Fw 200 vs. Allied Convoys

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Murmansk was by mid 1942 a hornet's nest of AAA, so intense that it bombing missions had to be conducted at at least 18,000 feet or higher. With so many committments, the Luftwaffe had only limited assets available for the Northern battles. They did score a notable success against PQ-18 in Sept of 42 sinking 10 of 13 frieighters sunk, but their losses in return were severe:

KG-26 - 19 bombers (HE-111/Ju-88 )
4 possible 109 losses (JG-5)
Kustenfliegergruppen 406/506/906 - 5 x HE-115
 
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Hello Glider
Nikademus is right, out of 40 freighters in PQ-18, 13 were sunk, 10 by air-attacks and 3 by U-boats.

Juha
 
Murmansk was by mid 1942 a hornet's nest of AAA, so intense that it bombing missions had to be conducted at at least 18,000 feet or higher. With so many committments, the Luftwaffe had only limited assets available for the Northern battles. They did score a notable success against PQ-18 in Sept of 42 sinking 10 of 13 frieghters, but their losses in return were severe:

KG-26 - 19 bombers (HE-111/Ju-88)
4 possible 109 losses (JG-5)
Kustenfliegergruppen 406/506/906 - 5 x HE-115

Those are pretty high for the situation. I would expect them to be better returns for the effort put into it (although I don't know the loss rate, losing 19 Bombers from one KG is pretty rough).

At Bismark Sea, the returns were as follows:

Allied
115 Bombers (2 lost)
54 Fighters (3 lost)

Japanese
8 transports,
4 destroyers sunk
20 fighters destroyed,

Numbers come from Wiki so they should be taken with a grain of salt, especially the Bomber losses. They seem very lite.

But it does reflect a great difference in the results. The reason may be, and I'm speculating, Allied tactics were superior to those used by the LW. The Allies had regular shipping attacks on Convoys and may've refined their attacks whereas shipping was just "another job" for the LW.
 
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Numbers come from Wiki so they should be taken with a grain of salt, especially the Bomber losses. They seem very lite.

But it does reflect a great difference in the results. The reason may be, and I'm speculating, Allied tactics were superior to those used by the LW. The Allies had regular shipping attacks on Convoys and may've refined their attacks whereas shipping was just "another job" for the LW.

The bomber losses were very light. The Japanese AAA was incompetent at best.

The tactics were also excellent. Cannon laden Beaufighters charged in first "hosing down" the ships to clear the gunners. Then the A20's and B25's roared in close after them and skip bombed the ships.

I dont think the LW had the light attack and medium bombers to do it. The B25's had six heavy MG's to provide the forward firepower. Could the Ju-88 have a nosefull of heavy weapons plus a few bombs, without being off balance? or cramping the cockpit beyond reason?
 
Those are pretty high for the situation. I would expect them to be better returns for the effort put into it (although I don't know the loss rate, losing 19 Bombers from one KG is pretty rough).

Particularily so given the distance and sea conditions meant almost zero survival. (46 bomber crew were lost) and given that the He-111 component were well trained torpedo bomber pilots. The success would not be repeated against future convoys.
 
Could the Ju-88 have a nosefull of heavy weapons plus a few bombs, without being off balance? or cramping the cockpit beyond reason?

That is a really good question. No doubt it would be a good bomber for that sort of setup. Maybe 20MM cannon instead of MGs or some such.

If you load up the front, you'll definitely need to counterbalance it with some weight in the tail or every landing would be a nose in at some point.
 
just check the link I provided above from u-boat.net and then research the dates-PQ's and QP's

would of been interesting if the Kondor would of been fitted with twin 2cm waffen pods under each wing and then a belly pack with similar arms for ship busting of course that was the idea of using the drop air to ship Henschlel rocket/bomb systems
 
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Isnt the North Atlantic usually foggy or low ceiling?

The Condor dropping the Fritz-X might have been problematic if its targets werent even to be seen. And dito that for winter when there is no sunlight (although the counter is true for summer).
 
Isnt the North Atlantic usually foggy or low ceiling?

The Condor dropping the Fritz-X might have been problematic if its targets werent even to be seen. And dito that for winter when there is no sunlight (although the counter is true for summer).

Man, talk about **** duty. Stuck on a freighter on the Murmansk run in summer with Condors hanging around, shooting guided missles at you. Like a duck in a shooting gallery.

And winter isn't any better. Worse weather and lots of U-boats. Weather clears up and the Condors are back.

Really lousy gig.

