Hawker Hurricane Mk. IIB vs. Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat (1 Viewer)

[JoeB]

HoHun,

I agree with you 100% on your take on tactics. It was mentioned earlier in this thread that the Hurricane did much better vs the Japanese planes in 1943 and onwards. The Hurris were the same, but the Oscars were all type II and type III, much better planes, (type III 360 mph) so the difference in results has to be tactics.

Again as long as 'tactics' isn't a catchall to explain everything that simple paper comparisons, or theoretical simplified calcs, or a few anecdotes, won't explain. Is tactics a factor?, sure, but I think it's repeatedly used as such a catchall.

On Hurricane's later performance v Type 1, it's also 'been stated on this thread' that it didn't do so badly v the Type 1 in 1942 which is just wrong. In 1943 the Allies in Burma had very strong numerical advantage over the Japanese (more than the Japanese had had in '42), and a lot of the Allied strength was other types (eg of the US 10th AF). And still Hurricanes did not do as well in '43 in Burma as F4F's had in '42, against Zeroes (Hurricanes met Zeroes one more time in Burma in '43 and got clocked, again). See the third volume of "Bloody Shambles" "Air War for Burma". How about rolling forward to the F4F-4's record in 1943 in the Solomons when it got to fly alongside better Allied types in superior numbers? (was better) or the improved but not totally different FM-2 in '44-45 (overwhelming: hardly any were shot down by Japanese fighters, true record is not possible to calculate comprehensively but ratio of credits to air combat losses was better than that of the F6F or F4U in the same period) so rolling forward the comparison is just a tangent, IMO, lots of other factors come in, not just 'tactics'.

Re: P-40's the AVG's eventually did well in '42, though mainly against Type 97's. Against actual Zeroes (which AVG never met) by mid-late '42 some (RAAF and USAAF) P-40 units were doing around 1:2, much better than the 1:5 the Hurricane had recorded v Type 1's and Zeroes in '42, but very early on (Philippines and Dutch East Indies) did almost as badly as Hurricanes. And no consistent actual P-40 results in 1942 were as good as the F4F's results. Anyway P-40 is another tangent IMO like rolling the comparison forward.

And again, old ground, but please read the references, F4F's did not fly specific anti-Zero tactics much in 1942. The Beam Defense Manuever (Thach Weave) was used by Thach's division at Midway but didn't become standard until 1943. In some periods of the Guadalcanal fighting USMC F4F's engaged Zeroes in dogfights on purpose (after they felt they were facing enemy units of reduced quality, though this isn't obvious in changes in OOB of the actual JNAF units they were facing AFAIK, anyway they thought so, did so, and did alright). And in general ca. late 1942 the *Zeroes'* preferred tactic v the F4F was noted by the USN as fast diving firing passes with quick breakaway.

That observation reflected the JNAF lesson instituted between the Chinese fighting and Pac War, of more emphasis on close coordination among 3 planes sections ('shotai'), without radio, but with enough training and practice for the 'shotai' members to anticipate one another's actions in mainly hit and run firing passes. There was a conscious move away from the previous individual aerobatic tactics, though obviously from Allied accounts there was a some reversion to those in the heat of combat. Like the escape manuever 'hineri-komi' where a Zero would sideslip out of a loop at the top to reverse position on a plane on its tail.

So if we look at tactics as an actual factual topic, not a catchall, it gets pretty complicated. Which form of JNAF tactics were used in particular combats? How about JAAF tactics? Lots of unknowns, all on top of documented variation in F4F tactics.

So '*has to be*' tactics, after exhausting IMHO a pretty short list of other factors (speed in standard sources, simplified theoretical turn calcs etc.) is an unsatisfying analysis, with all due respect. In short I just don't see the data with which to exactly and certainly describe why the F4F had a much better combat record against Japanese fighters than the Hurricane did in 1942, which is one certain fact. Tactics is probably part of the explanation, more subtle factors of the plane itself in favor of the F4F as fighter combat machine v a plane like the Zero, were likely another factor IMO. I don't see the data to move either opinion to fact.

Joe

 

[slaterat]

It really comes down to numbers, and the wildcat never faced the overwhelming numbers the Hurricanes did. The wildcats operations against the zero were primarily in carrier vs carrier actions where the numbers were much more closely matched.

Oh and my 3 volumes of "Bloody Shambles" arrived yesterday. Great books a real must have for anyone interested in this theater. I've just started reading them and it confirms that time and time again small numbers of Hurricanes were deployed and wasted against far superior numbers, almost always taking off late and still climbing to the fight when combat occurred. The best climbing speed of a Hurricane is between 150 and 160 mph doesn't sound much fun with Oscars and Zeros coming down at you at 300+ mph.

