Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?

bobbysocks said:

remember too that they had been fighting for some time now in china and other areas....so their resources were already being taxed. they had to occupy those areas and that takes manpower. they had a population but not enough to meet all their needs. plus their material resources had to be proiritized. yes they could have had the manpower and money but at the cost of something else....

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This is how it was:

WWII Imperial Japanese Naval Aviation Page
WWII Imperial Japanese Navy Aircraft

"At the beginning of World War II, the Imperial Navy had created the finest naval aviation corps in the world. Japanese aircraft were at least the equals of anything then flying in the West, and in some cases (as with the legendary Zero fighter) were substantially better. Japanese aircrews were superbly trained and had been battle tested in the conflict in China during the late 1930's. When war tore across the Pacific in December 1941, the IJNAF was more than a match for any of its opponents. It is not surprising , then, that Japanese aviators scored victory after stunning victory during the first six months of the war, from the attack on Pearl Harbor, through the sinking of the British men-of-war Prince of Wales and Repulse, to the fearsome raids on northern Australia and the IJN's rampage through the Indian Ocean in April 1942. Only after the defeat at Coral Sea and the debacle at Midway was this force finally able to be engaged on nearly equal terms. Throughout the war, the IJNAF remained a potent weapon, though Japanese equipment was eventually outclassed by newer American models, and relentless attrition began to take its toll on pilot quality. Even in defeat, though, the IJNAF refused to wilt away, finally immolating itself in the form of the Kamikaze air corps." (emphasis supplied)

parsifal said:

Ive already given you an answer to your post. Your salient question was how would F4Fs do in a fight like Phil Sea. Answer: individually not better, as CAG, probabaly as good or better because there would be more of them in the scenario i outlined.

For the record. CarDiv 1 and 2 had about 6 months service time, the other CAGs had 3 months (for one group) and 2 months for the other. The Japanese had lost nearly all their Carrier pilots in the battles of 1942, then they were again decimated in the battles against the allies in 1943. They had begun rebuilding their pilot base for a third time beginning in January 1944.

However this figure of 6 months is misleadingly high. Because of the fuel crisis affecting the IJN, it was necessary to move the 1st Mobile Fleet from Singapore to Tawi Tawi. There was fuel available at Tawi Tawi (extremely high octane, which made their ships vulnerable, but at least they could move), but no airfield. Consequently for the time the fleet was based at Tawi Tawi, the CAGs had no opportunity to train.

Most sources say that CarDiv 1/2 had an average of about 120 hours ...that primary training AND combat time. There were a few experts with a lot more experience than that.....probably around 30-35 pilots. The other CAGs had on average less than 100 hours. Some accounts claim less than 50 hours....Im doubtful of that figure, but cant categorically rule it out either.

The Japanese since before the outbreak of the war had had their training programs restricted, severely, by the acute fuel shortages since at least July 1941. They never really recovered from that restriction. Later, they also suffered from a shortage of suitable advanced training aircraft, and also a lack of good instructors. They tried to address this by moving new recruits out too the front directly, to learn on the job. This was a disaster for them. Pilots need the hours, in a safe environment, to get familiar and confident. Germans did similar things to their aircrew, but were not as acutely affected as the japanese.

There is some variation in various accounts given on the amount of experience in the USN CAGs. Some do put it as low as 300 hours (and dont specify if that is combat experience and Basic, or just combat). Most sources however, give a much higher figure....between 300 and 400 Training time (about 250 in induction....but additional "top up" training as they were rotated back and forth). Many (more than half) were reported as having more than 500 hours combat (or perhaps hours in a front line squadron...most accounts dont differentiate). It would not be wrong or innaccurate, or misleading (like mentioning the number 409 and Hellcat in the same sentence, or claiming Hellcat losses were just 35, which they werent) to estimate USN airmen in the fleet CAGs as having around 700-1000 hours expereince by June 1944. They were extremely experienced flyers. Which is one reason why by that stage it took time to get into combat for new pilots.

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You didn't answer my question.

youd better clarify instead of playing games then hadnt you

bobbysocks said:

the other issue isnt the number of carrier based planes and experienced pilots...but how many aircraft carriers did they have left for them to launch off of???? i know they lost several carriers at midway...how many did they lose at CS?? if you have really no chance to put those planes on carriers ( or an island ) ramping up your production and training is somewhat fruitless. you can punch out several thousand planes a month like germany did but to build a carrier is going to set you back years. those resources can be better shifted to something else.

