Goering and close escort

[Elmas]

Hitler, in his insanity, wanted to deploy personally even such a small unit as a platoon on all Fronts ( North Africa excepted, perhaps, but there there was Rommel, probably the only General that Hitler really trusted, until July '44) so, on a hyerarchy ladder, difficult to think that Goering let a wide margin of discretionality to his Commanders about tactics to be employed in the BoB, or at the very least, that he was not fully aware of those employed.

 

[SpicyJuan11]

Hitler, in his insanity, wanted to deploy personally even such a small unit as a platoon on all Fronts ( North Africa excepted, perhaps, but there there was Rommel, probably the only General that Hitler really trusted, until July '44) so, on a hyerarchy ladder, difficult to think that Goering let a wide margin of discretionality to his Commanders about tactics to be employed in the BoB, or at the very least, that he was not fully aware of those employed.

Hitler didn't personally command everything, what he did was meddle. For example, he had little to do with the tactics employed by the escorts, but had everything to do with switching the LW strategy from attacking airfields to cities.

 

[Just Schmidt]

'Stuka' was a generic term for all aircraft designed for dive bombing (Sturzkampfflugzeig) and did at least not originally relate solely to the Ju 87.

When it comes to Udet not insisting on having all fighters meet requirements for dive bombing it shows at least some good sense. Other threads have pointed out the problems of aerodynamically clean airframes building up speed to fast, even with dive brakes. On the other hand said dive brakes adds drag and weight when not used, reducing effectiveness as a fighter. Then consider payload and range, at least for the Bf 109. A bomber aircraft also seem to benefit more from an extra crew member.

Arguably the endearing thing about the dive bomber was that it made the bomber better as bomber, in other words more specialized for its primary task. By delivering the payload accurately enough, one plane (theoretically) could do what othervise would require tens or hundreds. Developing (not adapting) He 177 (or other heavy bombers) capable of dive bombing had it worked could have obviated the need of using hundreds or thousands to achieve 'strategic' results. Much of German ww2 arrogance and over confidense partly arose from suddenly being catapulted into a large general conflict that Germany wasn't (at least yet) prepared for. I doubt that many of the calmer heads (and they were more noumerous in those days) in the last half of the 30'es contemplated being able to spend resourses to build thousands of 4 engined bombers, and having the oil neccessary to operated them.

It's often implied that what germany needed in 1940 was a good and modern, yet sound and conservative 4 engined design with true long range capabilities. Yet it is hard to see how they could have spared enough fuel for such sustained campaigns, or how they could have produced planes enough with same number of engines and same amount of strategical materials. They still have to meet battle field requirements. One could suggest building only one engined battle field aircraft. Still, if 900 engines gave 300 Ju87's and 300 Ju 88's, same amount would give only 600 Ju 87's and 75 Ju 90B/ He 277/ Fw 200D (whatever can be imagined with four jumos).

Much judgement is passed on the priorities of Germany, but basically the strategy to concentrate on the needs of a land war was neccessary. The stunning successes of German arms in 39 throughout 41 was dependent on strong air support, and still better allied tactics and strategy arguably could have defeated (or at the minimum significantly slowed down) even that, at least in theory. The really big blunder was to enter a war with such inadequate resourses at disposal, but then again Hitler didn't expect interference with his 'little war'¨in Poland. Mind you, invading the USSR was a blunder too.

Will we one day see a historical revisionism where Neville Chamberlain and Joseph Stalin are praised as the men who lured Hitler into believing that he could get away with anything? I'm mildly surprised that conspirationalists haven't seized upon that one...

 

[davebender]

I doubt it.

It's not unusual for captured officers to lie to interrogators. Apparently Goering wasn't a very good liar. Otherwise he wouldn't attempt spinning such an obvious tale about the largest German aircraft program. About 15,000 Ju-88s were built and they operated almost everywhere the Luftwaffe had an airfield. By end of WWII there was little the Allies didn't know about the aircraft from being on the receiving end for almost six years.

