How good was the soviet air force? (1 Viewer)

[Luft.4]

It follows logically from your statements

You are responding to something which I did not state, and something which I even explicit state the opposite of (post #634). Reread what I posted about the Allied involvement in eastern front.
What part of in the east is so difficult for you to understand?

I see that you make incorrect statements.

Wrong, but I can see that you are quite unfamiliar with the sources and infer incorrectly despite the text being visible on your screen (about Harder as but one example). Reread your own posts on it if you don't believe me (#600). Harder was talking about how dangerous his soviet opposition was not quality; you stated quality. Seems to me it is you with the incorrect statements.
Oh here is another one: enigma traffic was filled with Germans whining and complaining about perfectionism...

If you take the time to read posts perhaps you could see that nobody told about the Allied missions in the east - it was an indirect impact.

Oh boy .... "The VVS need the help of the USAAF and the RAF to fought successfully in the east."
What the third (3rd) last word is in this quote above?

We are talking about the Soviets. The war in the East and in the West was quite different. Or does that not make sense to you either?

I'm pointing out that such logic fails immediately if another airforce is put in place, such as the USAAF. Reread what you posted, and think about the relationship you drew between air superiority and decisive factors. Faulty logic right there, hence me pointing it out. Sorry if that offends you.

Enjoy the rest of this thread, peace.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I see its starting to get heated, again…

Please remain civil. Not saying it again.

 

[bf109xxl]

You are responding to something which I did not state, and something which I even explicit state the opposite of (post #634)

Initial thesis: "The VVS need the help of the USAAF and the RAF to fought successfully in the east." (Post #626) No one word about the missions in the East. no one word about the direct impact. Now you statement from the post #634: "In a full-on continental war one should not be surprised that multiple factors overlapped, but to flat out state the Soviets needed the USAAF and RAF to win the war in the East is too big of an unsubstantiated stretch for me given the available documentary evidence. Med and Western Europe air activity certainly assisted in speeding things up, but that this won the war over the east, no. Fighting in the east won the air war over the east."
Initial thesis was, that the VVS needed help, i.e., about victory in the air war. You have simply substituted this thesis with your own - about victory in general. And nobody talked about it, although this topic is worthy of a separate discussion.

What part of in the east is so difficult for you to understand?

Try to understand the meaning of the phrase as a whole rather than in parts.

Reread what I posted about the Allied involvement in eastern front.

It is not necessary - initially it was spoken only about the assistance to VVS to fight successfully, nobody told about direct participation in the air combat in the east.

Wrong, but I can see that you are quite unfamiliar with the sources

I am familiar enough with the Soviet sources to draw a conclusion that you are quite unfamiliar with them. You still haven't supported any of your statements with numbers. Just emotions.

and infer incorrectly despite the text being visible on your screen (about Harder as but one example). Reread your own posts on it if you don't believe me (#600). Harder was talking about how dangerous his soviet opposition was not quality; you stated quality. Seems to me it is you with the incorrect statements.

Yeah, except that the reason of Harder's crash wasn't determined with certainty. But more on that later. As well as about the aircraft's performance.

Oh here is another one: enigma traffic was filled with Germans whining and complaining about perfectionism..

If you don't understand the meaning of any words, it's best not to use them. Own perfectionism isn't something people complain about, it's something they suffer from.

Oh boy .... "The VVS need the help of the USAAF and the RAF to fought successfully in the east."
What the third (3rd) last word is in this quote above?

Where is the indication here that the RAF and USAAF should themselves directly fight in the east? You're having trouble with logic again.

I'm pointing out that such logic fails immediately if another airforce is put in place, such as the USAAF.

It's not logic, it's your personal imagination. No AF should fight directly in the east to provide indirect (and crucial) assistance to the Soviet Air Force in the east.

Reread what you posted, and think about the relationship you drew between air superiority and decisive factors. Faulty logic right there, hence me pointing it out. Sorry if that offends you.

The decisive factor for air supremacy was a huge numerical superiority, which would not have been so huge if most of the Luftwaffe fighters were not busy in the west. So your claims to my logic can hardly be called substantiated.

Enjoy the rest of this thread, peace.

I'm not done yet - and neither with Harder. Don't expect your funny comparisons go without a response.

