Hardest plane to take down in WW2?

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I wouldnt use Hartman as a benchmark for a typical pilot...
Just cause we was able to sneak in there and surgically remove the oil cooler does not mean most pilots could.

Two engines = more to break, more critical points ... and with one engine the mission is over anyway. The pilot may have a greater chance of surviving but the thread is about "taking down."

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Il-2 was overrated; Hartmann scored most of his kills on Il-2's.

No by far the majority of his kills were fighters, and we're talking 85-90% here.

Hartmann shot down 15 IL-2's in total.
 
Another subjective question, entirely dependent on what theater we're talking about, and during what period in the war.

The Wildcat was amazingly tough for the period in which it served...every bit as resilient to a Zero as a P47 was to 109. An Oscar would be hard pressed to take down a Hellcat barring a lucky shot to the cockpit or control surfaces.

Probably the last thing you wanted to be in WWII was a Zeke trying to take down a B17.
 
Another subjective question, entirely dependent on what theater we're talking about, and during what period in the war.

Probably the last thing you wanted to be in WWII was a Zeke trying to take down a B17.
It's an example of subjective. The Japanese Navy was impressed with the B-17, but Zeroes inflicted heavy losses on B-17's early in 1941-42 on many occasions. These weren't battles on the scale of ETO, smaller formations on both sides. And B-17's did often resist immediate destruction, so that Zero claims against them were more conservative than their other claims, sometimes even underclaims, they didn't see the crashes. But a lot of those planes didn't make it back or were not repairable under the prevailing conditions. On the other side of the coin B-17 claims against attacking Japanese fighters in 1941-42 were grossly overstated, apparently worse than ETO, which was pretty overstated but more understandable given the larger formations (in which more duplication of claims was natural).

The particular B-17's involved were, early on in the Philippines, mainly B-17D's (or C's converted to D's) which were somewhat easier to attack (for example approaching from directly behind) and up to mid 1942 mostly early B-17E's with the fairly useless remote controlled belly turret. Still, Zeroes were very far from helpless against B-17's.

Joe
 
On the subject of vulnerability of F6F versus F4U. F6F delivered 6503 tons of bombs in WW2 and lost 553 AC to triple A. The F4U delivered 15,621 tons of bombs in WW2 and lost 349 AC to triple A. So the F4U delivered almost 3 times as many bombs and had a little more than half as many losses. Which one would you rather fly on an air to ground mission?
 
Renrich, let's stick to the statistics at hand as they are far more of an apples to apples comparison of the singular and limited issue of survivability between the Hellcat and Corsair under controlled circumstances. We have a huge data pool, same period, both from same carriers, both having suffered AA hits. (Prior to 1945 F4U's hardly operated from carriers so their losses are not comparable to those suffered solely in carrier operations. Also, as Joe B pointed out on another forum, there was more scope to nurse a damaged landbased plane back to base considering the greater risks of a carrier landing in a damaged plane. Further, as JoeB pointed out, the Hellcat did not fly along with the Corsair in Korea but the Skyraider did and the oil cooler vulnerability of the Corsair showed up prominently there too.

41% of carrier based F4U's actually hit by AA fire became losses versus 26% of carrier based F6F's that were actually hit by AA fire in 1945. (source "Naval Aviation Combat Statistics"). That's more than a 50% greater chance of becoming a loss under circumstances of actual AA fire hits. Moreover, you could argue that the Hellcat had a greater chance of getting shot to Hell to begin with because it was slower and thus an easier target.

The US Navy apparently thought it worthwhile to comment on the data and the proper conclusions to be drawn as they related to the Corsair and Hellcat with respect to survivability. From the report itself at page 58:

Thus comparisons are valid between the carrier F6F and F4U totals because they generally operated from the same ships during the same periods.
...
Certain tentative conclusions may be reached from these two tables:

(a) The F6F was slightly superior to the F4U in combat, apparently chiefly because of its greater ability to survive damage.


You will note that it was the United States Navy, as opposed to several individuals on the web regurgitating the same thing they heard someone else and each other say, that said that the Hellcat had a greater ability to survive damage. That assessment was not based on anecdotal accounts but from a huge amount of data collected according to objective criteria.

(I remember when you were more than willing to argue an unsubstantiated assertion that the USAAF had admitted that the Corsair could take more punishment than the Thunderbolt. Surely you aren't going to now argue with the US Navy's verifiable declaration concerning the Hellcat and Corsair.)

Moreover, the Navy declared that the Hellcat was superior in combat to the Corsair in the valid apples to apples comparison (see the data limited to carrier operations in 1945). Now the Corsair could smoke the Hellcat in just about every combat maneuver, climb, speed and roll. And yet still, the Hellcat was adjudged superior in combat. How can that be?

