There is a lot of sense. Historians can dissect the statements reports and records but in the late 1930s everyone in Europe knew what happened when German bombers bombed a city. Any comments on Rotterdam and Warsaw? in fact any city where the Germans had an army on the outskirts and the LW in range. The tactics used were the same as in medieval times, position a large army outside the city and bombard it.
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There is a lot of sense. Historians can dissect the statements reports and records but in the late 1930s everyone in Europe knew what happened when German bombers bombed a city. Any comments on Rotterdam and Warsaw? in fact any city where the Germans had an army on the outskirts and the LW in range. The tactics used were the same as in medieval times, position a large army outside the city and bombard it.
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
I wasn't suggesting an alternate way to defeat the UK, I was suggesting creating strategies potent enough to be able to force them into a cold war style armistice in the long run while making them impotent enough to weather any counter-attacks in the short run. (this would, of course, be very different than the sort of thinking Hitler had in general ... more the sort of scenario one of those early-war Military Coup alternate histories might include, depending just who ended up in charge) Re-organizing Germany into a practical, efficient military and economic logistics machine with planning and goals that could actually be met in the real-world is rather another topic entirely though.
The comments were regarding pre-war R&D and tactics, not specific to the BoB beyond citing the limits in available weapons/resources and reasons for their absence.
Exactly, it was an entirely different situation than what had previously complied with German Military doctrine and particularly demanded tactical strike aircraft better able to defend themselves as well as strategic bombing operations outside of existing LW practice in the preceding battles. (also ones they lacked the logistics planning to cope with)
The terror tactics also worked rather well in as far as inducing short-term disarray and panic making it easier for ground forces to advance and and establish occupation. Those tactics break down when you take way the immediate invasion on the ground. Germany simply lacked the proper naval resources to mount any sort of real invasion (and trying to mount an invasion from the air alone would have been well beyond their existing resources as far as heavy military transports and gliders went), and anything leading up to invasion plans was effectively a waste of resources.
They could wage a tactical war against coastal operations and they could wage a strategic war against industry and shipping, but planning an invasion of the UK (beyond the Channel Islands) was a waste. Even for propaganda purposes I'm not sure ... if threat of invasion more useful than threat of being starved out or isolated from mainland Europe? (not more useful for inducing fear, but more useful for reducing overall will to fight one way or another -including fostering apathy among isolationists)
My only comment is that the channel islands are not part of the UK ....from wiki
The small nearby islands of Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man are not part of the United Kingdom, being Crown dependencies with the British Government responsible for defence and international representation.[15]
I believe you are twisting my tail constantly switching and changing the discussion and it is tiresome, at no time have you addressed your comments to the question Stona posed.
The small nearby islands of Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man are not part of the United Kingdom, being Crown dependencies with the British Government responsible for defence and international representation.[15]
I believe you are twisting my tail constantly switching and changing the discussion and it is tiresome, at no time have you addressed your comments to the question Stona posed.
- Thread starter
- #64
Bombing up Bf 109s was not in itself a bad idea. The Bf 110s of Erprobungkommando 210 caused a lot of damage with their low level attacks and the Bf 109s of that unit could do the same thing. One thing Chain Home, or more accurately its operators, had a great deal of difficulty doing accurately was calculating the altitude of incoming raids. Fighter Command squadrons were not told the height of a raid but given a height at which to patrol and/or intercept the raid. The experienced commanding officer of each squadron almost invariably added a few thousand feet 'for the wife and kids' as altitude was life. This meant that low or even lower level raids often got through undetected and unmolested until after they had attacked. After a Bf 109 attacked it was one again a competitive fighter.
The problem was that when other units of the Jagdwaffe started to equip a staffel as fighter bombers they flew in as high as they could, though lower and slower than their bomb less escorts, and dropped their bombs and scarpered at the first sign of the RAF. Scattering a few small bombs over London and south east England was indeed a waste of resources.
It wasn't so much the concept as the implementation that was flawed.
Obviously a Bf 109 was an either/or as far as bombs and drop tanks went. It couldn't carry both.