ATropicalized Hurricane IIb would do 335 mph with an initial climbrate of 2,850 ft /min. It has a full rear sheet of armour protecting the pilot from his feet to the top of his head. Frontal armour is provided too as well as self sealing fuel and oil tanks/lines and an armoured windscreen.The Hurricane also used a substanial amount of tubular and heat treated steel in its construction making it one of the toughest fighters of the war. It was also very easy too repair and fly.

In a dive the Hurricane's airframe can take everything you can give it. RAF pilots routinely dived them past 450 mph. Terrence Kelly claims to have taken his Hurricane to 590 mph wrapping his speedo around the clock and up to 300mph again. The Japanese admit the Hurricane could dive far faster than a KI 43.

Accounts by pilots indicate that a Zero ,Oscar or Nate could out flat turn a Hurricane. However a climbing turn would seem to favor the Hurricane.

Remember Hurricane squadrons came from Europe or Africa where the Hurricanes were superior in the dogfight, something they had to unlearn in SE asia. Allied intelligence on Japanese aircraft was pitiful at the start of the Pacific war.

Slaterat

 

[Elvis]

In short I just don't see the data with which to exactly and certainly describe why the F4F had a much better combat record against Japanese fighters than the Hurricane did in 1942, which is one certain fact.

Joe,

Could that record be the result of how American pilots were rotated in and out of combat, then sent back to teach new pilots what they had learned?
Seems none of the Axis powers ever adopted that pratice.



Elvis

 

[kool kitty89]

The Hurricane would have a higher max dive speed (and better high-speed control) than the Zero or Oscar, but dive acceleration wouldn't be much better due to the thick wing. (though the Hurricane's weight would help, and it could certainly out-dive a Nate) It was tough too, but no more so than the P-40 or F4F, and the F4F had a radial engine as well.

Depending on the model, the Hurricane would have had better altitude performance than those japanese fighters as well.


And a comment on the AVG, in addition to the hit and run tactics used their Tomahawks were not standard (though the few P-40Es they later had were) they were basically P-40C's converted to the P-40B configuration, so they were lighter. (The P-40B/Tomahawk II-A was the lightest combat capable variant) The engines were also not standard, from: The Last Curtiss P-40C

Recent research appears to support Erik Shilling's strong argument that the AVG aircraft were very close to the P-40B configuration, which the British designated as the Tomahawk IIA. The history of the AVG fighters is nearly as interesting as the story of the AVG itself...
...Allison was running at 100% capacity. Simply stated, there weren't any extra engines to be had. Every block and cylinder head was already allocated to an existing contract. But, wait a minute, there were plenty of rejected blocks, cylinder heads and such. Allison realized that most of the rejected engine components were usable if the various parts were hand matched and fitted. They set up a production line and began assembling these engines. Individual parts were reworked and carefully matched. The results of this procedure were engines built to very tight tolerances. Essentially, these were 'blueprinted' engines. Dyno tests revealed that they produced as much as 220 hp more than the production line V-1710-33s going into the RAF Tomahawks and USAAF P-40C fighters. Allison had produced some very powerful and very expensive engines. Fortunately they were allowed to bury the extra cost into contracts for U.S. aircraft. These engines certainly account for the performance of the AVG's Tomahawks. In general terms, the AVG fighters could pull up to 370 mph in level flight, which is reasonable considering that these aircraft had 20% more power and less weight than the British Tomahawk IIB. Another fact not picked up on as significant by historians was the high rate of reduction gear failures in the AVG aircraft. This is easily explained when you realize that the older style reduction gear was rated for no more than 1,100 hp. With as much as 1,250 hp on tap, the reduction gearbox was over-stressed and frequently stripped gears. Later models, with 1,200 hp engines were fitted with a much stronger spur gear design that could handle up to 1,600 hp. This is the major reason that the nose is shorter from the P-40D onward.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Joeb,

You are wrong, and worse.

>simple paper comparisons

"Paper comparisons" ... that's what the professional use in real life. Read the TAIC data sheets that were prepared in WW2 as an aid for American combat pilots in the hostile skies of the Pacific ... paper comparisons all of them.

They proved their worth in combat, and "paper comparisons" have been prepared for possible opponents of US combat aircraft ever since.

Here ab interesting from the preface of Robert Shaw's "Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering". In case you do not know the book: It has been called the fighter pilots' bible - by fighter pilots.

