French AirForce sortie rate May/June 40

[fastmongrel]

Does anyone have good figures for French Fighter sortie rates during the Battle of France, with a breakdowwn for types. I have seen figures that some Squadrons didnt even manage 1 sortie per aircraft per day. Luftwaffe Fighter sortie rate seems to be around 3 per day and RAF around 3 to 2 per day with the rate dropping as the RAF was pushed west.

 

[tomo pauk]

Lt. Col. Faris R. Kirkland (USA) stated this years ago:
The French fighter force had available to it during the battle more than 2900 modern aircraft. At no time did it have more than one-fifth of these deployed against the Germans. The operational rate of the fighter force was 0.9 sorties per aircraft per day at the height of the battle. (German fighter units flew up to four sorties per aircraft per day.) Yet in spite of committing only a minor portion of its resources at a low usage rate, the fighter force accounted for between 600 and 1000 of the 1439 German aircraft destroyed during the battle.

(excerpt taken from here)

 

[fastmongrel]

Thanks for the link Tomo I didnt realise that the French Air Force was quite as bad.
From the same article you linked to
The behavior of the leaders of the French Air Force before and during the Battle of France suggests that their primary purposes were to protect the regular air force against its domestic adversaries and to ensure its survival after the battle and the expected defeat. This was a preposterous misordering of priorities in a nation at war but made psychological and institutional sense when one reflects on both the frustration the aviators had suffered in their struggle to achieve operational independence from the army and the cavalier and callous way in which parliamentary officials had played with their lives, careers, and values.

That quote seems like a bogus claim the RAF and USAAC had suffered the same problems yet the RAF had its act together.

The Royal Air Force sent 12 of its 40 operational fighter squadrons to France--30 percent. The French committed 580 of their 2200 fighters--26 percent. RAF fighter losses were 227 of those based in France plus 219 from Fighter Command units based in England. Total--446. French fighter losses totaled 508. Total losses of aircraft in the Battle of France were: French--892, British--1029, German-1469.
The French Air Force In 1940: Was It Defeated by the Luftwaffe or by Politics? Note 4

 

[soulezoo]

"The French Air Force In 1940: Was It Defeated by the Luftwaffe or by Politics? Note 4"

I believe the same could be said, although to a lesser degree, for the French Army. Note deployment of armor for instance. It wasn't just about faulty doctrine and tactics although that played the larger role.

I also believe that quoted statement could be applied to any US engagement after WWII (although, politics certainly played a huge role there as well).

 

[swampyankee]

"The French Air Force In 1940: Was It Defeated by the Luftwaffe or by Politics? Note 4"

I believe the same could be said, although to a lesser degree, for the French Army. Note deployment of armor for instance. It wasn't just about faulty doctrine and tactics although that played the larger role.

I also believe that quoted statement could be applied to any US engagement after WWII (although, politics certainly played a huge role there as well).

A major difference is, of course, that France was in a battle for its existence. No post-WWII US military action was.

France had many internal political problems and had so many of its men killed 20 years prior that its potential leadership pool was pretty shallow

 

[fastmongrel]

Using data from Battle of France Then and Now by Peter D Cornwell Amazon product ASIN 1870067657
View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/1870067657/View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Battle-France-Then-Now/dp/1870067657/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1506612273&sr=8-1&keywords=battle+of+france+then+and+now


I randomly picked a day Saturday 18th May and jotted down a/c losses of the day as listed in the book. RAF losses were collated from several sources The National Archive at Kew, The Commonwealth Wargraves Commision and Brian Cull. Luftwaffe losses from Genst.Gen.Qu.6.Abt.(1c) returns and the Namentliche Verlustmeldungen of individual units. French losses from the work of Jaqueline and Paul Martin, built on work by L'Herbier Montagnon. Belgian losses from the work of Peter Taghon.

RAF
Hurricane 44
Blenheim 18
Lysander 3
Magister 1
Gladiator 4
Total 70

FAF
Potez 631 2
Potez 63.11 3
Leo 451 1
Amiot 354 1
Bregeut 691 1
Bregeut 693 2
Morane 406 7
Dewoitine 520 1
Curtiss H75 8
Bloch 152 2
Total 28

BAF
Foxes 17
Renard R 31 2
Battles 5
Total 24

LW
Dornier 17 16
Henschel 126 8
Heinkell 111 23
Junkers 88 5
Junkers 87 1
Junkers 160 1
Junkers 52 2
Bf 109 11
Bf 110 13
Total 80

I have to wonder if the French were having a half day because it was Saturday.

