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Hello Vincenzo
The Battle off North Cape showed that even 14in shells, which had a bit less penetration power against decks than 15in, could from long range damage Sch. so badly that loss of speed was result, saying nothing on knocking out main artillery turrets.
Juha
Hi Vincenzo,
the first one was the original scheme!
And the other one was a modified or alternative scheme from me with the same armour weight.
Pardon me but this is nonsense, she beated down one of them very badly (IIRC when she popped up the second time)... Sure it reminds me of King Arthur and the Black Knight.. Arthur was certainly incapable of properly dealing with him, only cut off the limbs
.
Scharnhorst only ever got one or two hits on the Norfolk, due entirely to the Norfolk not having flashless powder. The other cruisers were using this new propellant, and were never troubled by Scharnhorsts fire
Any specifics or sources? According the Garzke and Dullin, the captain of Gneisenau (? - too lazy to look up) spoke very highly of the radar sets and their usefullness.
Cant answer right now with specifics, but I will give you the operational details of Scharnhorst versus the British radar fits in a day or two. Basically, there was no comparison in the relative performances of the radar capabilities by 1943. Different story in 1940-41 however.....D
Any specifics?
Disagree... radar IS using radio waves, its easy to detect (the Bismarck fairly easy picked up the HMS PoW's radar signals, even though itself was actually not detected). Scharnhorst was disengaging, switching radar on was equivalent to trying to flee in the dark with a torch in your hand... I would be very surprised if Allied ships would lack such passive sensors.
Scharnhorst was not trying to disengage at all, she was attempting to outflank the cruiser force. Moreover, of the Germans had used radar to keep their forces together, 4th Zerstorer flotilla would not have wandered off lost before the battle. This was the second biggest coup the cruisers achieved against the german dforce....the first was the destruction of the German radar set, effectively blinding the German ship, the second was the determination that 4th flotilla was not present to protect the Scharnhorst close in.....this meant that the RN ships could close to lethal range with impunity, including the destroyres to point blank range, with no threat to them by German torpedoes. Gunfire, even the hevay secondary armament carried by the Sharnhorst is not enough, generally to prevent destroyers and cruisers from closing to lethal range. Firstly, a destroyer or cruiser is a difficult target to hit with guns, and secondly guns might damage a ship, but will not generally disable it, except if hit multiple times.
So, this is the comparison...one force not using radar, starts out concentrated, gets hopelessly lost, ambushed, disabled, and ultimately sunk. The second force, able to co-ordinate and concentrate their forces, with very accurate fire, and able to determine the precise nature, and force disposition of the enemy at the right moment....whose policy and use of technology as well as understanding of basic naval tactics is superior????? It is invalid to argue simply that the Germans were simply outnumbered....they were, but this just didnt happen by chance.....they allowed it to happen to themselves mostly . The Germans could have had at least some parity in their force structure, but as a direct result of their mistaken use of radar, failed to achieve this outcome
Not using radar, as a means of passive defence proved a much more dangerous policy that led directly to the loss of the great ship. If the Germans had been equipped with and using an effective search radar, it would have been very difficult for the British to trap her.
Pardon me but this is nonsense, she beated down one of them very badly (IIRC when she popped up the second time)... Sure it reminds me of King Arthur and the Black Knight.. Arthur was certainly incapable of properly dealing with him, only cut off the limbs.
Scharnhorst only ever got one or two hits on the Norfolk, due entirely to the Norfolk not having flashless powder. The other cruisers were using this new propellant, and were never troubled by Scharnhorsts fire
Riiight, Norfolk was 'only hit by once or twice', but afaik this 'slight damage' in December 1943 meant she needed such level of repairs which took so long the ship was not ready even for D-Day six months later.. As for the others not troubled, of course, the forward FC set was knocked out with an early lucky hit, so they could aim at the gun flashes only. And...? I don't see where you are going with this...
Any specifics or sources? According the Garzke and Dullin, the captain of Gneisenau (? - too lazy to look up) spoke very highly of the radar sets and their usefullness.
