How many US Aircraft Carriers were enough?

[nuuumannn]

Langsdorff was on a fools errand and paid the price.

Always easy to say in hindsight. He was the commander of a warship of a combatant nation at war and he encountered enemy warships. He did his job, which is all that any commanding officer is expected to do.

I should have posted this in my previous post, signatures of prisoners held aboard the Admiral Graf Spee, on display at the Museo Naval, Montevideo.

River Plate 20

 

[pbehn]

Question about the carriers goes to one Ernest King.

So if you want to argue with him then be my guest.

Graf Spee was never in a trillion years going to make it back to Germany. It wasn't in a fit state anyway.

So you either scuttle, sail to Buenos Aires and intern or one way ticket to Valhalla.

Langsdorff was on a fools errand and paid the price.

I was only really discussing the logistics. He had used 2/3s of his main gun ammunition. Even if the force outside hadnt changed and his ship was undamaged he only had 20 minutes firing time left. Keeping a surface raider supplied wasnt easy, keeping a battle fleet supplied is an industry itself.

 

[The Basket]

Graf Spee was where and where was it's nearest friendly port?

Logistics yes!

It's engines go bang so what happens next?

From what I read....taking large dose of salt..... Admiral King had one eye on the Japanese and another eye on world domination.

He had a blank cheque and the will to spend it

How many carriers?

Yes.

 

[Conslaw]

I'm wondering if there was a sort of formula. In addition to escort type ships planned for escort duty: for every carrier, 2 CA's, 4CL's, 8 destroyers are needed or something like that.

Me too that's why I started the thread. Even Clark Reynold's "The Fast Carriers" doesn't really explain the planning behind the huge carrier numbers (but is still a great book).

 

[Conslaw]

For as much credit as Roosevelt and his brain trust deserve for ramping up US military production from 1940 to 1944, they also deserve credit for taking their foot off the gas in 1944. As 1945 the US arms industry slowed down, though not as fast as their opposition did. I'm sure this helped transition the US to a post-war peacetime economy, though there was a recession and lots of bumps in the road.

 

[Wiking]

An excellent book to read about this topic

"Engineers of Victory - The problem solvers who turned the tide in the second world war" by Paul Kennedy, Random House, 2013.

It's an excellent review of the critical components of war planning and logistical execution.

Chapter 5 is about the US war in the Pacific.

..and it's not a boring read.

Yes, the US Navy, as well as all branches of any professional Armed Services, had (and still have) planners whose job and expertise lay in projecting the material needs of conducting combat operations according to directives and goals given by Command staff. Often called War Planners, though I don't know if the job had that title.

Military Professionals to this day create War Plans that theorize a reaction to a potential conflict. War Plans are used for procurement and funding purposes.

In the 1930s Pacific, it was obvious to US war planners that Japan was a highly probable opponent, and an influence needing to be countered. So the US planners created war plans which were *the* fundamental basis for *both* parties in Congress to support funding of the initial Fleet Carriers.

From that initial decision to proceed with the Fleet Carriers it followed logically to fund *all* the logistics and infrastructure deemed necessary by the War Planners to support those carriers, right down to how many AA gunners were needed (which got tripled on the Essex-Class), including how many submarines, destroyers, cruisers, supply ships, would be needed for each carrier or carrier group - allowing for attrition and in-service rates.

Now, to get back to your question of how many carriers were necessary? ..,

As the actual war began and evolved, War Plans continued to be created to address the most likely scenarios, and/or tweaked according to the latest intelligence. Think of equipping both MacArthur's drive up the SW Pacific to Manila, *and* Nimitz's Central Pacific island hopping thrusts.

By 1944, maybe even 1943, US war planners had surely projected what materiel they felt was needed according to a War Plan for an invasion of Japan. The planners weren't privy to the Atom Bomb, so it would a conventional invasion. With lots of aircraft carriers. According to Paul Kennedy's book, the US Navy had planned on deploying Essex Class fast carriers in big groups (not traditional Carrier Groups). Deploying them in big enough numbers to defend themselves without needing to be surrounded by battleships or cruisers. These groups would serve as massive waterborne air assets as opposed to Carrier Groups centered on a single or a few fleet carriers.

Yes, in hindsight we all know now how things went, no invasion was necessary and the carrier orders were appropriately canceled, but all the Planners had to go by was the 'worst case scenario' of a land invasion of Japan.

That's probably not complete or perfect, but I hope it helps answer the question.

