German logistics, purchase programs and war booty, reality and alternatives 1935-43

[Art Medcalf]

One could argue that with lower octane gas than the Allies (C3 was what, roughly equivalent to 100/130, whereas late in the war R-2800 ran on 115/145?), and poorer valves, bearings etc., the Germans could get away with slightly more volume per cylinder before running into cooling limits due to the surface area vs volume issues you described.

Just an aside, I used to be in contact with the P&W engineer that ran R-2800 test stand during WW II. His in-house goal was to stay ahead of the test stand team developing the R-4360 in absolute performance. A 100 hour test was run on the R-2800 at 3000 HP out put. The peak HP attained on the test stand was 3800HP and the engineer felt 4000 HP was attainable , but meaningless in real world conditions. However, what that meant in actual service is the engine was able to take all kinds of overboost, misuse, and extreme operating conditions while staying together and getting the job done. If I had been a pilot during WW II and could have chosen what to fly and survive the war, would have chosen an R-2800 powered type. As a flight line worker in the early 1950s, I will say you have not lived until you watch a overloaded radial engine transport screaming past you on the ground a few hundred feet from the end of the runway with blue flame shooting out 50 feet behind. The gear gets pulled and the a/c sinks a few feet and disappears from sight, finally you see it two or three miles from the end of the runway, now at an altitude of maybe a hundred feet finally beginning to slowly climb away. I can only guess what the overspeed was in low pitch or what manifold pressure might have been. Certainly something well beyond what was the design maximums. These were the engines that saved many pilots and planes during WW II. In that area of technology, the USA was ahead of everybody else, why is a complex story but with rational reasons.
ArtieBob

 

[SaparotRob]

Just an aside, I used to be in contact with the P&W engineer that ran R-2800 test stand during WW II. His in-house goal was to stay ahead of the test stand team developing the R-4360 in absolute performance. A 100 hour test was run on the R-2800 at 3000 HP out put. The peak HP attained on the test stand was 3800HP and the engineer felt 4000 HP was attainable , but meaningless in real world conditions. However, what that meant in actual service is the engine was able to take all kinds of overboost, misuse, and extreme operating conditions while staying together and getting the job done. If I had been a pilot during WW II and could have chosen what to fly and survive the war, would have chosen an R-2800 powered type. As a flight line worker in the early 1950s, I will say you have not lived until you watch a overloaded radial engine transport screaming past you on the ground a few hundred feet from the end of the runway with blue flame shooting out 50 feet behind. The gear gets pulled and the a/c sinks a few feet and disappears from sight, finally you see it two or three miles from the end of the runway, now at an altitude of maybe a hundred feet finally beginning to slowly climb away. I can only guess what the overspeed was in low pitch or what manifold pressure might have been. Certainly something well beyond what was the design maximums. These were the engines that saved many pilots and planes during WW II. In that area of technology, the USA was ahead of everybody else, why is a complex story but with rational reasons.
ArtieBob

And they look cool.

 

[yulzari]

Not directly lorries for logistics, but my Yeomanry regiment in 1914 had its embodiment horses drawn from a contract with railway companies for their shunting horses and went to France with them. Some of the officers brought their own horses as well. The system was used for pre war annual training exercises whilst local training and parades used local horses.

The annual two week camp training gave the railway companies a chance to see how they coped without the contract horses. Which was fine until war broke out and the alternative sources also were called up and the national conscription of private horses took time to get into effect and this affected the shunting ability of the railways, especially the smaller branch lines and companies. Importing horses could not come from nearby across the Channel as these were also being called up by their armies so there was a long delay until horses could be shipped from around the world.

