French AirForce sortie rate May/June 40

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So in answer to the claim that French air victories might be inflated, I decided to put together a rough list to see just how inflated the French fighter claims might be.

Known or admitted German losses in air combat 10 may to the surrender are between 1380 and 1450 a/c. RAF claims are 750 a/c, the Dutch claimed 34 (in the air), and the Belgians just under 50. That leaves a nominal total of 581 to the FAF, which more or less lines up with kirklands figures. Nearly all of these losses can be assumed to be the result of the French fighters I think, given the weakness and poosr placement of their AA. These losses don't include the losses on the ground.

So the claims by type that I know of are:

Victories/losses

H-75: 230/29
MS406: 171/111
D 520: 175/81
MB152; 146 /59

Totals: 722/280
Some of the source material for this quick straw poll

Bloch MB-152

View: https://www.scribd.com/document/260635021/MS-406-Morane-WW2-French-Fighter
 
Germans were loosing. Henschell Hs 126 biplane dive bomber

Hs126 wasnt a Biplane divebomber. It was a Parasol wing army cooperation plane virtually the same role, size and performance as a Westland Lysander.

Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-565-1425-11A%2C_Italien%2C_Flugzeug_Henschel_Hs_126.jpg
 
The claims of German technical superiority are also undermined by the kinds aircraft the Germans were loosing. Henschell Hs 126 biplane dive bomber. Interesting is the heavy looses of Hurricane in Fastmongrel's data. Were they also being used for ground attack?

The Hs126 was not a biplane and certainly not a dive bomber. It was an army cooperation aircraft used for communication and tactical reconnaissance.

As to the Hurricanes, AFAIK they were not used for ground attack. At this stage of the war, RAF doctrine held a clean separation between the roles of fighter and light bomber.
 
The claims of German technical superiority are also undermined by the kinds aircraft the Germans were loosing. Henschell Hs 126 biplane dive bomber.
actually Hs 126
Henschel_Hs_126_%2815247029576%29.jpg


Hs 123
lrg1228.jpg

The Hs 126 was the standard short range reconnaissance and artillery spotter for the German forces. It could be used for light attack with either six 10kg bombs or a single 50kg bomb. It was much, much more common than the Hs 123 which equipped only a few squadrons. The Hs 126 was the rough equivalent of the Lysander.

I get the impression that the Fairy Battle was much maligned. It seems to have been an quite accurate weapon with its crews competently confident of busting bridges with a sting of bombs. The weapon was probably not escorted appropriately. One would expect that each Battle should receive its own Vic.
It was only partially maligned. It was miss used. It was a single engine strategic bomber pressed into tactical use without proper training (low level bombing vs medium or high altitude) for the crews or contrary to your expectations, even provided a minimal escort on most of it's missions. In some cases due to poor communications.

Most German FLAK seems to have been towed on the versatile German Sd. Ah. 51 two wheel trailer which had a split Y chassis. Apart from carrying 20mm FLAK guns it carried FLAK predictors, ammunition, signals equipment.

The Germans used a variety of trailers. Some of rather similar design but scaled to suit the intended payload. For example the gun director in the middle picture used a German Sd. Ah. 52 trailer as is noted on the model box. This larger trailer was also used for the 37mm AA guns and later the quad 20mm AA gun. there were also simpler trailers used for ammunition and general cargo.

The 20mm gun could be fired from the wheels in an emergency but there was a considerably loss of accuracy.
 
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The claims of German technical superiority are also undermined by the kinds aircraft the Germans were loosing. Henschell Hs 126 biplane dive bomber. Interesting is the heavy looses of Hurricane in Fastmongrel's data. Were they also being used for ground attack?

Some details of Hurricane, Defiant and Spitfire ops 10-15 may within the operational area.
10 May

On the first day, the pace of operations is frenetic. The fighter units of the AASF and the BEF air component shoot down a total of 40 enemy a/c in exchange for the loss of 10 hurricanes. Allied bomber formations perform far less effectively.