"Much of what you will read here has been derived from personal flight experience, engineering analysis of fighter performance data, and 'bar talk' with other fighter pilots."

Shaw's "engineering analysis of fighter performance data" is what you are trying to downplay as "paper comparisons" here.

In my eyes, that's a rather weak attempt to ridicule data you're not comfortable with. It's certainly not what I'd expect from a serious student of air combat history.

>theoretical simplified calcs

More propaganda. "Theoretical calcs" - as if there were "practical calculations". And "simplified" ... why do you even mention it? If you grab any NACA report from the NASA's vast database, there will be simplifications in it. That doesn't detract a bit from the obvious value of these NACA reports.

If you think "simplifications" somehow taint an engineering analysis, you have no clue, or you're trying to deceive the reader.

And in fact, "dissing" an engineenering analysis you have not even looked into is pretty low and makes you look stupid.

My advice is to ask "May I see your math, please?" the next time you're about to launch a post that tries to downplay the significance of a quantative analysis.

>So '*has to be*' tactics

There is technology, and there is tactics. Since you seem to confuse the term "tactics" with the much narrower term "ACM": According to Merriam-Webster, tactics is "a: the science and art of disposing and maneuvering forces in combat b: the art or skill of employing available means to accomplish an end".

So there are just three factors in air war that we have to consider:

1) Technology
2) "Human material"
3) Tactics.

With regard to 1), the "engineering analysis of performance data" shows a superiority of the Hurricane IIB over the F4F-4.

With regard to 2), I have never read about the British (or Commonwealth) pilots being innately inferior to the US aviators.

So what remains? Simple enough: 3), tactics.

I really don't understand all that dancing around the obvious.

And then ...

>Again as long as 'tactics' isn't a catchall
>I think it's repeatedly used as such a catchall.
>So if we look at tactics as an actual factual topic, not a catchall

versus ...

>IMO, lots of other factors come in, not just 'tactics'.
>more subtle factors of the plane itself in favor of the F4F
>So '*has to be*' tactics, after exhausting IMHO a pretty short list of other factors

If you go on talking about "other factors" without ever specifying one, you should better be careful with the abundant use of the word "catchall".

It's pretty cheap, too, to criticize a list as "short" if you don't point out what you think might be missing.

I have both outlined the limits of tactics defined by technology as well as provided a specific example for the use of sound tactics in combat by Hurricane pilots, while you have done nothing to clarify the nature of your "subtle factors".

I'd be escpecially interested in those of the "subtle factors" that could override the recognized big five (speed, climb, turn, firepower and protection) and make the Wildcat a better piece of technology than the Hurricane.

It's not like air combat tactics are an unfathomable mystery - Shaw's book is pretty complete, even it it's a bit long-winded.

Kind regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[HoHun]

Hi Slaterat,

>Oh and my 3 volumes of "Bloody Shambles" arrived yesterday.

Thanks for the great summary Sounds like "Bloody Shambles" is a very good read!

The examples for the tactical conditions, and specific strengths and weaknesses of the individual types you provide are very interesting - can we count on you to add more of the good stuff as you progress with your reading?

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[HoHun]

Hi Koolkitty,

>And a comment on the AVG, in addition to the hit and run tactics used their Tomahawks were not standard (though the few P-40Es they later had were) they were basically P-40C's converted to the P-40B configuration, so they were lighter.

Good point - the heavier P-40E really lost quite a bit of performance there.

With regard to the hit and run tactics, I once asked Pacific Theatre veteran Clay Tice (P-40 and P-38) about their tactical doctrine of the time. His answer showed that the tactical expertise of Chennault's Flying Tigers was not transferred to Clay's unit at least. He was also unaware of the results of the evaluation of the Akutan Zero and commented that if the USAAF ever distributed the report to the combat units, it certainly did not reach him.

Another Pacific War veteran, MF Kirby (P-39 and P-38), commented that their hit and run tactics were not the result of tactical training (which had only consisted of tight "welded wing" formation training and one-versus-one dogfighting between aircraft of the same squadron) but rather out of "fear". In my opinion, that was a very modest way of telling the audience that the pilots in his squadron independendly assessed the relative strengths of US vs. Japanese fighters and recognized that dogfighting was not going to yield results.

It's my impression that both Clay's and Kirby's units frequently relied on "drag" tactics against Japanese fighters (when equipped with the fast P-38 - they were not very confident in the speed advantage of the earlier types).

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[claidemore]

I think the comparison between Wildcat and Hurricane has been pretty much covered.
It's too complicated comparing the Hurricane to Oscar, Nate and Zero, so I'm just going to stick to the Oscar/Hayabusa, staying with the 'simple' theme.

