Getting P-40 into the air quickly

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There is more to than that. This was not the era of instant communication. RAF fighter command could do it but they were on a war footing and set up for instant response. The ground crews were billeted right by the aircraft, the pilots nearby ready for action. At 7.20 AM every one in Pearl is asleep, how do you get them down to the airfield in time to do anything?
Note that just getting them into the air in 35 minutes doesn't help, you have to intercept well before they arrive over target. The USN found from experience that at least 30 miles was the distance required with an altitude of 20,00 feet for a successful interception.
Resp:
Additional time would have helped. There is a big difference in anticipating an all out attack vs sabotage. However, Americans I believe didn't see the Japanese as equals in ability. They all 'wear glasses' mentality was wide spread. Yes, many military leaders did see them as a serious threat. Not too many believed Japanese forces that large could travel that far unnoticed. The Japanese PH attack was well planned. Their timing was near perfect. However, it's execution will continue to be debated. Let's not forget Sinapore on Dec 8. The British had to be forewarned, but did it change anything?
 
There is more to than that. This was not the era of instant communication. RAF fighter command could do it but they were on a war footing and set up for instant response. The ground crews were billeted right by the aircraft, the pilots nearby ready for action. At 7.20 AM every one in Pearl is asleep, how do you get them down to the airfield in time to do anything?
Note that just getting them into the air in 35 minutes doesn't help, you have to intercept well before they arrive over target. The USN found from experience that at least 30 miles was the distance required with an altitude of 20,00 feet for a successful interception.
Very insightful about the obstacles to a successful interception but alow me to split some hairs and belabor some points.:)
One thing is what are we going to call a successful interception? Sure it would be nice to meet them 30 miles out but given what Taylor and Welch were able to do imagine a couple dozen p40s that had gotten off 10 or 15 minutes earlier.
Not sure what exactly would have happened and not sure where we draw the line of what is a successful interception but I don't think its a wild stretch to say it's likely more Japanese planes would have been shot down. Maybe alot more. And if the first wave had been blunted theres a much better chance of a successful counter strike.
Maybe this scenario requires more pilots stationed at the ready to fully play out but I guess that's part of the what if that's interesting to think about. There were however some other pilots there besides Taylor and Welch so maybe it was to at least some degree doable with the guys that were actually there. With a little warning surly more of them could have gotten airborne. How many I don't know but it's interesting to think about.
 
Taylor and Welch
Don't forget Lt. Rassmusen and his P-36.

Also, as I mentioned before, the Enterprise and her task force were aproaching Hawaii that morning, being about 215 miles to the west.
It was her SBDs that stumbled into the middle of the attack that morning. With a bit of advance warning, the Enterprise could have contributed her fighters to the fight.
 
They attack on Sunday morning Coz that's the best time to attack. Lazy Sundays can't be beat.

I remember my days and half the camp is away and half the camp is sleeping.

So getting P-40 airborne is no easy thing when no one is around.

However had the Americans been fully prepared and waiting then that's a spicy meatball.

The Japanese could have been slaughtered week one day one.
 
Don't forget Lt. Rassmusen and his P-36.

Also, as I mentioned before, the Enterprise and her task force were aproaching Hawaii that morning, being about 215 miles to the west.
It was her SBDs that stumbled into the middle of the attack that morning. With a bit of advance warning, the Enterprise could have contributed her fighters to the fight.
Very true. I should have mentioned that. The SBDs took out two Japanese planes that morning, both Zeros I believe.
 
Very insightful about the obstacles to a successful interception but alow me to split some hairs and belabor some points.:)
One thing is what are we going to call a successful interception? Sure it would be nice to meet them 30 miles out but given what Taylor and Welch were able to do imagine a couple dozen p40s that had gotten off 10 or 15 minutes earlier.
Not sure what exactly would have happened and not sure where we draw the line of what is a successful interception but I don't think its a wild stretch to say it's likely more Japanese planes would have been shot down. Maybe alot more. And if the first wave had been blunted theres a much better chance of a successful counter strike.
Maybe this scenario requires more pilots stationed at the ready to fully play out but I guess that's part of the what if that's interesting to think about. There were however some other pilots there besides Taylor and Welch so maybe it was to at least some degree doable with the guys that were actually there. With a little warning surly more of them could have gotten airborne. How many I don't know but it's interesting to think about.
The Arizona still blows up. Without proper fighter direction the p40s get embroiled with the first aircraft they run into ie the ones directly overhead attacking wheeler. Same as the Japanese at Midway missed the dive bombers. Note that US fighter to die ration was pretty much crap all through 1942. Read the action reports for Coral Sea, midaway and Santa Cruz.
USS Northampton CA26 War Damage Report No. 41
USS Lexington CV2 War Damage Report No. 16
 