Cheers.

PS - as someone alluded to already, the support logistics of an armed force in the field, especially during intense combat operations is massive and unbelievably complex. Imagine then, the epic logistical planning and execution of the D-Day invasion at Normandy. The above book's chapter about that invasion really conveys how staggering an accomplishment that invasion was.

 

[SaparotRob]

Thanks, Wiking! It does a lot of explaining. I forgot all about Operation Downfall.

 

[EwenS]

I think it must have unnerved Langsdorf that the British cruisers could shadow the Graf Spee night and day via radar for thousands of miles, keeping out of effective gunnery range the whole time. It was a long way from Uruguay to Germany. Scuttling Graf Spee was like a chessmaster laying down his king early in the game, when he can project out a certain victory by the opponent.

The only ship engaged in the Battle of the River Plate with Radar was Graf Spee.

On the outbreak of war only 2 RN ships had radar, with another 2 being refitted with it. More were planned. These were Type 79 air warning sets. It was the late 1940 before gunnery sets became operational in RN ships.

 

[EwenS]

Ignoring for the moment the pre-war aircraft carriers, the US Navy built and planned to build an astounding number of aircraft carriers during World War II. The Navy ordered 36 Essex-class fleet carriers, and of that 24 were built. They ordered 9 Independence-class light carriers, all of which were built, they ordered 6 Midway-class "battle carriers", and 3 were built (seeing service after the war.) (I'll give them credit, they actually cancelled the other three during the war.) The Navy put in service over 100 escort carriers of various types. The Navy ordered 35 Commencement Bay-class super escort carriers. Of these, 19 were put into service and 19 were scrapped before completion.

My question is this: How did the Navy figure that this many aircraft carriers were necessary, did they crunch the numbers on the resources that would be necessary to build the carriers, crew the carriers, provide the aircraft, fuel, bombs, etc? The training? The escorts, bases, mobile replenishment, etc.? If anybody has a source for the numbers underlying the Navy's planning, I'd love to see it.

Firstly you need to draw a distinction between planned and ordered.

32 Essex class planned during the war forming part of the following shipbuilding programmes:-
1939 1 (Essex)
1940 10 (3 under Two Ocean Navy Act of 14 June 1940 + 7 more in Aug following the fall of France)
1941 2 (further expansion authorised in late 1941 and ordered immediately after Pearl Harbor)
1942 10 (ordered 7 Aug 1942 following big 1942 carrier battles as part of the Maximum War Effort Programme)
1943 3 (ordered June 1943)
1944 6

The first 11 ships occupied all the available carrier berths when they were ordered. 9 of the 10 1942 were built in US Navy Yards that had space following the delay to, and eventual cancellation of, the Montana class Battleships. The last 6, CV50-55, were part of the 1944 shipbuilding programme, and while building berths were identified for them, it was clear by March 1945 that the war would be over before they could be completed and the losses were less than expected so they were cancelled.

The expansion of the Essex Programme in 1942 to the Navy Yards allowed ships to be laid down there before the final ships of the 1940 and 1941 Programmes were laid down in the mostly civilian yards they had been ordered from. As a demonstration of the effort put in, build time was originally planned to be 3 years. Essex herself took 20 months and some as little as 18 months.

17 were completed by Aug 1945, with another 6 by the end of 1946. The remaining 3 were suspended at the end of the war with CV34 Oriskany being the last to complete to a much modified design in 1950. The other pair were scrapped incomplete.

The CVL were FDR's idea and virtually forced on the USN at the end of 19941. As it was they provided a much needed reinforcement of the fast carrier forces in the late 1943/early 1944 period courtesy of their very quick build times. CVL48 & 49 were ordered in anticipation of attrition amongst the original 9.

At one point the USN intended to operate carriers as divisions of 2xCV + 1xCVL and did so for a while in 1943/44 before more Essex became available.

The USN wanted 4 of the Armoured deck Midway class (CVB40-44) as part of the 1942 Maximum War Effort Programme, but this was opposed by FDR who was concerned that they would not be ready for the current war. In Aug 1942 he refused to sanction their construction while signing off on everything else. He was eventually persuaded to authorise 2 in Nov 1942 and a third in May 1943 by which time the final ship had been cancelled. The final pair (CVB56 & 57) were part of the 1945 Programme which FDR disapproved, except for the escort carriers, in March 1943 probably because he again felt they would not be ready for the current war. But they lingered on in USN planning until formally cancelled in March 1945 when it was clear that they would not be required.

