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- #61
IJA Secret Intelligence Team at Chofu
- Thread starter Shinpachi
- Start date
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JugBR
Staff Sergeant
if the aircraft was clearly unable to operate again, was a very fair decision, otherwise, would be blood for nothing.
but was also a noble act of chivalry in mine opinion, others could shot just to see what happends.
nice texts, its greatests pieces of history !
- Thread starter
- #63
Hi, JugBR.
Thank you for your post.
... I am just merely translating line by line so that the contents can be understood as naturally and logically as possible by the readers in overseas.
I have often not understood Author's full intention well until I interpretted all the paragraphs as a stream because he some times avoids writing a thing directly and replace it with indirect expression, which is a little hard for even a Japanese to understand so soon.
For example, in Article No.18 (Tracking the Grummans), author did not mention any responsibilities of the communication soldier of the base who was not good at catching the message. He simply mentioned what had happened scene by scene.
I did not notice that he wanted to complain about the soldier's fault until I completed all translation. This may be his Chivaly for the soldier.
Anyway, I'm glad you have taken it in a good way.
Thank you very much.
Thank you for your post.
... I am just merely translating line by line so that the contents can be understood as naturally and logically as possible by the readers in overseas.
I have often not understood Author's full intention well until I interpretted all the paragraphs as a stream because he some times avoids writing a thing directly and replace it with indirect expression, which is a little hard for even a Japanese to understand so soon.
For example, in Article No.18 (Tracking the Grummans), author did not mention any responsibilities of the communication soldier of the base who was not good at catching the message. He simply mentioned what had happened scene by scene.
I did not notice that he wanted to complain about the soldier's fault until I completed all translation. This may be his Chivaly for the soldier.
Anyway, I'm glad you have taken it in a good way.
Thank you very much.
Aaron Brooks Wolters
Brigadier General
Very interesting story Shinpachi, again, well worth the wait. Keep up the good work.
- Thread starter
- #65
Keep it coming!
eddie_brunette
Senior Airman
Thanks again m8, do you know what happened to the Hellcats?
edd
edd
Glider
Captain
I wish we knew the name of the Sargeant Major, he must have been worth his weight in gold.
An excellent series of postings.
An excellent series of postings.
- Thread starter
- #69
Thank you Wayne, eddie and Glider.
I appreciate your friendly comments in favor, always.
On Sergeant-Major
=================
Name: Nobuyuki Takenaka
Age: 28 as of 1945
A graduate of Kumagaya Army Aviation School
As a Ki-43(Hayabusa) pilot, he joined the Battle of Malaya(around 1942 maybe). Ditched on the sea and injured, he returned to Japan to join the 101st Communication Team later. Dead or alive unknown since the late June of 1945 when he joined the battle in Okinawa.
On the Captured Grummans
========================
I find quite few records about it. Here is a testimony by a grandson of a Navy(not Army) pilot for your reference.
"My grandfather was an IJN pilot and had ever flown a captured Grumman. He said that he was much scared in flight because the control stick was heavy and very hard to control."
URL quoted
ttp://www.warbirds.jp/ansq/1/A2000209.html
Nice day everybody!
I appreciate your friendly comments in favor, always.
On Sergeant-Major
=================
Name: Nobuyuki Takenaka
Age: 28 as of 1945
A graduate of Kumagaya Army Aviation School
As a Ki-43(Hayabusa) pilot, he joined the Battle of Malaya(around 1942 maybe). Ditched on the sea and injured, he returned to Japan to join the 101st Communication Team later. Dead or alive unknown since the late June of 1945 when he joined the battle in Okinawa.
On the Captured Grummans
========================
I find quite few records about it. Here is a testimony by a grandson of a Navy(not Army) pilot for your reference.
"My grandfather was an IJN pilot and had ever flown a captured Grumman. He said that he was much scared in flight because the control stick was heavy and very hard to control."
URL quoted
ttp://www.warbirds.jp/ansq/1/A2000209.html
Nice day everybody!
- Thread starter
- #71
Waiting!
- Thread starter
- #73
Hi Wayne!
I'm recently busy about searching the captured F6Fs too.