Don't forget Lt. Rassmusen and his P-36.

Also, as I mentioned before, the Enterprise and her task force were aproaching Hawaii that morning, being about 215 miles to the west.
It was her SBDs that stumbled into the middle of the attack that morning. With a bit of advance warning, the Enterprise could have contributed her fighters to the fight.
Resp:
Just saw his story on the History Channel. I stand corrected.
 
The Arizona still blows up. Without proper fighter direction the p40s get embroiled with the first aircraft they run into ie the ones directly overhead attacking wheeler. Same as the Japanese at Midway missed the dive bombers. Note that US fighter to die ration was pretty much crap all through 1942. Read the action reports for Coral Sea, midaway and Santa Cruz.
USS Northampton CA26 War Damage Report No. 41
USS Lexington CV2 War Damage Report No. 16
I don't disagree that it's not so cut and dried that if we heeded the warning it would have totally changed things but it would for sure have turned out different, maybe alot. Maybe not that much. Well never know.
I don't think for example the Arizona still goes down for sure. If a good number of planes assigned to attack that area get shot down or damaged that likelyhood becomes much less.
If the p40s/ p36s can get off before the Japanese are directly overhead they sould be able do disrupt the attacks on Pearl Harbor and not get embroiled in the attack on Wheeler field.
I think one thing's for sure, if we had heeded the warning and gotten alot more planes up they would have turned out different. How much different is anybodys guess.
 
If advance warning gets the Army's aircraft up, so too, does the warning go out not only to the Marine and Naval air units, but the fleet as well.
Even with cold boilers, 35 minute lead time would get them enough steam to get clear of their berths AND get the AA batteries active.
 
If advance warning gets the Army's aircraft up, so too, does the warning go out not only to the Marine and Naval air units, but the fleet as well.
Even with cold boilers, 35 minute lead time would get them enough steam to get clear of their berths AND get the AA batteries active.
The relations between the us navy and army at Pearl were extremely poor if not totally poisonous. The navy was supposed to contribute liaison officers to the AWS but did not do so. There was no means to get a warning from the AWS to the navy. In fact the antiaircraft batteries flatly refused to be tied in..... we know what we're doing we can take care of any attack was the attitude.
They changed their tune after shooting down several friendly aircraft during the raid.
 
Everyone's got a plan until your punched in the face.
How long would it take to get a battleship moving?
How much advanced warning would be needed for an effective response?

We always say they never learn from History. But Japan did this at Port Arthur and won. So maybe we should say you should never learn from history.
 
There is no big red button to push. This is the era of telephone exchanges and switchboard operators. If you've ever used a party line telephone system you'll understand how slow it is. There are no hot lines to the navy in fact they wouldn't want it. The navy never told the army when they would be flying in from carriers and vice versa. Foreign enemies may change with time but the army and navy will always have each other. The US radios all through 1942 were absolute crap so they were no help.
There simply isn't any system in place to communicate.
As for interception the sky is a very big place and if you aren't in the right position the interception doesn't happen. Shooting the enemy down after the bombs have fallen isn't all that useful. In fact one of the problems both the USN and the INJ had was the tendency of fighter pilots to chase after the empty bombers rather than waiting for the next wave of attackers
Just getting aircraft into the sky isn't enough. I suggest you read Friedman's Fighter Over the Fleet and you realize that interception was not easy.
 
