If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain

[Jenisch]

The Germans planned to put mines in the English Channel.

 

[Jenisch]

Wasn't there a fleet in the Mediterranean that the RN didn't even moved, letting it there in order to counter the Italians?

 

[fastmongrel]

The Germans planned to put mines in the English Channel.

And the entire Royal Navy planned to stay in harbour and get steaming drunk for at least 3 weeks.

 

[Jenisch]

I'm questioning how they would deal with the issue (...)

 

[fastmongrel]

I'm questioning how they would deal with the issue (...)

The RN would have done what it was doing anyway the question is where do the Germans suddenly find the 10s of thousands of mines and dozens of minelayers needed to lay the minefields planned in the time allowed. Read about the problems the RN had laying a big minefield Northern Barrage - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Shortround6]

Several hundred minesweepers?

Home Fleet, June 1940

Go to page two for Nore Command

and page 3 for Plymouth command.

It is also entertaining to find out HOW the Germans were going to put mines in the Channel in the numbers needed in the short period of time they needed to do it in.

And find out why the RN can't be mining the exits to the French, Belgian and Dutch harbors.

 

[pattle]

I think we can learn a lot from the fact that Germany did not try to invade, end of chat.

 

[silence]

Gentlemen there were orders issued regarding Sea Lion in 1944. It was postponed, not abandoned in 1940. Issuing fanciful orders about an operation and issuing orders for an operation are not the same thing.

As Juha says RN main armament had a maximum elevation of 40 degrees. Naval anti aircraft guns of medium calibre were classified as 3" to 5.25" firing explosive shells with timed fuses, typically timed to 1,500 yards. The Royal Navy's high angle control system didn't work very well but nobody's did with the possible exception of the USN. Some old cruisers had their 6" guns replaced with 4" guns for use as stop gap AA ships until the "Dido" class came along. The most vulnerable ships were the destroyers which mostly had WW1 vintage gun mounts unable to elevate above 40 degrees, probably due to Admiralty fears about the Low Angle Control for ship to ship engagements. A few Hunt class destroyers did have 4" guns capable of high elevation. Most ships had a suite of various armament from rifle calibre (.303) machine guns to 40 mm for close defence. In 1940 there was a shortage of the Oerlikon 20mm and Bofors 40mm guns. In the late 1930s the Admiralty backed a Vickers gun against the Bofors and it didn't really work. "Trials had proved most unsatisfactory" read the report. It was Chamberlain of all people who argued in that the effects of ordering a foreign weapon were not "necessarily over riding the essential need of obtaining a satisfactory weapon." 100 Bofors guns were in fact ordered. The saga of Vickers and the Admiralty is worthy of a book in itself!
Essentially, in 1940, Royal Navy anti aircraft guns and gunnery were far from satisfactory. Despite this the "Tactical Summary of Bombing Aircraft on HM Ships and Shipping from September 1939 to February 1941" makes it clear that, despite the opinion of some above, the Royal Navy itself was not unduly concerned about the potential of air attacks on its ships. The only method of attack it considered potentially dangerous was the dive bomber, and the Ju 87 comprised only a fraction of the Luftwaffe's bomber strength in Europe.
Cheers
Steve

Are you sure about the 40mm Bofors?

"The Royal Navy also made extensive use of the Bofors. Their first examples were air-cooled versions quickly adapted to ships during the withdrawal from Norway. With the fall of the west in 1940 the Dutch mine-layer Willem van der Zaan brought them their first example of a water-cooled gun on their Hazemeyer tri-axially stabilized mounting. Locally produced examples started arriving in 1942, known as the QF 40 mm Mark IV for use in twin-mounts, or the QF 40 mm Mark V for single mounts. The Navy ran through a variety of versions of the basic Bofors gun over the war, including the Mark VII to Mark XI. The Royal Navy's home-grown light anti-aircraft weapon, the QF 2-pounder gun, also had a caliber of 40 mm, but was referred to as the QF 2 pdr."

I don't think any navy had "satisfactory" AA at this time - and probably didn't even realize it (Bismarck's AA performance being a prime example even a year later). That said, having half the RN firing in your general direction is gonna make you consider your life's sins.

 

[parsifal]

The Germans planned to put mines in the English Channel.

They did more than plan, they did mine the channel, alng with most of the main ports around England. And this program was ongoing, and managed during the war to sink about 750000 tons of shipping. The Germans, despite intensive, prolonged efforts stretching over several years, could never manage to close the channel to British shipping or naval activity.


And this is the problem, or rather, one of them. To lay these minefields, the germans would need to spend several weeks doing it, in full view of the British. The British have their own minelaying capacity, and they have grater minesweeping capacity than the germans have either minelaying and minesweeping. Both sides have signficant, and secure CA capability. , but the British guns are better placed to cover the channel.

There is no way that the germans can lay a minefield dense enough and quick enough to securee their invasion routes. There is no way for the LW to prevent significant RN activity in the channel at night, and there is plenty of time for the RN to react to any embarkation and movement of the amphibious component of Sea Lion. The German transport relied on Rhine Barges and Tugs, which according to the wargaming done back in the 70s would take more than a week to load and get across the channel, and lord knows how long to disembark. say it takes 10 days to complete the operation, In that time the RN will have come in nightly and torn the inasion fleet to pieces, several times over. Whereever the landing point was, the british would have days to r3edeploy forces to that point and completely smother the landings.

As I said, Sea Lion was a total crock for so many reasons Anyone, with any experience of amphibious ops can see that

 

[stona]

The Germans planned to put mines in the English Channel.