Cheers
Steve
The problem was that when other units of the Jagdwaffe started to equip a staffel as fighter bombers they flew in as high as they could, though lower and slower than their bomb less escorts, and dropped their bombs and scarpered at the first sign of the RAF. Scattering a few small bombs over London and south east England was indeed a waste of resources.
It wasn't so much the concept as the implementation that was flawed.
Obviously a Bf 109 was an either/or as far as bombs and drop tanks went. It couldn't carry both.
Cheers
Steve
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
My suggestion was only partially relevant to the BoB scenario specifically (and mostly for coastal strikes within practical range of bombed-up 109s) but was more centered on the missed opportunities to investigate fighter-bomber equipment and tactics pre-war. Particularly experimenting with bombloads on fighters and comparing the capabilities with those of dedicated bombers. (in general practice, dedicated dive bombers tended to have better accuracy, better maximum bombload and usually better range with a given bombload as well -comparing twin engine fighters to single engine dive bombers could skew things though, among other variables)
In the end, even if they had extensively tested fighter-bomber configurations pre-war there'd still likely be a high demand for the superior qualities of dedicated bombers and support aircraft, but the actual production demand might have been somewhat lower compared to fighter/fighter-bomber production demands.
They potentially could have been fitted with small wing racks akin to the Ar 68 and some pre-war American fighters holding 10 kg (or 20 lb) bombs. 3 under each wing seemed to be common practice with both the USAAC and LW in the mid 1930s.
Granted, such small bombs might not be of much real use even for close support situation (where drop tanks wouldn't be relevant anyway), but still something to at least consider.
In war terms it is difficult to calculate present day costs. On an inflation calculation a 1939 spitfire costs about £1,500,000 today which may be about right when a hand built one goes at auction for £3,100,000. I presume a Bf109 would be slightly cheaper but not by much. In the BoB and in most conflicts the pilots were much more valuable than the planes they flew. Using Bf109s to randomly scatter 500 Lb explosives over the UK was a foolhardy and political venture no military thinking behind it at all. The chances of them costing the UK more than they cost themselves was very low. EPB 210 had some training in low level bombing attacks the first pilots to drop bombs from a Bf109 had none.
- Thread starter
- #67
I understand that you are referring to the Bf 109 pilots of the designated 'jabo' Staffeln of the various Gruppen and you would be correct about them. Not only did they have no proper training, they very much resented being forced into this role.
To be strictly accurate I would mention that Erprobungskommando 210 also flew Bf 109s and that those pilots did have rudimentary training in low level bombing using a gun sight.
Cheers
Steve
from
Battle of Atlantic
DEFENCE OF TRADE - April to December 1940
U-boats and now long-range aircraft had taken a heavy toll of British, Allied and neutral shipping in the Atlantic, mainly in the North Western Approaches to the British Isles. Further afield surface raiders had sunk, captured and disrupted shipping as far away as the Pacific. U-boats had also operated with success off West Africa. In UK waters, attacks by aircraft and E-boats had added to the continuous threat from mines. Over half the ships and 40 percent of tonnage had been lost close to home. Vital as the Battle of the Atlantic may have been, there could be no let up in the equally important battle for the coastal convoy routes once the ships reached UK waters. Only heavily escorted transports would use the Mediterranean until 1943.
The monthly loss rate in these months was twice the first seven months of the war, and each form of attack required a different technical and operational response from the Royal Navy and its Allies. The 1940 patterns of assault against the trade routes continued throughout 1941, although the U-boats would move further out into the Atlantic. By year's end they reached the coasts of America.
Total Losses = 878 British, Allied and neutral ships of 3,441,000 tons (382,000 tons per month)
The sea battle known as the battle of the Atlantic was part of the sea war between the allies and Germany, it was the longest battle fought in the whole war and among the hardest in terms of losses, technical endeavour and resources used.
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Agreed...not only were the pilots resentful they were unsure of the fuel consumption of a Bf 109 and unsure if they could make it back.
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
I'm aware of the significance of the Battle of the Atlantic, though I will admit to not being intimately familiar with the sheer numbers involved, thanks for those details.
This is all off topic from the close escort topic, but yes I should have specifically referenced the Battle of the Atlantic as a whole and more pointedly suggested that directing resources specifically into that rather than attacking British soil directly (with the exception of military targets most useful in aiding in the over-water battle -including coastal air defense).
