started. US started shooting late and didn't start to cooperate much until 1943?
Expecting a permanent CAP to be maintained depends on geography and numbers of aircraft.
RN had not figured out how to do that even in 1939-40. Reason (or one of them) for the losses of the Courageous and Glorious. They were not keeping a permanent recon/search watch let alone a CAP (air interception) cover.
You need 4 aircraft to keep up a permanent daylight one aircraft at time CAP. Double for 2 aircraft at time?
Italy for defensive purposes can close off a lot of it's extensive coastline. Getting ships into the Adriatic is hard. So the eastern 600-700 miles of coast is relatively safe. The 180 mile (?) gap between Sardina and Sicily closing off the southern entrance to the Tyrrhenian Sea is also a benefit. The Ionian Sea is the only vulnerable area and spending how much money on 2-4 carriers to cover that instead of using land or shore-based aircraft?
The British with their much larger number of colonies and areas of interest would need a much larger fleet of land/shore based aircraft to even cover the ocean areas 2-300 miles from shore. Carriers make sense for them. Unless Italy plans to attack Gibraltar or Alexandria with carrier strikes then carries make less sense.
Many navies over-estimated the effectiveness of their AA guns (include fire control here). But a small number of fighters (12-24?) may not be enough to stop all attacking aircraft either.
Italians tried and failed to come up with good naval AA guns, enough AA guns and/or good fire control. Some good ideas, not so good execution.

Italian 90mm AA gun, The idea of using gyro stabilizers (11 per mount) to greatly increase accuracy was good.
Problems
1. low rate of fire. 12-16 rpm
2. small shells, about 10kg.
3 great weight, 18-19 tons.
4. mount was not well protected from water.

Compared to the standard British twin 4 in.
rate of fire 15-20 rounds per barrel
Shell weight about 15kg per shell
Twin mount was about the same.
British mount was not stabilized but most had manual power with much less problems with water.
Cost of the sophisticated Italian mounts?

 

[Airborne2001]

For fighters, the pilots can start training with Fiat CR.32s, but CR.42s/Macchi C.200s would be flying by the time the ship is ready. The historic choice, the Reggiane Re.2001 isn't ready in time. Macchi C.200 was operated as fighter bomber for much of its career; it will need to do as Regia Marina's attack aircraft.

There was a proposed version of the Fiat G.50 known as the G.50bis/N which was the first attempted carrier aircraft. It definitely would've been a bit underpowered, but it was workable as an early training aircraft. Perhaps, if the performance penalty isn't too bad, it could be an early fighter before the Re.2001 Series 2 OR.

 

[TM06]

Many navies over-estimated the effectiveness of their AA guns (include fire control here). But a small number of fighters (12-24?) may not be enough to stop all attacking aircraft either.
Italians tried and failed to come up with good naval AA guns, enough AA guns and/or good fire control. Some good ideas, not so good execution.

Italian 90mm AA gun, The idea of using gyro stabilizers (11 per mount) to greatly increase accuracy was good.
Problems
1. low rate of fire. 12-16 rpm
2. small shells, about 10kg.
3 great weight, 18-19 tons.
4. mount was not well protected from water.

Compared to the standard British twin 4 in.
rate of fire 15-20 rounds per barrel
Shell weight about 15kg per shell
Twin mount was about the same.
British mount was not stabilized but most had manual power with much less problems with water.
Cost of the sophisticated Italian mounts?

Is that really a fair comparison? The rate of fire definitely and the weight can be argued as a result of the stabilizers, but inditing a 90mm gun for having lighter shells than a 102mm gun doesn't quite feel right to me. WW2 Italy sort of leapfrogged the 100mm class outside of the Skoda 10cm - they ditched the WW1-era Cannone da 102/45 in favour of the various 120mm guns so the comparison with the 4-inch isn't as relevant IMO.

