parsifal
Colonel
At the moment Im looking for evidence of what and how the Axis forced the straits. By far the most common method was by U-Boat, and perhaps 60 boats managed to enter the straits and perhaps 40 Italian boats transferred from the Med to the Atlantic Ports to take part in the Battle Of the Atlantic. So the Straits were somewhat porous to Axis traffic, of sorts, though I do remain very sceptical that getting a Battle squadron past Gib is the same as a U-Boat.
By October 1939, Dönitz had decided to use three Type IXs could be used to intercept the first Allied convoys of the war. U-25, U-26 and U-53 were to rendezvous southwest of Ireland before attempting to force the Straits and attack the convoys in the Mediterranean. Things began to go wrong from the outset when U-25 was diverted to a convoy southwest of Lisbon. After an unsuccessful torpedo attack on a steamer on 31 October, Schultze, U-25's commander, surfaced and proceeded to sink his target with fire from his deck gun. This course of action caused a crack in a vital part of the submarine, obliging the boat to return to Germany.
U-53 ran low on fuel after shadowing a convoy in the Bay of Biscay and was also forced to return.
This only left U-26, which compelled by a combination of unsuitable weather, searchlights and British anti-submarine patrols, abandoned any attempt at laying mines before Gibraltar harbour. The boat however did manage to sail through the Straits while on the surface and claimed but a solitary ship sunk in the Mediterranean. This 'sinking' was not confirmed by post-war analysis. She was one of the few boats to force the straits surfaced.
U-26 headed back through the Straits, arriving in Wilhelshaven on 5 December 1939; the only U-boat to successfully enter and leave the Mediterrannean in World War II.
This mission was summed-up in the BdU Kriegstagebuch (KTB) War Diary thus:
It was a mistake to send U-25, U-26 and U-53 into the Mediterranean. U-25 had to return before she ever got there, U-53 did not get through and U-26 hardly encountered any shipping worth mentioning. This patrol shows all the disadvantages of a long outward passage.
As an aside, more than half the attacks in the med by submarines from both sides were carried out surfaced. This was because of the lack of water depth more than anything, but also because many of the targets were so small as to be considered unworthy of a torpedo attack
With regard to RAF assets, construction of a solid surface runway began in late 1939 and in 1940 the runway was extended to a length of 1,550 yards (1,417 m). The land reclamation commenced towards the end of 1941 along with the construction of an RAF camp at the "North Front", now RAF Gibraltar.
At the beginning of 1940 the RAF dispatched their first squadron to Gibraltar in response to the "strong possibility of German submarines concentrating in the Strait of Gibraltar and using Spanish port facilities" (just a little late I guess). , loomed large in Admiralty thinking.On the 9th September 1939, No. 202 Squadron RAF was ordered to Gibraltar, loaded to the gunwales with equipment. This squadron started the war equipped with Saro Flying Boats, before coverting Sunderland and later (from the end of 1941) Catalina flying boats. They were credited with the sinking of 9 U-Boats, all but ntwo of which have been positively confirmed post wart.
Later, On 25 September 1939, No 200 (Coastal) Group was formed as a subordinate formation to HQ RAF Mediterranean in control of No 202 Sqn. The Group's function was the control of Royal Air Force units operating from Gibraltar. In late 1940 the Group was transferred to Coastal Command. Later a combined HQ was formed which commenced operations in early 1942.
U-boat net has an interesting map showing the U-Boat losses in the vicinity of gib. It was considered a very dangerous place for U-boats by Doenitz's command.
This link gives an interesting Italian perspective on the straits defences. I would say the italians were more successful thjan the Germans art dealing with the straits challenges as a generalization.
Mussolini's War: Fascist Italy's Military Struggles from Africa and Western ... - Frank Joseph - Google Books
According to Milan N. Vego (Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas) the RN laid about 10000 mins in the waters around Gibraltor. 93 German U-boats attempted the passage into the med, of which 62 were successful, only one one boat ever attempted the escape from the med, and U-Boats are inherently safer in running the gauntlet of a minefiled. Roughly speaking, id say the German Battle squadron would have about a 50/50 chance of not hitting a mine in early 1941.
Its difficult to pinpoint the exact strength of Force H, as its strength varied almost on a daily basis, moreover as the war progressed, and reliance on carriers increased, more and more the slower battleships were "left at the home port" so are often not included in the accounts of Force H operations. For example, during March, there were three slow battleships generally stationed at Gib, but neither in the operation before or after March 1941, are they mentioned. In a proposed forcing of the strait, however they of course need to be considered.