It had already been realised that the fodder for BEF horses would have to generally come from the UK as local fodder was already earmarked for their own army horses. That literally ate up a notable part of the whole logistics train right back into the UK. Both for railway transport and shipping which again impacted the logistics support in France and Belgium. Fodder is a bulky item and the more compact characteristics of petrol reinforced the desire to exchange horse transport for petrol lorries. In practice transport demands in a Continental war required all possible means to be used but caused the British army to have the early ambition to motorise itself post war. Budget restrictions slowed this in the inter war period and my father began his Royal Signals training with GS horse wagons in the mid 1930s but was soon motorised. In his case by a quick demonstration of how to drive a lorry, driving himself around a field once and then was qualified to drive anything.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
The German subsidy system for trucks before WW1 is briefly described in the book below:

The relevant extract:

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you for the replies.

The British gave up on the subsidized truck scheme in the very late 30s, at least for the larger trucks. They had gone over to the famous "quad" artillery tractor and the larger AEC Matador and others. The commercial operators were less interested in 4 wheel or 6 wheel drive in the late 30s (better roads?).
A lot of the smaller British trucks were based on commercial models like the Morris Commercial CS8 series and Bedford MW. Military bodies using commercial parts (engines, transmissions, axles etc) and in some cases (like the Bedfords) the same engine/transmission was used in larger 30cw and 3 ton rated trucks. Off road performance was not great?
This was fixed by the Bedford QL model which used the same engine but uses a two speed transfer case with the 4 speed transmission which had the ability to disconnect the front axle
for better fuel economy on roads. The truck was also slower (50kph?) than the smaller 2 wheel drive trucks (64kph?) But this was not a pre-war truck. it was requested in 1939, prototype was testing in Feb 1940 and production started in March 1941.

Most (all?) had no winch.

Getting back to the Germans, they could not build even this type of truck in the numbers needed.
In the Mid 30s things were not helped by the "best is the enemy of good" results they got with several of their truck programs. The Krupp Protze program is a prime example.

flat 4 engine of 60hp that was air-cooled. 4 speed transmission with two speed transfer case. But the front axle was not driven and the raised mid axle (spare tire mount?) only assisted in really rough ground when the chassis bottomed out. The independent rear suspension offered good ground contact in poor terrain. But there was no winch if the vehicle got stuck.
An expensive solution to the problem of moving a squad of men and/or a light gun. It was also a fuel hog despite the small engine.

The Germans need to find something more "out of the box" to replace the horse. It doesn't have to do 70kph on the road (60kph when towing). It needs to be cheap and reliable. Start with low speed to at least start getting the horses out of the army. Recognize that the Germans cannot afford to build enough trucks for even a substantial part of their army.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Not directly lorries for logistics, but my Yeomanry regiment in 1914 had its embodiment horses drawn from a contract with railway companies for their shunting horses and went to France with them. Some of the officers brought their own horses as well. The system was used for pre war annual training exercises whilst local training and parades used local horses.

The annual two week camp training gave the railway companies a chance to see how they coped without the contract horses. Which was fine until war broke out and the alternative sources also were called up and the national conscription of private horses took time to get into effect and this affected the shunting ability of the railways, especially the smaller branch lines and companies. Importing horses could not come from nearby across the Channel as these were also being called up by their armies so there was a long delay until horses could be shipped from around the world.

It had already been realised that the fodder for BEF horses would have to generally come from the UK as local fodder was already earmarked for their own army horses. That literally ate up a notable part of the whole logistics train right back into the UK. Both for railway transport and shipping which again impacted the logistics support in France and Belgium. Fodder is a bulky item and the more compact characteristics of petrol reinforced the desire to exchange horse transport for petrol lorries. In practice transport demands in a Continental war required all possible means to be used but caused the British army to have the early ambition to motorise itself post war. Budget restrictions slowed this in the inter war period and my father began his Royal Signals training with GS horse wagons in the mid 1930s but was soon motorised. In his case by a quick demonstration of how to drive a lorry, driving himself around a field once and then was qualified to drive anything.

View: https://youtu.be/kQ9DrerydpM?si=Bty2OA6EFHs15QcK