German commando attack on the US, Canada Alaska

[Freebird]

Assume you team is able to get real close to ensure reliable hits (within 200-300m). Sure you could knock down 1. A few. The scramble would be immediately canceled and then base personnel would be all over you. HMGs make a lot of noise and have no flash suppressors.

In Nov of 1941 {during peacetime} how many troops would typically guard an airbase in the continental US?

You are going to travel halfway around the planet, risking the lives of a U-Boat complement and SFs, to shoot down a couple of airplanes? Where is this thread headed?

The threads got a little confused earlier. As Parsifal stated {and I am in full agreement} the U-boats are too valuable, so they should be used for transport as little as possible. The best method IMO is if the Germans are to send commandos/saboteurs that they be sent via Vichy ships, probably embarking at Dakar, heading for the Caribbean. They would then enter Mexico and cross the US border on foot {or driving}. If the ship was stopped en route, the commandos would be posing as Vichy soldiers with small arms on their way to Martinique etc. {The US recognised the Vichy government, and made no attempt to restrict travel to Martinique pre-war.}

I thought that the thread was to discuss strategic targets of importance. Heck airplanes came off the US assembly lines in minutes. So now the strategically unimportant Alaska is off the subject for debate (good it was stoopid anyway). On to the Panama Canal and Canada.

At the outbreak of war the US has about 970 fighters in the continental US. The purpose of a few "spoiler attacks" against US airbases would be to bring confusion panic, and to make the government less likely to send everything overseas.

You are correct in stating that anymaterial losses will not make any difference. The prime purpose of these commando attacks IMO is to panic distract the government people of the US so that there is less imputus to send troops aircraft overseas quickly. The idea is for the Axis to buy enough time to consolidate Asia conquer Russia.

The secondary purpose of the commando attacks is to provide "headlines" so that the most urgent threat {the U-boat campaign} does not get attention.

Panama Canal - Good target. But a single Uboat would do nothing other than shortly gum up the works. An efficiency hit at best. Your not going to destroy the locks with a singe SF team. Not with the defensive forces in place of such a strategic world asset.

Agreed, this target would not be feasable. I think Parsifal had the right idea, about laying mines using U-boats to lurk in the approaches.

Now, Panama was one of the most heavily guarded targets prewar from landward attack. It was protected by more than a full brigade of troops pre-war, and this was rapidly increased soon after hostilities broke out. So, IMO a landward attack is not a great idea.

If all of them were carrying 100 to 150 mines, and were ordered to move to various locations in the carribean, particularly off shore of Panama Canal, and rather than just blindly rush and declare war straight after PH, but rather wait a few days or a week whilst the blockade runners were put into position, then lay the mines just before the DOW, using the newer versions of mag mines, which the US could not sweep, my opinion is that utter chaos would reign in the US and carribean for many months.

Historically, the Germans only laid about 300 mines off the US coast. those few were quite devastating sinking, IIRC about 10 ships. Now, what I am talking about is a sudden minelaying effort, aimed at sowing something like 5-8000 mines, and backed up by a sub force of 50-100 U-Boats, properly supplied.

The result IMO would have been utter chaos for the US, and its allies. it is not beyond the realms of possibility to suppose the loss of 2-3000000 tons of shipping in a month. Morever, the mining of the approaches to the Canal, would have been the equivalent to the loss of a further 2000000 tons, at least.

Canada - Coastline targets on the east coast. How much physical damage could possibly occur? Psychological? Squash the press and paint it as an ordnance explosion, gas explosion, diaper fire.

Any attacks would have to be so blatent and undeniable so that they cannot be passed off as a "gas explosion"

Canada would be a more difficult target in the fall of 1941 IMO, because the better targets are farther away from the coast, and usually guarded because Canada is already at war.

 

[Freebird]

Right after Pearl? Perhaps defences would be sub par. But Germany was MORE than occupied on two fronts.

Well we are discussing what possible actions could have been taken. The investment is not that great, perhaps 500 - 1,000 "Brandenburger" commandos, and some small arms.

The other option is to stay neutral, allow the US Japan to fight it out, and to concentrate on fighting USSR UK. There is considerable disagreement whether Roosevelt could have got Congress to declare war on Germany, except that Hitler did it first. There was a large push in Congress {backed by the majority of the public} to stay out of the "European war" and to concentrate on smashing the Japanese.