I don't disagree that it's not so cut and dried that if we heeded the warning it would have totally changed things but it would for sure have turned out different, maybe alot. Maybe not that much. Well never know.
I don't think for example the Arizona still goes down for sure. If a good number of planes assigned to attack that area get shot down or damaged that likelyhood becomes much less.
If the p40s/ p36s can get off before the Japanese are directly overhead they sould be able do disrupt the attacks on Pearl Harbor and not get embroiled in the attack on Wheeler field.
I think one thing's for sure, if we had heeded the warning and gotten alot more planes up they would have turned out different. How much different is anybodys guess.
The things that have to change are an incredibly long list.
If the aircraft had been refueled after the exercise the previous day
If the ammunition wasn't removed from the aircraft (actually removed from the belts) and placed under lock and key
If some of the aircraft didn't have their armament removed for maintenance
If the AWS was actually fully manned.
If one of the 3 men on the island who knew how the AWS actually worked was on duty
If the navy had provided the liaison officers
If the army and navy actually cooperated
If all the radar stations were in operation (the one actually running lost contact at 7.45 due to the masking effect of the island)
If the entire brain trust wasn't fixed on the idea that any attack on Pearl Harbor would come from the south ( the air searches immediately after the attack were all to the south)
If the US fighters had radios that actually worked ( the better radios went to the transports)
If realistic exercises had been conducted
 
Everyone's got a plan until your punched in the face.
How long would it take to get a battleship moving?
How much advanced warning would be needed for an effective response?

We always say they never learn from History. But Japan did this at Port Arthur and won. So maybe we should say you should never learn from history.
The USN did realize that the Japanese were not averse to sneak attacks. They in fact predicted that such an attack would take place at dusk or dawn (with dawn considered more likely) on a holiday. However the general consensus from top to bottom was that an attack on Pearl Harbor was unlikely. The Japanese were expected to go for the oil. Kimmel and Short were not alone in their complacency but someone had to take the blame. The Hart Enquiry on Pearl Harbor makes for very interesting reading.
 
Don't need no interception as the Japanese are coming for you. An effective CAP over Pearl Harbour would be sufficient. And when u see the bombs a falling. Then fly over there.

First rule of military is that military never wrong. So when military is wrong then find some scapegoat to blame. Even if they are innocent.
 
Don't need no interception as the Japanese are coming for you. An effective CAP over Pearl Harbour would be sufficient. And when u see the bombs a falling. Then fly over there.

First rule of military is that military never wrong. So when military is wrong then find some scapegoat to blame. Even if they are innocent.
That's not how it worked in real life. Even with cap the IJN lost 4 carriers at Midway and the US lost Lexington at Coral Sea, Yorktown at Midway and Hornet at Santa Cruz.
70 years later everything seems easy.
 
The Japanese CAP during Midway was out of position from the attack of VT-8 and many were low on fuel and ammo. The appearance of a third torpedo plane attack from the SE by VT-3 very quickly drew the majority of the Japanese CAP into the southeast quadrant of the fleet. "Shattered Sword"
Because the Japanese fighters grouped together like little kids playing hockey all crowed around the puck. With a working fighter direction system that doesn't happen. The US also failed to protect their carriers in 1942 because the didn't understand the nuances of fighter direction
 
The USN did realize that the Japanese were not averse to sneak attacks. They in fact predicted that such an attack would take place at dusk or dawn (with dawn considered more likely) on a holiday. However the general consensus from top to bottom was that an attack on Pearl Harbor was unlikely. The Japanese were expected to go for the oil. Kimmel and Short were not alone in their complacency but someone had to take the blame. The Hart Enquiry on Pearl Harbor makes for very interesting reading.
Very true. I should have mentioned that. The SBDs took out two Japanese planes that morning, both Zeros I believe.
That's not how it worked in real life. Even with cap the IJN lost 4 carriers at Midway and the US lost Lexington at Coral Sea, Yorktown at Midway and Hornet at Santa Cruz.
70 years later everything seems easy.
Resp:
The US was not physically or mentally prepared for war at the time of Pearl Harbor. Having ships, planes and men doesn't equal preparedness or desire. The Japanese failed to destroy:
- Aircraft Carriers
- Fuel stores
- Drydocks/repair facilities
- Submarines
All but two ships were repaired and returned to service. The Pearl Harbor attack gave the Americans the will/drive to fight, and fight they did.
 

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