German Nightfighters used as Day Fighters (1 Viewer)

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Somewhere I have a magazine article about one of the top Luftwaffe NF pilots, who flew BF-110G. One day he attacked a bomber formation in daylight and when he was pursued by fighters managed to whip around and shoot down two of them.

Aside from that I recall reading where there were cases in which Ju-87 went up to attack 8th AF bomber formations.
That's the problem when you have the most brilliant men in the world working for an evil organisation then that makes them evil too?

I have incredible respect for these guys doing what they did to defend their own country it's amazing some of the stories.

Their abilities are equivalent to a modern athlete. I can never do what they did
 
I thought our heavy weighters would jump this an an P-47 would jump a night fighter caught out after sun rise. Then again, it's not the first time I've been wrong.

As placing a nightfighter close to the bomber formations, and thereby the escort, is already putting a high valuer asset as risk, lurking around and not approaching the bombers is not going to earn you anything, even by the German high command. Getting close and personal is the best thing to make of a bad situation. The risk of gettin condenmned is infinitesmal compered to the risk of being dead. Still you may be praised as dead, though, sacrifice and all that BS.

While the Bf 110 may have sprung the occasional surprize (not really being at an disadvantage in a head on confrontation with a se fighter), a Ju 88 C certainly have no business tangling with escort fighters in 44. Nor a Ju 88 R or G either. From memory the use of night fighters was primarily in the spring and summer of 44, not many G's around then anyway. Please somebody correct me if I'm wrong

On a cloudy day ground rader would probably be of far more use than the rader on a night fighter. The night fighters, I think, needed the ground rader to get them close anyway, though being in the bomber stream they'd be able to pick their individual targets on their own. But daylight raids were not done in streams.

Shräge music would, I surmise, be of limited value. The night fighter was stalking the bombers unseen, hoping to set up a shot from the blind angle below and behind. In daylight the more potent forward armament would be far more devastating, and easier to aim. I'm actually not sure if any Ju-88c's got shräge musik.

As far as i know, twin engined day fighters were provided with rockets and big cannons before the crisis in early 44. When there was no longer a safe zone from escorts, they suffered as well, rader antennas or not. I never heard of the night fighters being modified with rockets. I'm under the impression that it was truly desperate improvization, with no time for modifications or training for the new operational environment. As such a really bad desicion. I think nobody will disagree on that particular point.

I'm sure the destruction of airframes hurt the nacht jagd. however, as the main problem of die luftwaffe in the last year of the war was fuel and experienced pilots, the loss of highly specialized night fighter pilots was probably far more telling. As already indicated, the tactics night and day differed immensely. My take is that in the last year, there was (relatively speaking) a surplus of new airframes. Fueling them, crewing them with experienced pilots, and even getting them to the operational units, posed greater problems. I don't really know about servicing them, but expect that was becoming increasingly difficult too.
You are probably right It would probably be Hitler misusing a enormous asset in the night war against daybombers or vainglorious Luftwaffe pilots trying to increase their kills
 
Werent the german busy
yes SM was used against US bombers at night. have the mission reports via 15th AF during 1945. the German NF's were from Ju 88G-6 equipped NJG 100.
Us bombers at night?
 
Werent the german busy

Us bombers at night?

Both the 8th and 15th air force had limited night bombing operations. I know next to nothing on the 15th Air Force stuff so Erich would have to fill in.

The 8th Air Force tried to get night bombing going in 1943, initially trying to covert the 93rd and 44th Bomb Groups (B-24s), but they got taken away in June to serve in the Mediterranean and then the Polesti raid. They tried again with B-17s, which resulted in the 422nd Bomb Squadron flying several raids with Bomber Command in September and October 1943 but that got canned after a bit. Lastly from December 1944 to March 1945 the "492nd Bomb Group" (not the original 492nd which was disbanded, but a carpetbagger unit that took over its name) was flying night bombing missions, normally attached to 100 Group RAF Bomber Command to fatten up the diversion raids. Doolittle wanted the 8th to be able to bomb at night since RAF Bomber Command was doing day and night bombing at the time, which is an interseting reason but that is what the 8th AF headquarters summaries say.

The 492nd did suffer some losses, perhaps one or two to SM on night fighters.
 