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

Wrong, 21 Ju 87 D5 were produced and delivered in September 1944. Beitrag zur Beschaffungsmeldung for September.
Your numbers for lost aircraft are likewise wrong: see my post above for losses (w/ and w/o %s), plus the fact that 1944 losses remain incomplete. There was alot more than 502. This is only for the eastern front.
Your understanding that the rate of loss was sustainable/linear is also wrong. Numbers I posted for losses were only for the eastern front. You must add to that western front / other front losses. As such the statement:

is not accurate at all because 1) its 9 months in 1944, 2) there were alot more Ju 87 losses than 502, and 3) with the high rate of 100% losses and crew deaths you are forced to fly the remaining aircraft with less experienced crews which increases the probability of future losses.

Yes: beyond its dwindling role it was delegated while units awaited the Fw 190s, it was used mainly for towing gliders into pockets, training aircraft for schools, nachtschlacht duties, and to build up reserves for other units when taken out of front line duty (as found ordered in HW-5). Bf 109 Es were used till the very end because they could still fly, the LW was desperate to use what they could.

The Bf 109 G6 was still being produced in Feb 1945 (!) because they had the parts and needed the aircraft. Bf 109 G14s were put ahead of K4 production in early 1945 because they needed to satisfy contracts for the former. One should consider that the plants had contracts agreed to many months prior that they needed to fulfill despite the realities at the front, and how bureaucracy plays a part in military production.

Ok next.

Twin engine aircraft in the east by wars end were now spplit between teir intended roles and for troop transport and supply dropping. If more twin engine aircraft were to be sent over, more would be used to supply trapped garrisions.
ADD/18VA activites did not require anywhere the same attention as the RAF, no need to send over additional NJGs.
The majority of transports were in the east and Balkans by war's end.
What would more bombers on the eastern front have contributed? As already stated ground attack and dive bombing aircraft like the Ju 87 were being retired and Fw 190s were given that role. KG units were being converted to fighter units KG(J), while those that werent (KG4 as an example) were preoccupied with supply dropping or glider towing, not bombing. Furthermore, spare twin engined bombers were used up for Mistels, not for bombing. The bomber itself became the bomb.

Fair. You have yours, I have mine.
In a full-on continental war one should not be surprised that multiple factors overlapped, but to flat out state the Soviets needed the USAAF and RAF to win the war in the East is too big of an unsubstantiated stretch for me given the available documentary evidence. Med and Western Europe air activity certainly assisted in speeding things up, but that this won the war over the east, no. Fighting in the east won the air war over the east.
Are you under the bizarre impression Africa and the Med won the war in the east? I hope not.

Please list the USAAF and RAF fighting contribution in the east. Otherwise cursory activities such as the Med/Africa can easily be countered with how the overwhelming majority of the second world war's European conflict occurred in the east.

Did the Brits/Americans win in Greece and Italy because the Soviets ADD dropped supplies to the Balkan partisans and with their long range Yak-9DD escorts they helped downed allied crews get back to Italy? Of course not. Although these activities did take place, they are cursory to the actual fighting. Once again, please list the actual USAAF and RAF fighting in the east and how those limited mission won the VVS the air war over the east.

How many times did the western allies fight over the east? ~100 times and this won the war there? Come on...

Maybe the things I want to say get lost in translation, but certainly I didn't say many of the things you say that I said:

Wrong, 21 Ju 87 D5 were produced and delivered in September 1944. Beitrag zur Beschaffungsmeldung for September.
Your numbers for lost aircraft are likewise wrong: see my post above for losses (w/ and w/o %s), plus the fact that 1944 losses remain incomplete. There was alot more than 502. This is only for the eastern front.
Your understanding that the rate of loss was sustainable/linear is also wrong. Numbers I posted for losses were only for the eastern front. You must add to that western front / other front losses. As such the statement:

is not accurate at all because 1) its 9 months in 1944, 2) there were alot more Ju 87 losses than 502, and 3) with the high rate of 100% losses and crew deaths you are forced to fly the remaining aircraft with less experienced crews which increases the probability of future losses.