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The followinglink give s a good summary of carrier losses for all protegonists that put them to sea

Fleet carriers sunk in World War 2

parsifal said:

youd better clarify instead of playing games then hadnt you

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Settle down. It was right at the bottom of the post you just replied to. When were those 545 Japanese pilots at the Battle of the Philippine Sea inducted into the Navy? When do you think?

parsifal said:

Stug, I cant get access to the link youve poted....only to the forums main page. Id like to see what was said, and how it was discussed if possible

Thanks

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Here ya go-

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/f4f-fm-2-alone-would-have-won-war-pto-20875.html

VBF-13 said:

Settle down. It was right at the bottom of the post you just replied to. When were those 545 Japanese pilots at the Battle of the Philippine Sea inducted into the Navy? When do you think?

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Playing games as ever i see. You already think you know dont you. Im going to say no idea. They didnt enter flight school until the end of 1943 at the earliest. But enlighten us please......this will be funny im sure


US Naval training inductee rates are listed here

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: U.S. Order of Battle

An example of typical training and experience for the USN Phil Sea aircrew can be found with Georgr Bush Senior

"Upon hearing of the Pearl Harbor attack, while a student at Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, George Bush decided he wanted to join the Navy to become an aviator. Six months later, after graduation, he enlisted in the Navy on his 18th birthday and began preflight training at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. After completing the 10-month course, he was commissioned as an ensign in the US Naval Reserve on 9 June 1943, several days before his 19th birthday; making him the youngest naval aviator then.
After finishing flight training, he was assigned to Torpedo Squadron (VT-51) as photographic officer in September 1943. As part of Air Group 51, his squadron was based on USS San Jacinto in the spring of 1944. San Jacinto was part of Task Force 58 that participated in operations against Marcus and Wake Islands in May, and then in the Marianas during June. On 19 June, the task force triumphed in one of the largest air battles of the war".

Thats nearly three years of flight training before exposure to heavy combat. if he is typical, what would be the normal hours chalked up by a pilot in training per year in the US.....200 hours????

stug3 said:

Here ya go-

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/f4f-fm-2-alone-would-have-won-war-pto-20875.html

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Yep, working now, thanks

Similar arguments to those we are having here. The guy does have a point n my opinion, though he does say some things I would disagree with.

Basically, this is my hypothesis, backed up by some anaysis. Provided that the fighters are within cooe of each other, the side flying the aircraft of higher performance might get some marginal advanatages insofar as own losses, expressed as losses per 100 sorties. Insofar as the enemy is concerned, ther is not evidence to support the notion that enemy losses go up because of poorer fighter quality, again expressed as losses per 100 sorties. Of course, lowering ones own losses means that you generate the opportunity to improve the experience levels of your formations, and then from there, you do get into a position of holding a decisive advantage. You can do that with numbers as well.

Case in point. USN relied mostly on carriers for force projectikon. The numbers of carriers determined how much pain they could bring to bear on th enemy. with a finite number of carriers, it did make sense to equip them with the best that was available. i have no argument with any of that.

However, what if you altered your wartime build strategy so as to increase the supply of carriers, or more accurately, altered the build so that carriers arrived earlier. If that meant sacrificing or postponing the introduction of the hellcat, but meant you would have more F4Fs earlier, would that be a better strategy? I think it would. F4F was a competitive fighter throughout the war, having the numbers would give you increased survivability, and you would be delivering body blows at a time when the Japanese were not in a position to resist.

Ill quote shattered sword the same as the banned guy with regards to Pilot (and aircraft ) supply

Page 10: "In addition to [the Midway carriers], two other carriers ought to have been sortied [Shokaku and Zuikaku.] Zuikaku was nominally operational, but her air-group was not and would not be fully reconstituted for months."

Page 90: "When the war had opened, Kido Butai's air groups had been full strength, although without as many spare aircraft as would have been optimal. But by June 1942, the situation had deteriorated. At the time of Pearl Harbor, Akagi had carried sixty-six aircraft; now she had just fifty-four. Kaga had been cut from seventy-five to sixty-three. Soryu and Hiryu had come down from sixty-three apiece to fifty-four apiece. Nominally, each squadron (fighter, bomber, and torpedo bomber) should have been allotted three spare aircraft, for a total of nine per ship. None were now carried by any ship in Kido Butai, and Kaga was the only ship that still retained an oversized squadron of twenty-seven torpedo bombers. The rest of the ships were all operating eighteen aircraft squadrons, with no spares. In a nutshell, each of the Kido Butai carriers had suffered a 16 percent decrease in their fighting power since December. Any casualties to the operating air groups, even damaged aircraft, would immediately impact the tactical cohesion of the air units, since there were no spare aircraft to feed into the formations. ... Nagumo thus had a grand total of 248 aircraft aboard his ships. By way of comparison, Kido Butai's six carriers had brought around 412 aircraft to the Pearl Harbor operation. Nagumo was thus fighting the decisive battle with only 60 percent of the airpower he might reasonably have expected as recently as May."