 

[fastmongrel]

To add to the above I have added up the causes of LW losses

RAF 30
FAF 20
Ground Fire 8
Accidents 10
Unknown 2

 

[fastmongrel]

RAF Victories
Hurricane MkI 29
Blenheim MkIV 1

FAF Victories
Curtiss H75 8
Morane 406 7
DeWoitine 520 1
Unkown type 4

 

[Koopernic]

A major difference is, of course, that France was in a battle for its existence. No post-WWII US military action was.

France had many internal political problems and had so many of its men killed 20 years prior that its potential leadership pool was pretty shallow

It's worth reflecting that the Germans too were fighting for their existence. It's often hard to put oneself in the shoes of the Germans. The anxiety must have been far worse for Germans and the call to desperate action greater. The Germans were engaged in a simultaneous two front war war France, Britain and Poland. The French received massive and direct British Army and RAF help. France had successfully captured 12 German towns and 20km of territory unopposed but for mine field and held them for 6 weeks without a single German solider setting foot in France. They withdrew after the surrender of Poland. They then had 7 months before the German offensive began.

The Germans then had to deal with not only French and British Army and Air forces but the very powerful and large Royal Navy which had a capacity to not only completely cut of Trade in critical raw materials but invade neautrals such as Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway denying access to critical for raw materials (Iron Ore) o and the RN, with neutrals denying Luftwaffe over flights could control access of the Germany Navy to the North Sea.

As in WW1 the German Military significantly out performed the Allies with superior tactics, drills and strategies. German Generals in WW1 killed far less of their own soldiers. During WW2 German combat effectiveness ratios were somewhere between 4:1 and 2:1 over the western allies whether on the offense or defense even dealing with the impressively organized US and UK Armies.

The tactics that made this possible were
1 Germans were organized for a fluid aggressive frontline war with frontline commanders empowered to make decisions. A German commander who discovered the enemy was trained to instinctively attack rather than telegram to a central command for a decision. This occasionally lead to needless losses as inferior German forces engaged superior enemy forces. This had been the case at least since the Franco Prussian war but overall it worked better. Nevertheless German Army was well equipped with radios and cryptography gear to communicate . Modell pointed out that an armies success depended on its decision making rate. Guardian pointed out that a bad decision is better than no decision.

This in part comes out of the humiliating defeat Prussia and the German states suffered not only under Napoleon but various French kings. The military and political strategies developed by von Clausewitz are still taught today.

During WW2 French were still sending telegrams to a central command and awaiting a decision, a decision which went through an in and out tray system. Likely to produce well reviewed but completely out of date decisions.

2 The Germans had an 'all or nothing' philosophy because they realized that long terms conflicts do not favor them. Germany is surrounded. Both the Poles and French held back resources and aircraft to preserve them. German aircraft were in front line airfields where they could produce high mission rates. Many Luftwaffe officers had been in the German Army and believed in ground support with a passion. The embedding of Luftwaffe FLAK down to 20mm with the Army maintained a strong connection.

The biggest failure in German history came with the death of Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm I. I don't dislike Wilhem II but he probably only had an IQ of 120 (top 10%) not the staggering intelligence of the first Wilhelm and Bismarck. Bismarck had maintained good relations with Russia. Had this good and friendly and natural relationship between Germany and Russia been maintained it would have countered France and particularly Britain and made the world a far better place.

 

[buffnut453]

So Bismark and Wilhelm II dying is Germany's biggest failure and not the election of National Socialists to power? The German people voted in favour of Hitler's worldview which demanded autarky at the expense of inferior races...specifically the Slavic races of the east. And you think somehow Germany could have maintained positive relations with Russia?

As to Germany facing a 2-front war, that was ENTIRELY of Hitler's own making. Hitler directed when to invade Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Low Countries. At any time, he could have said "Ok, we've made some major gains. Let's call it quits." Unfortunately, whenver he was faced with that option, he took the other path of further escalating or expanding the conflict.

In closing, apart from one brief mention of German aircraft being deployed on forward airfields, I fail to grasp what any of your post has to do with French Air Force sortie rates.

 

[tomo pauk]

<snip>

Another wall of text that is trying to justify Nazi conquest, and with it the crimes they did. Hence I've reported the post. I will keep reporting such posts any time I see them.

