parsifal
Colonel
The Planning of the War
To understand the the inevitable march to war, and also why things are not always what they seem, it is necessary or useful to understand the background and broad nature of each nations war plans. The next series of posts that i make are intended to give some ideas of each nations war plans
Ever since Germany had inflicted defeat upon France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the major nations of Europe had busied themselves with plans for the next war, seen by many as inevitable given the conflicting ambitions of the major powers; which, in the case of France, included the repossession of Alsace and Lorraine, both lost to Germany as a consequence of the Franco-Prussian War.
Much is made of the German Schlieffen Plan and, to a lesser extent, the French Plan XVII. But what of Austria-Hungary's Plan B and Russia's Plan 19? This article details the primary aims of each of these plans, and discusses the rationale behind them.
France: Plan XVII
The chief aim of Plan XVII, devised by Ferdinand Foch in the wake of the humiliation of the Franco-Prussian War, and taken up by French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre in 1913, was the recapture of the territory of Alsace and Lorraine.
Entirely offensive in nature, Plan XVII made extensive use of the belief in the mystical élan vital assumed to be instilled within every Frenchman - a fighting spirit capable of turning back any enemy by its sheer power. It assumed the average French soldier to be more than a match for its German counterpart. Indeed, numerous French officers were dismissed from the army during the early stage of the war for a want of fighting spirit, including General Lanrezac following the French army's failure at Charleroi.
More technically, Plan XVII called for an advance by four French Armies into Alsace-Lorraine on either side of the Metz-Thionville fortresses, occupied by the Germans since 1871. The southern wing of the invasion forces would first capture Alsace and Lorraine (in that order), whilst the northern wing would - depending upon German movements - advance into Germany via the southern Ardennes forests, or else move north-east into Luxembourg and Belgium.
The architects of Plan XVII, which included Joseph Joffre, took little account of a possible German invasion of France through Belgium until just before war was declared; and in modifying the plan to deploy troops to meet such an eventuality, actual French activity to meet an invasion via Belgium was lacklustre at best in August 1914.
Before war broke out Joffre and his advisers were convinced that the threat of British involvement would keep Germany from invading through Belgium (with whom Britain had a treaty guaranteeing its neutrality; Germany regarded this as a mere "scrap of paper").
Whilst the French had accurately estimated the strength of the German army at the opening of the war, they did not place much emphasis on Germany's extensive use of reserve troops, having little faith in their own. This proved a serious miscalculation which, in conjunction with an underestimation of the Schlieffen Plan, almost led to
France's undoing within a month of the outbreak of war.
Within weeks of the war's start, the French attack into Alsace and Lorraine had proved a debacle, effectively repelled by the German defences. With the inevitable advance of the Schlieffen Plan meanwhile, the French were thrown very much on the defensive.
Germany: Schlieffen Plan
Germany's Schlieffen Plan, named after its chief architect, Count Alfred von Schlieffen, was both offensive and defensive in nature.
Schlieffen - and the men who subsequently enhanced and modified his strategy, including Helmuth von Moltke, German Chief of Staff in 1914 - took as his starting assumption a war on two fronts, against France in the west and Russia in the east. The nature of the alliance system ensured that Russia was allied with France (and latterly Britain), set against Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy.
Notwithstanding the potentially enormous size of the Russian army, with its never-ending supply of men, Schlieffen assumed - largely correctly, as it turned out - that it would take six weeks or longer for the Russians to effectively mobilise their forces, poorly led and equipped as they were.
Banking on this assumption, Schlieffen devised a strategy for knocking France out of the war within those six weeks. In order to do so he would commit the vast majority of German forces in the west to form an overwhelming assault with Paris as its aim, leaving just sufficient forces in East Prussia to hold off the Russians during the latter's mobilisation process. Once France had been dealt with the armies in the west would be redeployed to the east to face the Russian menace.