Page 91: "If the aircraft situation was threadbare in the frontline carriers, it was far worse in the second-line carrier divisions. They were scraping up pilots and aircraft in any way they could to try and cobble together air groups, yet in most cases were falling short. Junyo's case is illustrative. Recently comimssioned, she was designed to carry fifty-four aircraft. Her dive-bonber group seems to have been reasonably intact and was composed of fifteen Type 99 aircraft. Her fighter group, however, was another matter. It was still in the midst of being activated and was in complete disarray. Twelve of the eighteen Zeros on board ship were actually aircraft from the 6th Ku. Yet 6th Ku was itself three planes and several pilots short of its nominal thirty-six plane establishment (the remaining twenty-one aircraft being with Nagumo). Not only that but 6th Ku apparently didn't have enough aviators to man its own aircraft. Nor could Junyo's aviators fill all the gaps. Indeed, Junyo's air group for the battle contained only five of its own pilots. The remainder were four 6th Ku pilots, a trio of aviators (one of whom was fresh out of flight school) on temporary attached duty (TAD) from Shokaku, and two more TAD fliers from Ryujo!"

this was BEFORE Midway!!

I also notice JoeB made the following comments, remmber this debate does not assume additional carrier availability for the US earlier....people should pay attention to Joes comments however

"Wildcats as only carrier fighters would probably not have prevented an Allied victory in the Pacific War, so great was Allied numerical superiority becoming by 1944; but it would have made it a much harder slog, with undoubtedly more carrier losses (note that while CV's operating F4F's at least one CV was seriously hit or sunk in almost every case where carrier TF's came under Japanese air attack, compare that to the F6F period), as well as more losses among escorted attack a/c. The FM-2 handled itself pretty well even against later Japanese fighter types when it met them, in the overall circumstances of combat at that time, but had major deficiencies in speed as interceptor, and in range as offensive fighter, compared to the F6F and F4U, which also meant more risk to carriers.

For land based fighters, range was an even more important factor since getting closer wasn't just a matter of ramping up risk to a carrier by moving it closer to its target but having to seize more islands and bases and bypass fewer of them, since each new base had to be within land based fighter range of the previous one (moving up the coast of New Guinea, for example, carriers generally not available in that theater).

P-40's did widely serve until 1945 in China, and also did well enough, real outcomes in the range of 1:1 or even a bit better against even the later Japanese fighter types, and generally had some advantage over the Army Type 1, their main opponent for most of the war. The Japanese were so outnumbered that 1:1 fighter kill ratio, broadly what they could hope for with the Type 1 and Zero against well flown P-40's and F4F's, wasn't anywhere near good enough from their POV. But from Allied POV, the extra advantage of the later fighters was very welcome in pure fighter combat, and as mentioned it had other important implications such as carrier losses with F4F/FM rather than F6F's and having to stage landings supported by land based fighters at closer intervals with P-40 compared to P-38 (or other long range fighters)".

And further along

"As already mentioned, the FM-2 could handle later Japanese fighers, in the overall circumstances at the time. That was shown in operations in the Philippines where CVE's were left pretty much on their own. The FM-2's claimed result for all of Sep '44-end of war, v the Type 3 (Tony) for example was 29:0, a claim but OTOH Type 3's proved unable to down FM-2's. FM-2's also downed Type 4's (Frank). And the FM-2's overall claimed fighter v fighter ratio was 26:1 v 15+ for both F6F in F4U in that same period, Sep 44-end of war. Many of the claims in all cases were fighter types serving as kamikazes, but there's no evidene the FM-2 was a much less capable fighter combat a/c in actual practice, against those opponents at that time. Only around 15-20% of F6F and F4U fighter combat losses were against the latest types (Frank, George, Jack) per USN stats, most of the opposition remained the older types, anyway.

Intercepting kamikazes OTOH was a weakness of the FM-2, although again it could do it, in the Lingayen Gulf landings the CVE's alone protected the landing force, which underwent intense kamikaze attacks and suffered a number of hits, but numerous enough kamikazes always had some successes. So the FM-2 could and did perform that role, but its slow speed was a definite practical weakness, whereas in fighter combat it was also a weakness in theory, but it's hard to find evidence it made much difference in practice.