 

[Koopernic]

RAF Victories
Hurricane MkI 29
Blenheim MkIV 1

FAF Victories
Curtiss H75 8
Morane 406 7
DeWoitine 520 1
Unkown type 4

The Spitfire doesn't appear in any of your statistics yet the Hurricane suffered. Was it that good it was evading losses?

The French types seem to have first flights 1 year latter than the German ones (36 instead of 35/34) and entry into service around 1938 so they should have been ready but it appears these aircraft were variously equipped as bombers, fighters and night fighters.

The decision to place French aircraft in backline airfields may have been based on a lack of anti aircraft defenses.

The Luftwaffe not only had FLAK for its own airfields but was tasked with advancing with Wehrmacht combat troops with half track towed FLAK 37 8.8cm as well as 2.0cm guns in some cases mounted on the half track.

 

[buffnut453]

The Spitfire doesn't appear in any of your statistics yet the Hurricane suffered. Was it that good it was evading losses?

No Spitfire squadrons were deployed to France and hence were not involved in the Battle of France.

 

[pbehn]

No Spitfire squadrons were deployed to France and hence were not involved in the Battle of France.

Dowding called it the Hurricane tap, he was careful to ensure it didn't become a Spitfire tap too.

 

[swampyankee]

It's worth reflecting that the Germans too were fighting for their existence. It's often hard to put oneself in the shoes of the Germans. The anxiety must have been far worse for Germans and the call to desperate action greater. The Germans were engaged in a simultaneous two front war war France, Britain and Poland. The French received massive and direct British Army and RAF help. France had successfully captured 12 German towns and 20km of territory unopposed but for mine field and held them for 6 weeks without a single German solider setting foot in France. They withdrew after the surrender of Poland. They then had 7 months before the German offensive began.

The Germans then had to deal with not only French and British Army and Air forces but the very powerful and large Royal Navy which had a capacity to not only completely cut of Trade in critical raw materials but invade neautrals such as Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway denying access to critical for raw materials (Iron Ore) o and the RN, with neutrals denying Luftwaffe over flights could control access of the Germany Navy to the North Sea.

As in WW1 the German Military significantly out performed the Allies with superior tactics, drills and strategies. German Generals in WW1 killed far less of their own soldiers. During WW2 German combat effectiveness ratios were somewhere between 4:1 and 2:1 over the western allies whether on the offense or defense even dealing with the impressively organized US and UK Armies.

The tactics that made this possible were
1 Germans were organized for a fluid aggressive frontline war with frontline commanders empowered to make decisions. A German commander who discovered the enemy was trained to instinctively attack rather than telegram to a central command for a decision. This occasionally lead to needless losses as inferior German forces engaged superior enemy forces. This had been the case at least since the Franco Prussian war but overall it worked better. Nevertheless German Army was well equipped with radios and cryptography gear to communicate . Modell pointed out that an armies success depended on its decision making rate. Guardian pointed out that a bad decision is better than no decision.

This in part comes out of the humiliating defeat Prussia and the German states suffered not only under Napoleon but various French kings. The military and political strategies developed by von Clausewitz are still taught today.

During WW2 French were still sending telegrams to a central command and awaiting a decision, a decision which went through an in and out tray system. Likely to produce well reviewed but completely out of date decisions.

2 The Germans had an 'all or nothing' philosophy because they realized that long terms conflicts do not favor them. Germany is surrounded. Both the Poles and French held back resources and aircraft to preserve them. German aircraft were in front line airfields where they could produce high mission rates. Many Luftwaffe officers had been in the German Army and believed in ground support with a passion. The embedding of Luftwaffe FLAK down to 20mm with the Army maintained a strong connection.

The biggest failure in German history came with the death of Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm I. I don't dislike Wilhem II but he probably only had an IQ of 120 (top 10%) not the staggering intelligence of the first Wilhelm and Bismarck. Bismarck had maintained good relations with Russia. Had this good and friendly and natural relationship between Germany and Russia been maintained it would have countered France and particularly Britain and made the world a far better place.

A two-front war they started.

 

[Ascent]

Not specifically about the air war but a very good book about the battle for France is Alistair Horne's To Lose a Battle. It covers the state of French industry and the trouble and unrest in the country from both right and left and the problems with the unions effecting industrial production directly impacting the front lines.

 

[pbehn]

Koopermic WTF has your post to do with French sortie rates in 1940? It is a political rant.

 

[parsifal]

The French had 2200 aircraft in its inventory, including reserves, and units undergoing rapid conversion training at the time of the invasion. But it could only deploy a fraction of those numbers into frontline units at the front for a number of reasons.