Here are an illustration and a photo
WINGS PALETTE - Grumman F6F Hellcat - Japan
Hope you enjoy
I'm recently busy about searching the captured F6Fs too.
Here are an illustration and a photo
WINGS PALETTE - Grumman F6F Hellcat - Japan
Hope you enjoy
Attachments
Have a short article about this Hellcat, Arawasi magazine Issue 6. if you want to know more?
- Thread starter
- #75
- Thread starter
- #76
Article No.57
Guiding the Special Attackers(1 of 2)
=====================================
Author: Mr. Teruo Miyoshi
Order had come from the base commander,
"Naval aircrafts will carry out a special attack sortie(=suicide attack sortie) being based on the operation plan that our team creates. Create details about the guiding route and the sortie period for them by the end of tomorrow.
Seven members - Chief of Communication Room, Second Lieutenant, Sergeant-major T(my Sergeant-major), Sergeant N, Communication Sergeant, a veteran of translation and Corporal M(me) - are to participate in the plan.
Recall and make use of our earlier attack experience on Iwo-jima which had taken advantage well. Work it out so carefully and do not overlook any tiny matters. That's all."
Our responsibility was so heavy.
Beside deciding the guiding route, we had to create such tactics as it would bring the maximum war-result without failure and with the least risk. We had no sufficient time. The seven gathered to discuss immediately.
Chief of Communication Room started saying,
"According to the information from our headquarters, target is a large task force including two or three aircraft-carriers.
It will be extremely hard for us to obtain a good result if we take a head-on attack. Success of the surprise attack on the Iwo-jima last time relied much on the factor that we could foresee the U.S.military's activities time to time precisely.
Therefore, this time also, we need to know their activities well and to make such plan that they will never foresee. "
Translation soldier said,
"By analyzing their communications time to time, we can easily know when the carrier-based aircrafts, whatever aircraft type they may be, are exercising the touch-and-go even when they are out of sortie. Before landing on the aircraft-carrier, the aircraft is always told by the carrier her location using the coordinates value. Catching the value, we can grasp their location on the map easily."
Sergeant-major's turn,
"Present location of the U.S.military task-force is estimated 138degrees east longitude, 27degrees north latitude which is equal to the U.S.coordinates value --- (about 300 miles west of Chichijima island). This is the shortest attack course to both Kanto(around Tokyo) and Kansai(around Osaka) areas. Exact location can be grasped each time by the value which Translation Soldier will capture. The touch-and-go exercises may be taken place in the night because it's more difficult for a pilot to land than the daytime. In order to intercept their communications during exercise, we need to detect the waves by the two-staffs-in-position system all through the night.
It will be easier for us to guide the Navy special attackers if we hand them our duplicated chart maps which our team has originally made and is to be newly plotted the latest coordinates value of the U.S.military then.
However, I guess that the U.S.military who have had a bitter experience on Iwo-jima the other day will be increasing the reconnaissance aircrafts and reinforcing sea-air deployment over the network to strict surveillance. Therefore, if we should encounter any U.S.fighters on the way, as our special attackers are heavily loaded with the bombs, there will be no possibilities for us to win and to reach the target. I believe all success of this operation depends on the flight course to the target"
It was my turn,
"In the last attack on Iwo-jima, we flew down to the south along the line of 150degrees east longitude where their alert level was expected relatively low. This time, they will be expecting our next attack, if comes, from the west and focusing on around the 140degrees east longitude. Our strategy for the U.S.military had better be the same route as the last time again, that is, heading south first. They are believed to be located 30degrees north latitude with the coordinates value --- now.
When we reach their east line, we will fly further 30miles to the south, then change direction 45degrees to the west(meaning the north-west on the map) and again change direction 45degrees to the north(meaning the north) at the point of 30miles south of the target and keep flying at ultra-low-altitude directly to the target.
As we are to fly in the reverse airspace to which they do not pay attention so much, I believe the success possibility is high.
Even if we were found by their exercising aircraft, we can oppose to its air-combat as such aircraft will be equipped with the minimum bullets.
