IJA Secret Intelligence Team at Chofu

Thank you Wayne for your detailed information about the captured F6F-5.
You know anything

In my impression, the two Grummans IJA captured were buried somewhere in Kinugawa of Tochigi Prefecture. I have ever been to Kinugawa when I was a child as it was famous for hot springs. Mountains area with few residents. Searching the Grummans may become my lifework

Article No.58

Guiding the Special Attackers(2 of 2)
============================
Author: Mr. Teruo Miyoshi


Next day, for more study and discussion on the Army-Navy tie-up tactics, two Navy officers came to visit our team.


Navy Captain greeted first,

"In attacking on the Iwo-jima on the other day, having our bombers guided by your Army's aircraft appropriately, we Navy was able to have big war-results.

This time we need to catch a specific point on the vast expanse of the Pacific but the plus/minus amplitude captured by our radar survey is so large that it is hard for us to specify the location precisely.

As you may know, the special attackers are requested to load the maximum bombs. Thereore, their fuel-bullets loads are kept the required-minimum inevitably. Accordingly, they are often unable to carry out the mission by the U.S. fighter's interception or out-of-fuel 10 or 20miles short to the target in spite of their finding the target well.

Provided a guide aircraft of your team leads us to the location of the U.S. task force not being found by the U.S. aircrats and accurately as well, I believe it is possible for us to completely fulfill the original mission."


The base commander replied,

"I am interpretting this special attack as an unavoidable extreme one on tactics for myself, while there still remains unconvinced. Under the present circumstances we are outnumbered by the enemy, no other tactics may be thinkable but I personally do not necessarily agree with such elevated tactics in the fight head-on.

However, I would like to show my respects for your subordinates' resolution to face to the jaws of death in high spirits. I find no way but pray your mission being resulted in a complete success."


Navy Captain said,

"Thank you very much. We will do our best so that we can meet your expectations."


We began discussion about the following points in details - concentration point soon after the sortie, altitude and cruising speed, radio fequency, blockade of radio transmission on the way and how to read our team's map which was showing the coordinates etc.


About the concentration point, we decided our junction above offshore the Boso Peninsula around the time when we confirmed the carrier-based aircrafts left the carriers and reached the west of Aogashima of Izu Islands on the 33degrees north latitude.


Therefore, we had to capture the communications that were exchanged between the U.S. fleet and the aircrafts accurately and never fail to take a good opportunity.


If their carriers had been sunk or flight deck was greatly damaged, when the aircrafts was back home to the carriers after the completion of air-raid, their landing was impossible. In order to adopt the "kill two birds with one stone" tactics, grasping the passage of time firmly was our top priority.


Early next morning when it was still dim, we heard a big voice of a translation soldier,
"U.S.planes are just about to take off."
Information was immediately transferred to the headquarters through the base commander. We also prepared for takeoff and waited for the time went by. Our sortie must be done after all U.S. aircrafts left the carriers. We were waiting for it and the passage of time was felt extremely slow.


Encouraged by all soldiers of the base "Ganbare(meaning 'Do the best')", we flew toward the junction to meet the Navy planes.
All what we could do was only to carry out the operation according to the original plan and obey the fate.
While I was wondering "How are they special attackers feeling now, grasping their control stick", our plane had reached the junction. Nine "Suisei"s were waiting for us in three formations.


Sergeant-major told them on radio,
"My plane guides you. Follow me 30miles behind according to the planned course as the coordinates show."

"Understood."
Reliable voice of the leader responded.

Flying parallel with the hindmost aircraft of the formation, I saluted to the pilot. He returned his salute to me with a smile and it had shaken my soul unexpectedly. Saluting one plane by one plane for a farewell, I wondered why such promising young men around twenty years old got to be dead in a hurry. I couldn't find answer.


Liquid-cooled "Atsuta" engine was originally mounted on the carrier-borne bomber "Suisei" but it was often out of order. Therefore, the Navy requested a maker to modify "Suisei" for the air-cooled engine and adopted it as Type 33. As a result, performance had got slightly lower but utilization got improved so much that the necessary quantity of aircrafts to carry out military operations could be supplied. As a series mounted with air-cooled engine, type 43 was also manufactured. This model had no rear seat and one 800Kg bomb was loadable in the bomb bay. Abandoned the homing direction radio device and the rear turning gun turret for simplification, it was newly added bulletproof equipments to the cockpit. Therefore, Type 43 looked as if it had been designed for the purpose of special attack only.


Increasing altitude from the south of actual location of the U.S. task force, I observed a large task force through the binoculars. One Essex-class and two Yorktown-class aircraft-carriers with the cruisers for escorting and the destroyers. They were totally ten vessels at least. If they were serious about a sudden raid on the Japanese mainland now, what kind of rusults should we expect.


I contacted with the leader of the special attackers on radio,
"The coordinates value ---. We found the enemy task force. We will observe at high altitude. You may rush."


"Grateful for your guide. I wish your safe homing." replied the leader.


Adjusting our transportable radio device which was assembled by our base soldier of technology to our Navy's frequency(A3 radio phone) and also using the shortwave for the communication with our base, I reported the scale of the U.S. task force and the rush by special attackers was just about to begin. Our Naval base would be catching them too.


The leader ordered at last,
"Target. Three aircraft-carriers. All follow me."