Now, rather than going further off into possible points on investing in strategic bombers and maritime patrol aircraft or such, there is still a relevant overarching point about bomber escort as well as my tangent on fighter-bombers:
In as far as supporting the anti-shipping efforts, harassing/disrupting RAF coastal fighter groups and preventing them from effectively intercepting anti-shipping operations would be significant. Any heavy tactical bomber efforts aimed at destroying coastal fighter bases (aircraft and infrastructure -and personnel- alike) would still need escort, and that would certainly include any Ju 87 strike forces. (which would be vulnerable during attacks as well as much more vulnerable than level bombers on their return flights after dropping bombs) So you've got tactical bombers with escorts and some of those escorting fighters also making strafing runs, or you potentially have a larger force of fighter-bombers sooner with the ability to run or fight effectively once bombs are dropped. (Bf 110s could at least run in most cases -hypothetical production Fw 187A-1s should also be able to outrun and outclimb Spitfires at lower altitudes)
Ju 87s obviously have the advantage in bombing accuracy and bombload (at least compared to Jabo 109Es) so plenty of potential advantages to escorting them over using fighter-bombers alone.
I'd also forgotten one factor on Naval fighters over their land based counterparts: with the strictly limited capacity for aircraft (and maintenance resources) on carriers, having fewer, more general-purpose/versatile types is more important than with their land-based counterparts. So the retention of bomb carrying capabilities even during the period in the late 30s where fighter-bombers seemed to disappear from interest. This may have been one more area important for the 109T had the kriegsmarine actually gotten its own air force (and aircraft carriers). A navalized Ju 87 was already planned, but using the Bf 109T as the primary carrier-borne fighter/fighter-bomber might make a great deal of sense. And an aircraft carrier force (not to mention coordinated Navy-controlled land-based patrol aircraft) would have made a huge impact on the Atlantic Theater. Considering allocating Jumo 211B/C/D powered versions of the 109T and Fi 167 might have made it a more attractive prospect to LW logistics as well -less sapping of limited DB engine resources while the Jumo engine's poorer altitude performance would be less significant and slight advantage in take-off power might be an advantage in spite of the slightly higher weight and frontal area)
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I still dont know if you are twisting my tail.
What you describe is what happened later with Fw190s. It was possible to raid the south coast at low level intruders, these intruders were the drive behind the Typhoon but what did they achieve? Was any airfield successfully attacked? During the BoB which was a maximum effort the RAF did not desert any airfield, the closest to the sea and most vulnerable was Manston which was only briefly put out of action. The Ju 87 was withdrawn from the BoB as it was IMPOSSIBLE to guarantee cover. The most successful raids in the BoB were when the RAF faced many attacks with other forces, the Ju 87 could then be termed sneak raids. Any assault using only Ju 87s with massive escorts would be a turkey shoot.
What is this about KM or LW carrier borne aircraft? Germany didnt build any carriers? The Graf Spee, Bismark Admiral Scheer and other well armed surface raiders were either sunk or confined to port, an aircraft carrier would be in an even worse position than a pocket battleship, Germany didnt have a fleet of ships to sacrifice to protect them. Germany quickly learned that no matter how well designed or used their ships were, any engagement resulted in a need for repairs and there was no where to have the repairs done apart from in home ports where they were trapped and liable to suffer more damage.
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parsifal
Colonel
The GRAF ZEPPELIN was a deeply flawed design that reflected the near total lack of experience the KM had with this type of ship. Its planned aircraft complement was 40 a/c with just 10 Me109T and 10 Ju87s, the remainder of the complement was to be Fi167s.
In 1942, when plans were dusted off and revived to get the carrier into service, it was planned to place 15 modified Bf 109fs and 25 Ju87s on the carrier.