FM-2's served as ground support fighter bombers more often than CV/CVL based F6F's. The FM-2 carried a lighter load, but fighter bomber results against land targets, especially well concealed Japanese field fortifications, were not usually very dramatic anyway. The main effect was on morale of friendly ground forces. And F6F's and F4U's didn't sink many ships. So, the FM-2 was a lesser fighter bomber but I don't think that makes much difference.

The problem with intercepting fast attackers is the most serious deficiency of the FM-2 in late war operations, especially since it wouldl ikely lead to higher ship los(s)"

Starting to get a bit heated. Play nice everyone. You all know the rules. There have been enough warnings given.

I cannot get rid of the feeling that given pilots of equal quality the FM2 would be at a significant disadvantage against late war Japanee fighters and be at a smaller disadvantage against the A6M5. We know that the pilot quality wasn't the same and the USN generally were able to control their forces more effectively with RADAR and command and control. Its for those reasons that the FM2 was able to more than hold its own, not because the aircraft was as good as the opposition.

Re defending against suicide bombers. A lot of those were obsolete fighters, bombers, trainers aircraft that the FM2 would ahve had a performance advantage. In a straight race faster attacking aircraft would ahve had a decent chance of getting through simply because the FM2 wasn't that fast.

Id agree with you that the FM-2 was approaching obsolescence. I dont agree that the A6M5 would be greatly superior, obviously i think some.....but not a generational difference that would render the Wildcat a deathtrap.

If the Japanese could somehow get a break in the relentless batle being prosecuted against them, they might gain time and breathing space to train pilots of reasonable quality. Put a half decent pilot in a Frank or a Tony, or similar, against an FM-2
and there is a serious problem for the Wildca. but theres a problem. If the Allies have been hammering harder than historically continuously since Coral sea, with no lull in operations such as occurred from January'43 through to about october '43, then as the Japanese I dont think you will ever get the opportunity to even half recover like they did. I think by early '44, instead of having pilots with maybe 100 hours experience, you will throwing guys with maybe 20 hours experience. Now, I would very much like to hear fom the flyers in this place. What happens when you have the numbers advantage, and your fliers have 40 or 50 times the experience of the enemy.The enemy has an aircraft faster more manouverable and more heavily armed than your mount, but you outnumber him by about 5:1 and your guys know what they are doing, and the fast guy doesnt. What happens in that scenario.

Dont underestimate the advantage that inititiave will give to your people

Fair points

I agree that the USN probably could have won the war with the F4F/FM2. It would have taken more losses, but US material superiority (and pilot training) was so superior that the US still would have won. The Wildcat was no great shakes, but two Wildcats were dangerous to any enemy. I take issue though with any argument that the Hellcat would have delayed victory. The Hellcat was essentially available in lockstep with the availability of the war-built carriers. Other than the CVEs (which usually deployed with FMs), as each new carrier was sent into battle, it had F6F fighters. Even the Bunker Hill which was supposed to get Corsairs, shipped out with Hellcats. The F6F was at least as well-suited to its primary role of naval air superiority fighter as the Merlin-engined P-51 was for the bomber escort mission. The Hellcat had the range to escort loaded bombers on any practical mission. It was as easy as any 2000 horsepower fighter could be to fly and land on carriers. It was easy enough to build that one factory could turn out fighters for all the fast carriers. It was a stable gun platform, well-suited to deflection shooting. It had enough speed to dominate the A6M zero and compete on an even basis with late-war Japanese fighter. It was a good fighter-bomber and nightfighter.

parsifal said:

.

If the Japanese could somehow get a break in the relentless batle being prosecuted against them, they might gain time and breathing space to train pilots of reasonable quality. Put a half decent pilot in a Frank or a Tony, or similar, against an FM-2
and there is a serious problem for the Wildca. but theres a problem. If the Allies have been hammering harder than historically continuously since Coral sea, with no lull in operations such as occurred from January'43 through to about october '43, then as the Japanese I dont think you will ever get the opportunity to even half recover like they did. I think by early '44, instead of having pilots with maybe 100 hours experience, you will throwing guys with maybe 20 hours experience. Now, I would very much like to hear fom the flyers in this place. What happens when you have the numbers advantage, and your fliers have 40 or 50 times the experience of the enemy.The enemy has an aircraft faster more manouverable and more heavily armed than your mount, but you outnumber him by about 5:1 and your guys know what they are doing, and the fast guy doesnt. What happens in that scenario.

Dont underestimate the advantage that inititiave will give to your people

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I never flew combat and have a lot less time than Joe. Having said that the number one thing about flying in high tension/agitation circumstances is that you do the right things instinctively about controlling your aircraft. That comes only with repetitive training and familiarity.

