Fulmar II versus F4F-4 under 10,000 ft.

[Ivan1GFP]

Regarding the Seafire, I remember reading about a conversation between Corwin Meyer and Eric Brown. Noting that the British put the Corsair aboard carriers a year before the US Navy did, Meyer asked why the RN was so set on getting the Corsair aboard ship. Consider that at times, there were ideas about partially deflating tires to make the folded wings of the Corsair fit in the RN Hangar decks. Eventually, the wingtips were clipped. Remember this was era of uneven stalls and bouncy landing gear, so Corsairs were certainly not well behaved.

The reply from Eric Brown was that the Seafires were basically junk. That surprised me also when I first read this. I can't seem to find the exact text at the moment. Perhaps someone else knows where it might be found online?

Did Seafires have flaps that were useable for Take-Off?

- Ivan.

 

[Greyman]

There was a modification (number 63) available that allowed an intermediate position for take-off (18 degrees specified for the Seafire), but I have no idea to what extend this was carried out.

The more common method I believe was to have the pilot lower the flaps and have the flight deck crew insert wooden blocks, then raise the flaps (the blocks stopping the flaps at a midway position). After take off the flaps were fully lowered, the blocks dropped out, and the flaps were raised fully for flight.

 

[RCAFson]

Prior to LL the UK was spendings its gold reserves to buy US aircraft of questionable combat efficiency, probably as much to encourage US aircraft production and development as to obtain aircraft but had that money been invested in FAA aircraft development...

The issue of the Corsair (and other carrier fighters available via LL) versus the Seafire/Sea Hurricane/Fulmar is interesting, and complicated. Development of FAA aircraft was expensive and required scarce resource allocations, which were hard to justify when the USA was offering fighters, basically, for free via LL. As a result FAA aircraft development was deprived of funding and lagged but also it removed much of the rationale for "making do" with UK designs, as exemplified by the Sea Hurricane (developed because the Martlet/F4F was both scarce and low performing) and early Seafires, and the Sea Hurricane turned out to be the outstanding Allied carrier fighter of 1942. However when the USA caught up in performance with the F4U/F6F, and offered the F4U in quantity, the pressure was off the UK to develop an indigenous carrier fighter of equal or better performance. The Griffon engine was prioritized to the RAF and Griffon engined Fireflys and Seafires were delayed till late 43/44, with the Griffon engine Seafire XV missing the war entirely, even though it was undergoing successful flight testing in mid 1944. The impetus to find ways to extend the Seafire III's range also lagged, but by late war it become useful for medium range escort duties. The Firefly is criticised as a heavy clumsy fighter, but in reality it weighed about the same as the F4U, and was really hampered by lack of engine power, again due to lack of FAA aircraft development priority. The later variants featured much improved top speeds, using Griffon engines available to the Spitfire in 43/44. A Griffon 60/70 powered Firefly had roughly comparable performance to the F4U (since it had similar engine output) and vastly superior landing characteristics and strike capabilities, but these were all post war aircraft.

 

[parsifal]

Regarding the Seafire, I remember reading about a conversation between Corwin Meyer and Eric Brown. Noting that the British put the Corsair aboard carriers a year before the US Navy did, Meyer asked why the RN was so set on getting the Corsair aboard ship. Consider that at times, there were ideas about partially deflating tires to make the folded wings of the Corsair fit in the RN Hangar decks. Eventually, the wingtips were clipped. Remember this was era of uneven stalls and bouncy landing gear, so Corsairs were certainly not well behaved.

The reply from Eric Brown was that the Seafires were basically junk. That surprised me also when I first read this. I can't seem to find the exact text at the moment. Perhaps someone else knows where it might be found online?

Did Seafires have flaps that were useable for Take-Off?

- Ivan.

hi ivan

I would like to see that interview if possible. I have a number of records of interview with Brown. His comments are in fact exactly the opposite to what you are saying. He was critical of the Seafire I, which lacked a lot of basic navalisation mods, like wing folding, and a daggie arrester hook. He was enthusastic about the later wartime marks of Seafire.

He may have given contradictory statements, or more likley, he may have been referring to the early versions of the type, which was never suited to frontline operations (though the british attempted it, with no success)

Proof that Brown either was not referring to the later marks, or didnt know what he was talking about, is that the british retained the Seafire, in a later configuration as a frontline fighter, until 1954. The Canadians also made use of it I understand.

As I said, the main criticism that has been levelled against the Seafire was its high accident rate. This problem had been addressed by 1945, and the type went from a real problem, to having a lower accident rate than either of the main US types. It had adequate range, and outstanding interceptor qualities (acceleration and climb). It was one of the fastest carrier fighters in 1943-5, and carried a very heavy armament.

whats not to like about the machine?