I missunderstood you in the losses. I understood that 502 were the whole for 1944, not just for the eastern front. I don't know if you have them for other theathers. Meanwhile, I think we can agree in the educated guess that all other fronts combines must had been considerably less than the 502 lost in the east due to their usage in less frontline and riskier missions. So some 300 losses is a number we can agree? If yes, again by your numbers, a linear proyection (that, as I had said in my post, come with "all the caveats that losses weren't lineal and building rate neither most probably") some 100 aircraft build a month in 9 months (with 21 build in the last month, some 110 build a month for the first eight months of 1944) going with your numbers. With our educated guess of some 800 Stuka losses everywhere in 1944, we come to a mean of 67 losses a month (with all the caveats that losses weren't lineal). So in 1944 for the Ju.87 (an outdated plane), as long as the production run was working, it was good enough for the eastern front but not the western or mediterranean fronts.

Why some SG units in the eastern front had to wait for the Fw.190 flying with the Ju.87? Could be that other theathers had priority? If so, why? Could be that the eastern AIR front wasn't regarded as lethal or as important than others?

Twin engine aircraft in the east by wars end were now spplit between teir intended roles and for troop transport and supply dropping. If more twin engine aircraft were to be sent over, more would be used to supply trapped garrisions.
ADD/18VA activites did not require anywhere the same attention as the RAF, no need to send over additional NJGs.
The majority of transports were in the east and Balkans by war's end.

The twin engined aircraft I mention weren't useful as transports or supply dropping.

Neither the Ju.88 or the Bf.110 had any use as transports and marginal at best for supply drops. Not even the He.111 had much use in that role (just read any Stalingrad airlift account, could not lift bulky cargos, nor heavy ones nor be fast enough).

I wasn't talking about sending more NF to the east. There wasn't a need or it as you said.

More twins of the types I mention at an earlier date could mean more CAS, bombing and interdiction sorties against the Red Army and the VVS airstrips and that won't had been good news for the soviet armies. Would that had change the outcome of the war? No. Would that made it bloodier for the soviets? Yes.

In a full-on continental war one should not be surprised that multiple factors overlapped, but to flat out state the Soviets needed the USAAF and RAF to win the war in the East is too big of an unsubstantiated stretch for me given the available documentary evidence. Med and Western Europe air activity certainly assisted in speeding things up, but that this won the war over the east, no. Fighting in the east won the air war over the east.
Are you under the bizarre impression Africa and the Med won the war in the east? I hope not.

Would you be so kind to quote where I said that?

Once again, please list the actual USAAF and RAF fighting in the east and how those limited mission won the VVS the air war over the east.

How many times did the western allies fight over the east? ~100 times and this won the war there? Come on...

Again, could you quote in my post where I said that?

I think the point here is not the few dozen Allied missions for the benefits of the Eastern Front but the whole Allied contribution to the air war in Europe. Lend-lease provided VVS with equipment and materials (fuel included), Allied bombing weakened the industrial base, changed German priorities and didn't allow LW to increase its fighter and AAA force in the East, Allies degraded the logistic network, etc. There were other influences, such as operations in the Mediterranean that forced LW to redeploy forces. Or the Battle of the Atlantic, which is not often mentioned in this context. Each new submarine (as a replacement to yet another U-boat sunk by Allied aircraft) required resources that could be used for tanks and artillery for the Eastern Front.
For the credit of VVS, its massive expansion turned the force into a steamroller which was, with all efficiency issues and non-flexibility, a serious factor in the Soviet advances in the last 2 years.

My opinion is just like this.

 

[Luft.4]

Maybe the things I want to say get lost in translation, but certainly I didn't say many of the things you say that I said:


I missunderstood you in the losses. I understood that 502 were the whole for 1944, not just for the eastern front. I don't know if you have them for other theathers. Meanwhile, I think we can agree in the educated guess that all other fronts combines must had been considerably less than the 502 lost in the east due to their usage in less frontline and riskier missions. So some 300 losses is a number we can agree? If yes, again by your numbers, a linear proyection (that, as I had said in my post, come with "all the caveats that losses weren't lineal and building rate neither most probably") some 100 aircraft build a month in 9 months (with 21 build in the last month, some 110 build a month for the first eight months of 1944) going with your numbers. With our educated guess of some 800 Stuka losses everywhere in 1944, we come to a mean of 67 losses a month (with all the caveats that losses weren't lineal). So in 1944 for the Ju.87 (an outdated plane), as long as the production run was working, it was good enough for the eastern front but not the western or mediterranean fronts.

