If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain

There are some who see the classic story of the Battle of Britain and how not only Britain but the free world was saved by "the few" as a bit of a myth. Even Churchill, one of the myths architects, complained that "some people seem to forget we have a navy."
The argument is that the myth is something developed by the British and American press with their respective propagandists to develop a heroic image of the British acceptable to a U.S. public opinion. The myth was subsequently sold back to the British people and, importantly, with an American narration or accent. This includes both the Battle of Britain and the Blitz and is probably most eloquently expressed in Angus Calder's "The Myth of the Blitz".
It's a bit strong for me but, like most myths themselves, there is a grain of truth in it. That is probably a different topic though
Cheers
Steve

stona said:

There are some who see the classic story of the Battle of Britain and how not only Britain but the free world was saved by "the few" as a bit of a myth. Even Churchill, one of the myths architects, complained that "some people seem to forget we have a navy."
The argument is that the myth is something developed by the British and American press with their respective propagandists to develop a heroic image of the British acceptable to a U.S. public opinion. The myth was subsequently sold back to the British people and, importantly, with an American narration or accent. This includes both the Battle of Britain and the Blitz and is probably most eloquently expressed in Angus Calder's "The Myth of the Blitz".
It's a bit strong for me but, like most myths themselves, there is a grain of truth in it. That is probably a different topic though
Cheers
Steve

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I think you hit the nail on the head. The legend of the "Few" has literally become so ingrained in Western culture that the automatic, kneejerk reaction is to focus on the air war as the only relevant aspect of the battle.

oldcrowcv63 said:

Seems to me, not only is the success of Sea Lion a virtually absurd notion, but defeat of the RAF just about as unlikely:

It seems to me that production vs losses heavily favored a British Victory:
Monthly aircraft production below: from: Statistics of the Battle of Britain

(I assume without evidence that most a/c production was dedicated to fighters).

Month------Great Britain-----Germany
June-----------446--------------164
July------------496--------------220
August---------476--------------173
September-----467--------------218
October---------469--------------200
Total----------2,354--------------975

I suspect trained pilots was a bigger problem. Clearly they needed more US recruits and french Armée de l' Air refugees

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The Luftwaffe had even worse problems with new pilots, with less numbers and just as poorly trained as the RAF ones. Stillpepper gives some examples in his book (Spitfire on My Tail).

But the RAF could have lost. in '41 (after Dowding and Park were ignominiously kicked out) 11 group held an exercise duplicating the BoB ... and Leigh Mallory lost badly (nearly all planes caught on the ground).

So much of the credit depends on Park's superb tactical control, which has never been beaten (despite being war gamed by just about every air force in the World). A truly remarkable man. Didn't put a foot wrong over months.

Dowding had created a superb system (copied all over the World) and was in the key positions at all the right times to push the critical elements through. But it still took someone to wield it properly.
An idiot with the best weapon in the World is still an idiot.

To me, the suggestion that the BoB myth is false and the RAF would inevitably have emerged the victors has all the benefit of hindsight. Not necessarily without merit but just obvious now but not then. It's easy to stand back now and say, well the BoB couldn't have been lost which may be a bit different I think than saying the Germans couldn't have won.

I can imagine an alternate reality where the RAF is run by Rowan Atkinson's Bean and the Luftwaffe leadership makes perfect decisions at every turn, and the BoB goes the other way. Historically, it appears the opposite situation was closer to the mark although how Bean got into the Luftwaffe eludes me.

What about if Mussolini sends torpedo bombers to augment the Corpo Aereo Italiano in the proposed scenario?

Maybe it was another Rowan Atkinson persona instead of Mr Bean it was Baldric with a cunning plan?

oldcrowcv63 said:

To me, the suggestion that the BoB myth is false and the RAF would inevitably have emerged the victors has all the benefit of hindsight. Not necessarily without merit but just obvious now but not then. It's easy to stand back now and say, well the BoB couldn't have been lost which may be a bit different I think than saying the Germans couldn't have won.