The worst possible option for Germany, IMO is what Hitler was foolish enough to do, declare war on the USA while he had no way to do anything about it.

And the Japanese Axis pact was only a discussion over Sake and Wine. To commit such an act would have dragged the US in on definite terms much earlier.

No actually Germany "dragged the US in" by declaring war the day after Pearl

What would be the impetus to open another front on the ocean with a known industrial powerhouse?

The point would be this. Germany recognises that the US will enter the war on the side of the UK sooner or later. In fact the US is already halfway into the war by providing the UK with aircraft. They use the impending attack on "Pearl" to impede the US ability to aid the UK.

And my Alaskan boat tour indicated that the Alaskan defenses were established in 1939.

Agreed. I cannot see any profitable attack on Alaska, it's too remote and without any easy targets.

And now I'm speaking out of the knowledge base, but living in Seattle you get a historical perspective of the war industrial machine. I can assure you that the US govt did not begin defensive measures for industrial complexes on Dec 7th, 1941. They were more than mature by that time. It was only Pearl that put those plans into immediate play.

What would have been the defences at an industrial complex in Nov 1941? Say at Boeing for example. A couple of squads?? Or a platoon? I wonder if Syscom might know the answer.

Remember that the US was very surprised to be attacked, it was only after war was declared that the complexes god adequate defence.

 

[Matt308]

Yes, yes. Agree.

So post Pearl, any attack of rather insignificant value would be ballyhooed in the US. It might serve as a moral booster to the German populace ( c.f., Doolittle's raid). But to what end? Certainly not in the context of a counterblow to an embarrassing German loss (i.e., like Pearl).

Panama Canal is the most intriguing target by far. Capable of suffering damage with the minimal amount of resource expenditure, yet creating the most amount of assymetric effect. But yet this was not lost on the US nor other western hemisphere countries.

It seems to me that any such attack on the Americas would need to be multifaceted (naval, air, SF), well timed in its execution to maximize the US press and local populace reaction, and be closely coordinated with an orchestrated psyops activity that provided indigenous people a direct understanding of the attacks and their relevance.

To do otherwise would be easily squashed by the US military machine. Small attacks never being capable if disabling the US war machine and occurring over extended timelines would be easily explained as accidents or natural disasters. Success would have to reside in maximizing the populace rumour machine and that would require timing and dissemination of propaganda directly to the local citizens.

All this spells of a MUCH bigger operation to be successful. This is not a single Uboat operation. Nor a SF team or two. This is big stuff requiring considerable assets, planning, and thus risk of discovery.

 

[Matt308]

I was composing my post at the same time as you Freebird. Looks like we are coming to very similar conclusions.

 

[Freebird]

Yes, yes. Agree.

So post Pearl, any attack of rather insignificant value would be ballyhooed in the US. It might serve as a moral booster to the German populace ( c.f., Doolittle's raid). But to what end? Certainly not in the context of a counterblow to an embarrassing German loss (i.e., like Pearl).

German public opinion is of little concern. Their reports in the fall of '41 are mostly about the Panzers carving up Russia. The point of the attacks it to influence US public opinion.

I am basing the probable US reaction on the historical reaction to the attack at Pearl on public opinion on the West coast. There was a sizable panic, as many people thought the Japanese were about to invade. Imagine how much worse the panic if there were some actual attacks on the contimnental US!

Consider some of the reports from the time:

Harry Elmer Barnes: Pearl Harbor After a Quarter of a Century

This Washington panic relative to the Pearl Harbor situation, until it was evident that the Japanese task force was on its way home and there was no probability of any further immediate Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, was momentarily so extreme that even some persons of high rank in Washington envisaged an actual Japanese occupation of the west coast of the United States. The United States would then trade space for time and meet the advancing Japanese forces at the crest of the Rocky Mountains, with a final rampart around Denver. {Secratary of War} Stimson was one of those who were much alarmed and this may have suggested to him the cruel and precipitate action in moving the Japanese off the Pacific coast for which he was mainly responsible.

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Palo Alto Daily News


It was believed that the West Coast stood completely defenseless and terrified civilians braced themselves for the possibility of Japanese troops storming up California beaches.