Why some SG units in the eastern front had to wait for the Fw.190 flying with the Ju.87? Could be that other theathers had priority? If so, why? Could be that the eastern AIR front wasn't regarded as lethal or as important than others?


The twin engined aircraft I mention weren't useful as transports or supply dropping.

Neither the Ju.88 or the Bf.110 had any use as transports and marginal at best for supply drops. Not even the He.111 had much use in that role (just read any Stalingrad airlift account, could not lift bulky cargos, nor heavy ones nor be fast enough).

I wasn't talking about sending more NF to the east. There wasn't a need or it as you said.

More twins of the types I mention at an earlier date could mean more CAS, bombing and interdiction sorties against the Red Army and the VVS airstrips and that won't had been good news for the soviet armies. Would that had change the outcome of the war? No. Would that made it bloodier for the soviets? Yes.


Would you be so kind to quote where I said that?


Again, could you quote in my post where I said that?


My opinion is just like this.

Respectfully, you are incorrect again with the numbers.

"Ps. on the subject of Ju 87s in the east in 1944, a quick check in my database shows 502 aircraft with damage over 60% (482 aircraft damaged 100%). In the German system, damage over 60% was considered unusable (Prien, IV. JG 3, Vol.4, p.332). There are an additional 234 Ju 87s with damage reported (% not specified). Data for 1944 is not complete, meaning there probably are even more Ju 87 losses. Beitrag zur Beschaffungsmeldung and C-Amt for 1944 (Jan-Dec inclusive) show only 904 Ju 87s were built. The rate of Ju 87 losses in 1944 (in the east alone!) is completely not sustainable compared to its production.
Pss. there was a reason why Ju 87s were being hurriedly replaced by Fw 190s over the east in 1944."

502 + some unknown part of 234 + western stuka losses + unknown number of 1944 losses not yet found because the 1944 losses are incomplete.

Because I am kind I ran some numbers for you: 1051 Ju 87 losses I have records of damaged 60+% and/or damaged but the percentage not known. To this number (whatever it shakes out to be) must be assumed an unknown number of additional losses yet to be found.
I do not have the most complete database, others would have more.

Ju 87s used until Fw 190s showed up. All it shows is that the LW had to keep the old Ju 87s flying until their replacements could appear, and they paid the price (in Stuka crews and aircraft) for it.

He 111 not useful for supply dropping or transportation??? The curious things people can come up with...
Budapest and Breaslau pockets would beg to differ, along with the evacuations in the Balkans, etc.
Facts stand that the more twin engined aircraft sent to the eastern front, particularly those that could carry heavy loads, the more they were delegated to supply dropping and transport tasks rather than bombing.
They were used as defacto bombs.

I have the flight logs of no less than 18 He 111 crew members for late 1944/45 (and counting). Guess what they were flying: supply missions.
The entire of KG 4 became a supply dropping lifesaver in 1944/45, heck even 14.(eins)/KG 27 became a supply dropping unit rather than a loco-busting unit. Fw 190s were employed as supply dropping aircraft as well. This was all because the situation called for it.

This thread is become a echo chamber for each player, little progress. Have the last word. Peace.

 

[nuuumannn]