11 May 1940

17 Sqn (Hurri)
Operation: Patrol Den Haag – Delft – Rotterdam, following losses sustained

F/O GW. Slee, NL KIA, AC N2405 lost; Shot down by Bf109s of I./JG51 over Gravendeel 5.00 p.m.

Flt Lt MS. Donne, KIA, A/C N2403 Shot down by Bf109s over Numansdorp 5.00 p.m. Possibly one of those claimed by Oberlt Krafft of 3./JG51

P/O O.P. DeL Hulton-Harrop PoW, A/C N2407; Shot down south of Rotterdam by Me 109 of JG51 at 17.00 hrs, possibly by Lt Terry of Stab I./JG51.

S/L GC. Tomlinson, safe, A/C N2547 crashed; Forced-landed at Hingene damaged by Bf109s south of Rotterdam 5.00 p.m. Possibly that claimed by Oberlt Schäfer of 5./JG27. S/L G. C. Tomlinson unhurt. Aircraft abandoned. Pilot returned to the UK.

Sgt. J.A.A. Luck, PoW, A/CX P2758 destroyed, Shot down by Bf109s in combat over Dordrecht 5.00 p.m. Possibly that claimed by Uffz Schreiter of 3./JG51.

79 sqn (Hurri)
Patrol, B/F. 1 Plane lost, 1 WIA. F/Lt R. Edwards bailed out after shooting down a He111 NW of Mons, Belgium. Burn injuries


12 May

1 Sqn (Hurri) AASF
6 Battles from No 12 sqn attack the vital bridges in the Maastricht area still standing. 1 a/c aborts due to engine problems, 5 attack bridges at Veldwezelt and Vroenhoven. Ahead of the bombers were 8 Hurricanes from No 1 Sqn. The escort see the sky fill with Bf109s - 120 in all according to German records. Despite the fearful odds, the Hurricanes fought as best they could, losing 2 a/c. Sqn claims amount to 7 a/c, of which 3 are confirmed post war. 1 of the hurricane pilots is captured by Belgian civilians and locked in a cellar until liberated by the Belgian army some time later


107 sqn (Blen)
At 0900 2 Blenheim Mk.IV sqns [107 Sqn. and ?] from BC attacked the bridges at Maastricht. It was a very bloody confrontation for the RAF. Of the 24 planes no less than 10 were downed. These attacks were simultaneous to the 12 sqn strikes that attacked the nearby bridge at Vroenhoven. All 5 Battles were lost. Aerial photographs taken during the Blenheim mission showed that all 96 bombs had missed their targets.

Hurris of 87 Sqn escorted the bombers. They battled with Me109's of Stab/JG27. 2 Hurris were shot down by Adolf Galland. The last Allied effort came from the FAF. During a strafing and bombing mission of German troops just west of Maastricht by 18 Bre-693 bombers, 8 a/c were lost


the Boulton Paul Defiant first fires its guns in anger. 'A' Flight of 264 Sqn based at RAF Duxford, Cambridgeshire on patrol off the Hague in company with six Spitfires of 66 Sqn encounter a single Ju 88, which was shot down by the Defiants during a co-ordinated cross over attack below the bomber. The attack employed standard tactics for bomber interception by the turret fighter, with single seat fighters to catch stragglers that were to deviate away from the formation, although there was only one aircraft present. The lack of fighter escort was also noticeable, but this was the environment for which the Defiant was designed. The next day, the 13th was to spell disaster for the type however, during its first encounter with the Messerschmitt Bf 109.


13 May 1940 –

1 sqn (Hurri)
Sqn attacks a formation of Me110's and He111 near Vouziers.F/O. 2 Me110s and 3 He111s destroyed.

3 Sqn
F/O W.S.C. Adams, in L2564 collided with aircraft of F/O Lines Roberts (S/N not reported). Both planes exploded, Both pilots lost.
F/O (Pilot) Albert R. Ball, RAF (Cdn), 'Dickie' Ball. Shot down by a Do17, crash-landed and captured. Died of wounds 04/06/1940.