Speed:
Hayabusa II, 320-331 mph top speed depending on source.
Hurricane IIB Trop, 320-335 mph, depending on source.
Net result: similar top speed.

Turn rate: HoHun? How much would I love to see a graph on this?
25lbs/sq ft for Hayabusa wingloading,
30 lbs/sq ft for Hurricane II.
5lbs/hp weight thrust for Hayabusa
6.4 lbs/hp for Hurricane.
Net result: better turn for Hayabusa, agrees with anecdotal info.

Climb:
Hayabusa reports climb rates ranging form 3100 ft/min to 3900 ft/min.
Hurricane climb rates from 2750-2850 ft/min.
Net result: better climb rate for Hayabusa. 5lbs/hp thrust for Hayabusa compared to 6.4 lbs/hp for Hurricane should mean a better climbing turn for Hayabusa as well and that is one of the most important and often overlooked factors in air combat.

Dive:
Hurricane can max dive to 450 mph, but has slow dive acceleration.
Haybusa is said to dive only a bit faster than it's max speed, Hayabusa III had max speed of 365mph, so that seems like a fair figure. Love to see stat from a reliable source rather than an estimate though. Hayabusas were known to shed wings in high G pullouts.
Net result: Hurricane has better max dive speed, but poor/comparable initial dive.

Range:
Hayabusa is 1000 miles more or less depending on model.
Hurricane, 640 miles.
Net result: Hayabusa has longer range.

Firepower:
Hurricane IIB has 12 x .303 Brownings
Hayabusa has either 2 x 13mm or 1x13mm and 1x7.7mm.
Net result: Hurricane throws out more rounds, but doesn't have penetration of heavy mg. Overall the Hurricane is throwing out more weight of ammo per second and doesn't require quite the degree of marksmanship.

Armor/ability to absorb battle damage:
Hurricane has good self sealing tanks, pilot armor, relatively sturdy construction (1400lbs heavier than Hayabusa albeit a bit larger)
Hayabusa has marginally effective self sealing tanks, pilot armor on II and III version, radial engine, but light construction.
Net result: The Ki-43 should be able to absorb more engine damage, and against .303 it's lightweight construction would do better than against .50s. Hurricane is sturdier in construction, but has liquid cooled inline engine. Quite a few variables, but the Hurricane had a reputation for absorbing damage, the Ki-43 did not AFAIK.

Ceiling:
Hayabusa II-36500 ft
Hurricane II-36,000 ft

Highest scoring Ki-43 ace was Satoshi Anabuki with 59 victories, highest Hurricane ace would be Pattle with 35 (possibly).

I see advantages for the Peregrine Falcon over the Hurricane, turn, climb, combat turn, range (it can operate from fields that are out of range for the Hurricane).

Advantages for the Hurricane would be firepower, survivability, and max dive speed. Firepower doesn't help if you can't get the guns on your opponent, and toughness/survivability is no 100% guarantee, as apparently quite a few Hurricanes were shot down by Nates which may have had just two 7.7 mg.

A Hurricane pilot against a Hayabusa that starts with no speed or height advantage, is probably gonna have a bad day IMO, and I'm a Canuck that loves Hurricanes.

Found this on Utube. check out the roll rate.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v7FYVEWNNrQ

 

[JoeB]

It really comes down to numbers, and the wildcat never faced the overwhelming numbers the Hurricanes did. The wildcats operations against the zero were primarily in carrier vs carrier actions where the numbers were much more closely matched.

Most F4F operations v Zeroes in 1942 were landbased from Guadalcanal. With all due respect, how serious a discussion could this possibly be if we're starting out arguing very basic stuff like that.

For numbers, review each combat in all three volumes of Bloody Shambles, that statement just doesn't hold up in general. Even in the OOB's already covered *on this thread* the great majority of the Japanese OOB in Burma in 1942 was Type 97's, Type 1's alone were outnumbered by modern Allied fighters even in the worst situation faced. Anyway each combat wasn't an outing by the whole OOB of each side, that's the same fallacious argument by which Allied successes v the Germans (and Japanese for that matter) later in WWII are explained away as meaningless. You have to look at each combat, look and see, especially in those dozen or so combats where Types 1had a score of 20:4 v Hurricanes in 1942 what the numbers were. Then look at a lot of the combats in the Guadalcanal campaign, or carrier actions for that matter, not a huge difference actually.