Eric, that weapons package on the Condor makes it a real widow maker. How strong was the frame? Could it take the pounding of the recoil of those weapons? I've hear (or vaguely remember) stories of the frames of FW-200s cracking near the tail.
 
yes cracked in half actually, weak fuselage structure supports but would assume the belly be strengthened it would not surprise me actually if they want to put in a single and larger cannon 3.7cm strength and have it belt fed. the wings were stout enough think it could of handled twin 2cm pods without a prob but the LW Atlantik force was still stuck on bomb dropping for the duration of it's campaign here only the missiles coming into being and not necessarily real accurate which was good for the convoys and her shipping escorts, this latter point about the air to ship missile still has not be covered adequately in any sources printed.

wish it was.
 
just check the link I provided above from u-boat.net and then research the dates-PQ's and QP's

would of been interesting if the Kondor would of been fitted with twin 2cm waffen pods under each wing and then a belly pack with similar arms for ship busting of course that was the idea of using the drop air to ship Henschlel rocket/bomb systems

The size and low speed of the Condor would have made it an easy target for shipborne AA. The Luftwaffe did use them against ships in conventional bombing attacks, and also the He-177:

Unlike her sister ships, the ROBERT was slated for the role as an anti-aircraft cruiser rather than an LSI. She was taken out of service in January 1943 and Burrard Dry Docks in Vancouver fitted her out. She was armed with ten 4-inch twin HA/LA Mark XXV guns, eight 2-pounder pompoms and twelve Oerlikon 20mm. At the same time, proper director and fire control were added. This was supplemented with some relatively modern Radar, suitable for aircraft warning, surface detection and fire control. The Asdic was also updated and four depth charge throwers added. Now the ROBERT was one of the most powerful A/A ships afloat, for her size.

The ROBERT sailed for England at the end of April, travelling via Panama and Bermuda. The voyage through the canal was made memorable at Colon by the introduction of young Canadian sailors to Central American nightlife...

The ROBERT now joined fast troop convoys to Gibraltar and return as A/A escort. The Bay of Biscay was a relatively dangerous route as the enemy were using long range aircraft as assistance to their U-boats.

By this time the Germans had established very sophisticated radio transmissions both in Spain and France to assist in the location of convoys and to enable the U-boats to home in on them. In addition, the long range Heinkel 177 bomber was able to carry two rocket-assisted flying bombs, which could be targeted by the controlling aircraft from a safe range.

In November 1943, a large Med-UK troop convoy was shadowed by hostile aircraft 250 miles WSW of Cape Vincent, Portugal. A series of U-Boat engagements over a period of four days ensued. Three submarines were destroyed and several damaged during the course of this action with no casualties to the convoy. Among the escorts the Canadian ships CALGARY and SNOWBERRY were credited with sinkings.

Discouraged with the lack of success of their U-Boats, the Germans then adopted new tactics by making strong assaults with large forces of bomber aircraft operating from bases in France. Four-engined FW200s carried out conventional bombing but the surprise threat was from HE-177s equipped with rocket-assisted, radio-controlled, flying bombs. The ROBERT arrived at the height of the action and fired everything she had for the next two and a half-hours.

Despite the ferocity of the attack, the A/A fire saved her from at least one flying bomb and held the casualties of the convoy to one ship with no personnel loss.

This was the first major air attack against Atlantic convoys in over a year and introduced new methods of anti-ship warfare. At a later date, the ATHABASKA was not so lucky under similar circumstances when a flying bomb passed through her before detonating on the other side.
6. Atlantic Mediterranean 1943 - Prince Robert Story

Earlier in the war, the RN began fitting merchant ships with catapults, known as CAM ships, to launch Hawker Hurricanes against the FW-200, and the first catapult Hurricane kill against a FW-200 was on Aug 02 1941. Hawker Hurricane variants - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
but the Kondor was not a certain kill for shipboard AA and that is a proven fact even with a bombed up crate, my thought is delete the bombs and carry heavier cannon for the typical Allied type ship busting, sure we are talking of an old slow-mo crate coming at you from the flank but with long range cannon it may have worked and not all Kondors would be easily fitted you would still have to have bombed or rocket upped versions. well anyway it is a what if thought(s) only.

remember that flying bombs as stated in the article are either thrown at the ship from an intended height and as luck would have it fall upon Allied shipping or it was radio controlled again from a selected height and it was all up to the bomb aimer whether he could guide (most of the times not) in for a kill or a miss; take this into consideration that the bomb/rocket aimer was not that talented with no preparation except to use his little training in actual combat experience

just a bit of note.

Kondors, He 177's, Dornier's and FAGr 5's Ju 290's all used the HS series of rocket glider type bombs in combat ops
 
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If you end up with a shooting match between a Kondor and a ship then the aircraft will be at a serious disadvantage. Far better for the FW200 to stay out of range and use the missiles.

At the end of the day the Fw 200 is a big vulnerable target for gunfire. Most of her successes were against merchant men who were lucky to have some WW1 Lewis guns as a defence against air attack. The normal weapons for a Liberty ship was 8 x 20mm a much more powerfull defence.
 
this was why by 1943 the Kondor was a useless piece of equipment even with air to sea projectors. the He series was to be the replacement or Dorniers, the Ju 290 could of and should of been used instead of agent dropping in KG 200 and the few seen recon duties with FAGr 5.

if I can find the German manual in my files on the HS series concept missiles will post a text or two. the air to sea rockets non radio controlled were to be dropped in an arc.
 
found this on the net although at the bottom the LW units may not be entirely correct

interesting anyone have feedback concerning the destroying or damaging of said Allied ships ?

