parsifal
Colonel
Ive learnt something about me over the years Aozora...never trust me with a maths question.....Ive always struggled with those zero numbers.....
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I'm talking about in the combat aircraft. A good round number for that for the USN encompassing all types would be around 100 hours. That would apply from January 1943 on. Give one morning or afternoon for their carrier-qualifications. Double those hours if you throw in the trainers and triple them if you include the biplanes.USAAF Training was about 260 hours and the USN a bit more than that as they had to deck qualify which obviously took extra time and practice. There were some comments earlier in the thread about there being slack in the RAF training scheme. The only reply I can give is that I wish it was so. From roughly the end of the BOB to mid 1942 RAF training wasn't as good as the US training but after that it at least matched it. If there was any slack in the RAF system it was used to try and fill the gaps in the training given.
Glider - the F4U was in production. USN designated it the Ensign Killer as it struggled in Sea Trials, even as Brits approved it - but one simple fact remains. The USN could have done very well with F4U on carriers in late 1942/early 1943 and never missed a beat to the end of the War.. more operation accidents? - Yes. .. better air to air capability vs IJN in 1943?... - Hell Yes. Simplified logistics? - Yes.
I'm not disagreeing your argument of F4F vs F6F, just pointing to a better alternative relative to a.) procurement dollars, and b.) significant leap in Fleet Air performance earlier than F6F.
You're painting with way, way too broad a brush. Beware of the conclusions you reach.
??? outline the 'way, way too broad a brush' Please?
Let's get back to the carriers and the F4Fs, for a moment, and touch again on that theory. On the carriers, are we playing a game, or do we really want to know?
If you are referring to me - let's get off the F4F's as that isn't My thesis. Mine is eliminate F6F and question whether the USN/USMC looses much in 1943 by applying all F6F procurement starting in Fy42 and shove it to F4U production similar to NAA building plant in Dallas to get Parallel production for P-51s.
If we really want to know, we think of things like this. You referenced earlier our performance at Coral Sea and Midway. We lost carriers, there, sure. They didn't get the Enterprise, did they? You guys go on about our sacrificing carrier-building for the F6F. What do you think we were doing?
You have lost track of a.) who you are debating, and b.) the Point. I wasn't talking about sacrificing Carrier building for F6F. I was talking about how perilously close to a disaster at both Coral Sea and Midway had the Japanese gamble succeeded. The F6F would not have been available for any reason for another year, and only in small numbers.
We commissioned the Princeton and Essex in 1942, the Franklin and Independence in 1944, and a plethora of other, lighter carriers, in between. We were building carriers. The way this theory goes, we stopped. On the F4Fs, improve them? How? They ended up through two manufacturers, and they couldn't be improved, but marginally. Grumman knew that. That's why the F6Fs.
Why not slip back a few pages and discover what I advocated as contrast to what you completely lost track of?
Now let's get to this pilot-training advantage the U.S supposedly had over these poorer-trained Japanese pilots as also referenced in Wikipedia of all things and totally-unsupported in fact (follow the citation, and see it for yourself). I already went over that, but evidently it didn't get across. Again, go back to Parsifal's post #145. Look at "150 hours," in January 1944. What do you think that was, they took somebody off the street and put him in a Zeke and he's a pilot? That was after three months on trainers, which was after three months on biplanes, which was after three months physical training, which was after three months classroom instruction--or, if it wasn't that, that's close enough to what it was. That "150 hours" was 50 hours more than the U.S. pilots had in our combat aircraft. In January 1944, they were still ahead of us in pilot-training. If you can trust that "150 hours," that's what that means.
Let's finish here with the Zeke. It could turn inside anything. It was also very, very hard to hit. Think of trying to hit a falling feather. Those are the kinds of descriptions I've heard, over and over. And, it had longevity. It was built right, that's why. Credit the manufacturer for that. Hell, I have a 27-year-old Mitsubishi TV. I wouldn't trade it for anything.
PS: I debate TVs, too...
Due to your formatting, I can't reference your reply in its entirety, here, as this is the only part that copies. Thus, if you'd care to re-format, you know, try again, by all means, be my guest. If you could do it less antagonistically, so much the better. I'd be more than happy to answer your questions, where I think can.Please go back to debating TV's. You will sound more clever and win more arguments. You are debating me on points I haven't expressed, confusing my points with those advanced by others.
USAAF Training was about 260 hours and the USN a bit more than that as they had to deck qualify which obviously took extra time and practice. There were some comments earlier in the thread about there being slack in the RAF training scheme. The only reply I can give is that I wish it was so. From roughly the end of the BOB to mid 1942 RAF training wasn't as good as the US training but after that it at least matched it. If there was any slack in the RAF system it was used to try and fill the gaps in the training given.