 

[stona]

Hitler didn't personally command everything, what he did was meddle. For example, he had little to do with the tactics employed by the escorts, but had everything to do with switching the LW strategy from attacking airfields to cities.

Not really. Hitler did lift his ban on bombing London on 30th August (1940). It wasn't until a conference between Goering and the men commanding the campaign against Britain (Sperrle and Kesselring) at the Hague, on 3rd September, that the decision to attack London was finally taken, though a few bombs had already fallen on the city.

Sperrle wanted to continue the attacks against Fighter Command and its infrastructure. He did not believe the loss reports having seen it all before in Spain, and he certainly didn't believe Fighter Command was on its last legs.

Kesselring felt that Fighter Command was on the verge of defeat and feared it would withdraw its aircraft northwards out of range of the Bf 109s. For him attacking London, a target that the British would have to defend, was the only way of drawing up Fighter Command's few remaining resources and destroying them.

Goering sided with Kesselring for essentially political rather than military reasons. His standing within Germany (call me Meyer and all that) and his relationship with Hitler were both compromised by British bombing of targets in Germany and particularly Berlin. Bombing Berlin was a political act and deserved a response in kind. That's why Goering sided with Kesselring and that's why he was largely responsible for the switch in strategy. Kesselring could not have done it without the lifting of Hitler's ban and then Goering's approval. Sperrle did it because he was told to.

Cheers

Steve

 

[GrauGeist]

Most cases of fighters being fitted with dive breaks (or flaps intended to operate as dive breaks, or landing gear used as such) with other countries tended to be fairly successful with varying degrees of actual accuracy and generally little detriment to fighter performance. (again, structural requirements would be rather similar to existing fighter G loads, especially with the 12 G -ultimate load- requirement for American fighters)

Adapting level bombers to that role is another matter entirely, that and fighters developed with relatively light maximum G loads in mind.

And that's what I was referring to: medium bombers, light bombers, heavy fighters.

Like I mentioned, the Ju88 program suffered a delay when Udet insisted on it being dive-bomb capable.

The Ar240 development was set back when it was required to be dive-bomb capable. The Me210 had this requirement (which the Me410 seems to have escaped). Even the Fw197 had to go through dive-bombing capabilities.

I know that not all multi-engine aircraft came under the RLM's dive-bombing philosophy, but the ones that did, it caused unnecessary delays in the airframe's development

 

[pbehn]

I dont know what the fuss was about, if the target was London the the Bf 109 could not escort the bombers there and back no matter where they were stationed. On the 15th September two raids of 25 bombers with 150 S/E escorts followed by 114 bombers with 340 S/E fighters both resulted in the bombers being without escorts over London.

 

[fastmongrel]

I have never understood all the fuss about bombing London from a political point of view. The LW and the RAF had been bombing each others port cities for weeks but no one gave a damn. Suddenly bomb the capital and its all up in arms perhaps all those dead people in Portsmouth, Hamburg, Plymouth and Bremen didnt count.

 

[kool kitty89]

Remember Spaatz asked him a probably set up question but very leading question "was the Ju 88 designed for the Battle of Britain". Remember he was being charged with "waging aggressive war" so admitting would be used by the prosecution to prove premeditation. The Ju 88 was a general purpose warplane with no specific target or nation in mind. Goering was very intelligent and would have understood that. Calling it a civil aircraft avoided all of that complexity.

The same could be said for the Do 17 (or 215), and in many ways the Ju 88 was a more modern successor to the Do 17. (particularly the earlier, lighter, more streamlined prototypes)

On the topic of the Ju 88 though, one thing that hasn't come up in previous discussions is that the early protoypes likely would have been good to develop into high speed unarmed recon airctaft apart from the added bomber versions' requirements (a lot more than just dive bombing compromised the latter, so a dedicated high speed long range recon/patrol variant might be more easily feasible).

And that's what I was referring to: medium bombers, light bombers, heavy fighters.

Like I mentioned, the Ju88 program suffered a delay when Udet insisted on it being dive-bomb capable.

The Ar240 development was set back when it was required to be dive-bomb capable. The Me210 had this requirement (which the Me410 seems to have escaped). Even the Fw197 had to go through dive-bombing capabilities.