 

[Shortround6]

Is that really a fair comparison? The rate of fire definitely and the weight can be argued as a result of the stabilizers, but inditing a 90mm gun for having lighter shells than a 102mm gun doesn't quite feel right to me. WW2 Italy sort of leapfrogged the 100mm class outside of the Skoda 10cm - they ditched the WW1-era Cannone da 102/45 in favour of the various 120mm guns so the comparison with the 4-inch isn't as relevant IMO.

A lot of people got the right naval AA gun wrong.
It wasn't the best gun from a ballistics point of view.
It was the best (or at least a good) gun as part of a system that gave good results for weight installed.
British made a crap load of mistakes in heavy AA guns from WW I to the end of WW II.

The trick before the proximity fuse came out was getting a number of shells into the air to create large numbers of worthwhile fragments.
Still picking on the British here.
Building 6in and 8in turrets that could elevate to 60 and 70 degrees turned out to be stupid. The shells were heavy with lots of fragments, but the rate of fire was too slow (3-6) rounds per minute and even a 120mph airplane could move a 1/2 mile between shots of a 4rpm gun. The long range of these large guns was an illusion. Firing from even a slightly rolling/pitching ship meant chances of getting into lethal radius of an aircraft at long range was exceeding small even with the radar and these ships were built 10-15 years before radar showed up. British went through several 4.7in (120mm) guns, several 4.5in (114mm) and the infamous 5.25 (133mm) guns. It wasn't until the 4.5in MK V, 6 and 7 starting in the 1943 Battle class destroyers (none competed in WW II) that the 4.5in guns were really good AA guns.
And at about 46 metric tons for a twin mount/turret you needed big ships to mount them. The twin 4in was under 1/2 the weight.
The British also used a bunch of old 4in guns in single high angle mounts during the early part of WW II and maybe the black puffs made the attackers release bombs early and they made the crew of the ship/s firing the guns feel better but they weren't really very good.

For the Italians the 120mm guns in the destroyers and the Conte Di Cavour class were mainly anti-surface ship guns. Being able to elevate to 40-45 degrees doesn't really make a gun an AA gun. The Italian guns didn't have a good rate of fire, 6-7 rpm (?) and rate of elevation and traverse is not known? You also need fire control to do much more than make noise.
The Italian 90mm might have fired faster than the 102 and 120mm guns but the opposition (British) were firing larger shells just as fast if not faster, at least for short periods of time.

Much like land AA, you need to fire a lot of shells (hundreds if not thousands) to get one kill. Making the attackers miss is easier, but you need high rates of fire, good traverse and elevation and good fire control.
Twelve 90mm AA guns on the Littorio's was pretty pathetic in the late 30s. Germans were putting 12 10.5cm guns on the Hippers, 14 guns on the Scharnhorsts and 16 guns on the Bismarks and that wasn't enough. British screwed up and put 16 5.25s instead of 20 4.5in guns in the KGVs.
Germans also screwed up and leaped on the stabilized mounting band wagon. Getting the mountings to work reliably in bad weather was a bit of a problem.
Please note that the stabilized mounting was an attempt to get naval AA guns to act like guns on solid ground.

 

[z42]

A lot of people got the right naval AA gun wrong.
It wasn't the best gun from a ballistics point of view.
It was the best (or at least a good) gun as part of a system that gave good results for weight installed.

There's also the issue whether you're planning to do a DP secondary or separate surface secondaries and heavy AA. If the former, the need for anti-surface capability will bias your "optimal" choice towards a bigger gun. If you're going for separate systems, then you might want a smaller gun, if that gives you more barrels and higher RoF for installed weight.

Of course it missed WWII, but even without VT fuzes, something like the 3"/50 RF could have been a sweet system. It will fire much smaller shells than a 5" gun, sure, but thanks to the square-cube law the "lethal bubble" around a 5" shell isn't hugely larger than a 3" shell. Firing larger numbers of smaller shells might be a better option for covering a volume of space with splinters. Also, the range will be smaller than for a 5" gun, but again, firing at maximum range seems to have mostly been a prodigious consumption of ammunition for relatively meager effect.