In striking against France von Schlieffen determined to invade through Belgium; for tactical as well as political reasons, an invasion via Holland was discounted (Germany desired Dutch neutrality for as long as possible); and Switzerland in the south was geographically invasion-proof. Passage through the flat Flanders plains would offer the fastest route to France and victory.
Working to a tight deadline, five German armies would advance through Belgium and France in a grand wheel motion, turning through the Flanders plains north-east of France. The German forces would move from Alsace-Lorraine west through France en route for Paris. Schlieffen's often-quoted remark, "when you march into France, let the last man on the right brush the Channel with his sleeve" was based upon this turning wheel-like advance.
By outflanking the French armies von Schlieffen aimed to attack from the rear, where the French were likely to be most vulnerable. A small German force would guard the Franco-German border, enticing the French to move forward, upon which they would be attacked from the rear by the main bulk of the German army, assuring encirclement and destruction.
A side benefit of the Schlieffen Plan saw the bulk of the French resistance situated within France rather than in Germany. Even while retreating - which was by no means part of the plan - the Germans could (and did) entrench themselves deep inside French territory.
Whilst the French aimed to evict the invader from their country - and consequently constructed their own trenches lightly, never intending that they should be in use for any great length of time - the Germans dug deep, sophisticated trenches, content to remain where they were pending a further advance at some later stage.
The weakness of the Schlieffen Plan lay less in the rigidity of the timescale - for the German army very nearly succeeded in capturing Paris within the time allotted - but in its underestimation of the difficulties of supply and communication in forces so far advanced from command and supply lines.
Ultimately, it was these problems, particularly in communicating strategy from Berlin, that doomed the Schlieffen Plan. The Allied forces could rush troops to the front by use of the railway faster than the Germans could arrange fresh supplies of food and reserve troops.
Most critically, Moltke's isolation from the front line not far from Paris led to a series of poor decisions and a crucial weakening of his forces in the north. A promptly timed French counter-attack exploiting a gap in the German lines at the First Battle of the Marne set off the so-called 'race to the sea' and the onset of static trench warfare. The rapid war of movement was brought to an end.
To understand the the inevitable march to war, and also why things are not always what they seem, it is necessary or useful to understand the background and broad nature of each nations war plans. The next series of posts that i make are intended to give some ideas of each nations war plans
Ever since Germany had inflicted defeat upon France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the major nations of Europe had busied themselves with plans for the next war, seen by many as inevitable given the conflicting ambitions of the major powers; which, in the case of France, included the repossession of Alsace and Lorraine, both lost to Germany as a consequence of the Franco-Prussian War.
Much is made of the German Schlieffen Plan and, to a lesser extent, the French Plan XVII. But what of Austria-Hungary's Plan B and Russia's Plan 19? This article details the primary aims of each of these plans, and discusses the rationale behind them.
France: Plan XVII
The chief aim of Plan XVII, devised by Ferdinand Foch in the wake of the humiliation of the Franco-Prussian War, and taken up by French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre in 1913, was the recapture of the territory of Alsace and Lorraine.
Entirely offensive in nature, Plan XVII made extensive use of the belief in the mystical élan vital assumed to be instilled within every Frenchman - a fighting spirit capable of turning back any enemy by its sheer power. It assumed the average French soldier to be more than a match for its German counterpart. Indeed, numerous French officers were dismissed from the army during the early stage of the war for a want of fighting spirit, including General Lanrezac following the French army's failure at Charleroi.
More technically, Plan XVII called for an advance by four French Armies into Alsace-Lorraine on either side of the Metz-Thionville fortresses, occupied by the Germans since 1871. The southern wing of the invasion forces would first capture Alsace and Lorraine (in that order), whilst the northern wing would - depending upon German movements - advance into Germany via the southern Ardennes forests, or else move north-east into Luxembourg and Belgium.
The architects of Plan XVII, which included Joseph Joffre, took little account of a possible German invasion of France through Belgium until just before war was declared; and in modifying the plan to deploy troops to meet such an eventuality, actual French activity to meet an invasion via Belgium was lacklustre at best in August 1914.
