He277: Promising? Or further development of a bad apple?

[Waynos]

Interesting that a parallel has been drawn between the He 177 and the Manchester. Its even closer than you think as the requirement that the Manchester was designed to meet also included the provision that the aircraft should be capable of dive bombing.

When you follow that through to the debut of the Lancaster in 1942 it just shows what Germany had at their own fingertips too, if only the hierarchy had seen it.

 

[davebender]

what Germany had at their own fingertips too, if only the hierarchy had seen it.

Britain was willing to spend a large portion of their wartime economy on heavy bombers. Germany wasn't. That's why Britain had the Lancaster but Germany did not have the He-277.

 

[Kiwikid]

What was the primary difference between the He177 and He274?

Was the He277 a derivative of the He177? He274? Both?

The He-274 which did not fly before Allies captured it was a much bigger aircraft than the He-277.

The He-274 had a wingspan of 44.19m, length 23.80m (7,000hp)
The He-277 had a wingspan of 31.43m, length 22.14m (7,000hp)
The He-177 had a wingspan of 31.44m, length 22.00m (5,900hp)

 

[HealzDevo]

Still the He-177 was potentially available to make a difference when redesigned while the larger aircraft never flew. A successful He-177 would have made more difference.

 

[Kiwikid]

The He-177 A-7 was an improved version of the He-177 with about 4000km range, but the He-277 had more power at take off and in the B-5 high altitude bomber had performance rivaling the post war Lincoln and almost approaching the performance of a B-29 in every respect except payload.

Even with the mighty A-7 Grief, I think the Germans realised hanging two engines on a common shaft was robbing the design of thrust.

B-29A


357mph. Max speed.
220mph. Cruise speed.
5,230 km (3,250 mi)
10,200 m (33,600 ft) service ceiling

He-277


354mph. Max speed.
286mph. Cruise speed.
6,000 km (3,728 miles)
15,000 m (49,210 ft) service ceiling


The He-277's cruise speed was 66mph faster than the B-29's.

 

[HealzDevo]

Perhaps, but the main fact, I think is that Germany had a lot of expensive projects that never produced a cost benefit to payment needed to produce the weapon system in the first place. Especially at the end of the War when the Allies were out producing all their aircraft and air defences even though the Reich was concentrating a fairly high proportion of their remaining manufacturing capacity into this. Therefore given real history to make any difference, the He-177 must be in effective service and producing results in 1943 as this when the German Air Superiority really began to permanently slip overall until the end of the war. I think we all agree that sometime in 1943 is the date of the Allied surge in available ground and air defence aircraft.

 

[Propellorhead]

From what I can gather, the He-177 B-0 was not intended to hide the He-277 design from Goering. These appear to be entirely different aircraft designs loosely based on the He-177 Greif. The He-177A was designated Projekt 1041 Bomber A, by Heinkel. It was not up to Heinkel to create the designation He-177B. This designation was conferred on the type by RLM.

Goeiring became enraged about the He-177A design some time in 1942 onwards, yet RLM created the He-177B designation in November 1938 when it asked Heinkel to prepare four prototypes with conventional engine fairings as an insurance policy against failure of the paired DB 601 layout (becoming the DB 606).

RLM asked for the He-177B to be fitted with four jumo 211 engines roughly comparable to the DB 601. The V101 prototype of the He-177 B-0 found shot up at Cheb in 1945 did not have a pressurised cockpit and was fitted with the Jumo222 engine which although it could perform well up to 30,000ft or so was not the high altitude Jumo 213E fitted to the He-277 B-5.

I did some scratching around to identify the four prototype He-177 B-0 aircraft ordered by RLM in 1938. When some of their airframes were converted from He-177B to He-277, their Stammkennzeichen codes changed too, which adds weight to my theory that these were entirely different aircraft. We know this is so because at least one He-177B, NE+OD was photographed with four seperate engine nacelles with stkz predating it's He-227 stkz.

He-177 B-0 V101... NN+QQ
He-177 B-0 V102... NE+OD ...He-277 B-5 stkz "GA+QQ"
He-177 B-0 V103... KM+TL
He-177 B-0 V104... DL+ AT ...He-277 B-5 stkz "GA+QM"

Whilst some of the He-177 B-0 aircraft were subsequently converted with an " H " type tail, they were not He-277 until after conversions took place.

 

[davebender]

DB605 and Jumo211 liquid cooled V12s were the only aircraft engines Germany was not short of. If the He-177 / He-277 is to be powered by 4 engines they must be one of these two types.

 

[Njaco]

There is some info about the 277 here....

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...g-cover-designation-really-existed-22578.html

 

[Propellorhead]

DB605 and Jumo211 liquid cooled V12s were the only aircraft engines Germany was not short of. If the He-177 / He-277 is to be powered by 4 engines they must be one of these two types.