Expecting effective war-results, we had better carry out this operation after almost all the aircrafts on the carrier have left for escourting B29s or air-raids on our mianland. They will lose their home to be back after their mission.
I think the key point of this operation is to grasp their communications promptly and to estimate each position of enemy planes from the passage of time accurately. Also, we need to consider where to refuel our guide aircraft after the operation."
Outline.
Being based on the above discussion and itemizing the sortie route we suggest with reasons and the sortie period which was thought most effective etc,, Chief of Communication Room and Sergeant-major T offerred the base commander our opinion.
Next day, the base commander gathered us and told,
"Results of Operation Meeting held with the Navy staff at our headquarters are as follows.
1. Operation to be taken place resolutely being based on the plan that our team has formulated.
2. The attackers are nine carrier-borne bomber "Suisei"s(*D4Y4 Judy).
3. Sortie base is "Kisarazu".
4. The sortie period is to be determined by the Navy finally being based on the report that our team intercepts the U.S.military communications.
That's all and I have received a warm word from Commander Lee to be added here - 'It was hardships for your team to formulate a plan for only one day. I was afraid of it being a never-ending discussion but my worry was nothing. I am so glad as to pick up several members who joined the plan for the headquarters. Tell my gratitude to your soldiers. It was really hardships.'"
The plan had been decided now and it had become our major subject whether the operation could get success as well as the blueprint we had drawn.
/End of Article No.57
Story to be continued to No.58.
Guiding the Special Attackers(1 of 2)
=====================================
Author: Mr. Teruo Miyoshi
Order had come from the base commander,
"Naval aircrafts will carry out a special attack sortie(=suicide attack sortie) being based on the operation plan that our team creates. Create details about the guiding route and the sortie period for them by the end of tomorrow.
Seven members - Chief of Communication Room, Second Lieutenant, Sergeant-major T(my Sergeant-major), Sergeant N, Communication Sergeant, a veteran of translation and Corporal M(me) - are to participate in the plan.
Recall and make use of our earlier attack experience on Iwo-jima which had taken advantage well. Work it out so carefully and do not overlook any tiny matters. That's all."
Our responsibility was so heavy.
Beside deciding the guiding route, we had to create such tactics as it would bring the maximum war-result without failure and with the least risk. We had no sufficient time. The seven gathered to discuss immediately.
Chief of Communication Room started saying,
"According to the information from our headquarters, target is a large task force including two or three aircraft-carriers.
It will be extremely hard for us to obtain a good result if we take a head-on attack. Success of the surprise attack on the Iwo-jima last time relied much on the factor that we could foresee the U.S.military's activities time to time precisely.
Therefore, this time also, we need to know their activities well and to make such plan that they will never foresee. "
Translation soldier said,
"By analyzing their communications time to time, we can easily know when the carrier-based aircrafts, whatever aircraft type they may be, are exercising the touch-and-go even when they are out of sortie. Before landing on the aircraft-carrier, the aircraft is always told by the carrier her location using the coordinates value. Catching the value, we can grasp their location on the map easily."
Sergeant-major's turn,
"Present location of the U.S.military task-force is estimated 138degrees east longitude, 27degrees north latitude which is equal to the U.S.coordinates value --- (about 300 miles west of Chichijima island). This is the shortest attack course to both Kanto(around Tokyo) and Kansai(around Osaka) areas. Exact location can be grasped each time by the value which Translation Soldier will capture. The touch-and-go exercises may be taken place in the night because it's more difficult for a pilot to land than the daytime. In order to intercept their communications during exercise, we need to detect the waves by the two-staffs-in-position system all through the night.
It will be easier for us to guide the Navy special attackers if we hand them our duplicated chart maps which our team has originally made and is to be newly plotted the latest coordinates value of the U.S.military then.
However, I guess that the U.S.military who have had a bitter experience on Iwo-jima the other day will be increasing the reconnaissance aircrafts and reinforcing sea-air deployment over the network to strict surveillance. Therefore, if we should encounter any U.S.fighters on the way, as our special attackers are heavily loaded with the bombs, there will be no possibilities for us to win and to reach the target. I believe all success of this operation depends on the flight course to the target"
It was my turn,
"In the last attack on Iwo-jima, we flew down to the south along the line of 150degrees east longitude where their alert level was expected relatively low. This time, they will be expecting our next attack, if comes, from the west and focusing on around the 140degrees east longitude. Our strategy for the U.S.military had better be the same route as the last time again, that is, heading south first. They are believed to be located 30degrees north latitude with the coordinates value --- now.