I know that not all multi-engine aircraft came under the RLM's dive-bombing philosophy, but the ones that did, it caused unnecessary delays in the airframe's development

Making it a definite requirement was a problem, and making it a desired feature on aircraft not otherwise required to be stressed for high G loads was also a problem, but at least testing it as a desirable feature on fighter aircraft already intended to pull high Gs should have minimized R&D overhead and basic airframe modifications.

Requiring vertical 90 degree (or nearly) dives was also extreme ... again, making it desirable but not required would make more sense especially if that compromise allowed for an otherwise more capable aircraft.

If adding dive breaks to an already high G load capable aircraft worked well then fine, if it was problematic than consider any reworks there relatively low priority and something to be applied after more fundamental refinements were accomplished if at all. (thus you might have some designs gaining favor for being naturally better suited to dive bombing and that as one more consideration for merits over others -more complicated when said 'others' are more competitive in other attributes)

As above, I'd think the Fw 187 would adapt better to the fighter-bomber and dive bombing role than the Ar 240 due to its lighter weight relative to drag/wing area and potential added drag had breaks been fitted. (with the Ar 240 you had a much heavier aircraft that would accelerate much more quickly and need larger and mechanically stronger -heavier- dive breaks to slow it down sufficiently while the high wing loading would make it more difficult to pull out quickly without stalling even if it could withstand high Gs)

The Bf 109's slats should have been good for medium speed high-G pull-outs and also avoid the elevator heavy high speed pullout issues. (bombing dive strikes tending to be limited to the 250 mph range) Having good power to weight ratio at low altitude to accelerate away from the relatively slow combat speeds would also be very useful. (something the A-36 mustang had a decent advantage with below 5,000 ft as well)



Given the amount of figher-bomber work the P-40 and Hurricane ended up doing, they probably should have at least been tested with dive breaks to better facilitate that role. (the P-38 and P-47 both eventually got dive recovery flaps that potentially could be used as drag-breaks as well -deploying combat maneuvering flaps would probably also help with both drag and pull-out ability, though they'd add to 'drift' in the vertical when lining up with a target -you'd really need spoiler type dive breaks to mitigate that)

When it comes to Udet not insisting on having all fighters meet requirements for dive bombing it shows at least some good sense. Other threads have pointed out the problems of aerodynamically clean airframes building up speed to fast, even with dive brakes. On the other hand said dive brakes adds drag and weight when not used, reducing effectiveness as a fighter. Then consider payload and range, at least for the Bf 109. A bomber aircraft also seem to benefit more from an extra crew member.

Adding dive bombing to the Zerstörer requirements might have made more sense than adding it to the Schnellbomber. Dive bombing of SOME sort really should have been possible on most WWII fighters already designed for high G stability. The Bf 110's greater drag, larger wing area, and defensive armament might have made it more appealing in that context than the Fw 187 (the Ar 240 would be a bit worse there, actually given its greater weight and high wing loading -the lighter Fw 187 would probably be easier to adapt to a dive bomber of some sort than what the Ar 240 went through). If nothing else, focusing on the Bf 110 as a replacement for the Ju 87 might have been somewhat worthwhile and seems more sensible than trying to make the Ju 88 a dive bomber or heavy fighter-bomber.

The BF 109T with dive breaks and increased fuel capacity and bomb rack would probably have made a fair replacement for the Stuka in the shorter range tactical context as well. (larger wing, higher drag than the 109E -let alone F- and the longer span LE slats improving lift and stall characteristics -good for heavier take-off loads) Throw in wider track landing gear on later models and you might have a fighter-bomber more competitive with the 190 but perhaps a bit cheaper.