Looking back decades later with a certain amount of victorious historical hindsight, an American continent bordered on both sides by vast oceans seems rather impenetrable. But especially after the profound shock of Pearl Harbor, the possibility of a Japanese attack on the U.S. mainland seemed all too plausible - especially in the Bay Area.

As rumors were flying everywhere, hours after the initial Japanese strike, a report came into the Army's Western Defense Command that a Japanese fleet was just 30 miles off the San Francisco coast. Sixty army trucks raced to the water below the Golden Gate Bridge to install anti-aircraft guns, and by nightfall every available Army man at the Presidio was digging trenches on the beach.

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And I think that you will find that there was a similar panic reaction in Australia after the "Darwin raid"

 

[Freebird]

I was composing my post at the same time as you Freebird. Looks like we are coming to very similar conclusions.

Great minds think alike? {or fools?}

Panama Canal is the most intriguing target by far. Capable of suffering damage with the minimal amount of resource expenditure, yet creating the most amount of assymetric effect. But yet this was not lost on the US nor other western hemisphere countries.

I don't see any easy way to attack it by land, but perhaps a freighter entering full of explosives, similar to "St. Naziere"? I can't imagine that they would be so careless though. A better plan would be to use the mines U-boats to wreak carnage on the traffic exiting.

It seems to me that any such attack on the Americas would need to be multifaceted (naval, air, SF), well timed in its execution to maximize the US press and local populace reaction,

and be closely coordinated with an orchestrated psyops activity that provided indigenous people a direct understanding of the attacks and their relevance.

Now those last part was brilliant! You understand exactly what the thrust will be!

To do otherwise would be easily squashed by the US military machine. Small attacks never being capable if disabling the US war machine and occurring over extended timelines would be easily explained as accidents or natural disasters. Success would have to reside in maximizing the populace rumour machine and that would require timing and dissemination of propaganda directly to the local citizens.

Yes exactly!

 

[Matt308]

Yes, but the likelihood of pulling such a coordinated attack off with limited assets is very remote.

And the example that mass panic would ensue over a small scall attack is not supported by historical evidence. What about the Japanese phosphorous bombs dropped on Oregon. Or the Uboats in the Gulf of Mexico or just offshore of the eastern seaboard sinking ships within land sight.

I'm just not tracking on this one without a more massive and planned attack. I know I understand the thrust. I'm just trying to ascertain my continued participation in a hopeless scenario.

 

[Freebird]

All this spells of a MUCH bigger operation to be successful. This is not a single Uboat operation. Nor a SF team or two. This is big stuff requiring considerable assets, planning, and thus risk of discovery.

True enough. However I think there is a good chance that the true danger will not be realized until after the attacks, much the same way that the information hinting at the "9-11" attacks was only noticed after the fact.

Juha had some questions about intelligence Enigma, I'm not an expert, but I think Enigma was mot used to send info about "Black ops"

{There were a bunch of posts about Alaska following this, so I will re-quote it}

Quote-Freebird: "There is no big danger of the intelligence leaking out"

There may well be, the messages of Japan's Berlin ambassor were a big help to Allied intelligence, bacause they were able to read them. I cannot recall when they crack the Japanese diplomatic code but because they were able to read the instructions to Japanese embassy in Washington prior 7.12.41 odds are that they were able to read the messages in mid-41.

Juha

What I meant was that if the Allies do get some intelligence and do believe it, it won't help them much anyways.

Both the Allies and the Nazis already knew that the Japanese were gearing up for war, they just didn't know about Pearl Harbour, the information didn't help very much at Pearl Harbour.

The Allies also knew that German U-boats were on the way to the US east coast before "Drumbeat", but this didn't help them at all either.

The Allies also knew to some extent about the "Synarchist" movement, but there is less danger of Enigma decoding because they would not be sending "black ops" instructions to the machine in the Mexico city embassy, these orders would all be given by hand to the operatives. If some of the teams are taken over by U-boat, Berlin will not be sending detailed "black ops" instructions to the U-boat.

Freebird

Bit farfetched, Germans had almost absolute trust on Enigma, so they would have used it. On the other hand I cannot recall the system Abwehr used, so I cannot state that as a fact and anyway not all Enigma systems were solved in late 41. So IMHO right thing to do is to assume that Germans used their normal system for sending black ops instructions.