FDR, as someone very pro-navy, really liked the whole CVE concept and couldn't get enough of them as can be seen from the above. More of them were probably built than really necessary due to the mass production efforts in Kaiser yards. Uses were found for them however as transports and to support USMC air Groups. The later larger Commencement Bay class ships were less austere and more capable ships.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

One more than we can ever build?

 

[ARTESH]

USN Carrier Fleet be like:

- Sir, How many should we build?
+ YES

 

[EwenS]

Just to complete the picture here is the US CVE build history.

The whole US CVE programme was kicked off by FDR in Oct 1940. After various discussions about the complexity of ship required, a C3 merchant hull was requisitioned in March 1941 to become AVG/ACV/CVE-1 Long Island on completion in June 1941.

There was then some discussions about converting 3 large transports as AVG-2 - 4 which came to nothing.

In early 1941 negotiations with Britain resulted in 6xC3 incomplete hulls being acquired by the USN for Lend Lease Lease to Britain. These became Archer, Avenger, Biter, Charger, Dasher and Tracker. Charger was reacquired by the USN in Oct 1941 principally, at that time, with the intention of assisting in training FAA pilots for the RN. The final ship, Tracker, became the model for the remaining C3 conversions.

The FY42 programme saw the requisitioning of 20 more C3 hulls then building which became the Bogue class. 10 were Lend Leased to the RN. These completed between Aug 1942 and June 1943.

Another 24 C3 conversions were ordered as part of the FY43 programme (some sources say FY42), starting May 1942. Initially these were to be split between the USN and RN, but eventually only 1 ship remained with the USN, Prince William completed April 1943. By that stage they were running out of C3 hulls in the merchant shipbuilding programmes to convert.

During 1942 the USN converted 4 of its precious Cimarron class fleet oilers to CVE in time for Operation Torch in Nov 1942. These became the Sangamon class. These proved better ships than the C3 conversions and led to the development of the final CVE class (see below).

The orders for CVE placed in 1942 need to be viewed against the background of the U-boat campaign then taking place against shipping on the US east coast and Caribbean, with large numbers of ships being sunk and no end in sight. At this time both the USN and the RN were placing orders for huge numbers of escort ships, just as many as the yards could cope with building. By late 1943 the position had changed dramatically but no one could foresee that in mid-1942. Late 1943 saw for example the cancellation of some 400 DE that had been ordered in 1942.

Then in June 1942 FDR intervened again and demanded another 50 CVE be built. This seems to have been prompted by an offer from Henry J Kaiser looking for work for one of his yards in Vancouver, Washington (not Canada). He had a CVE design prepared by Gibbs & Cox the Naval architects. This offer was accepted,and after some refinement the Casablanca class was born. 50 ships in FY43 (or FY42 in some sources) laid down between Nov 1942 and March 1944 and completed in the space of the year between July 1943 and July 1944. Initially these were to be split between the USN and RN, with at least 5 earmarked for the latter, but all ended up with the USN while the RN standardised with CVE based on the C3 hull.

By 1943 when the FY44 programme was being considered, attention turned to a better CVE based on the Sangamon class tanker hull. 15 Commencement Bay class were ordered with construction commencing in Sept 1943. 10 of these completed between Nov 1944 and the end of the war with the remainder by Feb 1946. Another 8 were ordered for FY45 of which 2 commissioned Dec1944/Jan 1945, another two completed but never commissioned and went straight to reserve before turning up in one of the Dirty Harry movies in the 1970s. The remaining 4 were suspended in Aug 1945 and subsequently scrapped on the slips.

In March 1945 FDR authorised another 12 but construction of these had not begun by the time the war ended so they were cancelled.

If Henry J Kaiser hadn't been able to make that offer to build 50 CVE in 1942 and make good on his mass production effort, then we might not have seen so many CVE.

 

[EwenS]

I'm wondering if there was a sort of formula. In addition to escort type ships planned for escort duty: for every carrier, 2 CA's, 4CL's, 8 destroyers are needed or something like that.

When it came to the wartime shipbuilding programmes such as the Maximum Effort Programme of 1942, orders were being placed for as many ships of each type as possible up to the capacity that each yard could take. At the same time yards tended to specialise in particular types of ship. So in 1940 2 Cleveland class cruisers ordered from Federal in New Jersey were cancelled to allow that yard to concentrate on producing destroyers, with new cruiser orders being placed elsewhere.

