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It is very clearly lopsided in the comment section on the video.Greg's audience would disagree.
If I may add my interpretation of Greg's argument:I'd summarize the "debate" thusly (with profuse apologies to all concerned).
Greg: P-47s had the range to cover 1943 bombing missions, proven by the fact that they did similar missions later in the war.
They are absolutely convinced they've uncovered the last great WW2 conspiracy.It is very clearly lopsided in the comment section on the video.
I get the impression that most of the detractors in the comments simply didn't understanddrgondog 's counter points. I generally enjoy Greg's video's, but his fan base seems to be clouded with some sort of hero worship
I actually don't think he has much of a point regarding doctrinal issues causing delay.I'd summarize the "debate" thusly (with profuse apologies to all concerned).
Greg: P-47s had the range to cover 1943 bombing missions, proven by the fact that they did similar missions later in the war.
Bill: In 1943, combat drop tanks weren't available, the racks hadn't been manufactured, the aircraft wasn't plumbed for it, and internal fuel was limited (critical because: no matter how far you go on drop tanks, you have to fight and return on internal fuel only). Later missions were in different conditions and prove little.
Greg: but they could've fixed all those problems except for the Bomber Mafia.
Rinse and repeat.
I'd say if Greg was trying to prove a conspiracy theory, it was a hard miss. But he does have a point, in that doctrinal belief in self-protecting bombers delayed recognition of the requirement of long-range escorts, and that it could've been fixed earlier with proper emphasis. But the idea they could fix it in '43 after earlier inaction ignores some fairly basic logistic realities. I learned a few things about development of drop tanks and accessories, but I wish the terms of the debate were better laid out to reduce the talking past each other. Technical issues exacerbated the problem.
The other thing that stood out was that Greg and Andrew had much more experience on the audiovisual side, and were much more focused on presentation . . . Bill was more focused on history.
The emotional rush (for the Greg fans) of "uncovering" a new conspiracy and being a part of that uncovering is way too satisfying to accept anything less satisfying than that.I actually don't think he has much of a point regarding doctrinal issues causing delay.
His point here exists in a vacuum where he doesn't take into account the prewar or early war situation at all. The Air Force didn't have enough bombers, much less fighters in the pre war period. The early war period is much the same as the United States is building out its military.
The United States in from 1939 to 1943 is trying to build up it's capacity and then fight a war in multiple theatres. Even if we confine the demands of industry to just the army Air force, there are many things that had to get done before drop tanks would even be useful. There were not enough bombers for major penetration raids and the depth of the raids was in many ways a function of the 8th getting bigger.
This is a big part of Greg's muddled narrative. In early 42 and most of 1943 the raids the 8th was doing were not major raids into Germany. Most of these missions were in fact escorted. Schweinfurt and Regensburg occured very shortly after the 8th had built up enough bombers to start attempting deeper raids. And what was the reaction? Almost immediate pausing of the campaign and revaluation of the situation.
Moreover, his point about P38s is the same kind of thing. P38s were pulled from the 8th to go to torch. The fact that they had to pulled from the 8th in the first place sort of puts the lie to the idea that the leadership was opposed to escorts. What this shows is that there were other priorities.
On top of that, what is it P38s were doing in Africa? Lots of bomber escort in fact, just of the local operations rather than into Germany.
And various fighters were used for escort obviously in England throughout 1942 and 43.
But Greg presumes that any shortfall was the result do nefarious buffoonery on the part of the leadership. Despite, as Bill pointed out, that all the specific evidence of leaderships decisions during the war is to the contrary.
Greg rather clearly has a (willful?) misunderstanding of drop tanks vs ferry tanks. Comparing modern jet airliners (with low volatility fuel internal tanks with boost pumps) to WWII drop tanks with high octane gasoline made me wonder if he were serious.If I may add my interpretation of Greg's argument:
-that a proven drop tank was available and being used in the Pacific and was not used by the 8th AF because the bomber mafia blocked it.
-the bomber mafia controlled the the AF but somehow didn't control the 5th AF under Kenney
-P-38s that could've flown escort in 1943 were sent to Africa
Me:
-Somehow the mafia hated Kenney so much he became the first head of SAC post war.