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Both the 8th and 15th air force had limited night bombing operations. I know next to nothing on the 15th Air Force stuff so Erich would have to fill in.

The 8th Air Force tried to get night bombing going in 1943, initially trying to covert the 93rd and 44th Bomb Groups (B-24s), but they got taken away in June to serve in the Mediterranean and then the Polesti raid. They tried again with B-17s, which resulted in the 422nd Bomb Squadron flying several raids with Bomber Command in September and October 1943 but that got canned after a bit. Lastly from December 1944 to March 1945 the "492nd Bomb Group" (not the original 492nd which was disbanded, but a carpetbagger unit that took over its name) was flying night bombing missions, normally attached to 100 Group RAF Bomber Command to fatten up the diversion raids. Doolittle wanted the 8th to be able to bomb at night since RAF Bomber Command was doing day and night bombing at the time, which is an interseting reason but that is what the 8th AF headquarters summaries say.

The 492nd did suffer some losses, perhaps one or two to SM on night fighters.
It makes perfect sense to get some experience of real night time operations, its hard to re create the situation in peacetime.
 
Georg Hermann Greiner of NJG 1 (47 night victories) was credited with 4 daylight kills between Jan and March of '44 (3 B-17's and 1 B-24). Through the help of Erich and others, I was able to get in touch with Georg a couple of years before his death in Sep. '14 and we exchanged lengthy letters. I'll forever be thankful for your assistance, Erich!
 
15th Air Force night bomber effort, 170 effective, 39 non effective, 49 non sorties, 5 aircraft destroyed, 6 missing 2 damaged, 1 enemy aircraft destroyed, 391 tons of bombs. Airborne sorties:
Group
28-Oct-44​
30-Oct-44​
2-Nov-44​
13-Nov-44​
25-Nov-44​
30-Nov-44​
7-Dec-44​
8-Dec-44​
Total
2nd
2​
0​
3​
4​
5​
5​
3​
2​
24​
97th
2​
0​
0​
3​
6​
5​
3​
3​
22​
98th
0​
2​
0​
0​
0​
3​
3​
3​
11​
99th
2​
0​
1​
4​
6​
6​
3​
3​
25​
301st
2​
0​
0​
4​
6​
6​
3​
3​
24​
376th
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
3​
3​
3​
9​
449th
0​
2​
0​
3​
0​
3​
3​
3​
14​
450th
0​
2​
0​
3​
0​
1​
3​
3​
12​
451st
0​
0​
0​
0​
3​
0​
2​
2​
7​
454th
0​
0​
0​
0​
4​
0​
2​
2​
8​
455th
0​
0​
0​
0​
3​
0​
2​
2​
7​
456th
0​
0​
0​
0​
4​
0​
2​
2​
8​
459th
0​
0​
0​
0​
3​
0​
2​
2​
7​
460th
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
2​
2​
4​
461st
0​
0​
0​
0​
3​
0​
2​
2​
7​
463rd
1​
0​
3​
3​
6​
3​
3​
3​
22​
464th
0​
0​
0​
0​
3​
0​
2​
2​
7​
465th
0​
0​
0​
0​
2​
0​
1​
2​
5​
483rd
2​
0​
3​
4​
6​
5​
3​
3​
26​
484th
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
0​
2​
2​
5​
485th
0​
0​
0​
0​
2​
0​
0​
2​
4​
Total
11​
6​
10​
28​
63​
40​
49​
51​
258​