Joe

 

[JoeB]

Hi Joeb,
1. Here ab interesting from the preface of Robert Shaw's "Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering". In case you do not know the book: It has been called the fighter pilots' bible - by fighter pilots.
2. >theoretical simplified calcs

More propaganda.
3. And in fact, "dissing" an engineenering analysis you have not even looked into is pretty low and makes you look stupid.
4.
1), the "engineering analysis of performance data" shows a superiority of the Hurricane IIB over the F4F-4.

2), I have never read about the British (or Commonwealth) pilots being innately inferior to the US aviators.

So what remains? Simple enough: 3), tactics.

I really don't understand all that dancing around the obvious.

And then ...

6. >Again as long as 'tactics' isn't a catchall
>I think it's repeatedly used as such a catchall.
>So if we look at tactics as an actual factual topic, not a catchall

versus ...

>IMO, lots of other factors come in, not just 'tactics'.
>more subtle factors of the plane itself in favor of the F4F
>So '*has to be*' tactics, after exhausting IMHO a pretty short list of other factors

If you go on talking about "other factors" without ever specifying one, you should better be careful with the abundant use of the word "catchall".
(HoHun)

1. You should go and re-read that book. One important point he makes is chess-like tactics have become a lot more important in the age of afterburning jets because they take a lot more time to complete manuevers (like a 360 deg turn) than WWII a/c and far more than WWI. WWI as Shaw says was largely reflexes and gunnery, modern jet combat is chess like tactics and weapons that guide themselves, WWII was somewhere in between.

2. No engineering estimation is worth a lot unless it can be calibrated to a real result, to see if the shortcuts affect the real result a lot or not. I don't see any such verifcation for the turn calculation presented, except anecdotes from the time, and we know many examples where such trial results varied depending who did them. And the central issue, which you always ignore in these debates, quickly re-emerges *who says* something like *sustained* turn capability of a WWII fighter was very important to its combat success? where is the interactive study of performance and results that quantifies that? We certainly can't refer to Shaw in that case, that's ridiculous, the baseline for most of the discussion in that book is 1980's jet fighters, planes that could pull sustained g's on the order of human endurance in some cases, fighting each other in typically small numbers on each side, and again, the completion of manuevers taking a lot longer.

3. pointless ad hominem.

4.
1) debateable, and anyway what quantitative degree of combat effectiveness does this 'engineering analysis' equate to?
2) who says that can be ruled out as partial explanation? I doubt any nationality is 'innately' better or worse at producing fighter pilots (something the Allies learned to their grief in their underestimation of the Japanese). But who says the actual state of training, unit cohesion, leadership and general overall capability was equal in all Allied units, between Allied air arms and between them and the Japanese air arms or between *their* two air arms in the Pacific in 1942? Total equality all around would seem a highly artificial assumption.
3) Therefore that's an artificial conclusion to state as if deductive fact. And I note you didn't respond *at all* to the discussion I gave about actual historical tactical variation among F4F units, and in the JNAF. What a superficial approach to insist on treated 'tactics' as some black box constant that's deduced as 'the answer' based on a limited stats analysis and artificial assumption about pilot effectiveness.

6. Some other possible factors, either not mentioned or just asserted not proved:
-who says the ability to absorb damage was the same between Hurricane and F4F, where's it written what weighting to give this factor?
-WWII planes seldom performed really sustained turns, so how fast they could get into the turn and do the first several 10's of degrees turn was probably the most important factor. Where's this comparison in controlled conditions?
-The F4F had a stubby nose which allowed better tracking of targets in deflection shots than long nosed fighters. The good adaptation of USN planes to such deflection shooting was one reason the pilots were specifically trained in it, almost no other air arms did so formally. But the fact that they emphasized deflection shooting was a reason the plane was configured that way (as well as advantage in carrier landing). Is this a 'pilot', 'plane' or 'tactics' factor? What is its weighting?
-there was considerable variation among various WWII fighters in stability as gun platforms, both in handling and degree of flexing of the gun mounts (the wings or wherever else the guns were located). Where's this analysis, what's the weighting?