You will obviously have to endure a bit of accusations of copying. By the way, you claim that they are copying, but for some reason you blame EVERYONE for that. Can I be offended here? Is there a justification? Should I share my hatred with you?
Next, you first suggest agreeing that the USSR has a great system. Then you describe it as suffocating, sudden, brutal and terrible. A good attempt to reach an agreement. Yes, terrible. And not like a normal one. The system is good, it eats children for dinner.
I am a Russian engineer and a cosmic smart. Thank you. Did you report this? The power do what I'm doing or me? I didn't copy. but studied. Not powers studied.
Let's discuss not confidence, but the history. A good reason to introduce us here with examples of copying from the USSR and PRC. Not all examples, but one for "the US, the Brits and the Germans".
And in which country under discussion did you find a lack of institutions, comparing with the USSR? What do you know about their competition and even enmity?
Copying is sin. Profanuses and profanus-bosses love copying. It's easier to tell us engineers to "do the same", only big. Choice to menu by finger tap. The right system does not suppress the imagination. Let's attention to the fact that according to one specification, engineers give a dozen VERY different aircraft. Unless they are in a terrible stiffed system and their opinion isn't asked. In the USSR, they also offered different, but much more often they chose to copy. It didn't work out well. It is better then to licensed, which was done many, many times before the war in the USSR. The PRC flowering when they stopped copying, but began to buy. You'd be surprised how many licenses they bought. But their system is still does not allow creative. Slovaks can, but Chinese not.
Finally, you don't know about the motives of the people you're protecting. You don't know their exclusive living conditions. You don't know the biographies. Because they are not well-known. I wrote two biography on wikipedia, I know I don't know. But you will teach us indiscriminately.

Easy Tiger. take it down a notch. I suspect you are misconstruing far too much in my post. I don't know where you are getting much of what you are accusing me of, but you certainly have completely misread the entire tone of my post.

I'm not going to attempt to justify your response simply because you have misread mine so badly. "The system is good, it eats children for dinner"? What does that even mean!?

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

Respectfully, you are incorrect again with the numbers.

"Ps. on the subject of Ju 87s in the east in 1944, a quick check in my database shows 502 aircraft with damage over 60% (482 aircraft damaged 100%). In the German system, damage over 60% was considered unusable (Prien, IV. JG 3, Vol.4, p.332). There are an additional 234 Ju 87s with damage reported (% not specified). Data for 1944 is not complete, meaning there probably are even more Ju 87 losses. Beitrag zur Beschaffungsmeldung and C-Amt for 1944 (Jan-Dec inclusive) show only 904 Ju 87s were built. The rate of Ju 87 losses in 1944 (in the east alone!) is completely not sustainable compared to its production.
Pss. there was a reason why Ju 87s were being hurriedly replaced by Fw 190s over the east in 1944."

502 + some unknown part of 234 + western stuka losses + unknown number of 1944 losses not yet found because the 1944 losses are incomplete.

Because I am kind I ran some numbers for you: 1051 Ju 87 losses I have records of damaged 60+% and/or damaged but the percentage not known. To this number (whatever it shakes out to be) must be assumed an unknown number of additional losses yet to be found.
I do not have the most complete database, others would have more.

Ju 87s used until Fw 190s showed up. All it shows is that the LW had to keep the old Ju 87s flying until their replacements could appear, and they paid the price (in Stuka crews and aircraft) for it.

He 111 not useful for supply dropping or transportation??? The curious things people can come up with...
Budapest and Breaslau pockets would beg to differ, along with the evacuations in the Balkans, etc.
Facts stand that the more twin engined aircraft sent to the eastern front, particularly those that could carry heavy loads, the more they were delegated to supply dropping and transport tasks rather than bombing.
They were used as defacto bombs.

I have the flight logs of no less than 18 He 111 crew members for late 1944/45 (and counting). Guess what they were flying: supply missions.
The entire of KG 4 became a supply dropping lifesaver in 1944/45, heck even 14.(eins)/KG 27 became a supply dropping unit rather than a loco-busting unit. Fw 190s were employed as supply dropping aircraft as well. This was all because the situation called for it.

This thread is become a echo chamber for each player, little progress. Have the last word. Peace.

Keep moving the goal posts as you see fit.

When talking about twin engined offensive aircraft midwar, you bring in twin engined transport late war. When using your numbers of destroyed Ju.87, them those with an unkonwn % damage are all above 60% damage.

Ok, then.

El duro para ti.

 

[Dimlee]

Hopefully, this good thread will not be derailed by the piss contest personal judgements and misunderstanding.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Hopefully, this good thread will not be derailed by the piss contest personal judgements and misunderstanding.

As long as people stop ignoring the moderator requests to not respond to uncivil poste and allow us to moderate it shouldn't.

Two temporary (5 day) thread reply bans have already been given out. They can still post in other threads. Hopefully when temporary thread one is lifted, they don't start back up.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

And for everyone, its perfectly ok to disagree, debate, and even tell other members they are wrong. Just keep it civil. We are all adults right?