Oh, is that what you simply did? Read it, again.Try what? I simply pointed out that you weren't debating with me based on any arguments I advanced in the discussion.
You are provocative, aren't you?You picked something up in the ether and the TV you were debating steered you in the wrong direction.
We have private messaging for private discussions. This is a public forum, the last I checked.Summary - I didn't Ask you any questions. I wasn't 'writing' to respond to anything you said - that interchange you quoted was between Glider and me. You leaped into the discussion and sank to the bottom of the pool.. you have not experienced 'antagonism' but you stumbled on 'response to the clueless'...
I'll certainly mind that when it comes to replying to you, not a problem.I have been there before and it taught me some lessons regarding 'answer the question' and also 'don't answer when the question has not been asked'.
No, everything you said copied.Do I need to reformat?
The USN hours were split up the same way, around 100 in the trainers and 100 in the combat aircraft.How much combat training did allied pilots get? By that I mean was there any disimiliar aircraft fighting training, sort of WW2 top gun programme or was that left to in service squadron training?
How much combat training did allied pilots get? By that I mean was there any disimiliar aircraft fighting training, sort of WW2 top gun programme or was that left to in service squadron training?
Drgondog, may I? Just on this? This would mean our fathers got in at right around the same time. These training hours are remarkably similar. Just substitute the SNJ/SNV for the AT-6 and the SBD for the P-40, and they're bookends.From Dec 1943 to May 1944 my father had 200 hours in P-40 and AT-6.
Brief Clobber Collage in ETO, P-51 in combat
did he get clobber college at Goxhill or when he got to the 355ths base?? like your dad, mine only got a couple hours "familarzation" time in a war weary 51B before heading to the group. there he got a few more but not that much time before his first mission. i talked to guys who went in afterwards and they got a lot more hours and some actual training in tactics at clobber college.
From Dec 1943 to May 1944 my father had 200 hours in P-40 and AT-6.
i would venture to say ( maybe erroneously ) that the wealth of that was in the AT 6.
Drgondog, may I? Just on this? This would mean our fathers got in at right around the same time. These training hours are remarkably similar. Just substitute the SNJ/SNV for the AT-6 and the SBD for the P-40, and they're bookends.
PS: And it's my pleasure to make your acquaintance. FWIW...
Ah. I was figuring your father for induction in 1942, just going straight up through the program, so to speak. I see.My father was in Class 40-A for Cadet Training and graduated from flight school in March 1941. Snatched into Training command as an instructor and languaished there unto he commanded the 322 AAFFTTD in Miami Ok (RAF/RCAF Primary Basic Flight Training school, and esaped Training Command by volunteering for B-26s in August 1943. Then to Fighters in Nove 1943 and on to ETO in May 1944.
i dont know how they had it set up when your dad got to the UK. but later on the replacement pilots were in a "waiting pool" and as they needed replacements the fighter groups (both 8th and 9th AFs..and maybe even the 15th??) would send up a representative to pitch for their group. basically the only reason my dad went to the 357th was they needed 9 pilots and he was in a group with 8 other guys that went through training together. they volunteered to go there so they could all be in the same group.
Ive got a book at home somewhere dealing blow by blow with Phil Sea. I will try and dig it out. but the guy states very clearly that the average hours for the US flyers was about 500 hours of training time and about the same in combat experience. thats about 1000 hours all up.
Ive also got the Japanese reports I mentioned earlier, which is backed up in the USSBS about Japanese training times. I got the experience levels for early war from Al nofi's book on the Pacific war.
There was a huge difference in experience levels between the average Japanese flyer and the average US flyer. There were a dwndling number of very experienced Japanese flyers who were able to take the zero up and usually survive, and sometimes thrive...
Moving on, 545 aircraft, 408 go down, we lose 38. In a single day. According to Ray Spruance. Do you think our F4Fs and FMs could have done that? We were equal in pilot training. Don't forget that. We lost experienced pilots from Pearl Harbor through Midway, too. The Japanese weren't the only ones. Were they?There is no comparison between the unit capabilities of axis to allies in the early war, compared to the unit capabilities of axis to allies late in the war. And further, the japanese Air forces were so elitist at the beginning that they actualkly became vulnerable to losses....they couldnt replace the losses to attrition as efficiently as the allies. Its the same reason that the numbers game will win every time....the Japanese aircrew numbers had no depth, and so were susceptible to attritional losses. Thats precisely how they lost, not some magical uber fighter. That helped, because it sped up the attrition rate....it didnt cause or begin the attrition. The Japanese were already bled white before the Hellcat ever arrived on the scene