At the top of the list was the limited numbers of aircrew available. There were about 1300 trained pilots in the FAF at the time. Rule of thumb is that you can afford to put about half your pilots into the front lines at any given time, if you want to undertake sustained operations. The others you need for trainng (either being trained, or giving the training), and others still undergoing some form of type conversion. Another reason was that interior areas needed to be protected. The French were acutely concerned that their cities would be razed by a sustained German assault on them, so many units were kept back for interior protection, much the same as vast proportions of the RAF were kept back to protect their cities. The germans with their more realistic situation appraisals and confidence had virtually nothing left in their interior areas for protection. Everything was pushed as far forward as possible to support the land campaign.

This last point also affected sortie rates. Both the AASF and the Armee de la air were think ing strategically, and tended to keep their air assets back from the front, which reduced both loiter time and further the sortie rates, particularly for their bombers. Allied bombers suffered horrendous loss rates, and many that did survive were heavily damaged requiring days to repair, if at all. This was due mostly to the far superior german ground based air defences, which tore into the vulnerable level bombers with a vengeance. Allied formations were devoid of intrinsic AA and in any event the pin point attacks of their divebombers, coupled with the more modern characteristics of their other bombers, tended to reduce their airborne damage rates

In airborne warfare, the great myth is that the Germans cleared the allies of the skies, destroying all opposing fighter opposition in a matter of hours or days. In point of fact the allies did rather well in airborne combat.

On May 10 the RAF lost thirty-four aircraft, only three of them destroyed on the ground by German bombers. The rest were shot down as they made bombing attacks on the advancing Germans, and an inspection of the locations and recorded causes—insofar as they are known—makes clear that the majority of these planes were lost to ground fire as they tried to stop the advance through Luxembourg and the Belgian Ardennes.. On the following day, the RAF lost twenty-three bombers—and this time, an appreciable number (eight) were lost to enemy bombing attacks—but again the majority were lost to ground fire, not the enemy fighters. On the third day the RAF lost another thirty-four bombers, again most were lost to ground fire as they tried to stop the German advance.

The myth is that the germans enjoyed air supremacy and that it was their fighter forces doing the majority of the damage. If this were the case, Allied fighter forces would not have been able to inflict significant damage on the LW. Truth is, large numbers of LW bombers were being brought down, and this proves, by definition, that the LW did not enjoy air superiority. British and French fighters were inflicting considerable damage on the Luftwaffe.

The weakness of allied flak, the inherent weakness of low flying level bombers flying tactical support and the ferocious efectiveness of the German flak defences of their front line army formations were what tore the heart out of the allies airborne forces. German flak is known to have shot down 586 allied planes in the first four days of fighting, out of a total loss of six hundred and odd planes

Conversely allied planes inflicted a steady attrition on German bombers. Most accounts of the air war in 1940 have focused on the fighter-to-fighter conflicts. In general both the French air force and the RAF Fighter Command gave a good accounting of themselves in these battles, but the attrition they inflicted was a long term effect, when quick results were what was needed on the BOF. Losses in the BOF were to affect operations over SE england in 3 months time, but were not effective in affecting operations over NW France. French squadrons equipped with the Curtiss 75A fighter shot down 33 German fighters (and roughly 2-3 times that number of bombers) and lost only three of their own in the air; units equipped with the Morane-Saulnier 406 fighter plane shot down 31 German fighter planes and suffered only six losses (ive read conflicting claims about bomber losses to the MS406, but it appears to be about 130). This despite the fact that the MS 406 was thought to be obsolescent. Units equipped with the Bloch 152 shot down 156 German planes and lost 59. French pilots flying Dewoitine 520 fighter planes lost forty-four of their own and accounted for 175 Germans. These are not the results one would expect where the enemy purportedly has air superiority or air supremacy.

The surprisingly competent performance of the French and British (and Dutch and Belgian) fighter pilots has to a large extent been obscured the massacre of their ground-attack craft, which has in turn led to a series of misconceptions, first about the air war itself, and second about the extent to which the Allies were "tricked" or "surprised" by "new" German tactics and technology. The one major cause of the defeat was clearly the Allied airpower failure—specifically the failure to have the right kinds of airplanes for tactical bombing, as well as a doctrine requiring the coordination with the ground forces. As with tanks, the Allies had plenty of planes, and in air-to-air combat, they clearly knew how to use them. Where they signally failed was in a fundamental misunderstanding of tactical airpower and the defenses against it.