4 Sqn (Lysander)
P/O P W. Vaughan, KIA, Took off 07.30 hrs from Monchy-la-Gache. Flew over German positions on banks of Gete river. Shot down by Lt Horst Braxator from 2./JG1. (De Decker/Roba: 1.JG1).

17 Sqn (Hurri)
Hurricanes N3403, N2454, N2405 and N2407 all lost on the ground or abandoned

66 sqn (Spit), 264 sqn (Defiant)
In the evening the RAF had planned a strafing mission of 6 Defiants and 6 Spits along the Dutch coast. They drew fire from Dutch AA at the Coast, As this combined squadron approached the Dutch coast, no damage. Over the Hague and Rotterdam, a total of 7 Stuka's from 12 Staffel, Lehr Geschwader 1 are spotted and engaged, as the stukas dive towards Dutch positions at Alblasserdam. Succeed in breaking up the attack. LG 1 request immediate ftr protection from the nearby patrol (firing a red flare). 24 to 27 Me 109s of JG26 turns the tables. After the intensive clash between the two forces (together about 45 planes) 5 Ju87s are lost [RAF claimed seven - only 5 wreckages were identified], 2 Me-109's and 5 Defiants are lost in exchange

73 sqn (Hurri)
Interception, F. 1 Plane lost, 1 WIA, a flt of Hurris intercepted He111Ps of KG55 and Bf110Cs as they approached. 2 He111s shot down, 1 Hurri badly damaged and written off by enemy escort.


14 May

1 Sqn (Hurri)
Sedan, 3 a/c lost, 1 KIA, 1 MIA, all believed lost to Me 110s of ZG 26 in the disastrous attacks on Sedan. F/O Clisbie (an Australian) is killed when he bales out. He was the first Australian ace of the war.
3 Sqn
Sgt D. A. Allen, in L1591 shot down by Ju 87 and killed near Sedan.
P/O F R. Carey, in L1932 was – WIA but safe A/C damaged by Do17 of 3(F)/11 near Hamme-Mille. Made a forced landing. Injured. A/c later burnt.
P/O M.M. Stephens in L2541 - Made a forced landing near Sedan, south of Annelles. Pilot safe, A/C burnt.
P/O C.G. Jeffries in L2908 Damaged by Me110 in Sedan area, bailed out and returned to unit

73 sqn (Hurri)
4 Planes lost, 3 KIA, 5 Hurris scrambled in pursuit of bombers reported attacking a convoy on the Givet-Namur road. They however became involved in combat with German fighters from numerous locations (Me 109s and 110s, multiple stafelns). 1 enemy Me110 is brought down (possibly from III/ZG26), but out of ammo lose 3 on the return and 1 written off.

79 sqn (Hurri)
Patrol. 2 Planes lost, 1 MIA, 1 WIA, no details on MIA, P/O J.E.R. Wood bailed out after a bringing down a Ju 88, nth of Leuze. Injured


15 May 1940

1 Sqn

2 Hurris (L1681 L1943)are lost whilst engaging enemy formations. 8 enemy a/c are claimed destroyed in this clash, 4 are confirmed post war. Both RAF pilots are recovered safe

3 Sqn
Flt Lt M M. Carter, in L2534, Shot and KIA down by a Me110 of II/ZG76 near Vouziers.
S/L Pat Gifford, DFC – In L1610 Made a forced landing near Wevelghem. Pilot safe, A/C salvaged Returned to unit.
P/O N D. Hallifax, PoW L2422 Shot down by Me110 of II/ZG76 near Zeebrugge.