Add the additional factors of a.) choosing to engage, b.) manuevering for advantage against an opponent that sees you, and c.) manuvering with skill, without having to think 'control', with the aircraft as part of you (i.e. situational awareness and ability to keep your opponent in sight without 'thinking about your controls) - just 'doing it.

A 300 hour total time pilot, average, is far better able to do this than a 200 hour pilot. A 2000 hour pilot may be every bit as good as the 10,000 hour pilot by contrast - given the same talent.

The other differentiator is attitude. Aggressiveness comes with confidence.

There are few exceptions in the low time bandwidth

Not having or delaying the hellcat is a cost, not a benefot. essentially what im trying to get you guys to do is undertake some sort of cost benefit analysis. Ther are a lot of ifs to what im suggesting. What was the actual cost of the hellcat program, did it cause a delay in the building of the wartime carrier fleet, how would the US have known that they might not need the Hellcat. These are all valid questions as to practicality, but the questions raised still dont diminish or deflect the hypothetical Im chalenging you guys with. Essentially it goes like this

If the US was able to get 3 or 4 additional carriers early in 1943, in exchange for delaying the hellcat program by 8 or 9 months, would the US war effort have been better off or worse off than the historical model? The question is not, if the hellcat wasnt built, and no benefit arises from that? That would obviously be a negative effect. The question is, how much is maintaining the initiative and forward movement of an offensive worth?

drgondog said:

I never flew combat and have a lot less time than Joe. Having said that the number one thing about flying in high tension/agitation circumstances is that you do the right things instinctively about controlling your aircraft. That comes only with repetitive training and familiarity.

Add the additional factors of a.) choosing to engage, b.) manuevering for advantage against an opponent that sees you, and c.) manuvering with skill, without having to think 'control', with the aircraft as part of you (i.e. situational awareness and ability to keep your opponent in sight without 'thinking about your controls) - just 'doing it.

A 300 hour total time pilot, average, is far better able to do this than a 200 hour pilot. A 2000 hour pilot may be every bit as good as the 10,000 hour pilot by contrast - given the same talent.

The other differentiator is attitude. Aggressiveness comes with confidence.

There are few exceptions in the low time bandwidth

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Thanks DG, very helpful, and i can see that you "get it"

I am NOT a SAS guy, but at one stage in my career, I undertook tactical training with a few SAS guys along with our boarding teams. . In exercise we got absolutely trounced by these guys. they were bloody good. one of their secrets was maintaining forward momentum. Once they got the initiative, those guys dont let go of it easily. they dont advance blindly....that just gets you killed, but once they have their opponents backpedalling, no matter how much defensive fire you bring down on them, they keep moving, generally in stages to provide covering fire. Before you know it they are in your flanks and your drawing enfilading fire. I think thats the same principal as what im advocating here. Get the initiative, and in a strategic sense, dont give your opponent the slightes opportunity for recovery. For us guys directing, you cant afford to stop thinking....that can get people killed as well, but its important to keep the forwar momewntum as much as possible....

IMO - this was the greatest single factor in 8th/9th AF success against LW when they were turned loose in 1944. Attack, attack, attack was the standard. Conversely, very talented and experienced LW fighter pilots were neutered by Goering doctrine to avoid fighter combat - or be sacked.

LW could have, in my opinion, inflicted serious casualties and stripped 8th FC of many future great leaders and fighter pilots in April through October 1943 timeframe by reversing the policy and attacking US fighters as a matter of course while the US pilots were seriously tethered in defensive posture close to the bombers - giving LW complete option to engage or not.

Yes, i agree. I also think that the Mustang was one of those rare aircraft that is the exception to the rule. Ive expressed the opinion here and elsewhere, that fighters alone dont win air campaigns, because the cause of losses is simply too diverse. but the Mustang took what a losing proposition and turned it aroud completely. I acknowledge your point....they got more than a litle help fom the germans themselves....but the campaign October 43 through to June 44 should have been an unmitigated disaster for the USAAF. If Id been around August '43, I would have been saying to the 8th commanders, "give it up boys!!!" " You havent a chance!!!", But they proved sce[tics like me Im wrong. The US air victory that winter should not be under-estimated

parsifal said:

Playing games as ever i see. You already think you know dont you. Im going to say no idea. They didnt enter flight school until the end of 1943 at the earliest. But enlighten us please......this will be funny im sure

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I don't know where you're getting this "playing games" thing from. I asked you about their training programs. I thought it would have occurred to you to have looked into those facts before you formed your opinions. It's obvious to me now you have a somewhat different methodology that doesn't entail looking into facts.