Cant answer right now with specifics, but I will give you the operational details of Scharnhorst versus the British radar fits in a day or two. Basically, there was no comparison in the relative performances of the radar capabilities by 1943. Different story in 1940-41 however.....D
I have looked up thespecification of the FuMo 26/27 that Scharnhorst had at that time. The specs are impressive, but I'll give you possibility to look up the specs of the respective rather sets and finally present us something that is beyond the current, as it seems, wishful arguement based on absolute ignorance of the actual capabilities of the sets used on these ships.
Based on the capabilities of the Fumo 27, especially its accuracy in both range and bearing, I strongly believe that there could be no practical tactical advantage for Allied radar.
Scharnhorst was disengaging, switching radar on was equivalent to trying to flee in the dark with a torch in your hand... I would be very surprised if Allied ships would lack such passive sensors[/I].
Scharnhorst was not trying to disengage at all, she was attempting to outflank the cruiser force.
For which she needed to disengage first of course, cease contact and become invisible of course... I really do not see what are arguing here on semantics..
Moreover, of the Germans had used radar to keep their forces together, 4th Zerstorer flotilla would not have wandered off lost before the battle.
Utter nonsense, the 4th Zerstorer flotilla was sent out by Bey on a wider search pattern for the convoy, not 'wandered off lost' as you try to suggest... and again having absolutely nothing to do with radar at all.
This was the second biggest coup the cruisers achieved against the german dforce....the first was the destruction of the German radar set, effectively blinding the German ship, the second was the determination that 4th flotilla was not present to protect the Scharnhorst close in.....this meant that the RN ships could close to lethal range with impunity, including the destroyres to point blank range, with no threat to them by German torpedoes. Gunfire, even the hevay secondary armament carried by the Sharnhorst is not enough, generally to prevent destroyers and cruisers from closing to lethal range. Firstly, a destroyer or cruiser is a difficult target to hit with guns, and secondly guns might damage a ship, but will not generally disable it, except if hit multiple times.
The destroyers did not close in until the matter was sealed and Scharnhorst was slowed down effectively from battle damage sustained from the DoY. The cruisers did not close in for torp runs until Scharnhorst guns were effectively silenced by gunfire...
So, this is the comparison...one force not using radar, starts out concentrated, gets hopelessly lost, ambushed, disabled, and ultimately sunk. The second force, able to co-ordinate and concentrate their forces, with very accurate fire, and able to determine the precise nature, and force disposition of the enemy at the right moment....whose policy and use of technology as well as understanding of basic naval tactics is superior?????
Its your comparison only though, and as pointed out, it is based on heavy colouring of the events (see 'lost' destroyers, 'due to' radar..) and driven by nationalistic bravado... as such it is rather meaningless IMHo, it just fits to your usual stance on this and just about any other subject.
It is invalid to argue simply that the Germans were simply outnumbered....they were, but this just didnt happen by chance.....they allowed it to happen to themselves mostly . The Germans could have had at least some parity in their force structure, but as a direct result of their mistaken use of radar, failed to achieve this outcome.
The German side had a light Battleship with 11" guns, escorted by 5 destroyers.
The British side 1 battleship with 14" guns, 1 heavy and 3 light cruisers, and 9 destroyers.
You are arguing nonsense. Even with the German force concentrated, they would massively outnumbered all the same.
If the Germans had been equipped with and using an effective search radar, it would have been very difficult for the British to trap her.
They had an effective search radar, and effective passive sets. Again your facts on this are simply wrong.
The German side had a light Battleship with 11" guns, escorted by 5 destroyers.
The British side 1 battleship with 14" guns, 1 heavy and 3 light cruisers, and 9 destroyers..
Tue but it tends to ignore the fact that the BB and her escort were out of the fight for hours and in that time the Scharnhorst was up against cruisers that could not penetrate her armour. She had plenty of time to inflict serious damage.
Not against the convoy and its close escort.You are arguing nonsense. Even with the German force concentrated, they would massively outnumbered all the same..
Clearly the passive sets were not effective or they would have seen the DOY, plus the Germans relied on a few radar sets the 80cm Seetakt being on the forward and aft fire control posts. Therefore one hit made her blind forward. RN ships had Type 284 (main Armament) and Type 273Q surface search so there was back up. The surface search radar would not have helped with fire control but would have warned of danger ahead.They had an effective search radar, and effective passive sets. Again your facts on this are simply wrong.