When we reach their east line, we will fly further 30miles to the south, then change direction 45degrees to the west(meaning the north-west on the map) and again change direction 45degrees to the north(meaning the north) at the point of 30miles south of the target and keep flying at ultra-low-altitude directly to the target.
As we are to fly in the reverse airspace to which they do not pay attention so much, I believe the success possibility is high.
Even if we were found by their exercising aircraft, we can oppose to its air-combat as such aircraft will be equipped with the minimum bullets.
Expecting effective war-results, we had better carry out this operation after almost all the aircrafts on the carrier have left for escourting B29s or air-raids on our mianland. They will lose their home to be back after their mission.
I think the key point of this operation is to grasp their communications promptly and to estimate each position of enemy planes from the passage of time accurately. Also, we need to consider where to refuel our guide aircraft after the operation."
Outline.
Being based on the above discussion and itemizing the sortie route we suggest with reasons and the sortie period which was thought most effective etc,, Chief of Communication Room and Sergeant-major T offerred the base commander our opinion.
Next day, the base commander gathered us and told,
"Results of Operation Meeting held with the Navy staff at our headquarters are as follows.
1. Operation to be taken place resolutely being based on the plan that our team has formulated.
2. The attackers are nine carrier-borne bomber "Suisei"s(*D4Y4 Judy).
3. Sortie base is "Kisarazu".
4. The sortie period is to be determined by the Navy finally being based on the report that our team intercepts the U.S.military communications.
That's all and I have received a warm word from Commander Lee to be added here - 'It was hardships for your team to formulate a plan for only one day. I was afraid of it being a never-ending discussion but my worry was nothing. I am so glad as to pick up several members who joined the plan for the headquarters. Tell my gratitude to your soldiers. It was really hardships.'"
The plan had been decided now and it had become our major subject whether the operation could get success as well as the blueprint we had drawn.
/End of Article No.57
Story to be continued to No.58.
Aaron Brooks Wolters
Brigadier General
I have been down for over a week now trying to get my new computer up and running. Windows Vista is a disaster. I want Windows XP back. Sorry Shinpachi, had to get that off my chest. More great history, keep up the good work.
- Thread starter
- #78
Thank you Aaron for your friendly post.
My father's generation would never foresee this kind of friendly and openly communications with the Americans and other pre-allied peoples after sixty three years.
Even I myself hesitated posting first.
Thank you for your acceptance and generousity again.
PC sometimes brings unexpected hardships!
My PC had also been infected by an spyware and I was oblidged to reinstall the 'XP' this evening. Two hours wasted.
Now everything is OK. I will continue translation.
Please look forward to next!
My father's generation would never foresee this kind of friendly and openly communications with the Americans and other pre-allied peoples after sixty three years.
Even I myself hesitated posting first.
Thank you for your acceptance and generousity again.
PC sometimes brings unexpected hardships!
My PC had also been infected by an spyware and I was oblidged to reinstall the 'XP' this evening. Two hours wasted.
Now everything is OK. I will continue translation.
Please look forward to next!
Good stuff Shinpachi, keep it coming....
Hi Wayne!
I'm recently busy about searching the captured F6Fs too.
Here are an illustration and a photo
WINGS PALETTE - Grumman F6F Hellcat - Japan
Hope you enjoy
This Hellcat (Yo-801) in its damaged condition was photographed in Sept 1945 at Yokosuka air base in Kanagawa Prefecture.
It was an F6F-5 , Bu.No. 71441 White 29 from VF-44 aboard the USS Langley an Independence class Light Carrier.(CVL-27)
The pilot was Lt.(jg) Charles Valentine August, the aircraft suffered an engine failure and crash landed at Kobi, Taiwan on Jan.4th. 1945 during an attack on Japanese positions.