Now, making it a definite requirement for all fighters would have been more flawed, but making it a desired feature where practical would be more the point. (and also that adapting fighters to fighter-bomber+dive bomber capabilities requires far fewer modifications than adapting level bombers or recon aircraft not otherwise intended to be capable of high G maneuvers)

 

[pbehn]

I take Goerings ramblings after capture with a pinch of salt. He was a drug addict facing execution. History shows he had little grasp of what was going on when it was going on so why try to make sense of his drug affected memories. Germany was not allowed military aircraft under the Versailles treaty so all designs were mail planes sport planes or passenger planes. He realised that Germany had some sort of problem when escorts could reach Hanover and then Berlin. Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, North Africa, Italy, Normandy landings, the Atlantic war and many other reverses seem to have escaped his attention.

 

[tyrodtom]

Those interviews are just a few months after Goering surrendered, at first he evidently thought he was going to be treated as the noble emissary of a defeated enemy. The Allies, with the overrun concentration camps still fresh on their minds, weren't too inclined to see nobility in any of the 3rd Reich's surviving leaders.

Goering wasn't sent to the prison near Nuremberg till October, a few months later.

So these interviews are probably while Goering is still withdrawing from his drugs, but before he knew he was going to be on trail for his life.

 

[Elmas]

Hitler didn't personally command everything, what he did was meddle.

And for this very reason he wanted to be informed of the tiniest technical details.

For example, he had little to do with the tactics employed by the escorts, but had everything to do with switching the LW strategy from attacking airfields to cities.

About Luftwaffe tactics, I'm not speaking of Hitler, I'm speaking of Goering. Luftwaffe tactics, certainly for the first part of the war were, if not imposed or suggested, certainly supervised and approved by Reichmarschall.

 

[stona]

I dont know what the fuss was about, if the target was London the the Bf 109 could not escort the bombers there and back no matter where they were stationed. On the 15th September two raids of 25 bombers with 150 S/E escorts followed by 114 bombers with 340 S/E fighters both resulted in the bombers being without escorts over London.

Fighter Command didn't intercept over London. In response to an invitation to that 'infamous conference' concerning the use of wing formations Park wrote to Stevenson at the Air Ministry asking him to circulate to the participants some of his instruction for the use of two or three squadrons at a time within 11 Group and the results of his months of experience trying to engage the Luftwaffe formations "BEFORE THE BOMBER RAIDS HAVE REACHED VITAL OBJECTIVES." Upper case in the original, I'm not shouting.

Bf 109s could operate over London, albeit for a limited time. The reason those bombers reached London unescorted is because the formations, including escorts, were typically initially engaged at a line running east-west from Dover to East Grinstead and then harried by successive squadrons all the way to London (and then back). The escorts had been stripped away before the bombers got to London by Fighter Command, not by a lack of endurance.

Kesselring was a very clever commander, as a look at Luftwaffe operations on just about any day of the battle will reveal, but he was out-generalled by Park (and Dowding). Park would do for Kesselring again in the future.

Kesselring's idea was to force Fighter Command to come up in defence of London where it could be destroyed by the Luftwaffe's fighters. He had realised that, unlike previous campaigns, he was not catching British fighters on the ground. It didn't work because the Luftwaffe never came close to achieving the kill to loss ratio it needed.

Edit: The two raids to which you refer were confronted by large numbers of RAF fighters. The first raid comprised 25 bombers, 21 Jabos and 150 fighters. It was engaged by 254 RAF fighters. The second raid comprised 114 bombers, 20 zerstorer and 340 fighters. It was engaged by 276 RAF fighters. Those numbers are the reason that the bombers were stripped of their escorts.

The first raid was really a bait raid and it is a tribute to the leader of KG 76 that any of the bombers survived at all. They were subjected to numerous attacks including a head on attack from 253 and 501 Squadrons which failed to break their formation. In the end only 15 Dorniers remained in formation, 6 of which were damaged. 6 were shot down, 4 made it back alone. 12 Bf 109s were also shot down. 18 losses equalled 12.5% of the attacking force. The RAF pilots claimed 81

On the second raid the Luftwaffe lost 35 aircraft (the British claimed 104) of which 11 were Bf 109s and 3 Bf 110s.

Cheers

Steve

 

[bobbysocks]

isn't there copies of the original orders for the missions? thought I saw somewhere there was an archive with as many of the original mission details....target, course, number of ac, etc..

