The Brandenburgers were disbanded in 1944, not 1943, and it wasn't because the high command didn't think highly of them, they were considered to be amongst the creme de la creme of the German army, it was simply because they were part of the Abwehr which by then was known to be behind an assasination attempt on Hitler that they were disbanded. Canaris and several other high ranking men within the Abwehr were arrested and executed. The Brandenburgers however, although disbanded, just joined other specialized units within the army, such as the JagdVerbände, another equally well trained spec ops unit within the German army.
I didnt mention that they were "disbanded" in 1943. In fact AFAIK, they were never actually disbanded, they just came under the control of the SD.
However, as specialist commandos they had pretty much had their day by the end of 1942. By late 1942, the majority of the Brandenburg regiment was being used as elite infantry and plugging gaps in the German lines, principally in yugoslavia. In February 1943, the Brandenburgers were pulled out of the line and moved back to Germany. The Regiment was being expanded again, this time to become Division Brandenburg, this expansion hardly suggests a lack of support. the "lack of support" was relating to the Abwehr control, who had generally proven such incompetent commanders of such an elite force. The division was to be formed by four regiments. One regiment was returned to the Eastern front, to resume duties as a fire brigade, One battalion was sent to Med front to continue harassing the Allies in the Mediterranean. The remainder of the division was sent to the Balkans, to engage in anti-Partisan operations
As for the SAS LRDG's, they did well, but for a good reason, they had the support they needed.
They were no more supported than the Brandenburgers. The only difference is that the people controlling them, with the priceless advantage of ULTRA, were able to achieve measurable results, and were clearly being provided with superior leadership, as evidenced by their measure of operational success. The british army as a whole, however, looked down on these "private armies". There were a significant number of british officers who worked hard to have them closed down. However inspirational leaders such as Wingate (of the Chindits), and Bagnold (of LRDG fame) along with the Stirling (of the SAS) were the difference between the British efforts and German. The other huge difference was co-ordination, whereas the various German special forces really were run more or less as "private armies" those in the British Army were always controlled from a central point. It was always intended that they were controlled centrally (I say intended, because it sometimes did not work out that way)
Also remember that if the plan isn't good, then it really doesn't matter how good your men are. And I really can't express enough how true that is!
For once we agree!!! But this failure was not limited to just the germans. The british were just as good at stuffing things up....just look at Dieppe
How about you read the book before you make such statements Parsifal ?? It's completely pointless otherwise.
But if you don't like it then you can read Spearheads book Brandenburgers - The Third Reich's Special Forces by Ian Westwell. A great book
I will read your sources, but all I want from you is that you assess things properly, and in a balanced way. I know that you have a lot of knowledge, but you often present it in such a cockeyed and biased way as to damage the credibility of the discussion. When you are on the money, you demand absolute precision, when you are not, you appear to want to allow the debate standards to drop, and allow "the multitude of sins" to cover dangerous generalizations. This originally quoted source does have its supporters, and overall may be worth looking at, but it is not "the bible" because it cannot establish it credentials as being totally unbiased