-The use of Trent Telenko from ChicagoBoyz as his inspiration for the original P-47 range/conspiracy video is a problem.
The P-38 just wasn't suited for European conditions for the following reasons:
• The twin booms made it easily recognizable for enemy fighters.
• Cockpit heating was poor resulting in extremely cold cockpits.
• The aircraft was restricted in performing dives.
• Engine failures were common and fire prone.
• The roll rate was poor.
Due to the high rate of engine failures, Jimmy Doolittle, then commander of the 8th Air Force, decided to pull the P-38 out of Europe. After P-51 Mustangs replaced the Lightning, the kill ratio went from 1.5: 1 to 7:1.
Yes. His argument is from a sky high overall view and doesn't break down what was going on with the 8th AF on say a month to month basis from Aug '42 to Aug '43.This is a big part of Greg's muddled narrative. In early 42 and most of 1943 the raids the 8th was doing were not major raids into Germany. Most of these missions were in fact escorted. Schweinfurt and Regensburg occured very shortly after the 8th had built up enough bombers to start attempting deeper raids. And what was the reaction? Almost immediate pausing of the campaign and revaluation of the situation.
That's all true, but Douhet was touting bombers on deep penetration raids in 1921 and there's no doubt his proponents were looking forward to something similar. Moreover, the bomber "combat box" formation predated the war and was a clear indication of the belief that unescorted bomber raids were feasible . . . until experience proved the were not. To what degree this failure of imagination delayed subsequent long range fighter development seems a reasonable argument.The United States in from 1939 to 1943 is trying to build up it's capacity and then fight a war in multiple theatres. Even if we confine the demands of industry to just the army Air force, there are many things that had to get done before drop tanks would even be useful. There were not enough bombers for major penetration raids and the depth of the raids was in many ways a function of the 8th getting bigger.
I thought the combat box was developed during the war as opposed to bomber streams.combat box" formation predated the war and was a clear indication of the belief that unescorted bomber raids were feasible . . . until experience proved the were not. To what degree this failure of imagination delayed subsequent long range fighter development seems a reasonable argument.
I think strategic bombing and lack of escorts are separate things. Douhet and the USAAF are also different things.That's all true, but Douhet was touting bombers on deep penetration raids in 1921 and there's no doubt his proponents were looking forward to something similar. Moreover, the bomber "combat box" formation predated the war and was a clear indication of the belief that unescorted bomber raids were feasible . . . until experience proved the were not. To what degree this failure of imagination delayed subsequent long range fighter development seems a reasonable argument.
Yeah and you can also see the in Greg in how gleefully managed to ramrod the Operation Northwoods into this.The emotional rush (for the Greg fans) of "uncovering" a new conspiracy and being a part of that uncovering is way too satisfying to accept anything less satisfying than that.
I was certain the concept and basic formation predated the war (or at least the US involvement), but am having a very difficult time substantiating it. It's remarkably difficult to find tactical manuals from the beginning of the war. Closest I can find is a rudimentary 4 plane box formation drawing from 1942 (which doesn't help all that much, and might not even be pre war):I thought the combat box was developed during the war as opposed to bomber streams.
He did a video on Boyd. I questioned Boyd in the comments and Greg leapt to his defenseAnd there his obvious infatuation with the buffoonery of John Boyd and the reformers.
Yes not easy at all. The combat box basic formation was the 3 plane Vic. Masters of the Air shows it well,It's remarkably difficult to find tactical manuals from the beginning of the war.
Anyone else ever see any other images or info on this tank in the above image? I cannot find any info on this, despite Greg claiming he has 4 documents on this.
I personally think this tank doesn't exist or never made it through development. Even if it does exist, we have no evidence it was pressurized, or otherwise worked correctly. It hardly looks like it would jettison.
Personally I think this is a error in artistic rendition or something in this manual.
Well what I am trying to rule out is the existence of a second tank. I've only ever seen the ferry tank.That's a snippet from the manual for the P-47C, D and G.
The belly tank artistic rendition in the 3-view is indeed faulty - the belly tank was sorta slipper tank as used on the Spitfires, if more complicated in making due to the all-curved sides.