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

As a show of good faith, and the admittance by myself that at least one of the instances was quite possibly translation error I have lifted the reply bans for both.

Now lets all remain civil, and let the moderators moderate… cheers

 

[Just Schmidt]

I better start with stating my viewpoint very clearly: It's complicated.

The geographical differenses between between the east and the west was a large factor, which changed over time. The different actions of the western airforces had different impact at different times. Until late 1941 RAF was the only one western airforce that was directly involved, and the USA didn't do a lot of fighting over Europe for some time to come after that. And by the way, Britain and the Commonwealth benefitted from lend-lease too.

In the darkest period for the USSR, say until the onset of winter in 1942, most of the Luftwaffe was consentrated in the east, thereby cutting some slack for great britain and the front in North Africa. Though by no means intended as such by the USSR, the very existence of the eastern fronted helped. One example is the air supply in the winter of 41-42 at Kholm and Demyansk. It tied down germen supply aircraft and used up fuel that could have been used elsewhere. While I am not in any way certain that Germany could have won the war by applying more pressure on the British Empire, principally in North Africa and the Mediterranian, they could have made the going a lot harder. In this critical period the largest contribution of the VVS probably was that it refused to die. One undeniable achievement of the Soviet system was the willingness and ability to mobilise new forces to replace the immense losses all arms suffered in the beginning. Even though it got better, the strain remained throughout the war. In the process, Luftwaffe never got the chance to either consentrate elsewhere or take a break and really expand to a bigger force than the one it started the war with. Of course eventually the bulk of what was in the east, and southern Europe, had to be redeployed to the defence of the Reich, but the eastern front was more than two years old by then. Lendlease had comparatively little impact at the very beginning, but gained in importance throughout. It contributed more to the victories than to the bare survival, though it was never inconsequential.

Until the summer of 1944 the air war in the east and the west differed immensely. Southern sideshows apart, it was in the west the defence of one Island with an extensive and modern chain of radar stations and a defence system honed to perfection in the battle of Britain. The coastline, even where the continent was close, at least protected against the radar stations and forward airfields being overrun by panzers. That went both ways though Germany had a far longer coastline to defend. How good their defence in depth had to be changed as RAF got better at bombing the right country by night. In numbers and precision they didn't really start to matter until well into 1942. Effects on german production were neglegible at least untill that time too. In comparison the eastern front stretched from the arctic to the Caucasus (in length of the line itself it was at its biggest in the autumn of 1942), and constantly threatened on the ground. The corresponding air campaigns lasted without any real letup for nearly 4 years. There were blizzards and periods of less activity. Even after the (proper) second front opened up, it never stretched as far as the eastern, barring perhaps the last weeks. In the West Germany eventually faced not one but two major airforces, in the east the VVS faced Luftwaffe alone, together with miscellaneous German allies of widely different capability. (Yes, the two airforces did help by distracting the Luftwaffe, but it helps when one can specialize in night bombing and interception, while the other can specialize on daylight bombing and long range escort.) That also fluctuated over time until eventually none were left, possibly excepting the Slovak airforce.

I am NOT denying that the VVS and USSR got a lot of help from the western allies in different ways. Even then it is a remarkable feat that the VVS continued fighting in very adverse conditions. The precise weight of this and that contribution at certain moments cannot, in my opinion, be measured with much exactitude. Still i do enjoy threads like this very much, as especially the war in the east still present us with many riddles. The shortcomings of the soviet system and the animosity between the erstwhile allies are very much contributing factors for this. They even overlay the usual national national biases that also becomes clear when the question arises who contributed even more than the others to the defeat of the axis. Without answering the question exactly how good the soviet airforce was, I will venture that in relative terms the soviet army made a greater contribution to winning the war.

This is a long post on a rather generalized level. Luckily I am in no doubt that the following posts will go into details. I await in eager anticipation.

 

[marathag]

The few Frantic missions were not the only (not even the main) support for the air war by the western allies

Stalin rebuffed FDR's request for USAAF bases in Soviet Territory completely, and only in February '44 got permission for a tiny air mission, not the hoped for full 'numbered' AF, as the 8th and 15th were.