Priorities also changed as the war went on. Bethlehem Quincy for example got 8 Baltimore class cruiser orders in 1940, and laid down 4 in 1941. Then carriers took priority so the next 4 weren't laid down until 1943, by which time it was clear more 8" cruisers were needed following losses in the Solomons in late 1942. More orders were then placed for these in other yards as well. But these ships only began to enter service in 1945.

When it comes to large warships, cruiser sized and above, FDR seems to have been very careful about building for the current war not the next. Hence his opposition to the Midway class. But US industry achieved some remarkable feats in reducing shipbuilding times. An Essex in 2 years instead of 3 for example.

1942 the urgency was for DE for the U-boat campaign. In late 1943 with the Allies beating the U-boat some 400 DE were cancelled. 1943 saw a vast increase in assault shipping construction for D-Day and the Pacific campaigns.

Every effort was made to maximise the use of building facilities. At Philadelphia Navy Yard they built 2 Baltimore class cruisers simultaneously from 1943 in a single dry dock intended for a cancelled Montana class battleship. Both were floated out the same day but their final completion dates were 6 months apart in Jan & July 1945.

In terms of fast carrier group organisation from late 1943 onwards each task group would consist of 3-5 carriers (numbers grew in each group as new carriers completed) with an escort of 2-3 fast Battleships, a cruiser division of 4 ships, generally of the same class, an Atlanta class AA cruiser and approx 16 destroyers. These usually comprised the most modern units available. So as the war went on Sumner and eventually Gearing class destroyers supplemented and then displaced less modern Fletcher class ships. There were exceptions. At one point (Marianas of Leyte I cant remember which) the fast Battleships were concentrated in a single task group separate from all the carriers. And in spring 1945 there was a separate night carrier group for a short time with just 2 carriers, and a few cruisers and destroyers for escort.

For Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, Japan in Nov 1945 the USN would have fielded Enterprise plus 14 Essex class and 7 CVL in 5 TG divided between the 3rd and 5th Fleets. To that would have been added 4 or 5 fleet and 4 light fleet carriers from the British Pacific Fleet in two TG. Plus all the escorts and support ships.

 

[SaparotRob]

Thanks for the reply. It was very informative. It was amusing to read "less modern" Fletcher class. They were quite an improvement. The pace of the war I guess.

 

[ARTESH]

Hey @EwenS , Thank you for your complete explaining.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

PS - as someone alluded to already, the support logistics of an armed force in the field, especially during intense combat operations is massive and unbelievably complex. Imagine then, the epic logistical planning and execution of the D-Day invasion at Normandy. The above book's chapter about that invasion really conveys how staggering an accomplishment that invasion was.

Right. Anyone who's looked into Neptune/Overlord will see a 2-year build-up of troops, supplies, and shipping, to the point of artificial harbors and PLUTO, amongst other creative ways to overcome bottlenecks -- not to mention what probably runs into the hundreds of thousands of man-hours planning the precise unfolding of operations to make the flower bloom according to plan.

That's without looking at the logistics of building the shipping and escorts to emplace it in the UK in the first place, past the waiting U-boats. Of course, both nations by Jun 1944 had experience landing large forces, but all the same Overlord was a massive jump in scale over most of them (the first-day landings at Sicily, I understand, put more troops ashore, but follow-on requirements were obviously much smaller).

 

[GrauGeist]

Considering the scope and complexities of Operation Overlord, just imagine what Operation Downfall would have entailed...

 

[vikingBerserker]

4,000+ Kamikazes lined up ready to go. Several hundred put a number of fleet carriers out of way during Okinawa.

 

[Conslaw]

4,000+ Kamikazes lined up ready to go. Several hundred put a number of fleet carriersR out of way during Okinawa.Ro

Roughly 3,700 Kamikaze sorties during the Okinawa campaign, damaging more than 200 ships.

 

[vikingBerserker]

I'm reading "The Ultimate Battle" by Bill Sloan on they are on the 9th wave and it does not seem anywhere near that many.

Per "The Last Great Battle of - Bloody Okinawa" by Wheelan:

"The Japanese fell short of their goal of "one plane one ship," but sank 36 American warships, and damaged 368 other vessels at Okinawa. The Navy's losses were the highest of the Pacific war: 4,907 sailors and officers killed, and 4,824 wounded. Japan lost an estimated 1,600 suicide and conventional planes at Okinawa."