Targets reported attacked, Effective sorties
CnLocationTargets
28-Oct-44​
30-Oct-44​
2-Nov-44​
13-Nov-44​
25-Nov-44​
30-Nov-44​
7-Dec-44​
8-Dec-44​
Total
GeBlechhammer/SO/Synth.
0​
0​
0​
15​
0​
0​
0​
0​
15​
AuErlasbackCity
1​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
AuGleisdorfT/O
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
1​
GeGlewitzCity
0​
0​
0​
1​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
AuGmundenCity
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
0​
0​
1​
AuGraz/MainM/Y
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
6​
6​
AuHaimingCity
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
0​
0​
0​
1​
AuInnsbruck/MainM/Y
0​
0​
0​
0​
9​
5​
4​
0​
18​
PoKarvinaT/O
0​
0​
0​
1​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
AuKlagenfurtCity&M/Y
0​
3​
1​
0​
6​
1​
7​
7​
25​
AuLienzCity
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
2​
0​
2​
AuLinz/Hermann GoeringO/Benzol
0​
0​
0​
0​
20​
18​
0​
0​
38​
AuMittersillCity
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
0​
1​
GeMunichM/Y
2​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
2​
GeMunich/WestM/Y
6​
0​
0​
0​
9​
4​
0​
0​
19​
CzRuzomberokCity
0​
0​
0​
1​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
GeSalzburg/MainM/Y
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
2​
0​
2​
GeSalzburg/WestM/Y
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
6​
0​
6​
AuSpittalCity
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
0​
1​
AuSt. PoltenCity
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
1​
ItTriesteO/Store
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
0​
1​
HuVacCity
0​
0​
0​
1​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
AuVienna/MoosbierbaumO/Benzol
0​
0​
6​
0​
0​
0​
0​
5​
11​
AuVillachM/Y
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
5​
5​
11​
AuVolkermarktT/O
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
1​
AuWolfbergRR/Junc
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
0​
1​
AuYbbsCity
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
0​
1​
1​
CnLocationTotal
9​
3​
7​
19​
45​
30​
30​
27​
170​

The 15th also had carpetbagger units. For my next request does anyone have daily figures for operations by the 1st, 14th and 82nd Fighter Groups in November and December 1944 and February and May 1945? An appendix to a published history for example? As much as possible of the following, group, date, target, Mission (escort, strafe, sweep, fighter bomber etc.), effective, non effective and non sorties, Claims: Aircraft type/D/P/D, US aircraft losses: missing/destroyed/damaged. This is to get the 15th AF Fighter Operations figures to the same level of detail as the bomber ones.

The 8th Air Force at night. The 422nd squadron of the 91st Bomb Group was designated Night Leaflets in October 1943. The 36th and 406th squadron numbers arrived in Britain in November 1943, receiving personnel and equipment from disbanding anti submarine units for Carpetbagger operations. The 8th formed the 803rd provisional squadron for RCM in March 1944, operating with RAF 100 Group with B-17, began conversion to B-24 in "mid June". Also in March 1944 the 801st PBG formed to control the 3th and 406th Carpetbagger squadrons, then on 10 May the 788th squadron of the 467th Group and the 850th of the 490th Group, were added to the 801st PBG.

In late June 1944 the 492nd group lost its 858th Squadron which became Night Leaflets, replacing the 422nd. The 492nd Group ceased bomber operations on 7 August and on the 11th the group and squadron numbers but not personnel were transferred, renumbering the existing carpetbagger 801st provisional group, with the 858th rejoining.

In designation terms as of 9 August 1944 it was 492nd BG (B-24, 856, 857, 859 sqns non operational), 801st PBG (B-24, 36, 406, 788, 850 sqns) (carpetbagger), 803rd PBS (B-24) (RCM), 858 HB sqn (NL). As of 14 August it was 492nd BG (B-24 (some B-17?), 856, 857, 858, 859 sqns) (carpetbagger), 36 HB (B-24) (RCM) sqn, 406 (B-24) HB (NL) sqn, with the 788th and 850th squadrons back with their original groups. The two original Carpetbagger units were now RCM and night leaflets, where all the personnel ended up in another matter. From late 1944 the 36th was used more to support the 8th AF than the RAF.

With the liberation of France the Carpetbagger operations wound down, leaving the 492nd group semi employed. One squadron was later sent to Italy. According to Roger Freeman only the 856th stayed as Carpetbagger, though the 858th did some operations. Night bombing and signals investigation were added to the list of duties.

The 8th did a small number of night raids 1943/early 1944 partly as GH and Oboe trials. According to Richard Davis night raids resumed on 24 December 1944 against coastal targets in France, 34.8 tons on December using H2X, 16.7 tons using H2X in January. It was not until 20 February 1945 a target in Germany was attacked, all up 57.5 tons by GH, 239 by H2X in February 1945, 269 tons H2X in March, 116.6 tons H2X in April. A total of 254 sorties credited with attacking targets in Germany, 2 aircraft MIA, most raids on Marshalling Yards but they had an unusually high percentage of incendiaries, 420.5 tons HE to 204.1 tons incendiary, for the war the 8th dropped about 9 tons HE to 1 Incendiary.