I can imagine an alternate reality where the RAF is run by Rowan Atkinson's Bean and the Luftwaffe leadership makes perfect decisions at every turn, and the BoB goes the other way. Historically, it appears the opposite situation was closer to the mark although how Bean got into the Luftwaffe eludes me.

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Oh it was close, although the RAF had the advantage it was only if they did everything right, they had little margin for mistakes. Not so much the Germans could have won, in term of FC being totally destroyed, but they could have weakened FC in the SE enough to ensure they had local air superiority to cover any landing.

If you look at the entire history of air attack nearly everyone got caught on the ground and destroyed in the first part of the war, Poland, USSR, Philippines, etc (even when they should have known better). All it took would have been a bad day for Park, make a few mistakes and they could have lost a hundred or more fighters on the ground, a loss they might not have been able to recover from. That's exactly what LM did in their war game a year later. Yet another problem with the 'big wing' idea.

An example is Malta they lost more planes on the ground than to any other cause, by forming up into a big wing (this was later with plenty of Spits). Apart from the fact they didn't stop any bombing you had a large vulnerable number of planes on the ground at any one time (plus a big wing was more vulnerable to fighter attacks in the air as well). When Park took over there, he stopped that nonsense, actual bombs dropped on Malta dropped rapidly, very few planes lost on the ground and the Luftwaffe loss rates went up greatly. Kesselring taking a thumping from Park yet again, not to knock him though, the only successful leader of air and ground forces, he just (like Rommel coming up against Monty three times) got unlucky, against a more poorly led opponent he would could easily have prevailed.

So the BoB could have been lost in a few days basically (in the terms of losing local air superiority over the SE that is).

The Luftwaffe was at the peak of its power then, never again would it have such a qualitative edge (in machines and skills), it's really only weakness was not developing fighter bomber training and tactics enough. But then again it took the western Allies until early-mid '43 to do that properly (Park and Broadhurst being the architects in their own spheres of that).

The RAF was only Britain's first layer of defence, if the RAF had of lost the Battle of Britain then this would not have left the door wide open for anyone to walk in. The idea that the Royal Navy would just stay in port and do nothing while Britain was invaded is extremely silly, without Britain there would be no Royal Navy, Britain was the Royal Navy's reason for existing.

All it took would have been a bad day for Park, make a few mistakes and they could have lost a hundred or more fighters on the ground, a loss they might not have been able to recover from.

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I think in the instance of the Battle of Britain, the mistakes were made by the Luftwaffe in this case, since although devastating, sustained attacks against 11 Group's airfields were not consistent, nor as thorough as they could have been. Obviously the RAF squadrons dispersed, but many of the airfields bombed were back to being in use again within days of the LW attack. The Germans also lacked in effective recon, so they were never able to assess accurately what damage was being done and where, nor were they able to establish an accurate picture of how they were doing - one of their biggest failings of the Battle.

I dont think that the RAF losing the air war in the BOB opens the way for invasion, but i do think it will mean Britain would come in for a terrible pounding, perhaps to the point of having to make terms with the Germans. If the Germans won air superioirty, they could then undertake the systematic destruction of british cities and imdustry, undertake comprehensive interdiction of the port facilities,and a sustainedf, unchecked minelaying operation around Britiain . her ships couold undertake a certain level of free moveent around Britain, not invasion but sea denial missions could be quite posible. The LW winning air superiority confers significant advantages to the germans, but it doesnt open the way for invasion.

OldSkeptic said:

Oh it was close, although the RAF had the advantage it was only if they did everything right, they had little margin for mistakes. Not so much the Germans could have won, in term of FC being totally destroyed, but they could have weakened FC in the SE enough to ensure they had local air superiority to cover any landing.

If you look at the entire history of air attack nearly everyone got caught on the ground and destroyed in the first part of the war, Poland, USSR, Philippines, etc (even when they should have known better).

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I think you are making a point here worth highlighting. Establishing the air superiority to cover a landing is not the same as saying a landing would be successful. It's just one condition, and in this case I'd describe it as a necessary but insufficient condition to achieve a successful landing.