Apparently, chiefly because the Corsair had more than a 50% greater chance of becoming a catastrophic loss under circumstances where actual AA fire was suffered.

Again, the culprit appears to be the oil cooler. The other R-2800 powered fighters do not have these interesting tidbits inserted into the pilots manuals.

The Pilots Flight Operating Instructions for the F4U-4 (October 1944 T.O. No. AN-01-45HB1) warned that there was only enough oil for a maximum of ten seconds of inverted flight. Also, where there was damage to an oil cooler with resulting loss of oil, neither the oil pressure gauge nor the oil temperature gauge would register the change in pressure or temperature until all of the oil was out of the system. (See Manual at page 10) Pilots were warned during combat to check the oil coolers and trailing edges of the wings often for damage that could prove catastrophic.

I have checked the pilots manuals for the P-47 and Hellcat and no such caveats or warnings are present. Nor have I ever heard of any noteworthy vulnerability of the oil cooling systems for either.

As JoeB has pointed out, the oil cooler vulnerability issue is further supported by reports from those who fought in Korea. I have been reading various references to the vulnerability of the oil coolers in Corsairs elsewhere on the web (as I am sure you have) as well.
 
Besides general difference in carrier and land ops, another specific operational historical reason the overall bomb tonnage v loss comparison for F4U and F6F is invalid is this: Marine F4U units spent most of 1944 and part of 1945 as mainly ground attack planes pounding bypassed Japanese garrisons in Solomons and Central Pacific where the defenders couldn't even afford to fire a lot of AA; defending fighters were long gone with exception of an occasional few re-built from wreck(s). They largely just hunkered down.

Marine F4U sdns began to be deployed on carriers starting in January 1945 for two main reasons: to quickly boost fighter CV complements against the Kamikaze threat, and realization that the bombing of now very far bypassed garrisons was being overdone to the point of wasting resources. Then of course some USN F4U sdns also flew from carriers as 1945 went on. Only in that year could the two types could really be compared in the same missions v same opposition, especially v AA. There'd been a bit of side by side against serious fighter opposition earlier in the Solomons (land based F6F's and F4U's).

Joe
 
Brassey's Air Combat Reader

The author, Walter Boyne, mentions that with respect to operations in Korea, the oil cooler in the Corsair was vulnerable to even small arms fire.

"The airplanes would be hit by nothing more serious than a singe rifle bullet, and then their engines would seize when all the engine oil leaked from the oil cooler. They would then be forced to land behind enemy lines minutes after being hit. ... We were losing many F4U pilots and hoped they were being captured, not killed out of hand" (Page 174)

BTW - those "rifle bullets" that were bringing down Corsairs were 7.62 x 39 and not the 8 x 57 rifle rounds that the Germans used in WWII (for reference sake). The 7.62 x 39 has about 65% of the energy of the German rifle round used in WWII. In other words, Corsairs appear to have been brought down with little more than rocks thrown by third world savages. (OK ... that was an exaggeration but I thought it sounded funny)

To bring the point home though, the rifle rounds used by the Japanese in WWII, 7.7 x 58, were significantly more powerful than the 7.62 x 39 as well.
 


Okay, Jank, I like you; you have a sense of humour (number one in my book; a sense of humour loosely corelates to your intelligence level; i.e.: Robin Williams is a genius).

Anyway, not to nit-pick, but the German round was actually 7.92mm, not 8mm. In any case, your argument is valid.
 
Well not to nitpick back but the cartridge is in fact called the 8 x 57.

The disparity between what cartridges are called and what they actually measure is a very common phenomenon. For instance, a .270 Winchester is actually .277, a .303 British is actually .311, the .380 Auto is actually .355, the .44 Magnum is actually .429, the .38 Special is actually .357 etc.
 
Hi Jank,

>We have a huge data pool, same period, both from same carriers, both having suffered AA hits. (Prior to 1945 F4U's hardly operated from carriers so their losses are not comparable to those suffered solely in carrier operations.

Hm, I'm getting confused here - could you please point me to the relevant table in the NASC? I have just found "Table 17 - Navy Fighters", and it lists just 121 combat sorties for 1945 with just 2 losses to A/A, which would be too small a sample to allow reliable conclusions ... ah, I see - you're probably using "Table 29. Anti-aircraft loss and damage"?

>Moreover, you could argue that the Hellcat had a greater chance of getting shot to Hell to begin with because it was slower and thus an easier target.

Surprisingly, there is hardly any difference. If you compare the 1945 data, you can see that 17.9% of the Hellcats attacking A/A-defending targets were hit, and 17.7% of the attacking F4Us. (I'd have expected the F4U to be better, too.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 

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