The point to reiterate most though in your completely ignoring the discussion of what tactics the two sides actually used, and variation and doubt about it. I'm not ingoring the basic stats of the two planes, like speed and and wing loading; rather, for the umpteenth time, I'm pointing out the basic and obvious fact that there is no deterministic way to say each mph of speed is worth A units of combat effectiveness, each fpm of climb is worth B units and each lb of wing loading is worth C units, let alone to weight the 'other' stuff I just mentioned. The way to weight those would be to observe actual combat results. But those results, obviously, are also affected by the specific tactical situations, pilot/unit effectiveness, etc. No way is the exact explanation of the F4F's much better performance v the Japanese fighters going to be proved, or rather the exact weighting of each factor in that success, it stands to reason more than a single factor explains it; unless...pure obstinancy plus calling people 'stupid' qualifies as objective analysis, then it's easy as 1,2,3

Joe

 

[claidemore]

Geez Joe, right back at you. Wheres your weighting? Where's your quantifiable analysis? All I've seen is a constant referance to 1 set of books and assertations that the F4F had a better combat record but no data or arguments as to why, just more questions and challenges to other members.

This is the first I've heard of the Wildcat being designed for deflection shooting. AFAIK, the view over the front of a Hurricane with it's tapering nose is better than the view over the Wildcat with it's wide radial engine. And if you look at both planes you might notice that the pilot in the Hurricane actually sits a little further ahead relative to the leading edge of the wing than on the Wildcat. The Wildcat is a midwing, so the angle of view down is much shallower than the angle of view down on the Hurricane which is a low wing design. Look at a 3 angle view. Don't be fooled by the glass in the canopy, the Hurri pilot has one panel of glass behind the seat, the Wildcat does not, the Hurri pilot sits forward of the flaps, the Wildcat pilot sits directly above them.

In any case, guns on fighters aren't sighted to shoot straight ahead into the blind spot, they are canted up a few degrees to bring them into the line of sight. Basically, any plane with correctly mounted guns is capable of deflection shooting.

In the theatre in question, all three airforces taught deflection shooting, I've seen the RAF manual, it's quite indepth, and I've read several accounts about Japanese training in marksmanship.

The Hurricane was a stable enough gun platform to mount 40mm anti tank weapons, could the beer barrel on roller skates with an ironing board shoved though it do that?

That might not be a quantitave proof, but I could come up with a formula showing acceleration, terminal velocity, pound force per square inch and diagrams of nerve endings to proove that a 10 lb hammer dropped on your foot is going to hurt, or I could rely on common sense for you to believe me. Alternately, I could drop a hammer on someone elses foot and they could give you anecdotal evidence about how much it hurt. If you heard that anecdotal evidence, would you let me drop a hammer on your foot?

As for Shaws book on fighter combat, I've read it numerous times, found it to be quiet enlightning and relevant concerning WWII combat. You might want to take your own advice and read the sections concerning guns vs guns again.

Claidemore

 

[Graeme]

The good adaptation of USN planes to such deflection shooting was one reason the pilots were specifically trained in it, almost no other air arms did so formally.

In the theatre in question, all three airforces taught deflection shooting, I've seen the RAF manual, it's quite indepth, and I've read several accounts about Japanese training in marksmanship.

RAAF Gunnery Manual, September 1943...

 

[claidemore]

RAAF Gunnery Manual, September 1943...

That is interesting. It is a different manual than the RAF one, different graphics (better IMO). Just goes to show that Commonwealth airforces were independant and not just fragments of the RAF.

 

[kool kitty89]

It does seem to use a Do-17 bomber as the target a/c though, which would imply it was probably made by the RAF...

 

[HoHun]

Hi Joeb,

First, let me say that I'm happy with big parts of your post and feel we're really making progress towards mutual understanding, so I'm going to ignore the nasty bits.

>One important point he makes is chess-like tactics ...

Chess-like moves are not required for "tactics". According to the classical definition, any move is "tactics". Whatever you do, there would always have been another choice.

(This is jokingly highlighted in "Murphy's Rules of Combat" as "Everything you do can get you killed, included doing nothing.")

One re-curring point in my reply will revolve around the "tactics" definition - it's a rather broad term, while you use it with a narrow meaning.

I imagine if I'd have said "employment of forces on the battlefield" instead of "tactics", you'd not have disagreed as strongly as you did.

>I don't see any such verifcation for the turn calculation presented

You did not see ANYTHING of the turn calculations presented because you failed to ask before condemning them. If you'd care to ask, I could post something that's specific enough to allow independend verification.

>2) who says that can be ruled out as partial explanation?

If you think it is a partial explanation, by all means go ahead and suggest it.

However, human behaviour on the battlefield determined by training falls under the broad classical tactics definition (while physically determined behaviour like "blacks out under Gs due to unfavourable genetic disposal" falls under "pilots".)

>And I note you didn't respond *at all* to the discussion I gave about actual historical tactical variation among F4F units, and in the JNAF.

True, but for two good reasons.

1) That a battle (or war) historically had one certain result does not mean that this was the only possible result. Thus the historical result of a battle (or war) can not be used to prove that it was the only possible result - which is what you are trying to do.