Juha

The Germans never used Enigma for Commando/Black ops contack {AFAIK}, for the obvious reason of the danger of the machine being captured in the field. It was used to contact Generals in Army HQ {Europe}, U-Boats, and Embassies. Even if it was considered 100% secure, it was not used to send info to "Black Ops" teams, because of the danger of the messages being read by staff at the embassy, and also the danger to the agents being identified if they show up at the embassy to get a message.

Another point to remember that in the fall of 1941 ONLY THE BRITISH have access to enigma data, and the US does not know how reliable this data is.

So assume that the message is given to the USA "Britain has passed along intelligence that the Nazi's are preparing plan XYZ in Latin America", would it be believed or acted upon?

1.) Some in the US suspect that the data may be fake or planted
2.) They may also suspect that the British are "crying wolf" to try to push the USA into the European war.
3.) There is so much intelligence data that comes in, it was often overlooked, so even if it was believed, it may not have made any difference.
4.) The British were also deliberatly vague about their intel before the US got into the war, as they didn't want to let anyone know how much they knew

 

[Freebird]

Yes, but the likelihood of pulling such a coordinated attack off with limited assets is very remote.

Well that is what we might explore, just how feasable it is.

And the example that mass panic would ensue over a small scale attack is not supported by historical evidence.

I think the "panic" factor wears out after 6 - 12 months, so it has to be done right away after "Pearl" We already know that there was considerable panic after Pearl, so any more attacks by commando's will only add to the general panic.

What about the Japanese phosphorous bombs dropped on Oregon. Or the Uboats in the Gulf of Mexico or just offshore of the eastern seaboard sinking ships within land sight.

I think the phospho bombs were in late 42/43? The plan there was to start forest fires, but it didn't work. The problem with that plan is that the public didn't know about it.

I guess the public just didn't connect with the sinking of ships, the same way that bombs falling seemed to get everybody exited.

I'm just not tracking on this one without a more massive and planned attack. I know I understand the thrust. I'm just trying to ascertain my continued participation in a hopeless scenario.

Well I think it certainly has to be coordinated with the "maximum" U-boat offensive that Parsifal wrote in his last post. The primary purpose of the commando operations would be distraction IMO, and to push US public opinion against "foreign entanglements" in Europe, but towards a stronger defence of the USA.

If the USA devotes the majority of its forces to defend the Western Hemisphere and abandon Asia Europe to the Axis- well that's a win for the Axis I would think.

 

[parsifal]

I think the role of any special forces committed to the "carribean/Panama solution, would be to try and neutralize the air assets in the region so as to facilitate the minelaying and U-Boat offensive that I mentioned. Here is the OB for the US in December 1941, including the available air strips.

Puerto Rico Sector, Caribbean Defense Command, United States Armed Forces, 7.12.1941

Caribbean Defense Command, United States Armed Forces, 7.12.1941

Whilst the canal zone is very heavily guarded, the limited number of airfields in the region dont appear as formidable. Taking out the airfields, or denying their use for even a few days will reduce the German losses from the air assets in the region. There are not that many airfields, plus the US would simply not be ready psychologically for such a concerted attack. the troops would need to be hidden in the transports, Norway style, with the transports (being some of the blockade runners also carrying mines) laying offshore, in International waters (where the US cannot legally board and search), until the signal to attack is given. You 500 elite forces men might just have a chance of neutralizing the key airfields, at least for a short while

Another possibility we have not talked about, is the use of italian chariots, or even SBS (Small Boat Squadrons) groups, to attack key navy yards, in the way of the Royal oak attack in 1939. The possibilities of this style of attack were shown to be feasible elsewhere, in places like Singpaore (1943, the Australian attack on Jap shipping by Kayaks launched from the MV Krait), the attacks in the gironde by the british (again using Kayaks) or even the 10 MAS, using limpet mines attached by frogmen in the style of the italaian attacks on the QE and Valiant, 1941. These would be launched from a modified merchant ship, in the style of of the Italian attacks intoGibraltar harbour, from that MS vessel in the Spanish Port near to Gib.