In both cases, neither of the subtypes (109T and 109F(T)), were designed to carry bombs, and I strongly suspect that in both cases, any attempt to carry things with these aircraft would have been to get fuel capacity increased, as for both types endurance was far too limited to do anything else. Graf Zeppelin had an inefficient catapult system, which kept her 'spot rate" (the rate that she could launch and retrieve aircraft) well down compared to even the British carriers. moreover their prospective launch and handling procedures could never be anything but inefficient. To get a fully escorted strike off the deck meant accepting severe limits on the range that strikes could be made, perhaps 80-100 miles radius at best. Seafires by comparison had radius of action of 175 miles 1944-5 whilst British Hellcats and Corsairs about 225miles. A Fulmar/Albacore combination was about 210miles. It gets down to how fast you can get your aircraft off the deck as much as the endurance of the aircraft itself. The Japanese had the longest legs by far, generally able to strike out to ranges of about 325 miles. The Japanese had two advantages, firstly of course were the in built range benefits their a/c possessed, secondly, less well known was their launch and recovery procedures were very efficient, and this meant they could form up strikes quicker than anybody, and this in turn added to their effective ranges.
Graf Zeppelin would have made some difference, but it was never going to be the game changer so many people (including myself in an earlier life) believe that she could. If she had been ready to follow Bismarck for example, she would be highly unlikely to have been able to avert the damage on the Battleship, because the Swordfish strikes were delivered at night, in conditions that only a Swordfish could tackle. It would have been impossible to get German fighters airborne, just as it was impossible to get Fulmars off the Ark Royals deck in the fce 5 gale blowing cross winds (relative to the base course for Bismarck) in excess of 50 knots. if nothing else, Ark Royal was a better sea boat to anything the GZ could claim and this would make a difference as to if and when she could engage in flying operations.
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
Wouldn't development have improved had more interest and investments been made in aircraft carrier development? (including putting emphasis there in place of Bismark and Tirpitz?) Then again, with the lack of experience and necessary learning curve there, it might have been better to forgo development entirely and focus on land based Naval aircraft operations. (in that case, the likes of the Fw 187 might be more interesting as far as fighters go)
Indeed, increased fuel capacity along with wider track, inward retracting landing gear would likely be required to be really acceptable in carrier operations. (the wing slats should have made for fairly smooth take-off and landing operations, though, with little concern of dropping wings or torque rolling when near stalling) Granted, most of those changes would also be extremely useful for the land-based 109 counterparts.
A purpose-built carrier-borne fighter might be more attractive, though. (still likely using DB or Jumo engines given the power, drag and fuel consumption limits of the BMW and Bramo 9 cylinder radials) A 1200 ps Jumo engined fighter with similar general characteristics to the F2A or F4F would make sense in the early-war timeframe. (that would include the fuel capacity and range of those fighters)
A good catapult system is also less necessary if most/all aircraft have good STOL capabilities.
Was that a similar mechanism to the catapults used to launch aircraft from German battleships?
- Thread starter
- #74
The Ju 87 had to attack from altitude. The most successful 'sneak raids' were carried out by the Bf 110s of Erprobungskommando 210 and one of the regular Kamfgeschwader operating at low level.
I agree that Ju 87s proved impossible to protect. It is often forgotten just how slow they were. Contrary to its own belief the Luftwaffe never established even temporary air superiority over the area in which it attempted to operate the Ju 87 against Britain. The fluidity of Park's defence meant that a squadron of single engine fighters was always likely to turn up when and where it was least expected. The results for the Ju 87 were disastrous. The Ju 87 had the additional disadvantages of pitiful defensive armament and that it was not at all resistant to damage, fuel tanks in particular were very vulnerable.
Cheers
Steve
I agree that Ju 87s proved impossible to protect. It is often forgotten just how slow they were. Contrary to its own belief the Luftwaffe never established even temporary air superiority over the area in which it attempted to operate the Ju 87 against Britain. The fluidity of Park's defence meant that a squadron of single engine fighters was always likely to turn up when and where it was least expected. The results for the Ju 87 were disastrous. The Ju 87 had the additional disadvantages of pitiful defensive armament and that it was not at all resistant to damage, fuel tanks in particular were very vulnerable.
Cheers
Steve
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The Graf Zepplin's compressed air system was only good for about 18 aircraft before it had to recharge it's reservoirs.