Night leaflet operations began on 7 October 1943, 2,289 successful sorties, 5 aircraft MIA. Carpetbagger on 6 January 1944, 2,074 successful sorties, 30 aircraft MIA.
 
Geoffrey,

Would this link help you with the 1st FG?


Eagledad

BTW I do enjoy your tables of data. Thanks
 
With the liberation of France the Carpetbagger operations wound down, leaving the 492nd group semi employed. One squadron was later sent to Italy. According to Roger Freeman only the 856th stayed as Carpetbagger, though the 858th did some operations. Night bombing and signals investigation were added to the list of duties.

The 8th did a small number of night raids 1943/early 1944 partly as GH and Oboe trials. According to Richard Davis night raids resumed on 24 December 1944 against coastal targets in France, 34.8 tons on December using H2X, 16.7 tons using H2X in January. It was not until 20 February 1945 a target in Germany was attacked, all up 57.5 tons by GH, 239 by H2X in February 1945, 269 tons H2X in March, 116.6 tons H2X in April. A total of 254 sorties credited with attacking targets in Germany, 2 aircraft MIA, most raids on Marshalling Yards but they had an unusually high percentage of incendiaries, 420.5 tons HE to 204.1 tons incendiary, for the war the 8th dropped about 9 tons HE to 1 Incendiary.

Night leaflet operations began on 7 October 1943, 2,289 successful sorties, 5 aircraft MIA. Carpetbagger on 6 January 1944, 2,074 successful sorties, 30 aircraft MIA.

I have the 492nd's "unit history" so to speak from Maxwell Alabama Air Force Historical Research Agency. The raids on coastal targets in France was a German controlled gun battery, and the 492nd raids were essentially test runs to get experience. The 492nd was trained up by RAF Bomber Command, so they used the bomber stream tactic, path-finding technique, H2X, Loran, Chaff etc. The first raid on the coastal battery was in daylight, but using night technique. They then bombed it twice more at night. This was December 44 and January 45. They did a few "bullseye" night bombing exercises, a few "round-robin" exercises, then they started bombing in February. From reading a few sources it it looks like the 492nd were in a bit of a tug of war between the OSS and 8th Air Force. The 856th squadron was left as carpetbagging, but the OSS clawed back another squadron (I don't know which one) leaving just two squadrons doing night raids in March. By mid march the entire 492nd seems to have gone back to doing largely carpet bagging operations. They got a few small scale raids in in April but that was it.

As for the targets being "Marshalling Yards", that is a bit of an euphemism for the 8th Air Force when it comes to doing area bombing attacks on cities. The 8th Air Force did a fair amount of area bombing during the war, right from the very start of their raids on Germany in fact. But a lot of euphemisms was used (inconsistently) to obscure this fact in documents: for example last resort bombing of "Industrial targets of opportunity" was an allowance for crews to bomb any built up area they could see through the clouds if the primary and secondary targets were cloud covered. Bombing "Marshalling yards" was a common euphemism related to H2X radar bombing raids. In reality H2X bombing, or bombing through overcast, or blind bombing or whatever phrase was used was just area bombing by another name, and bombing Marshalling Yards was the American euphemism for bombing cities. Not all that different from RAF Bomber Command with "Dehousing" being a euphemism for targeting the German populations in the cities.
 
Hi
Theo Boiten's 'Nachtjagd' has some information on night fighter losses. Page 193 has the example of the wartime losses of II./NJG2 (later renamed IV./NJG1) from the early days of the night fighter formation to the end,during the war they lost 37 aircraft in flying accidents, bad weather, engine fires and to friendly Flak. Of the 35 lost to enemy action, 14 were lost to return fire from RAF bombers, 13 destroyed by RAF Beaufighter and Mosquito intruders, 3 were lost to Allied fighters during the day and 3 were claimed by return fire from US bombers during daylight raids. Two were lost when the bombers they attacked exploded at close quarters.
We should also remember from mid-1943 the German night fighters had increasing problems with the increasing numbers of RAF night fighters and intruders present over the occupied countries and Germany, particularly after 100 Group was formed. From page 188; "Between December 1943 and April 1945, Mosquitos of 100 Group accounted for 257 German aircraft destroyed, most of them nightfighter aircraft, for the loss of only sixty-nine Mosquitos. Additionally, 2nd TAF and ADGB Mosquitos claimed around 230 German planes shot down on offensive operations between early June 1944 and late April 1945."
All this resulted in a change of tactics by the German nightfighter force by the autumn of 1944, which included crews switching off all radio and radar equipment on board to prevent the Mosquitos 'homing' in on them, and flying low to avoid attacks. This latter tactic resulted in an increase in accidents and reducing their interceptions of bombers. This all created the "Mosquito panic" of late 1944.
It was not only their use during daylight that caused increasing attrition on the German units but also their increased vulnerability at night.