 

[Juha3]

I better start with stating my viewpoint very clearly: It's complicated.

The geographical differenses between between the east and the west was a large factor, which changed over time. The different actions of the western airforces had different impact at different times. Until late 1941 RAF was the only one western airforce that was directly involved, and the USA didn't do a lot of fighting over Europe for some time to come after that. And by the way, Britain and the Commonwealth benefitted from lend-lease too.

In the darkest period for the USSR, say until the onset of winter in 1942, most of the Luftwaffe was consentrated in the east, thereby cutting some slack for great britain and the front in North Africa. Though by no means intended as such by the USSR, the very existence of the eastern fronted helped. One example is the air supply in the winter of 41-42 at Kholm and Demyansk. It tied down germen supply aircraft and used up fuel that could have been used elsewhere. While I am not in any way certain that Germany could have won the war by applying more pressure on the British Empire, principally in North Africa and the Mediterranian, they could have made the going a lot harder. In this critical period the largest contribution of the VVS probably was that it refused to die. One undeniable achievement of the Soviet system was the willingness and ability to mobilise new forces to replace the immense losses all arms suffered in the beginning. Even though it got better, the strain remained throughout the war. In the process, Luftwaffe never got the chance to either consentrate elsewhere or take a break and really expand to a bigger force than the one it started the war with. Of course eventually the bulk of what was in the east, and southern Europe, had to be redeployed to the defence of the Reich, but the eastern front was more than two years old by then. Lendlease had comparatively little impact at the very beginning, but gained in importance throughout. It contributed more to the victories than to the bare survival, though it was never inconsequential.

Until the summer of 1944 the air war in the east and the west differed immensely. Southern sideshows apart, it was in the west the defence of one Island with an extensive and modern chain of radar stations and a defence system honed to perfection in the battle of Britain. The coastline, even where the continent was close, at least protected against the radar stations and forward airfields being overrun by panzers. That went both ways though Germany had a far longer coastline to defend. How good their defence in depth had to be changed as RAF got better at bombing the right country by night. In numbers and precision they didn't really start to matter until well into 1942. Effects on german production were neglegible at least untill that time too. In comparison the eastern front stretched from the arctic to the Caucasus (in length of the line itself it was at its biggest in the autumn of 1942), and constantly threatened on the ground. The corresponding air campaigns lasted without any real letup for nearly 4 years. There were blizzards and periods of less activity. Even after the (proper) second front opened up, it never stretched as far as the eastern, barring perhaps the last weeks. In the West Germany eventually faced not one but two major airforces, in the east the VVS faced Luftwaffe alone, together with miscellaneous German allies of widely different capability. (Yes, the two airforces did help by distracting the Luftwaffe, but it helps when one can specialize in night bombing and interception, while the other can specialize on daylight bombing and long range escort.) That also fluctuated over time until eventually none were left, possibly excepting the Slovak airforce.

I am NOT denying that the VVS and USSR got a lot of help from the western allies in different ways. Even then it is a remarkable feat that the VVS continued fighting in very adverse conditions. The precise weight of this and that contribution at certain moments cannot, in my opinion, be measured with much exactitude. Still i do enjoy threads like this very much, as especially the war in the east still present us with many riddles. The shortcomings of the soviet system and the animosity between the erstwhile allies are very much contributing factors for this. They even overlay the usual national national biases that also becomes clear when the question arises who contributed even more than the others to the defeat of the axis. Without answering the question exactly how good the soviet airforce was, I will venture that in relative terms the soviet army made a greater contribution to winning the war.

This is a long post on a rather generalized level. Luckily I am in no doubt that the following posts will go into details. I await in eager anticipation.

While agreeing your main points I would not say that the Med was a side show.
According to Strategy for Defeat by Williamson Murray
On the fighter losses; practically fron January to October 1943 losses in the Med were heavier than in the East and in October and Novemberthey were equal.
For all aircraft Jan to Nov 1943 in April, July and September losses in the Med were signicantly greater and more or less equal in March, May, June, October and November.

And in the time span June-Dec 1942 the LW losses were significantly heavier on the other Fronts than on the Eastern Front in Oct and Nov 1942, ie. during the time of the 2nd el Alamein and the beginning of the Operation Torch.