On August 25, 1943, an Hs 293 was used in the first successful attack by a guided missile, striking the sloop HMS Bideford, though as the explosive charge did not fully detonate, the damage was minimal. On August 27, the Hs 293 was used again, this time sinking the British sloop HMS Egret. On November 26, 1943 an Hs 293 caused the sinking of the troop transport HMT Rohna killing over 1,000 personnel.
Other ships sunk or damaged by the Hs 293 include:

* Banff class sloop HMS Landguard (slightly damaged with Bideford in Bay of Biscay 25 August 1943)[1]
* HMCS Athabaskan (heavily damaged by confirmed hit with Egret in Bay of Biscay 27 August 1943)[2]
* HMHS Newfoundland (heavily damaged and later sunk by Allied gunfire)
* SS Bushrod Washington (sunk 14 September 1943 during Operation Avalanche (World War II))[3]
* SS James W. Marshall (damaged 15 September 1943 during Operation Avalanche (World War II) and used for Mulberry harbour -- possibly due to a "Fritz X")[3]
* HMS LST-79 (sunk)
* SS Samite (damaged)
* SS Hiram S. Maxim (damaged)
* SS Selvik (damaged)
* USS Tillman (possibly slightly damaged 6 November 1943 while escorting Mediterranean convoy KMF-25A)[3] though more likely a torpedo was the cause[4])
* HMS Rockwood (damaged slightly, later written off)
* HMS Dulverton (heavily damaged and scuttled)
* MV Marsa (sunk)
* SS Delius (damaged)
* HMS Jervis (damaged off Anzio during Operation Shingle 23 January 1944)[3]
* HMS Janus (damaged -- possibly from Hs 293, or a torpedo)
* USS Prevail (damaged -- possibly from Hs 293)
* USS Mayo (damaged -- possibly from Hs 293 or a mine)
* SS John Banvard (damaged)
* SS Samuel Huntington (sunk off Anzio during Operation Shingle 29 January 1944)[3]
* HMS Spartan (sunk off Anzio during Operation Shingle 29 January 1944)[3]
* USS Herbert C. Jones (damaged off Anzio during Operation Shingle 15 February 1944)[3]
* SS Elihu Yale (sunk off Anzio during Operation Shingle 16 February 1944 -- LCT 35 alongside is also destroyed)[3]
* HMS Inglefield
* HMS Lawford (sunk -- probably from Hs 293, official report states "aerial torpedo")
* USS Meredith (sunk -- possibly from Hs 293 or other causes)
* HMCS Matane (damaged)
* USS LST-282 (sunk)

Although designed for use against ships, it was also used in Normandy in early August 1944 to attack bridges over the River See and River Selume. Only one bridge was slightly damaged for the loss of six of the attacking aircraft [2].
The Hs 293 was carried on Heinkel He 111, Heinkel He 177, Focke-Wulf Fw 200, Dornier Do 217 planes. However, only the He 177 (of II./KG 40), certain variants of the FW 200 (of III./KG 40) and the Do 217 (of II./KG 100 and III./KG 100) used the Hs 293 operationally in combat.
 
Haven't read it, probably won't. One of the reviewers makes a good point. It was a sideshow to the main show which was the U-boat war.

But it seems nobody ever put any real thought into how effective aircraft could be in the Battle of the Atlantic until the Brits got the idea of using Coastal Command/VLR aircraft. Almost amazing, considering how much thought the Japanese and US put into it for the Pacific. It was something of an afterthought for the Atlantic.

Had the Condor been in large scale production, sync'd in with the U-boat fleet (and a larger U-boat fleet available earlier), it would've been murder for the Convoy system.

I would imagine that the proponents of naval air in the LW had the same problem as those in the RAF, the planners wanted to ramp up bomber operations to the maximum possible, at the expence of Coastal command ( the LW equivilent)
 
I had a book that I lent to someone (cannot remember who, called the "Arctic Convoys" and looks in detail but from an allied perspective the operations from 1941-5. It makes the point that the fight continued right to the last days, and that the contest was fought with grim determination by both sides.

I recall the book mentions that several squadrons of Beaufighters, Hampdens and Hurricanes, with RAF (Hampdens were crewed by Australians) were sent to Murmansk. There can be only reason the Beaus were sent north....to provide NF protection for the port. They did not provide fighter cover for the convoys I know that.

The RN did not provide carrier based aircover for the convoys until well into '43, and found the best poor weather aircraft to be the venerable Swordfish. It was found to be an ideal poor weather aircraft, and with its ASV radars could have some chance of electronic detection, even in conditions of poor visibility. The most common fighters were Wildcats by that stage. It was found that even just a few aircraft could break up Luftwaffe attacks and prevent the LW strike aircraft fom reaching the targets. LW losses were low, but their rffrctiveness also plummetted after carrier based aircover was provided.

USN CVEs were found to be unsuited to this type of work. The main problem was in their crew training....they simply could not operate effectively in the poor weather. Poor weather flying and carrier ops was something the RN had been training for since the '30s. Its a skill you simply cannot acquire in a short period of time. Even in the '70's USN CAGs were not strong or well trained in poor weather flying
 

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