2) Because I consider the tactical variations you mentioned as a very small part of overall tactics, or "employment of forces on the battlefield".

>-who says the ability to absorb damage was the same between Hurricane and F4F, where's it written what weighting to give this factor?

What evidence do you have that the F4F was superior, and that the factor was important enough to outweight the performance disadvantages of the F4F?

The performance difference probably is worth several hundreds of kilograms, and even late-war fighters with much higher power output than the two types we're analyzing did not sacrifice that much weight for armour in order to increase the ability to absorb damage.

>-WWII planes seldom performed really sustained turns, so how fast they could get into the turn and do the first several 10's of degrees turn was probably the most important factor.

With the Hurricane being the faster aircraft of the two, it would be more likely (everything else being the same) to enter the turn faster, giving it more energy to bleed, and it bled energy at a lower rate at the same speed and turn rate, giving it a double advantage even in an instantaneous turn. (Note that energy increases to the square of speed.)

>-The F4F had a stubby nose which allowed better tracking of targets in deflection shots than long nosed fighters.

What evidence is there that it made any difference in combat? Of the "big five", speed, climb, armament and armour were constantly increased during the war, but there was no similar trend for "view over the nose" for fighters that did not have to land on a carrier. Apparently, this factor did not have enough impact on actual combat results to influence the design of land-based fighters at all.

>But the fact that they emphasized deflection shooting was a reason the plane was configured that way (as well as advantage in carrier landing). Is this a 'pilot', 'plane' or 'tactics' factor?

Tactics, as it's a way to employ the available forces. I doubt the plane was consciously configured for deflection shooting (see above), but if you could provide evidence to the contrary, I'd agree that "plane" (or "technology") would have to be considered, too.

(It would be "pilot" only if the US pilots could be trained that way, but the Commonwealth pilots could - due to their genetic disposition - not.)

>there was considerable variation among various WWII fighters in stability as gun platforms, both in handling and degree of flexing of the gun mounts (the wings or wherever else the guns were located).

So do you mean to suggest that the Hurricane was a poorer gun platform than the F4F? I'd consider this a "too-subtle" point, but it appears moot anyway as the Hurricane seems to have a rather good reputation as a gun platform.

>rather, for the umpteenth time, I'm pointing out the basic and obvious fact that there is no deterministic way to say each mph of speed is worth A units of combat effectiveness, each fpm of climb is worth B units and each lb of wing loading is worth C units, let alone to weight the 'other' stuff I just mentioned.

It might cheer you up that I'm despairing in an exactly symmetric way over your deterministic way of drawing conclusions from historical results. That one of the reasons I feel we're really beginning to understand each other

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[renrich]

It is a myth that none of the Allies knew what the best tactics to use against the Zero were until the captured Aleutian Island Zero was tested. The formal preliminary report on the Zero's performance was forwarded to BuAer on 31 October, 1942. By then the battles of Coral Sea and Midway had been fought and the battles around and over Guadalcanal were either already fought or were at their peak. It is also a myth that the Hellcat design was based on the tests of the Aleutian Zero. On 6 October the pilot testing that Zero stated: "The general impression of the airplane is exactly as originally created by intelligence-including the performance." The performance of the USN and Marine pilots in F4Fs against crack JNAF pilots flying Zeros during 1942 is plenty of evidence that those pilots knew what tactics to use to defeat the Zero. The Wildcat had a down angle of 6.5 degrees of vision which was necessary for FULL deflection shooting. In Lundstrom's "The First Team" in appendix 2, fundamentals of fixed aerial gunnery, there is a full explanation which explains why pre war USN pilots were much more proficient at deflection shooting than the pilots of any other air force. The diagram showing an RAF fighter demonstrating deflection shooting is a low side attack which does not require good visibility over the nose. It is not a full deflection shot and it is not a desirable firing pass. "Full deflection approaches gave the fighter pilots tremendous advantage over defending gunners, presenting them with such return fire angles that the gunners faced "one hell of a time finding the lead." " The pilots of the USN and Marines were virtually the only fighter pilots trained from the beginning to utilize and regularly succeed in deflection shooting." " With the partial exception of the IJN, no other air forces during WW2 taught their pilots how to make full deflection shots." Page 531 of Lundstrom's "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign" says it all IMO and explains the apparent disparity in the performance in the early part of the war between the F4F and it's pilots and the other services with their various aircraft against the Zero. "In all of WW2 no one did their job more "smartly" than the pilots of the US Navy."