An attack into a major Navy yard, to sink or disable any major warship would cause material and psychological losses that can only be guessed at. Moreover, with US shipping being sunk at a massive rate, and the US forces seemingky unable to do anything about it, with what looks like an axis invasion into the Carribbean (shades of the cuban missile crisis i guess) and even major losses in the defended naval bases, I believe it is entirely likley that the US might retreat into a sort of isolationist panic, that may well have altered their fundamental war strategies

 

[Negative Creep]

In material terms, the Commando team could only ever inflict a tiny amount of damage. Even if they blew up 100 B-17s, in a week or so another 100 would've been built to take their place. Unless they assassinated a top general or the President, their best weapon would be a psychological one. Attacking a base on mainland USA would mean the US wouldn't feel safe, and divert troops from the front to defend bases

 

[drgondog]

No chance of that little cartridge making plant in Ohio, huh? Thought 90% of all cartridges being stopped might cause alittle panic.

(going back to my crayons now)

I think this company made dies and cartridge making loading tools. I know it did not make 90% of the ammunition.. there were arsenals all over the country that may have used their equipment but the revenues size clearly shows it was a reasonably small company.

It sounds to me like Pb hit a very key precision target with a small and vulnerable component - namely the power grid coming in.

 

[syscom3]

The problem with small commando teams is their inability to cause extensive damage, damage enough to really impact war production.

But ......I would suspect the following targets if damaged, would really cause problems.

1) The turbines at large dams
2) The boiler "room" at oil refineries.

The Panama Canal was always relatively simple to knock out. And if done by a commando crewed freighter, stuffed with explosives (like the USS Campball), they could shut down the canal for months with immense impact on naval operations.

 

[Freebird]

The problem with small commando teams is their inability to cause extensive damage, damage enough to really impact war production.

I would suspect the following targets if damaged, would really cause problems.

1) The turbines at large dams
2) The boiler "room" at oil refineries.

Yes and I don't imagine that they were very well protected pre-war {if at all}

The Axis presumably knew how to make diesel/fertilizer explosives? It would be much better if the teams could make explosives, rather than trying to bring tons of the stuff from Europe. How many pounds of explosive would be needed to blow a turbine room/boiler room? Could say 3 - 4 guys each with 40 pound backpacks do the job? {160 lb of explosive?}

The Panama Canal was always relatively simple to knock out. And if done by a commando crewed freighter, stuffed with explosives (like the USS Campball), they could shut down the canal for months with immense impact on naval operations.

Did the US carefully search each ship before it approached the locks? {pre-war} And it would have to be a detailed search too, as IIRC the Germans were not aware of the explosives in the bow of the "Cambelton".

Another possibility we have not talked about, is the use of italian chariots, or even SBS (Small Boat Squadrons) groups, to attack key navy yards, in the way of the Royal oak attack in 1939. The possibilities of this style of attack were shown to be feasible elsewhere, in places like Singpaore (1943, the Australian attack on Jap shipping by Kayaks launched from the MV Krait), the attacks in the gironde by the british (again using Kayaks) or even the 10 MAS, using limpet mines attached by frogmen in the style of the italaian attacks on the QE and Valiant, 1941. These would be launched from a modified merchant ship, in the style of of the Italian attacks intoGibraltar harbour, from that MS vessel in the Spanish Port near to Gib.

That's what I had thought too, although you said the Italian chariots would be top secret, so it would be "frogman style". The only problem is that the attacks would have to take place on "Pearl + 1". Germany would not want to risk drawing the US into the war until Japan attacks. I have assumed that the Germans are told that the Japanese will go to war with the US Allies if they don't get Dutch oil, but Germany does not know that Pearl will be attacked, or the exact date.

So when the attack happens in Hawaii {7 am} it is already 9 am in San Diego and noon in Norfolk Virginia. Assume that the Commando teams are ready to go into action the following night, would not every Naval base be on full alert?

An attack into a major Navy yard, to sink or disable any major warship would cause material and psychological losses that can only be guessed at. Moreover, with US shipping being sunk at a massive rate, and the US forces seemingky unable to do anything about it, with what looks like an axis invasion into the Carribbean (shades of the cuban missile crisis i guess) and even major losses in the defended naval bases, I believe it is entirely likley that the US might retreat into a sort of isolationist panic, that may well have altered their fundamental war strategies

That would also play a big part in the "end game' strategy for the Axis. With a severe lack of shipping, and trouble brewing south of the border, the uS Congress may well decide to abandon plans for a major effort overseas. Perhaps Japan would agree to some compromise where control of the Philippines are returned {demilitarized of course} but that Japan keeps Indonesia, Malaya China. With enough distraction at home the public might be willing to accept that. {but perhaps not}