With respect to your list of examples. I have to challenge you regarding inclusion of the events in the Philippines on December 8, 1941. It's frequently asserted, incorrectly that MacArthur's air force was destroyed on the ground. It's true that virtually every aircraft that was on Clark airfield was destroyed, but that amounts to less than half the B-17s and about 20 P-40Bs from one squadron, the 20th PS. The fighters were caught because the group commander dithered in the case of that one squadron. the planes and pilots were ready and waiting for the order to launch as a sister squadron (17th PS) had done some minutes earlier. Of the four squadrons of P-40 fighters in the PI, one (the 20th PS) was mainly caught on the ground (5 P-40Bs either got airborne or were salvaged later) while the airborne 3rd PS was roughly handled by A6M Zeros. The other two squadrons were airborne but were misdirected by ground control and never engaged enemy a/c. Based on subsequent events, I'd rate the B-17s as not particularly effective in the numbers present even if they had all survived. The real damage was the loss of the 20 or so P-40Bs.

I just dont see how the Germans could have maintained any kind of air supremacy over England with a fighter as short legged as the 109. All the British had to do was withdraw all fighters and bases back beyond the effective range of 109's and savage any German bomber force that came beyond that point. They could continue to attack and harass German fighters within the range of the 109 as they chose. Basically, they would pick and choose where and when they tangled with German fighters.

That being said, exactly how far could the 109 effectively escort bombers?

If the Germans attained air superiority over Britain and didn't invaded it, the British would be relived when the Germans invaded the USSR and subsequentely pay their sins there.

All the British had to do was withdraw all fighters and bases back beyond the effective range of 109's and savage any German bomber force that came beyond that point.

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This is a good point that is often overlooked; Fighter Command's full strength was not concentrated in 11 Group and the RAF always had squadrons on stand down in the north, not to mention the units primarily based in the north and Scotland through the battle. That Park in charge of 11 Group did not want to undertake this tactic of moving squadrons rearward, as a necessity I'm sure he would have done so if things got that far, but they didn't.

nuuumannn said:

I think in the instance of the Battle of Britain, the mistakes were made by the Luftwaffe in this case, since although devastating, sustained attacks against 11 Group's airfields were not consistent, nor as thorough as they could have been. Obviously the RAF squadrons dispersed, but many of the airfields bombed were back to being in use again within days of the LW attack. The Germans also lacked in effective recon, so they were never able to assess accurately what damage was being done and where, nor were they able to establish an accurate picture of how they were doing - one of their biggest failings of the Battle.

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They were not that devastating. The key thing was that the fighters were not caught on the ground and destroyed there. Taking out airfields of that time, with planes that were quite happy to land and takeoff on grass was really difficult if not impossible. Plus there were many alternative airfields all over the place.

For the Luftwaffe to win they had to achieve a kill/loss ratio of about 4:1 in fighters, at least, since they still had to have some 109s left for air cover for an invasion (5:1 was probably more realistic) as Britain had a lot of bombers.

There was only one sure fired way of doing that ... catch lots on the ground and destroy them. The Luftwaffe were very aware of this, they were very careful to camouflage and protect their own airfields in France, as British bombers found out to their cost.

Park made sure that never happened. What a delicate dance he played, intercept and inflict the maximum damage all the time, while always ensuring he never got caught out. Day after day, month after month. A lesser man would have failed (eg LM).

Dowding and Park knew they were in a war of attrition and played to that accordingly, the Luftwaffe didn't and lost as a result. After so many 'quick cheap wins' they were not prepared (or was the German economy) for that sort of battle.

Plus the RAF's command and control system (forever more called the Dowding System) was a thing of rare beauty, effective, fast, high levels of redundancy, et al. Plus it was designed for human mental strengths, it was visual with simple symbols to denote what was happening and enhanced, what the human brain is really good at, pattern recognition.