 

[pbfoot]

It is a myth that none of the Allies knew what the best tactics to use against the Zero were until the captured Aleutian Island Zero was tested. The formal preliminary report on the Zero's performance was forwarded to BuAer on 31 October, 1942. By then the battles of Coral Sea and Midway had been fought and the battles around and over Guadalcanal were either already fought or were at their peak. It is also a myth that the Hellcat design was based on the tests of the Aleutian Zero. On 6 October the pilot testing that Zero stated: "The general impression of the airplane is exactly as originally created by intelligence-including the performance." The performance of the USN and Marine pilots in F4Fs against crack JNAF pilots flying Zeros during 1942 is plenty of evidence that those pilots knew what tactics to use to defeat the Zero. The Wildcat had a down angle of 6.5 degrees of vision which was necessary for FULL deflection shooting. In Lundstrom's "The First Team" in appendix 2, fundamentals of fixed aerial gunnery, there is a full explanation which explains why pre war USN pilots were much more proficient at deflection shooting than the pilots of any other air force. The diagram showing an RAF fighter demonstrating deflection shooting is a low side attack which does not require good visibility over the nose. It is not a full deflection shot and it is not a desirable firing pass. "Full deflection approaches gave the fighter pilots tremendous advantage over defending gunners, presenting them with such return fire angles that the gunners faced "one hell of a time finding the lead." " The pilots of the USN and Marines were virtually the only fighter pilots trained from the beginning to utilize and regularly succeed in deflection shooting." " With the partial exception of the IJN, no other air forces during WW2 taught their pilots how to make full deflection shots." Page 531 of Lundstrom's "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign" says it all IMO and explains the apparent disparity in the performance in the early part of the war between the F4F and it's pilots and the other services with their various aircraft against the Zero. "In all of WW2 no one did their job more "smartly" than the pilots of the US Navy."

The best deflection shot of any of the western allies was a RCAF pilot named Buerling who flew against top notch German pilots with equal or better aircraft in a scenario that was IMHO far more hazardous then the SW Pacific.

 

[Graeme]

The diagram showing an RAF fighter demonstrating deflection shooting is a low side attack which does not require good visibility over the nose. It is not a full deflection shot...

Discussed in the preceding chapter, but called 'Angle Off' deflection shooting. The illustration I posted was only one of many, from an introduction to deflection shooting.

It does seem to use a Do-17 bomber as the target a/c though, which would imply it was probably made by the RAF...

Quite possibly, but then if you were an Australian Defence Force illustrator, what enemy aircraft would you depict, if your country was involved in both the European and Pacific theatres? (a small image, but it's actually a Ju88).
However there is definitely an Aussie larrikin attitude in the artistry!..

 

[claidemore]

Hi Renrich,

Just curious, how many degrees does John Lundstrom mean when he's talking Full deflection shooting? I'm not entirely sure what he means by full deflection shooting either. Can you elaborate?

I googled the RAF gunnery manual to refresh my memory and it covered up to 30 degrees of angle off. Incidentally, pre war RAF trained in a number of coordinated attacks intended for use against bombers which included various angles of deflection.

I did some measurements on 3-angle views of Wildcat and Hurricane, and on some select photographs of the two planes in level flight from similar camera angles and I don't get any difference in angle of view over the nose for these two planes. Even if we concede a difference of a degree or two, that only adds up to a couple feet at 100 yards (guestimate).

Which brings me to the angle the guns were mounted. The WWII Fighter Gun Debate website mentions that P51's had their guns mounted 2 degrees above the line of flight. In theory you could mount guns at 45 degrees and view over the nose would not be a factor. (This was done in Schrage Musik installations on Luftwaffe nightfighters.) Even long nosed fighters like Corsairs, Dora9s and Griffon Spits were capable of deflection shooting. You just have to mount the guns according to the view available on the individual plane.

The view over the nose of a P39 was light years better than any of the above mentioned fighters, but I don't recall them having a very good record in the Pacific. (ok, they weren't flown by navy pilots )

The one advantage I do see for a Wildcat over a Hurricane in deflection shooting is the .50 ammo, 425fps faster than .303.

 

[Graeme]

I did some measurements on 3-angle views of Wildcat and Hurricane, and on some select photographs of the two planes in level flight from similar camera angles and I don't get any difference in angle of view over the nose for these two planes.

Tried that myself but encountered a few problems. Scale? True flying 'attitide'? and where's my protractor?




Have also read that, according to one author, regards the Wildcat, that...

"...the pilot's seat was cramped and too low relative to the location of his head and need for visibility."