The counter-point might be that if we don't have something like the 3" RF, then a 3" gun won't have hugely higher RoF than a 5" gun. Add in available deck space, chow and berths for crew etc. and the DP secondaries start to look pretty good. Now Italy didn't do DP secondaries, but maybe they should have?

 

[Shortround6]

There's also the issue whether you're planning to do a DP secondary or separate surface secondaries and heavy AA. If the former, the need for anti-surface capability will bias your "optimal" choice towards a bigger gun. If you're going for separate systems, then you might want a smaller gun, if that gives you more barrels and higher RoF for installed weight.

Quite true, the British 5.25in was biased too heavily to surface requirement. Rate of fire of 8 rounds per minute is not good.

Of course it missed WWII, but even without VT fuzes, something like the 3"/50 RF

The counter-point might be that if we don't have something like the 3" RF, then a 3" gun won't have hugely higher RoF than a 5" gun.

Kind of depends on the 3in gun. The UK 3in or 12pdr/20cwt fired at about 12-14rpm (?).
The US 3in gun used in WW II fired at about 15-20rpm. Both are a little on the low side.
Some mounts offered easier loading than others. One hangup was fuse setting. You need a way to adjust the fuses somewhere in the loading path.
For some reason some of the mid-war land 90mm-3.7in guns got much faster firing rates that don't seem to have transferred over to naval guns.
They got powered ramming and different fuse setters. This speeded things up a lot. However, a land gun had easier ammo supply. Ammo was closer and it was at nearly the same level as the gun. Naval gun fire rate may be dependent on ammo hoists getting ammo from below deck (several decks) magazines and up to the guns.
Priorities seem to have been screwed up in some navies. Things that improved rates of fire in the 1930s don't seem to have gotten the attention they should have. Some navies seem to have improved rate of fire instead of fancy stabilized mounts.
The US 5in/38 was hand loaded but power rammed and could be easily loaded at any elevation. This also meant that the gun barrel was high off the deck for a tall mount and that when the gun was fired at surface targets the breech was high in the air, solved by either rotating platforms for the loaders or by using enclosed gun houses. Most US 5in/38s used a ring mount with a built-in gun hoist and the shells /cases were presented to loaders very close to gun breeches.
German 10.5cm mounts with their triaxial motion offered better theoretical accuracy but had electrical faults, didn't train or elevate as fast and fired at about the same rate of fire or slightly slower because the ammo had to be passed from the magazine hoists and ready racks to the gun mounts and depending on traverse of the guns the ammo had to travel different distances.

Ammo is coming from where?
2nd sailor on the left is holding the round in the fuse setting machine. Loading crew on the right are 1-3 seconds ahead of the left loading crew?
Using such mounts in the North Atlantic or Arctic waters vs the Med can give different results?
We can also see the problem with trying to shoot at destroyers or torpedo boats with these guns or mounts. Guns are trunnioned well back but loading at low elevation is going to be hard. There may be folded up foot plates for the loaders to stand on when firing at surface targets.
There is a lot of stuff to consider for AA guns aside from weight of shell and velocity.
Not at all helped by the change in speed of the attacking aircraft in the late 30s and early 40s.

For battleships, they are supposed to have their own light cruisers and destoyers in formation to help stop enemy torpedo craft.

 

[z42]

Short video about the Italian carrier proposals by Bonfigletti in the late 1920'ies:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f31MasfLEMo

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you.
The Italian navy and constructors were always inventive and forward looking, sometimes too much so.
The British tended to be much more conservative. Much is made of the British Dreadnought but it's importance was more propulsion and building speed than the actual gun layout (all big gun). An Italian designer, Vittorio Cuniberti, had published an article in 1903 Jane's about the ideal battleship using all big guns. Other people may have had the Idea but not taken it quite as far. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904 had further shifted ideas of needed main gun batteries. The US had actual designed 1-2 battleships with eight twin turrets all on the centerline before the Dreadnought was laid down. However they kept reciprocating steam engines instead of turbines and kept the standard 18.5 knot speed (but were 1000-2000 tons smaller).
Vittorio Cuniberti had to temper his ideas with the reality of the Italian industrial base. He sort of came up with or resurrected the idea of large ships that could outrun anything they couldn't outfight.