Just because Germany had plentiful supply of DB605 and Jumo211 does not imply these were the power source for four engined Heinkels.

The He-177 B-0 V101 was found destroyed with Jumo 222 engines.

The He-227 was different from the he-177 B because of it's pressurised cockpit. For the He-277 to deliver the specified performance it had to be fitted with the Jumo 213E engines that it was specified with.

If that rationale were true davebender, then 1,805 Focke Wulf Ta -152 fighters would never have been built with Jumo 213E engines either.

 

[looney]

I read somehwrere that the crews flying them, liked them. They where used in naval scout missions.

Can't think of where I read it. Most likely Osprey

 

[davebender]

If that rationale were true davebender, then 1,805 Focke Wulf Ta -152 fighters would never have been built with Jumo 213E engines either.

The Ta-152 entered mass production during 1945. It's rather pointless for Germany to begin manufacturing a heavy bomber at that late date. A bomber that enters mass production during 1942 would be an entirely different story even if powered by smaller 1,340 hp Jumo 211 engines.

 

[dennis420b]

Would it have made the plane better? Yes. Would it have made it a success? No. The problem comes from the policy's and resource's needed to make it into a productive strategic force. They would have had to create a fleet of bombers and training facility's to compensate for losses they would have incurred. How long would it take to develop and refine effective tactics? Could they have afforded the resource's or the manpower? And what about escorts?

 

[davebender]

Not for bombing the British Isles during the daytime. By 1942 RAF Fighter Command aircraft were more numerous then sand on the seashore. And they were supported by a decent aircraft control system.

Operating such a long range bomber from Sicily, Norway and the Bay of Biscay for maritime attack would be an entirely different matter. Even if a convoy is lucky enough to contain a CVE the Allied fighter protection would be a tiny fraction of what RAF Fighter Command can put in the air.

 

[dennis420b]

Ok it could have been used as a maritime bomber. Then yes I guess it would have been a success. But one worthy of the resources?

 

[davebender]

The German Navy needed something for a long range patrol bomber. Historically they used a combination of Fw-200s, Ju-290s and He-177s plus some medium range Do-217s. It would probably be less expensive and more effective for the navy to mass produce a single model optimized specifically for their requirements.

 

[dennis420b]

You know i always fantasized about an exchange of tech and thought what if the Germans would have had a couple wings of Kawanishi H6K? and later the H8k? Sorry totally off subject.

 

[Shortround6]

The German Navy needed something for a long range patrol bomber. Historically they used a combination of Fw-200s, Ju-290s and He-177s plus some medium range Do-217s. It would probably be less expensive and more effective for the navy to mass produce a single model optimized specifically for their requirements.

Not really.

The plane it self might have been more effective but how many planes where actually used for long range maritime reconnaissance and strike duties? 200-300? a few more? A model designed specifically for them might have been made in slightly larger numbers but no specially designed plane built in those numbers could really be considered cost effective considering the the engineering time to design it, the cost and time of building the tools, jigs and fixtures to build it. The cost of the testing program and the cost of the maintenance/repair set up for a special type as opposed to a variant of an existing design is also higher.

Chances of the German Navy being able to mass produce any aircraft independent of the Luftwaffe is about zero due to politics.

 

[Gixxerman]

In my new book - 'Heinkel He 177 Greif' by J. Richard Smith Eddie J. Creek - they make the interesting point that the German high command had no 'will' for a protracted strategic bombing campaign and that that ran counter to their entire 'war ideology'.
So effectively a couple of operational squadrons of He 177s engaging in attacks (which is how they talked about them) really are neither here nor there.

Perhaps if something like the attack on the Russian power plants around Moscow, Gorki and Yaroslavl had been thought of earlier and implemented it might have had a significant effect but the obvious fact is that Germany never really attempted to 'work up' an effective true strategic bomber force (something that takes years) - and interesting sounding one-off attacks on high-value targets like the power station plan in fact illustrate in a very ironic but clear manner the fact of their lack of a true strategic 'vision'.

The focus of their efforts were dictated by the sort of war the found themselves actually in (as opposed to what they had planned). Hence the weight of effort in tactical aircraft and a serious lack of strategic aerial planning.

(just as the UK USA's situation dictated that they focus heavily on strategic air offensive)

All this is before we get into the severe lack of material resources and how on earth you train and operate squadrons (assuming you can actually make the aircraft) in an environment where your 'air superiority' extends 1.5 meters as Jurgen Rosenstock put it .

 

[davebender]

German high command had no 'will' for a protracted strategic bombing campaign

1930s Germany had no "will" for a protracted war period. That didn't change until the USA entered the conflict during December 1941. By then it was too late for Germany to establish the industrial and training base necessary for a large force of heavy bombers. From 1941 onward most German war production was required just to maintain 200 or so Heer divisions in combat, along with their supporting Luftwaffe fighter and CAS units.