 

[Readie]

It was a case of the pilots getting used to / being trained to deal with the torque reaction / swing of the Seafire. This was the case with other aircraft like the Mossie.
It must have been an alarming experiance to be heading to the control tower on the carrier when you open the throttle to take off !
Cheers
John

 

[parsifal]

The Torque swing issue really was not that big a problem until until the arrival of the first griffon engined versions. The aircraft hadf a tendency to crab walk down the flight deck, which was a definite control problem, since applying even maximum rudder would not rectify the problem. The initial "fix" was to limit boost on takeoff to a maximum of 7 lbs. Later, in the Seafire 47, the rotation of the engine was reversed, which made the problem disappear.

AFAIK, the Merlin engined versions did not have this problem, or at least its effects were controllable.

 

[Readie]

The Torque swing issue really was not that big a problem until until the arrival of the first griffon engined versions. The aircraft hadf a tendency to crab walk down the flight deck, which was a definite control problem, since applying even maximum rudder would not rectify the problem. The initial "fix" was to limit boost on takeoff to a maximum of 7 lbs. Later, in the Seafire 47, the rotation of the engine was reversed, which made the problem disappear.

AFAIK, the Merlin engined versions did not have this problem, or at least its effects were controllable.

The Griffon rotated the opposite way to the Merlin.The torque swing effect of the huge single propellor was evenually countered by contra rotating propellors, an ungainly but effective solution. There is a Mk47 flying in the USA, its on you tube 'The one and only'. I cant post the link at the moment.

I must admit that I have been under the impression that the torque swing effect was an issue for Merlin engined Spitfires as well as taxi'ing visibility with the high nose.

Cheers
John

 

[Freebird]

For the record, I said, referring to the F4F3 "was a decent shipboard fighter and on balance was the best in the world in the Allied quiver in 1942-early43." I apologise that I was not more clear in my statement

Generally I agree with that statement Renrich.
First off, I think we are talking about the British FAA here.
For the Americans the Wildcat is the best (it's all they have) from 1941 - mid '43
For the British, RCAF is correct, the Fulmar is the best in 1940.(nothing better available.) I would agree with Parsifal, with all the Martlet I problems (no sealing tanks, guns jamming, no folding wings etc) it was an inferior choice in early 1941. So the SeaHurri would be the better option from Feb - Aug 1941. When the Martlet II is available from Sept 1941 it would be the best option IMO. Of course it won't replace all FAA SeaHurris because there are not enough Martlets available as the USN urgently needs them too.

As for the Fulmar and Wildcat versus the Ju88, Brown could not be more clear that the Ju88A-4 was faster than the Fulmar and he could not be more clear than that the Wildcat was a better opponent versus the Ju88 than the Fulmar.

And not only the Ju88, I think considering the combat results of Fulmar vs both Zeros Me109, the F4F is the better fighter.
Not really surprising either, I don't know of any WWII two-seat fighter-bomber or multi-role aircraft that could outperform the latest single seat fighter in a fighter role. Me110 couldn't, Pe-3 couldn't, Beaufighter couldn't.

 

[Freebird]

A RN Commander says the Vmax is 300 MPH at the fighter conference. Apparently you either did not read the comments or don't believe them.

Frankly no I don't believe them. The comments are wildly inaccurate in at least a half dozen ways.
The commander was either confused, misinformed by his staff or had an axe to grind, because it's obvious that he's not well informed about the Firefly, and has never flown one.

His comments:
From Commander D R F Campbell, DSC, RN at the Fighter Conference, 1944. The Firefly Mark 4
1.) "Would make a fair dive bomber if fitted with dive brakes."
2.) "The engine is a Mark II RR Griffon, 1725 HP 54. Performance is even more contemptible than I thought."
3.) "Japs could out fight it and Firefly could not run away."
4.) "Do not consider it adaptable as a night fighter."
5.) "Very similar in all respects to the Fairey Battle although many improvements add to it's suitablity."
6.) "Do not see a spot for it in Pacific or elsewhere."
7.) "Too slow and clumsy"
8.) "Performance believed too low for modern warfare."
9.) "Vision aft is not good enough, performance not good enough. Too much changing of lateral and directional trim required."
10.) "The performance is nothing to write home about."

1.) The Firefly would never need (nor could it be fitted with) dive brakes, as every Firefly already has retractable Fairey-Youngman flaps, which are used both as dive brakes and to provide low speed lift manouverability.
The comment makes no sense.

2.) The Firefly mk 4 was not in service in Oct 1944, and never had a 1725 hp Griffon, it had the 2245 hp Griffon 74.

