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but also the oilfields in Ukraine in 1940.
The LW was not the root cause of the failure of Germany taking Moscow.
Germany never had the resources that the Soviet Union had but the primary question is whether Germany, with absolutely no chance of France or Britain intervening on September 1, 1939, could add the additional resources from the West (opposing France) to make a final push to not only capture Moscow (and beyond) but also the oilfields in Ukraine in 1940.
No amount of Luftwaffe bombers or oceans of oil are going to improve German logistics enough to let them win in 1941. They had truck shortages, spare parts shortages, lack of roads which bounced apart vehicles, weather problems, and just the sheer distance that even rail roads could not keep up with, as Germany lacked enough rail cars and locomotives to sustain her forces in the East, occupied Europe, and her own economy. There are far too many structural problems to allow a 1941 win even if Moscow is somehow taken, which is impossible logistically.Fuel and pilot shortages wouldn't be a factor if Germany wins during the first summer of Barbarossa.
I disagree.No amount of Luftwaffe bombers or oceans of oil are going to improve German logistics enough to let them win in 1941.
Stalin was a paranoid who had tens of millions murdered based on his 'expectations'. I don't take Stalin's fears as truth in that scenario.I disagree.
According to Beria's son, Stalin expected to be arrested by members of the Politburo 30 June 1941. Punish the Soviet armed forces significantly more during the first 10 days of Barbarossa and that coup could happen. German logistics would not be an issue that early in the war.
No argument there, but that increases the logistical burden on the already overstressed system during Barbarossa.BTW, between Greece and North Africa the Heer should also have an additional field army for use during June 1941.
Yes, the initial fighting did not have logistical problems, but the fighting that was to culminate in the fall of the USSR, after Smolensk, was seriously beset with problems. Even leading up to closing the Smolensk pocket and later Kiev pocket had serious logistical problems, which was the result of rail roads being unable to sustain the advance and most vehicles breaking down, including aircraft. The sort of logistical support the extra troops that would be added with the deletion of Greece and North Africa (probably Yugoslavia too, as without the UK in the war there is little need to pressure the Yugoslavs to join the Axis and then cause the assassination of their king) would only be enough to bring forward supplies from rail heads to the front lines units, which isn't a problem before perhaps the beginning of September at the lastest. At that point the extra supply requirements for rail units is more than could be handled. Which means something has to give.
Apparently we are talking about two different wars.
Heer logistics were not overstressed during the historical June to September 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union. Logistics would not become a serious problem until after months of heavy fighting that including advances of several hundred km into Soviet territory.
Heer units historically used in North Africa and Greece had their own logistical support. So did Me-110s and Ju-88s employed against Britain during 1940 and 1941. If those units are available for Barbarossa their attached transport and depot units would be part of the package.
Without operations in Crete and North Africa Barbarossa will also have an airborne corp and accompanying transport aircraft.
Now we are getting into political territory....
Soviet aggressiveness in Finland, the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria was the deciding factor for the German decision to invade. Would Stalin be so aggressive without the promise of British and U.S. support? I doubt it.
Would Poland refuse a plebiscite for Danzig without Britain and France encouraging Poland to seize the city in violation of the original League of Nations mandate? I doubt it.
1939 Europe might be a whole new diplomatic ball game in this scenerio and there might not be an "Operation Barbarossa".
What about Romania?That aggressiveness by Russia in the Baltic was already approved by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of Aug.39, trying to now give it as one of Hitlers excuses for invading in 41 is just nonsense.
And the same for Polands failure to agree to a plebiscite in time. Germany had already decided to invade. Demanding Poland agree to a vote less than 2 days before they invaded was just Germany creating a casus belli, or excuse for war. Because Germany had already revealed it's intention to invade with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.