A single 12in gun at each end a three twin 8in turrets on each side combined with a 22 knot speed. Unfortunately they took about 6 years to build for the first two ships and were thus obsolete when they joined the fleet. Italy was hardly alone in this. The first two American all big gun ships took over 4 years to build and were commissioned in 1910. British had hammered out 7 turbine powered all big ships at about the same time and had started construction on the next generation of Dreadnoughts (over 12in guns).
Point I am trying to make is that getting ideas from paper to workable weapons is often hard and long.
In the 1920-30s there was quite a bit friction in many nations between the new air forces and the old navy. There was never enough money for both and both were fighting with the army for what money there was.
Many national forces of the 3 services were fighting for prestige on the world stage and not necessarily what was best for each nation's needs. Italy had the air power advocate Giulio Douhet that was internationally known in the 1920.
Did Italy need 3-4 small/medium carriers to control the Med or did it need a fleet of 400-500 large bombers?
It got neither.
Air power advocates in other countries were years ahead of the technology needed to fulfill their claims.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If we can keep Italy from invading France in 1940, we may find that once the USSR adventure begins to sour, that Germany invades Italy in order to secure its southern flank. We'll need a good military then.

 

[Shortround6]

If we can keep Italy from invading France in 1940, we may find that once the USSR adventure begins to sour, that Germany invades Italy in order to secure its southern flank. We'll need a good military then.

This opens up a real can of worms.
Italy was not looked with favor by the international community after the Ethiopian adventure, involvement in Spain and then the invasion of Albania. Siding with Germany in the take-over over of Czechoslovakia did not help either.
Maybe England would continue to supply coal?
Other raw materials would come from where?
Wanting a good military does not mean you can build one.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Wanting a good military does not mean you can build one.

True. I wonder if in a neutral Italy the populace, politicians, industrialists and the king himself will have soured on Mussolini by 1943. The Ethiopian adventure and supporting Germany politically brought no benefit to anyone.

 

[Howard Gibson]

If we can keep Italy from invading France in 1940, we may find that once the USSR adventure begins to sour, that Germany invades Italy in order to secure its southern flank. We'll need a good military then.

Why would anybody attack a neutral Italy? The Mediterranean was an unmitigated disaster for the Germans. Italy needed to stay out of the war, just like Spain did.

 

[swampyankee]

Why would anybody attack a neutral Italy? The Mediterranean was an unmitigated disaster for the Germans. Italy needed to stay out of the war, just like Spain did.

A neutral Italy means the Mediterranean is the RN's lake. No siege of Malta. No battleships sunk (albeit temporarily) in Alexandria. Fewer losses from submarines. On the whole, a neutral Italy is a plus for the allies. Of course, the Allie don't get to practice on the Africa Korps before starting the liberation of Europe.

 

[yulzari]

The thought occurs that a neutral Italy might be able to shop for weapons in Vichy France and North Africa. Possibly to arm Libya and Italian East Africa and reserving the Italian resources for defending the homeland from Germany. A large part of their doctrine was maintaining a strong Alpine defence capability. The Commonwealth has nothing to gain by attacking a neutral Italy and having no near bases from which to gather and launch and supply a sea borne invasion anyway whereas Germany is a clear, present and contiguous threat.

Or to equip a more successful expansion of their own into the Balkans whilst still remaining neutral in the wider conflict as a halfway house between full AH neutrality and OTL.

They should be coining it selling to both sides, especially getting cheap coal and oil. If they can restrain their imperial ambitions then the Balkans, in its widest sense, and Turkey are open to Italian exports with the Commonwealth and Germans being busy at war. The Italians had shown themselves willing to sell directly for useful commodities in lieu of hard or soft currency.