I covered that above. The KM were well aware that this did not secure the flanks of their operation. One of the men I quoted was the KM C-in-C Minesweepers West who should know what he was talking about.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

Are you sure about the 40mm Bofors?

Yes, absolutely in 1940. I'm not sure how many Bofors 40mm the RN had by 1942/3 but they had few, aside from the initial pre-war order of 100, and I don't know if they were delivered and fitted by 1940.
Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

I'm questioning how they would deal with the issue (...)

They didn't have to as, by the Germans' own admission, it wasn't really an issue. It is possible that some ships may have struck mines, but the mines could never have closed the Channel to the RN and both sides knew it.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

ps: It is often claimed that the RN would never risk a battleship in the Channel if the German's invaded,

This is because Forbes told Churchill that he would not bring the Home Fleet south of the Wash "under any circumstances." Those present including Ismay all reported that Churchill kept his temper, spoke indulgently, and refused to believe Forbes. Nobody at the time seems to have seriously believed that Forbes would have kept the Home Fleet to the north and missed his opportunity for another Trafalgar with an invasion fleet lumbering across the English Channel. The fact that Forbes is virtually unknown outside naval or historical circles is because he never got this opportunity.

Raeder was concerned about British naval forces based at Portsmouth, Plymouth and the Nore which the Germans assessed as substantial. He was also concerned about the state of his own bases. Calais and Boulogne were operable from mid September, Zeebrugge not until November. According to Blumentritt the only harbours capable of loading a panzer division (given the proposed embarkation timetable) were in the Antwerp area which is a long way from Brighton.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

The "home Fleet" and "a battleship are not the same thing. In the summer of 1940 some of the "R" class battleships may have been looked upon as 'expendable' as they were due to be replaced by the KG V class.

 

[stona]

The "home Fleet" and "a battleship are not the same thing. In the summer of 1940 some of the "R" class battleships may have been looked upon as 'expendable' as they were due to be replaced by the KG V class.

Indeed, but Forbes' comment is often taken out of context and misinterpreted by those who believe that the Royal Navy would not have committed major assets to the defence of Britain.

Raeder obviously didn't know of Forbes comment but he thought that the Royal Navy would treat the departure of an invasion fleet (which incidentally the Germans themselves reckoned would take fifteen hours to make the crossing in ideal weather) as a life or death situation and throw everything at it.

The estimated crossing time was given by Vice Admiral Ruge at one of the Sea Lion conferences in support of the KM's arguments that there would be no element of surprise and that the RN would have time to react. The fifteen hours does not include embarkation or assembly times.



Cheers

Steve

 

[fastmongrel]

The R class were worn out and very much 3rd class by 1940. There were plans to convert 2 of them into bombardment ships by removing the B and X turrets, fitting massive torpedo water and air compartmentalised bulges proof against 2,000 pound mines and 1,200 pound torpedo warheads which would have increased beam to 140 feet, reduced draught by 9 feet and speed to 14 knots. All unnecassary upperworks would have been removed to leave a conning tower and gunnery directors. Flame cut slabs of 5 inch armour would have been fitted to the A and Y turrets and to make an armoured box around the engines, funnel, intakes, magazines and control positions. All the 6 inch guns would have been removed and replaced with a large number of HA guns and automatic AA guns.

This monstrosity was designed for one of Winston Churchills madcap plans to break into the Baltic and cut off Iron Ore supplies to Germany luckily for all involved the RN ignored and humoured Winston and nothing came of the plans. If an R had been converted it would have made an ideal anti-invasion vessel anchored off the beaches and diverting a big share LWs efforts from the invasion by acting as a bomb magnet.

 

[silence]

Indeed, but Forbes' comment is often taken out of context and misinterpreted by those who believe that the Royal Navy would not have committed major assets to the defence of Britain.

Raeder obviously didn't know of Forbes comment but he thought that the Royal Navy would treat the departure of an invasion fleet (which incidentally the Germans themselves reckoned would take fifteen hours to make the crossing in ideal weather) as a life or death situation and throw everything at it.

The estimated crossing time was given by Vice Admiral Ruge at one of the Sea Lion conferences in support of the KM's arguments that there would be no element of surprise and that the RN would have time to react. The fifteen hours does not include embarkation or assembly times.

The RN prob doesn't even need BBs. This sounds to me like a perfect job for their oodles of light cruisers (and destroyers, of course). Maybe have the BBs shell the on-land assembly area....

 

[stona]

The RN prob doesn't even need BBs. This sounds to me like a perfect job for their oodles of light cruisers (and destroyers, of course).

Yes, and that's precisely what Raeder was worried about.

Cheers

Steve

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Seems to me, not only is the success of Sea Lion a virtually absurd notion, but defeat of the RAF just about as unlikely:

It seems to me that production vs losses heavily favored a British Victory:
Monthly aircraft production below: from: Statistics of the Battle of Britain

(I assume without evidence that most a/c production was dedicated to fighters).

Month------Great Britain-----Germany
June-----------446--------------164
July------------496--------------220
August---------476--------------173
September-----467--------------218
October---------469--------------200
Total----------2,354--------------975

I suspect trained pilots was a bigger problem. Clearly they needed more US recruits and french Armée de l' Air refugees

 

[Jenisch]

Seems to me, not only is the success of Sea Lion a virtually absurd notion, but defeat of the RAF just about as unlikely

I didn't read Stephen Bungay's The Most Dangeours Enemy, but from reviews he seems to make a strong case of this.