The German destroyers didn't have any radar so as soon as they left the Scharhorst no matter what the reason they were out of the fight. Trying to find a convoy at night in rough seas and without radar is almost a lost cause.
Clearly the passive sets were not effective or they would have seen the DOY,
plus the Germans relied on a few radar sets the 80cm Seetakt being on the forward and aft fire control posts.
The surface search radar would not have helped with fire control but would have warned of danger ahead.
The German destroyers didn't have any radar
Thanks for the information its appreciated. The only question mark I have is the fitting of the Hohentweil on the destroyers, my understanding is that this happened during 1944 not1943. The rest I accept without question.In fact, They were very effective, but the lucky hit on the foremast destroyed both, passive systems and the forward Seetakt radar set as both thenm were grouped closely, so It didn´t worked only because It was previously destroyed, but there are evidences of traces of signals picked up by the "Scharnhorst" from the "Jamaica" or the "DoY" some 15 minutes before the final battle thanks to a "Naxos" set given by the Luftwaffe. But this set couldn´t track properly the range nor the true size of the enemy.
That is not correct. The "Scharnhorst" had a "Hohentwiel" set plus the two "Seetakt" sets.
Only If It is turned on, but the main problem was that when the "Scharnhorst" firstly engaged the British Heavy crusiers, activated the "Funkmesstile" ("silent active radar" more or less) protocol, turning off all the radar sets and leaving only the passive sets which were still working to escape from them.
That is nonsense, all the German heavy destroyers had one "Seetakt" set instaled from 1942, and from mid to finish 1943, also a "Hohentwiel" surface search set also, among the passive radar sets.
Hope this can help.
all the German heavy destroyers had one "Seetakt" set installed from 1942…"
That is also my understanding. Did they use their radars?
" They were very effective, but the lucky hit on the foremast destroyed both, passive systems and the forward Seetakt radar set as both them were grouped closely, so it didn't worked only because it was previously destroyed…"
Interesting, but why didn't they pick up the radars of the cruisers before the first clash; the cruisers have had Sch. in their screens c. 54 minutes before they opened fire?
Thanks for the information it's appreciated.
The only question mark I have is the fitting of the Hohentwiel on the destroyers; my understanding is that this happened during 1944 not 1943.
It must be said though you have to wonder why the radars were not turned on once combat had been initiated.
I doubt if passive sets were able to allow blind firing and at night that is pretty critical.
There is a pretty good account of the battle by Mike Kemble, a well known author, at the following site
The Battle-Cruiser Scharnhorst
A few things that have been raisede that need to be responded to
There were a number of passive detection systems that could be in use with the KM that I know of, including Metox, Naxos, Samos and Timor. There were others, but as far as I am aware they were incapable of detecting the HF radars below the 10cm wavelengths such as the Type 274.
Afaik, effective passive detection of this radar was not developed until the mid-50s.
Korfu saw little use,
As will be seen below, Naxos was unable to detect either the Type 284M
or the Type 274 gunnery radars in use by the RN in the battle
Metox was a similar device, able to detect radars above the 10 cm bandwidth.
Since the surface radars installed in the RN surface ships after 1942 were all well below this wavelengt,
even against its intended target ASV radars,
"German radar was comparable in performance to the late war British radars"
German radar was in fact comparable to British radar in 1940-41, but lagged very badly as the war progressed, especially those sets actually employed in an operational capacity
Type 284/284M/274/Fumo 27
in that order. Note that DoY was fitted with Type 284M and Type 274,
and Scharnhorst with FuMO 27 at the time of the battle
Frequency: 600/600/3296/368. Frequency is important because it is a major determinant in the definition the set will achieve and its overall accuracy.
As can be seen, the German set operated at about half that of the Type 284s, and about 10% as high as the Type 274.
Power: 25/150/400/60 (FUMO 34)
Pulse (microseconds): 2/1/0.5/5.0
Bearing Error: +/-30/5/3/300
By 1945, my sources tell me that the new sets fitted to the Prinz Eugen had reduced the PP to 4 microseconds, and the accuracy to +/-50 m
At no point however were German naval radars at all comparable to Allied radars,
I will continue to rely on the sources that I draw from, such as Campbell and the nav weapons
since they are accepted by all
cocketed pro-germans
and in fact the Germans only let us win because they felt sorry for us