Before war broke out Joffre and his advisers were convinced that the threat of British involvement would keep Germany from invading through Belgium (with whom Britain had a treaty guaranteeing its neutrality; Germany regarded this as a mere "scrap of paper").
Whilst the French had accurately estimated the strength of the German army at the opening of the war, they did not place much emphasis on Germany's extensive use of reserve troops, having little faith in their own. This proved a serious miscalculation which, in conjunction with an underestimation of the Schlieffen Plan, almost led to
France's undoing within a month of the outbreak of war.
Within weeks of the war's start, the French attack into Alsace and Lorraine had proved a debacle, effectively repelled by the German defences. With the inevitable advance of the Schlieffen Plan meanwhile, the French were thrown very much on the defensive.
Germany: Schlieffen Plan
Germany's Schlieffen Plan, named after its chief architect, Count Alfred von Schlieffen, was both offensive and defensive in nature.
Schlieffen - and the men who subsequently enhanced and modified his strategy, including Helmuth von Moltke, German Chief of Staff in 1914 - took as his starting assumption a war on two fronts, against France in the west and Russia in the east. The nature of the alliance system ensured that Russia was allied with France (and latterly Britain), set against Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy.
Notwithstanding the potentially enormous size of the Russian army, with its never-ending supply of men, Schlieffen assumed - largely correctly, as it turned out - that it would take six weeks or longer for the Russians to effectively mobilise their forces, poorly led and equipped as they were.
Banking on this assumption, Schlieffen devised a strategy for knocking France out of the war within those six weeks. In order to do so he would commit the vast majority of German forces in the west to form an overwhelming assault with Paris as its aim, leaving just sufficient forces in East Prussia to hold off the Russians during the latter's mobilisation process. Once France had been dealt with the armies in the west would be redeployed to the east to face the Russian menace.
In striking against France von Schlieffen determined to invade through Belgium; for tactical as well as political reasons, an invasion via Holland was discounted (Germany desired Dutch neutrality for as long as possible); and Switzerland in the south was geographically invasion-proof. Passage through the flat Flanders plains would offer the fastest route to France and victory.
Working to a tight deadline, five German armies would advance through Belgium and France in a grand wheel motion, turning through the Flanders plains north-east of France. The German forces would move from Alsace-Lorraine west through France en route for Paris. Schlieffen's often-quoted remark, "when you march into France, let the last man on the right brush the Channel with his sleeve" was based upon this turning wheel-like advance.
By outflanking the French armies von Schlieffen aimed to attack from the rear, where the French were likely to be most vulnerable. A small German force would guard the Franco-German border, enticing the French to move forward, upon which they would be attacked from the rear by the main bulk of the German army, assuring encirclement and destruction.
A side benefit of the Schlieffen Plan saw the bulk of the French resistance situated within France rather than in Germany. Even while retreating - which was by no means part of the plan - the Germans could (and did) entrench themselves deep inside French territory.
Whilst the French aimed to evict the invader from their country - and consequently constructed their own trenches lightly, never intending that they should be in use for any great length of time - the Germans dug deep, sophisticated trenches, content to remain where they were pending a further advance at some later stage.
The weakness of the Schlieffen Plan lay less in the rigidity of the timescale - for the German army very nearly succeeded in capturing Paris within the time allotted - but in its underestimation of the difficulties of supply and communication in forces so far advanced from command and supply lines.
Ultimately, it was these problems, particularly in communicating strategy from Berlin, that doomed the Schlieffen Plan. The Allied forces could rush troops to the front by use of the railway faster than the Germans could arrange fresh supplies of food and reserve troops.
Most critically, Moltke's isolation from the front line not far from Paris led to a series of poor decisions and a crucial weakening of his forces in the north. A promptly timed French counter-attack exploiting a gap in the German lines at the First Battle of the Marne set off the so-called 'race to the sea' and the onset of static trench warfare. The rapid war of movement was brought to an end.
