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Plus electrics are lighter than hydraulics in some cases.
Simplicate and add lightness...
Cheers,
Biff
It's quite surprising how slow the industry has been to adopt electrical systems when complete widebody airframes have been lost to simultaneous bleed out of multiple hydraulic systems.
There's quite a big difference between a single seat fighter and a 250+ seat airliner. You need real power to move big flaps, big multi wheel undercarriages etc. Hydraulics has more grunt. Also, most airliners these days do have electrical systems that drive control surfaces, but coupled with hydraulics. If hydraulics wasn't needed, they'd not use it in modern airliners - as Biff pointed out, saves weight (electronic systems introduce their own degrees of complexity). ATRs for example have electric flaps, but rely on hydraulics for their undercarriage.
Besides, very few aircraft have been lost to multiple hydraulic system failure, normally, one system might fail, but extremely rarely both; I am aware of one such failure, in a 737, but considering the number of them in service use, that's a rare case. Normally hydraulic system failures are driven by some other consequence, like engine failure or such like - hydraulic pumps are driven by engines, but there are back-up electrical systems that drive stand-by hydraulic pumps, which prevent total system failure. cases where lines and components have failed do happen, but this doesn't always necessarily result in the loss of the aircraft. Considering the number of aircraft lost due to hydraulic system failure as a cause, i.e. very few, the use of hydraulics won't go away yet. Damn, more skydrol in the eyes...
Left engine being replaced with a forklift, which subsequently cracked the attach fittings. When the engine broke free on rotation, it took the hydraulic lines and fluid with it, and down she came.If I recall correctly, it was a DC-10 in the late '80's that had a tail engine go out and as the fan section shrapneled, it took out the hydraulic lines which led to the crash. The design was changed to prevent this from happening again, but the bad reputation for DC-10's was cemented.
Left engine being replaced with a forklift, which subsequently cracked the attach fittings. When the engine broke free on rotation, it took the hydraulic lines and fluid with it, and down she came.
Left engine being replaced with a forklift, which subsequently cracked the attach fittings. When the engine broke free on rotation, it took the hydraulic lines and fluid with it, and down she came.
Different accident. The one you are referring to happened at Chicago O'Hare.
Just a note on the Fw 190, it was a very clever design and its electric systems (as well as other devices, such as the Kommandgerat engine management system) were quite advanced. It wasn't the first to so equipped. The Avro Manchester (and consequently the Lancaster) had multiple electrical systems, which took quite a bit of effort to get right.
The statistical culprit here is the DC10, which was designed without adequate redundancy and fault tolerance in it's hydraulic and some other systems in the race to beat the L1011 to the marketplace. It won the race, but impacted air safety in a bad way. The L1011 was the better machine, but lost the race, and then suffered a sensational (flight crew error) accident right after entering service. The media coverage of this accident condemned the TriStar in the court of public opinion as it constantly referred to the recent notorious teething problems of the C5A. All these years later, the non aviation public who remember that crash mostly don't remember that it was crew error. Just another Lockheed failure. This was one of the first in the series of accidents that eventually led to Cockpit Resource Management.Besides, very few aircraft have been lost to multiple hydraulic system failure, normally, one system might fail, but extremely rarely both; I am aware of one such failure, in a 737, but considering the number of them in service use, that's a rare case.
Some of the design flaws were never rectified, just worked around. And only after several ineffective modifications that didn't address the real problems. By the time that happened the damage had been done. The cabin was never properly vented to the baggage compartment with the vulnerable baggage door. They finally fixed the baggage door latch(after four tries), but the cabin floor would still collapse if another baggage door latch failed. And the hydraulic lines still run in the wing leading edge where they're vulnerable to impact. And they still run to the rudder right around the tail engine turbine case where an engine disintigration or a bird strike can take out the rudder circuit. Al Haines' Sioux City landing could still happen again. Except there are hardly any DC10s left in domestic sevice. The Ten's PR record has way outshined its safety record.The DC-10, incidentally, has a good safety record after design flaws were rectified, comparable to similar second-generation passenger jets.