15, 607, 615, 40, 242 Sqn
On 15 May Sqn Ldr Lance Smith of 607 (Hurri) Sqn led 11 Hurris in escort of a dozen Blenheims (3 of 15 Sqn and 9 of 40 Sqn), which were to bomb the bridges over the Meuse in the Dinant-Celles area.Before reaching the target they encountered Bf110Cs plus Bf109s from Stab III/JG 53 at 11,000 feet. In the ensuing combat Sqn Ldr JR Kayall of 615 Squadron claimed 2 Bf110s while F/O H. N. Fowler claimed a probable Bf109 before being shot down himself (he parachuted safely but was later taken PoW). 607 Sqn claimed 2 Bf109s shot down, one by Whitty, who reported seeing the pilot bale out of the aircraft he attacked, and the other by newly attached P/O Grassick of 242 Sqn's B Flight. Sqn Ldr Smith was KIA. 3 Hurris were claimed by III/JG 53 and were credited to Hauptmann Werner Mölders, Oberleutnant Heinz Wittenberg and Leutnant Georg Claus, while 2 of the Blens (1 from 15 sqn) were shot down by Bf109s of 1/JG 3 encountered when NW of Charleroi.


73 sqn (Hurri)
2 Planes lost, 1 WIA, On a sortie S/L J.W.C. More and F/Lt Scoular shared in the destruction of He111 A1+LK of 2/KG53 which crashed Grandpré, SE of Vouziers. The pilot Oberleutant Walter Klue and one other were killed, while the remaining 3 members of the crew were captured. The 2 allied losses occur in subsequent engagements with enemy interceptors, as 73 sqn returns low on ammo and fuel. Unable to engage properly both a/c are lost when the pilots bale out following damage in combat with pursuing Me-110's of ZG2, west of Vouzières


103 sqn (Hurri/Battle)
Evac order
3 hrs notice received to evacuate Betheneville. Sqn equipment had been loaded during 15th May in preparation for evac. The main party left at 0130 hours. All serviceable Battle and Hurri a/c took off at first light. Difficulty experienced with transport and the evac of Ftr Sqn personnel who were without sufficient vehicles. In view of the uncertainty of the rapidity and extent of enemy the advance, all sqn personnel who could not be evacuated were held in readiness to withdraw across country on foot. Surplus personnel of the ftr sqn were ordered to rendezvous on the West side of the river Suippe as the enemy were constantly attempting to bomb the bridge across the river, and it was considered that mechanical transport should stop on that side to prevent being cut off. 8 airframes were burnt to avoid capture
 
I've always taken claims of German technological superiority with a large grain of salt. For one thing, check out the airfoils used on the Bf109. For another, check out the machinery in many of their destroyers.

France lost for numerous reasons, many having less to do with German competence (and the German Army and Luftwaffe were tactically excellent) but with the French Army's incompetence and the absolute hatred some parts of its political leadership had for each other. ("French conservatives condemn French Socialist leader Léon Blum because of his Jewish ancestry and his strongly anti-Nazi orientation. A popular slogan at the time condemns the future French premier: 'Better Hitler than Blum.'" -- Timeline of Jewish Persecution in the Holocaust).
 
I've always taken claims of German technological superiority with a large grain of salt. For one thing, check out the airfoils used on the Bf109. For another, check out the machinery in many of their destroyers.

France lost for numerous reasons, many having less to do with German competence (and the German Army and Luftwaffe were tactically excellent) but with the French Army's incompetence and the absolute hatred some parts of its political leadership had for each other. ("French conservatives condemn French Socialist leader Léon Blum because of his Jewish ancestry and his strongly anti-Nazi orientation. A popular slogan at the time condemns the future French premier: 'Better Hitler than Blum.'" -- Timeline of Jewish Persecution in the Holocaust).

In many cases the supposed technical superiority fell on it's face because they tried to push things an extra step further than what other people were doing. Being first always has risks and the further out in front you try to push the bigger the risk.
The Germans had some of the best integration of forces and communications in the early part of the war. Even a few radios beat motorcycle messengers for example.
 