Mike
 
if available, the 13 destroyed by intruders in air or in the ground?
Hi
The source doesn't clarify, however, the context appears to be discussing air to air losses.
In the book 'Mosquito' by Sharp and Bowyer, there is a mention of German records of night-fighter losses for December 1943 to April 1944 of 163 destroyed in the air and 62 on the ground in/over Germany and additionally 15 and 17 in/over France and the Low Countries.
Damaged during the same period are 53 in the air and 79 on the ground in/over Germany and 2 and 9 in/over France and Low Countries.

Mike
 
Excellent thread, chaps.
I DO NOT REMEMBER THE SOURCE (of course) but recall a Luftwaffe history stating that night-fighter pilots/crews with 20 or more victories were not to fly daylight missions.
 
Both the 8th and 15th air force had limited night bombing operations. I know next to nothing on the 15th Air Force stuff so Erich would have to fill in.

The 8th Air Force tried to get night bombing going in 1943, initially trying to covert the 93rd and 44th Bomb Groups (B-24s), but they got taken away in June to serve in the Mediterranean and then the Polesti raid. They tried again with B-17s, which resulted in the 422nd Bomb Squadron flying several raids with Bomber Command in September and October 1943 but that got canned after a bit. Lastly from December 1944 to March 1945 the "492nd Bomb Group" (not the original 492nd which was disbanded, but a carpetbagger unit that took over its name) was flying night bombing missions, normally attached to 100 Group RAF Bomber Command to fatten up the diversion raids. Doolittle wanted the 8th to be able to bomb at night since RAF Bomber Command was doing day and night bombing at the time, which is an interseting reason but that is what the 8th AF headquarters summaries say.

The 492nd did suffer some losses, perhaps one or two to SM on night fighters.
The 492nd BG was 'transferred' in the context that i a.) ceased operating under 8th AF/2AD control, b.) crews were transferred en masse to 801st BS (P), as well as other 2AD Bomb squadrons as replacements. The 492nd was disbanded in August 1944.

I don't recall any mention that it (492nd) continued to operate as 492nd after August 1944. What is yor source that Dolittle (or Spaatz) wanted to join RAF in night attacks? The AAF training doctrine was totally unsuited to night operations, and the 1943 Fall experimentation showed how unsuited 8th AF would be in such ops. The core training groups were the 95th, 96th and 385th (all 3BD B-17 BGs). IIRCthe 422ndBS/305th was equipped and tasked to train with RAF first and seected to train the other groups.

As you noted earlier, H2S/X assisted bombing through overcast was strikingly unsuccessful, save a few strikes in which natural features such as lage bodies of water like a port or lake offered a target marker on the periphery.
 
I think that Jazz Music attacks would have been suicidal against B-17's and B-24's even at NIGHT.

Note that none of the RAf night bombers had so much as a window to look out the bottom of the airplane.
RAF Lancasters (and Halifaxs?) were fitted with the FN64 ventral turret. But they were generally left un-manned or removed as they were deemed to be not worth the effort, as the view below was quite poor. Eventually, the H2S radar took over the ventral turret location, as it was a better use of the space. An approaching night fighter was next to impossible to see against the dark ground.

1683646101420.png


1683646636514.png
 
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They should have had flares shooting in front of flight with a declination ( considering speed wind etc.) That let it go off on lower but juusstt in front low down. It will light up those peskey jazz guys just fine.
Wouldnt a searchlight work better, that would blind the varmints too?
 

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