Convoy "Excess" in January 1941, lists available forces as 1 Carrier, 1 Battlecruiser, 4 cruisers and 14 destroyers. Operation "Substance" lists the forces committed as 1 carrier, 1 battleship, 1 Battlecruiser, 5 cruisers and 21 destroyers. From the middle of March to the middle of July 1 of the Battleships stationed at Gib included a Rodney Class BB.
By October 1939, Dönitz had decided to use three Type IXs could be used to intercept the first Allied convoys of the war. U-25, U-26 and U-53 were to rendezvous southwest of Ireland before attempting to force the Straits and attack the convoys in the Mediterranean. Things began to go wrong from the outset when U-25 was diverted to a convoy southwest of Lisbon. After an unsuccessful torpedo attack on a steamer on 31 October, Schultze, U-25's commander, surfaced and proceeded to sink his target with fire from his deck gun. This course of action caused a crack in a vital part of the submarine, obliging the boat to return to Germany.
U-53 ran low on fuel after shadowing a convoy in the Bay of Biscay and was also forced to return.
This only left U-26, which compelled by a combination of unsuitable weather, searchlights and British anti-submarine patrols, abandoned any attempt at laying mines before Gibraltar harbour. The boat however did manage to sail through the Straits while on the surface and claimed but a solitary ship sunk in the Mediterranean. This 'sinking' was not confirmed by post-war analysis. She was one of the few boats to force the straits surfaced.
U-26 headed back through the Straits, arriving in Wilhelshaven on 5 December 1939; the only U-boat to successfully enter and leave the Mediterrannean in World War II.
This mission was summed-up in the BdU Kriegstagebuch (KTB) War Diary thus:
It was a mistake to send U-25, U-26 and U-53 into the Mediterranean. U-25 had to return before she ever got there, U-53 did not get through and U-26 hardly encountered any shipping worth mentioning. This patrol shows all the disadvantages of a long outward passage.
As an aside, more than half the attacks in the med by submarines from both sides were carried out surfaced. This was because of the lack of water depth more than anything, but also because many of the targets were so small as to be considered unworthy of a torpedo attack
With regard to RAF assets, construction of a solid surface runway began in late 1939 and in 1940 the runway was extended to a length of 1,550 yards (1,417 m). The land reclamation commenced towards the end of 1941 along with the construction of an RAF camp at the "North Front", now RAF Gibraltar.
At the beginning of 1940 the RAF dispatched their first squadron to Gibraltar in response to the "strong possibility of German submarines concentrating in the Strait of Gibraltar and using Spanish port facilities" (just a little late I guess). , loomed large in Admiralty thinking.On the 9th September 1939, No. 202 Squadron RAF was ordered to Gibraltar, loaded to the gunwales with equipment. This squadron started the war equipped with Saro Flying Boats, before coverting Sunderland and later (from the end of 1941) Catalina flying boats. They were credited with the sinking of 9 U-Boats, all but ntwo of which have been positively confirmed post wart.
Later, On 25 September 1939, No 200 (Coastal) Group was formed as a subordinate formation to HQ RAF Mediterranean in control of No 202 Sqn. The Group's function was the control of Royal Air Force units operating from Gibraltar. In late 1940 the Group was transferred to Coastal Command. Later a combined HQ was formed which commenced operations in early 1942.
U-boat net has an interesting map showing the U-Boat losses in the vicinity of gib. It was considered a very dangerous place for U-boats by Doenitz's command.
This link gives an interesting Italian perspective on the straits defences. I would say the italians were more successful thjan the Germans art dealing with the straits challenges as a generalization.
Mussolini's War: Fascist Italy's Military Struggles from Africa and Western ... - Frank Joseph - Google Books
According to Milan N. Vego (Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas) the RN laid about 10000 mins in the waters around Gibraltor. 93 German U-boats attempted the passage into the med, of which 62 were successful, only one one boat ever attempted the escape from the med, and U-Boats are inherently safer in running the gauntlet of a minefiled. Roughly speaking, id say the German Battle squadron would have about a 50/50 chance of not hitting a mine in early 1941.
Its difficult to pinpoint the exact strength of Force H, as its strength varied almost on a daily basis, moreover as the war progressed, and reliance on carriers increased, more and more the slower battleships were "left at the home port" so are often not included in the accounts of Force H operations. For example, during March, there were three slow battleships generally stationed at Gib, but neither in the operation before or after March 1941, are they mentioned. In a proposed forcing of the strait, however they of course need to be considered.
Convoy "Excess" in January 1941, lists available forces as 1 Carrier, 1 Battlecruiser, 4 cruisers and 14 destroyers. Operation "Substance" lists the forces committed as 1 carrier, 1 battleship, 1 Battlecruiser, 5 cruisers and 21 destroyers. From the middle of March to the middle of July 1 of the Battleships stationed at Gib included a Rodney Class BB.