The problem was that neither the French nor the British air command had given any serious attention to the basic problems of tactical bombing. They both subscribed to the idea that level-flight bombing could destroy targets on the ground, and had neglected the impact of antiaircraft fire on such attacks, when, by definition, the bombers flying at low altitudes would be most vulnerable.

Principal Source:
The War in the Air- France 1940

 

[Shortround6]

The Spitfire doesn't appear in any of your statistics yet the Hurricane suffered. Was it that good it was evading losses?

AS has been said the Spitfire was not deployed to France and only became involved when the ground fighting came within range of the bases in England. Spitfires were lost over France but not until the last few weeks.

The French types seem to have first flights 1 year latter than the German ones (36 instead of 35/34) and entry into service around 1938 so they should have been ready but it appears these aircraft were variously equipped as bombers, fighters and night fighters.

Not sure what you are trying to say here. The MS 406, Hawk 75, Dw 520 and Bloch 151/2 were not used as fighter bombers or night fighters, at least not specifically, as at this point in the war most any fighter was also a night fighter, it just flew at night instead of daytime and hopefully had a few flares it could drop to help illuminate the landing field. obviously actual success at intercepting anything was extremely rare.

The decision to place French aircraft in backline airfields may have been based on a lack of anti aircraft defenses.

The Luftwaffe not only had FLAK for its own airfields but was tasked with advancing with Wehrmacht combat troops with half track towed FLAK 37 8.8cm as well as 2.0cm guns in some cases mounted on the half track.

Both the British and French armies were woefully deficient in light AA guns, although the Germans use of halftracks is perhaps over stated.

I am not sure how many light AA guns were moved by trucks and German light AA was also the province of the MG 34.

This mount being used on a variety of car and light truck chassis and is one reason the MG 34 and MG 42 had the high cycle rates they did.

 

[Koopernic]

, that the LW did not enjoy air superiority. British and French fighters were inflicting considerable damage on the Luftwaffe.

The weakness of allied flak, the inherent weakness of low flying level bombers flying tactical support and the ferocious efectiveness of the German flak defences of their front line army formations were what tore the heart out of the allies airborne forces. German flak is known to have shot down 586 allied planes in the first four days of fighting, out of a total loss of six hundred and odd planes

Conversely allied planes inflicted a steady attrition on German bombers.

Principal Source:
The War in the Air- France 1940

This is one of your better posts Parsifal. Its compelling but not totally convincing because I retain some doubts whether the author makes a distinction between claims, confirmed claims nevertheless its true that the Luftwaffe had significant numbers of FLAK units embedded in the Wehrmacht. Pictures of 2.0cm FLAK C30 and C38 are not hard to find. Some even had clockwork driven gyro sights indicating the serious effort that went into the weapon.

AS has been said the Spitfire was not deployed to France and only became involved when the ground fighting came within range of the bases in England. Spitfires were lost over France but not until the last few weeks.


Not sure what you are trying to say here. The MS 406, Hawk 75, Dw 520 and Bloch 151/2 were not used as fighter bombers or night fighters, at least not specifically, as at this point in the war most any fighter was also a night fighter, it just flew at night instead of daytime and hopefully had a few flares it could drop to help illuminate the landing field. obviously actual success at intercepting anything was extremely rare.



Both the British and French armies were woefully deficient in light AA guns, although the Germans use of halftracks is perhaps over stated.

I am not sure how many light AA guns were moved by trucks and German light AA was also the province of the MG 34.

This mount being used on a variety of car and light truck chassis and is one reason the MG 34 and MG 42 had the high cycle rates they did.

The claims of German technical superiority are also undermined by the kinds aircraft the Germans were loosing. Henschell Hs 126 biplane dive bomber. Interesting is the heavy looses of Hurricane in Fastmongrel's data. Were they also being used for ground attack?

I get the impression that the Fairy Battle was much maligned. It seems to have been an quite accurate weapon with its crews competently confident of busting bridges with a sting of bombs. The weapon was probably not escorted appropriately. One would expect that each Battle should receive its own Vic.

Most German FLAK seems to have been towed on the versatile German Sd. Ah. 51 two wheel trailer which had a split Y chassis. Apart from carrying 20mm FLAK guns it carried FLAK predictors, ammunition, signals equipment. It allowed a large load like a gun to be lowered and picked up quickly. It looks like it has winches. I think at some point rather than towing the gun and carrying the ammunition the gun was carried on the half track to get into action quicker.