 

[pbehn]

As Njakos excellent thread pointed out Goering issued seem to apply only to the escort of Ju87 Stukas which had suffered heavy losses Bungays "The most dangerous enemy" states that Goering had a meeting of his commanders on the 19 to discuss the losses of the 15th.

Prior to the BoB the Lw fighters were not bomber escorts, they operaated as hunters trying to catch the opposition on the ground or bouncing them when they tried to oppose attacks.


After several screw ups with coordination of attacks the bombers were instructed to "pick up" their escorts at their fields. This meant that the escorts had to fly the whole mission in the company of the bombers. To maintain station the Bf109s had to fly with flaps down or circle/zig zag. A Bf109 could fly to London and fight over london but it couldnt fly from France to London maintaining station with a fleet of bombers of various types flying into a head wind. When Park realised what the German plan was he could position squadrons to the east of the attacking stream "up sun" for a morning raid at 27,000ft turning the LW hunters into the hunted. It was an interesting question posed by Stona, I think the issue was of the fighters being used as escorts which is automatically "being tied". The Bf 109 was never designed for such a role, it couldnt engage the RAF escorting bombers and reach London. Goering could rage as much as he liked but what did he want if the escorts stayed with the bombers he may prevent 10 or 20 bombers being shot down and have 100 pilots and planes ditched in the channel.

 

[pbehn]

On the second raid the Luftwaffe lost 35 aircraft (the British claimed 104) of which 11 were Bf 109s and 3 Bf 110s.

Cheers

Steve

Steve, I only quote part of your reply to acknowledge I am replying to you. We are singing from the same sheet. I was only pointing out that the Bf109 as it was in 1940 could not escort a stream of bombers from France to London especially in the face of 11 group and Parks generalship.

The LW were doing what the USAF did later, sending a fleet of bombers attacking a target that must be defended as "bait" to deliver a hammer blow to RAF fighters. Unfortunately things worked not as planned, in both cases the bomber losses despite massive initial escort strength were unsustainable. Hitler ordered the destruction of the RAF and London but Goering couldnt deliver.

 

[kool kitty89]

Steve, I only quote part of your reply to acknowledge I am replying to you. We are singing from the same sheet. I was only pointing out that the Bf109 as it was in 1940 could not escort a stream of bombers from France to London especially in the face of 11 group and Parks generalship.

The LW were doing what the USAF did later, sending a fleet of bombers attacking a target that must be defended as "bait" to deliver a hammer blow to RAF fighters. Unfortunately things worked not as planned, in both cases the bomber losses despite massive initial escort strength were unsustainable. Hitler ordered the destruction of the RAF and London but Goering couldnt deliver.

Using those same tactics, but continuing to target fighter command (particularly 11 group) directly in the more accessible southern and coastal locations seems like it would have been more sensible, that and perhaps attempting another series of concentrated strikes at chain home. (pushing further north put the LW at a greater disadvantage and redistributed stresses among a larger array of RAF fighter groups among other things)

 

[Koopernic]

Steve, I only quote part of your reply to acknowledge I am replying to you. We are singing from the same sheet. I was only pointing out that the Bf109 as it was in 1940 could not escort a stream of bombers from France to London especially in the face of 11 group and Parks generalship.

The LW were doing what the USAF did later, sending a fleet of bombers attacking a target that must be defended as "bait" to deliver a hammer blow to RAF fighters. Unfortunately things worked not as planned, in both cases the bomber losses despite massive initial escort strength were unsustainable. Hitler ordered the destruction of the RAF and London but Goering couldnt deliver.

Luftwaffe daylight attacks were on military/industrial targets within London. Docks, oil storage, factories, electricity distribution etc. They weren't carpet bombing.

 

[kool kitty89]

The USAAF daylight bombing raids weren't carpet bombing either.

 

[pbehn]

Luftwaffe daylight attacks were on military/industrial targets within London. Docks, oil storage, factories, electricity distribution etc. They weren't carpet bombing.

Whether the target is an oil tank or a housing estate makes no difference to the range of the bombers escort. I was referring to London as a geographic location.