This enabled someone competent, such as Park, to respond very quickly as the Luftwaffe continually changed tactics and targets.

The Luftwaffe are never given enough credit for how flexibly they thought and tried out new things and tried continuously to 'con' the RAF into the wrong moves. This was no lumbering behemoth, they probed, they changed targets, they changed tactics, they always tried to get the RAF into fighter traps. Yes they were limited in information, but that didn't mean they weren't creative and smart. Against a lesser opponent they would have succeeded.

As for the 'Dowding System'. Even today, with all our computers and communication abilities there are very few (any?) systems as effective.

Very, very, very few people really understand good C&C systems properly, the list of rubbish and disasters is far (far?) longer than the list of successes. Here in Victoria Australia, we created a 'state of the art' C&C system for (mostly) bushfires. When "Black Saturday' hit us ... it progressively fell further and further behind until it was a couple of hours behind reality, whole towns were wiped out before the 'centre' even knew what was happening and the orders they were giving out were nonsense (and downright fatal in some cases) as a result ... so much for technology and stupidity (note that modern tech can allow people to stuff up even faster and more effectively than before, a real double edged sword).

In one sense it was sheer luck that the British won. If Leigh Mallory had been in charge of 11 Group ... or Sholoto Douglas had got his 10 (or was it 20 he wanted) squadrons of Defiants.
It was luck that Dowding was able to survive in a hostile (and very political) RAF and create the components and the system.
Luck that Park was in charge of 11 group (thanks to Dowding again) .. a New Zealander for that job?
And luck that Chamberlain (never given a good press) was so supportive of fighters, which went against everything the RAF and Air Ministry stood for.

And lucky for the RAF, which has ever shone in the glow of the BoB, wiping out it's many, many, many stuff ups during the war (and seemingly ever since).

The attacks on the sector airfields were serious, even devastating. It is no accident that Park and Dowding wanted to move sector control rooms away from airfields in September 1940. Luckily the Germans had no clear idea how the British system worked, nor which were most important airfields.

The attrition of qualified pilots was also a much closer run thing than many realise.

Dowding wrote. "The stabilisation of squadrons in the line and the creation of class "C" squadrons was a desperate expedient forced upon me by the heavy losses."

Nearly 1/3 of Fighter Commands pilots (440) were effectively non-operational at the end of September 1940. The raw numbers are irrelevant. 11 Group needed men who could fight and the men in the "C" class squadrons could barely fly a Hurricane or Spitfire.

Dowding was far from perfect, though the right man for the job in 1940. His biggest failing was in Fighter Command's woeful training system. It is no accident that Poles,Czechs and others out performed their British comrades. It wasn't because of some nazi hating recklessness, it was because they were better trained.

Park was a better tactician. He pulled it off again on Malta, something often forgotten. It is often said that the Luftwaffe bombed London in some sort of retaliation, but this is far too simplistic. Park ignored Luftwaffe fighter sweeps, designed to lure the RAF up to its destruction. It was assumed that the RAF would come up to defend London, and it did. It just didn't quite work out for the Germans.
It is also probable that it was dawning on the OKW that Sea Lion was a non starter and bombing London might concentrate the minds of the British government on some kind of negotiations. This had worked for them before.

Cheers

Steve

Fighter Command OoB for Sept 15 by Group

Document-49: Fighter Command Order of Battle Sept 15th 1940

from THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Did the RAF do much in the way of airfield camouflage or develop alternate camouflaged bases?

A lot of the satellite airfields were just that a field with a hut or tent for the pilots to keep out of the weather and a telephone line for the call from control. Hard to put a stretch of grass out of action unless the LW parachuted in a tractor and a plough.

oldcrowcv63 said:

Did the RAF do much in the way of airfield camouflage or develop alternate camouflaged bases?

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They did. They camouflaged runways and laid false hedgerows, made from coloured sand. False field patterns and hedges were also painted onto runways. They also used decoy sites but more for night time deception.





This one shows the fake hedgerows running acroos the runways clearly.



Cheers

Steve