If I'm not mistaken, the Kreigsmarine's capitol ships (Bismark, Scharnhorst, Prinz Eugen, etc) used a compressed air system based on the earlier German mailboat catapults of the 20's and early 30's, made by Heinkel.
parsifal
Colonel
It wasn't a lack of enthusiasm that bedevilled the development of GZ, at least not prewar, and certainly not after 1941. In 1939-40 interest waned because the KM misjudged the nature of naval warfare and a distinct lack of interest by Hitler himself. Ive read somewhere that Hitler was advised that the new jet and ro cket technologies then under development would make all carriers obsolete. I don't know whether to laugh or sit back in awe at that. In a sense he was patently incorrect , carriers essentially replaced battleships as the new capital ships. In another sense, hitler was remarkably accurate to the point of being prophesorial. GZ, like all the wartime carriers used a straight deck system, which was unsuitable for jet a/c. Jets needed angled decks and mirror landing systems, things that weren't even invented or thought of in 1940. I suspect DKm wasn't savvy to this kind of minutae though, they just got their appraisal of the importance of carriers totally wrong. Faced with shortages of steel, workers, dockyard capacity, they opted to suspend construction of all major surface warships except for a few here and there and concentrate on the production of Uboats. In retrospect that was the correct one for Germany, but should have been made in 1937, not 1940.
Ah yes, but highly unlikely to ever occur. Aircraft design and procurement for the carrier remained at all times firmly the prerogative of the LW, not the fleet, and the LW was never going to expend resources designing and developing a purpose built carrier design
Ah yes, that's correct, In relation to your second question, the answer is I don't know. A good discussion on the problems of the GZ including its catapult shortcomings can be found here https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/the-german-aircraft-carrier-graf-zeppelin.t6602/
Relevantly the discussion includes the following:
"It's elaborate trolley catapult system would almost certainly be unreliable and difficult to service in actual use"....which I have read elsewhere as well
SpicyJuan11
Senior Airman
But they did with the Me 155. The German's did have next to no experience with Aircraft Carriers, but couldn't they consult with Japan about their designs, etc?
Interesting discussion on the GZ here, A higher priority for the Graf Zeppelin class - Axis History Forum
parsifal
Colonel
They did so extensively, and then chose to basically ignore Japanese experience. There were four GZ planned of which two reached some sort of stage of construction. German studies into carrier design began in 1933, and included investigations into the designs for the Furious as well as the brand new Hiryu class. They were planned after a thorough study of Japanese carrier designs; nevertheless, German naval architects ran into difficulties due to lack of experience in building such vessels, the situational realities of carrier operations in the North Sea and the lack of overall clarity in the ships' mission objectives. This lack of clarity led to features either eliminated from or not included in the carriers of other nations. For example the 8in guns of the Lexingtons and the Akagi types were already gone by the time the Germans decided they needed a significant low angle gunnery capability worked into their design. Its clear evidence of a total misreading of the tactical realities in carrier usage.
Japanese spot rates were good for a number of reasons. They had very simple deck procedures for example. The deck officer would simply dop a white flag and the deck strike would roll down the deck and take off one after the other. Because Japanese a/c were so light, most of the time they could do away with the need for any catapults. There were no batsmen to help guide in the returning flyers, from memory all the flyers got was streamers or smoke across the deck to indicate wind speed and strength.
Much of the GZ design was the Germans "best guess" on what they thought they might need plus a confused hotch potch of different ideas from different nations. The result was a design that failed to capitalise on a winning theme in its design, but retained many archaic and quite bad ideas from allover the shop.
As many nations today are finding out excellence in carrier operations requires experience, and experience requires time. Carrier aviation in the war required those nations wanting carrier fleets to have been working out the issues since 1920. Even a 1930 start in gathering the knowledge was too late. Look mat the French. They had one carrier completed in 1927, but really did not get a lot out of tyhat carrier. Germany was in an even worse situation. One cannot expect miracles. Germany really needed to abandon its dreams of a blue water fleet and build what it built best, Uboats. Another 30-50 Uboats instead of the capital ships was a far better investment they should have elected to follow.
cherry blossom
Senior Airman
- 516
- Apr 23, 2007
The IJN had developed landing lights as described at http://www.ussessexcv9.org/pdfs/Japanese Carrier Operations.pdf. There was a good thread on IJN carrier operations including very good information from Shinpachi Japanese Carrier Operations
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