3.) As a fighter bomber it was never meant to dogfight other fighters, but to intercept provide carrier defence against bombers.
The Firefly's 316 -319 mph is at least 10 mph faster than a Helen, Sally, or Jill, and at least 45mph faster than the common mid-war bombers Betty, Val, Kate or Nell.
Certainly none of these bombers could outfight a Firefly
(Though they are all faster than the Fulmar except for the Kate Nell)

4.) As of Oct 1944 the Firefly night fighter is already in service, so this comment also makes no sense.

5.) Hardly similar, as the Battle is 60 mph slower, lacks dive capability, much less manouverable and cant be used to intercept bombers.

6.) It's already in service on British carriers, and the choice of whether to send RN carriers to the Pacific is far, far above his pay grade. The decision to send British carriers to the Pacific was a very contentious question that went right up to the PM's Presidents desk. An RN commander who made comments like that while delicate negotiaions were going on would be lucky not to get sacked.

7.) At 316 mph it is only a couple mph slower than the Wildcat. The Firefly is far from "clumsy", it is more agile than other fighter bomber or DB.

8.) Believed by who? Lord Haw-Haw? Name me another fighter-bomber capable of dive bombing, with a 316 mph top speed, ASW capable and search radar equipped.

9.) The visibility from the Firefly is as good as a Wildcat or Hellcat

10.) Is he trying to say that a fighter-bomber fully loaded with 2,000+ lb payload doesn't dogfight very well against late-model Japanese fighters? Seems to verge on the bleedin' obvious.

There are so many errors in the quoted comments that you would have to question how competant he is,

However Renrich, what I suspect is that he may be describing the Firefly NF mk II.
Fairey Firefly NF.II

The addition of the massive air-intercept radar gear along with the lengthened fuselage had a major impact on performance.

It dropped Vmax to about 300 mph
It made pilot visibility much worse
NF Radar performed poorly
The added mass changed center-of-gravity and badly affected handling.
So while the Firefly was a huge success, the NF mk II was not, and was cancelled.


Here is a comparison of a Hellcat Firefly mk I.
Both pilots have similar vision, but cannot see directly behind.
The firefly pilot however sits closer to the wing's leading edge than trailing, so has better view forward below.
The Firefly pilot cannot see as well aft below. (But the observer/WO can)

 

[RCAFson]

hi ivan

I would like to see that interview if possible. I have a number of records of interview with Brown. His comments are in fact exactly the opposite to what you are saying. He was critical of the Seafire I, which lacked a lot of basic navalisation mods, like wing folding, and a daggie arrester hook. He was enthusastic about the later wartime marks of Seafire.

Brown does not give an assessment of the Seafire III, but for the IIC he states:

p115
Seafire in the forthcoming Operation Torch and operate it from two
old carriers, as the elevators in British fleet carriers could not accom-
modate the nonfolding fighter. Trials were successful, and the Seafire
went off to war.
Assessment: The Seafire's performance fell below that of the
land-based Spitfire because navalization incurred the penalties of
increased weight and drag. Never designed for shipboard use, the
Seafire was difficult to deck-land, and it acted like a submarine when
ditched. In spite of this, it was the fastest shipboard fighter in the
world at the time of Operation Torch. A great airplane to fly and
fight, it boosted the morale of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm pilots.
Duels In the Sky

Of course the 2nd fastest naval fighter in 1942, was the Sea Hurricane IIC, according to Brown.

 

[Glider]

Freebird
I agree with what you say but think you have the wrong Firefly photo

 

[Freebird]

Freebird
I agree with what you say but think you have the wrong Firefly photo

Oops! right you are!
Thats a mk 6 or 7

Same fuselage canopy as a Mk 1 IIRC

 

[renrich]

Free bird, you have confused Campbell's remarks with the remarks of pilots who flew the Firefly. Campbell in his remarks to the conference during the opening only made statements #2 and #10(in your post) One Navy pilot flew the Firefly and nine contractor pilots, no Army and no British. The Navy and contractor pilots were responsible for the other points made in your post. However, it is apparent that Campbell did not care for the Firefly or at least the one they had there. One wonders why the British sent a "dud" example if that is what it was to the fighter meet. However, one can also see that the pilots at the "Fighter Meet" would hardly be impressed by the Firefly.

 

[parsifal]

Brown does not give an assessment of the Seafire III, but for the IIC he states:



Of course the 2nd fastest naval fighter in 1942, was the Sea Hurricane IIC, according to Brown.