In many cases the supposed technical superiority fell on it's face because they tried to push things an extra step further than what other people were doing. Being first always has risks and the further out in front you try to push the bigger the risk.
The Germans had some of the best integration of forces and communications in the early part of the war. Even a few radios beat motorcycle messengers for example.

..or the technological superiority simply did not exist. The German armed forces, on the other hand, were very likely tactically more capable and may have had better specified equipment. They certainly had better air-ground integration. On the other hand, the French Army was caught wrong-footed, and never recovered.
 
In many cases the supposed technical superiority fell on it's face because they tried to push things an extra step further than what other people were doing. Being first always has risks and the further out in front you try to push the bigger the risk.
The Germans had some of the best integration of forces and communications in the early part of the war. Even a few radios beat motorcycle messengers for example.

And yet, logistically, the German army was relatively unmechanised, with heavy reliance on horses. The adage that good generals think about tactics whereas the great generals think about logistics seems apposite here. All the German forces were aligned for a relatively short tactical campaign and yet Hitler and the Nazi leadership consistently refused to do anything other than escalate even when there was no pressing need for that escalation.
 
All the German forces were aligned for a relatively short tactical campaign and yet Hitler and the Nazi leadership consistently refused to do anything other than escalate even when there was no pressing need for that escalation.
Not an expert on this but I believe Adolf knew Russia USA UK and France were re arming and was aware that they would soon catch up. Also he had little concept of sustained warfare. Also he had no one to advise him, Goering was unaware of the LW losses sustained in Belgium Holland Norway and France prior to the Battle of Britain, if he didn't know how would Hitler? Also Hitler was a bit nutz in the strategy department
 
And yet, logistically, the German army was relatively unmechanised, with heavy reliance on horses. The adage that good generals think about tactics whereas the great generals think about logistics seems apposite here. All the German forces were aligned for a relatively short tactical campaign and yet Hitler and the Nazi leadership consistently refused to do anything other than escalate even when there was no pressing need for that escalation.
In Europe they could also depend on trains for long distance or heavy movement. Then use horse drawn wagons for short distances. Eastern Europe and Russia had nowhere near the rail density of western Europe. This was one reason for the allies shooting up all the rail transport they could before D-Day.
 
Easy to forget that trains were the means of transport used by most in Europe before WW2. Pre war cars were owned by rich enthusiasts..
Trains were the means of long distant transport in the US. The interstate highway system hadn't been built.
 
trains were even short distance, plenty of short/branch lines let alone commuter lines. Buses were just starting to make serious inroads into anything but city traffic.

I have no idea what year this is for but a railway map of Belgium
belgium-rail-map.jpg


You have to look hard to find a spot more than 12 miles (20K) from a rail line. Granted there may not be sidings in every location one might want but it doesn't look like anyplace is more than one days wagon travel from a rail line. (OK a truck could make multiple trips per day) but motorization or lack of it was probably of the least importance in this particular area. It does take very good staff work to use rail lines as they are still less flexible than using trucks.
 
In Europe they could also depend on trains for long distance or heavy movement. Then use horse drawn wagons for short distances. Eastern Europe and Russia had nowhere near the rail density of western Europe. This was one reason for the allies shooting up all the rail transport they could before D-Day.

The problem is that your "last mile" logistics is dependent on a mode of transport that simply can't keep up with the front-line forces. The inability of German logistics to keep up with mobile manoeuvre units was apparent throughout the war from the 1940 Blitzkrieg to the 1945 Battle of the Bulge. The "last tactical mile" is vital and relying on horses just won't cut it unless you're fighting a static war (which is a great way to lose).


Easy to forget that trains were the means of transport used by most in Europe before WW2. Pre war cars were owned by rich enthusiasts..

True enough but we're not talking about civilians. We're talking about the military and most field armies were highly mechanized. As noted above, your logistics has to keep pace with your front-line forces, and that goes both for advance and retreat. It was extremely naiive of the German Army to think it could subsist to such a degree on horse-drawn logistics chains.
 

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