Thanks for bringing the details of those comments to the thread. I think what he says is entirely consistent with the statements I have made, and totally debunks the claim that the Seafire was a total failure. In fact, if I can paraphrase him, what he is saying is that the nonfolding Seafires (the Seafire I and II), there was no wing folding, and this caused a lot of problems. What he doesnt say is that throughout 1942 and 1943, when the Seafire I and II were the main types, there was a very heavy accident rate. In large measure this was due to putting a high performance aircraft with difficicult deck handling characteristics on escort carriers, but throughout 1944 methoids were worked out that overcame these dificulties.

The problem for the reputation of the Seafire is that all this adverse comment arises from those first months of operations. People conveniently forget, or overlook or deliberately ignore that these problems were overcome, and the type returned quite successful service in 1944 and 45. The comparison to the Wildcat, so often held up as a pillar of dependability, also forgets the initial teething problems that dogged the American type as well, and in no less disastrous fashion. The Wildcat was first intoduced to the RN in September 1940, but it really was of limited value to the RN until the following September. I suspect, but am unsure, that it had similar teeting issues for the USN as well, which I believe introduced the type from December 1939. If we take the service delivery date as December 1939, and its first effective operational deployment as Septmber 1941, then the Wildcat was undergoing field mods to make it a useful type for 21 months. If we look at the Seafire, it was introduced in June 1942, and assume its date of effective service as say 1/44, it took 19 months to render the Sefire an effective type. In other words, it took longer to iron out the kinks with the Wildcat than it did with the Seafire.......

 

[parsifal]

Free bird, you have confused Campbell's remarks with the remarks of pilots who flew the Firefly. Campbell in his remarks to the conference during the opening only made statements #2 and #10(in your post) One Navy pilot flew the Firefly and nine contractor pilots, no Army and no British. The Navy and contractor pilots were responsible for the other points made in your post. However, it is apparent that Campbell did not care for the Firefly or at least the one they had there. One wonders why the British sent a "dud" example if that is what it was to the fighter meet. However, one can also see that the pilots at the "Fighter Meet" would hardly be impressed by the Firefly.

Evidently those pilots that flew the type in the Pacific and Europe didnt get this message either. I think it was the raids over Palembang, where, despite being configured for a bombing mission, and having lost their Cosair and Hellcat escort, and being confronted with Japanese interceptors (Ki43s and Ki44s mostly), the aircraft of a single squadron (No 1770) managed to shoot down at least 6 enemy fighters. This squadron had already carried out strikes on the Tirpitz (as flak suppressors), and sank a U-Boat.

Its usual role was as armed advance scouts. They would fly ahead of the main force, reporting enemy fighters, and over the target engaging enemy defences with rockets and/or cannons.....

I fail to see how an aircraft so demonstaby successful at a wide range of different roles, can then be labelled a failure. It beggars all rational assessment in my opinion

 

[RCAFson]

Thanks for bringing the details of those comments to the thread. I think what he says is entirely consistent with the statements I have made, and totally debunks the claim that the Seafire was a total failure. In fact, if I can paraphrase him, what he is saying is that the nonfolding Seafires (the Seafire I and II), there was no wing folding, and this caused a lot of problems. What he doesnt say is that throughout 1942 and 1943, when the Seafire I and II were the main types, there was a very heavy accident rate. In large measure this was due to putting a high performance aircraft with difficicult deck handling characteristics on escort carriers, but throughout 1944 methoids were worked out that overcame these dificulties.

In fact Brown does explain the high accident in early Seafires as a consequence of flying onto Escort carriers in very light wind conditions. Brown was involved in type testing and certifying the Seafire for use on escort carriers, but he experienced higher winds than were typical in the Med. Brown was very laudatory regarding the Seafire LIIc and it's 4600fpm initial climb rate.

 

[tomo pauk]

Were ever F4U F6F served aboard of escort carriers (think not?) - so we can compare high performance planes in a fair fashion?

 

[parsifal]

F4us did operate to a limited extent. I dont think Hellcats ever did. I do not know Corsair operational loss rates when operating from escort carriers, and I dont know how frequently they were used .

 

[renrich]

Many Marine squadrons operated Corsairs from CVEs in 1944-45. Hellcats operated from CVEs also. It was not limited at all. For references, go to Pages 520, 523, 521 and 560 in Dean, "America's Hundred Thousand" In fact Hellcats operated off of CVEs in the Med in support of the landings in Southern France.

Marine F4Us and FGs had 21 operational losses in all carrier operations in WW2.

 

[parsifal]

I'll accept that, was not real certain about CVE deployment of these two types. But I then wonder why they would keep the Wildcat in production as the FM-2 if the Corsair and Hellcat could operate satisfactorily from the baby flat tops. One wonders if they too suffered heavy attrition aboard such carriers, or otherwise had some operating difficulties