All attackers rushed in forming a line of tandem at ultra-low-altitude.
It had to be a line to make the target smaller for the anti-aircraft cannons.


The leader was rushing aiming at the bridge of a carrier. He was going to attack the controll center of the ship. Shot to fire on the engine, he kept flying straight and crashed the bridge. Immediately after the explosion, I heard on radio his final shout "Woooh!" then "Mom!" and the rest was silence.


Next attacker had penetrated through the flight deck. Bomb fuse was specially designed to explode after the break-through. Pillar of fire and black smoke blow out. It looked as if inferno.


"Attacker No.3. Name---. Now rush."
The third pilot rushed into the rear-side of a carrier. It would be an engine room.


I heard "Emperor Forever" too but the voice "Mom" was sticky to my head.
Listening to their voice which was coming in one after another, I reported every details of the ongoing war situation and results to the base.


All young pilots who just saluted me with a smile earlier had gone.
Tears streamed along my cheek and my hitting the telegraph key tended to pause. One of the nine attackers had been downed by a volley of Pom Pom cannons regretly but three aircraft-carriers were badly damaged or crippled after all. That was our war-results.


'War is a dog-eat-dog or kill-or-be-killed but, now that we have actually witnessed the special attack in front of us, we cannot help wondering who ordered this kind of tragic attack', 'Does the person who ordered this operation have such spirit of the special attack too?' Sergeant-major and I had exchanged conversation like this later.

I never wanted to witness such a cruel and merciless scene again from the bottom of my heart. Never.


/End of Article No.58

Thankyou very much Shinpachi. I need to dedicate time to read all your posts... I'm a little behind.
I'd curious to know if there were anyway way to ID the sub that surfaced and to track down anyone who remembers the same incident..

Your work is very much appreciated!

Hi comiso90!
I'm so glad you are interested in my posts.
Thank you very much.

Yes, I want the IDs too because we can know more historical backgrounds with them.

I'm researching action records of Gato-class submarines as I've found several subs of the class were frequently acting near the Japanese mainland in 1944-1945.

I'm also tracing testimony of the local residents around Kashimanada of Ibaragi Prefecture.

image link: ttp://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/64/USS_Mingo%3B0826106.jpg

Very good post. Good read.

great work again Shinpachi, thanks....

Thank you timshatz, Wayne for the warm comments.

I've also ever heard of the last word "Mom!" on a Kamikaze movie about fifty years ago when I was a little boy.

I thought it was impossible for a grownup man - a brave military man to say such a word as if he had been a little boy.

I now, over fifity, believe twenty years old was still a boy!

Next story will be "Attack on Iwo-jima(precisely 'Attacking on the U.S. military airfields of Iwo-jima')".
It's a further longer story ranging three articles (Tears for me )

Please look forward!

looking forward to more....

Thank you Wayne for your encouragement, always.

To save my translation time and make it quicker, I am not a man who always goes straight alone and I have been testing many translation tools such as - Google, Yahoo, Alta-Vista, IBM's and our local's excite, Infoseek, @nifty, OCN etc. as many as I'm bored enough.

There is no satisfactory one at all.

Checking our very local sites recently however, I'm beginning to find some SANE tools! Check the translation results in comparison the attached image shows. You could know what the sentenses mean in a few boxes naturally.

Original Japanese sentenses meant - As a result, more bombs were loadable(to B29s) and, from the beginning of April 1945, long-range P51 fighters were beginning to be deployed on Iwo-jima as an escort fighter.


Let's hope in the future

image site:
10???????????????????

Well that's an eye opener....I have tried the net to translate some japanese stuff and, for the most part was confusing to read but you could get only a general meaning.

Your example simply confirms this...

Thank you Wayne. You have kindly verified the tools.

I understand it's too early to rely on such tools entirely.

Here is my gift image for you, the sixth rib of N1K2J.

It's my work

Thanks mate! good work....got a few Shiden-kai kits to build....

Again Shinpachi, great work. It is much appreciated and very interesting.

Thank you Wayne.
You have soon understood Shiden-kai by the N1K2J
It's Great always. No words frankly


Thank you Aaron for your acceptance of my introduction of those articles on the thread.

There may be coming up another testimony about Kamikaze pilots which was introduced by another IJA pilot, not Mr.Miyoshi. I can't recall if it was a writen one or simply introduced on a TV program. He said that, including himself, not a few Kamikaze pilots of IJA survived because of engine trouble but it was not officially announced by the Army as they had been to die. I'm checking exact source.

Please enjoy my CG for sometime.
Thank you and Good Day

very nice!! Looks great mate!

Thanks Wayne. Here is coming new article

********

Article No.46

Attacking the U.S. military airfields of Iwo-jima (1 of 3)
=========================================
Author: Mr. Teruo Miyoshi


After the Battle of Iwo-jima(Feb-Mar 1945), the U.S.military had improved those old Japanese Kita(meaning the North), Motoyama and Chidori airfields and began to use them for emergency landing and refueling B29 bombers which were carrying out air-raids on the Japanese mainland.

As a result, more bombs were loadable to them and, from early April 1945, long-range P51 fighters were also beginning to be deployed on Iwo-jima as an escort fighter.


B29s had not been able to carry out daytime raids until they were escorted by P51s. Because P51 had more powerful air combat capability than carrier-based F6F, B29 was able to concentrate on targeting better than before and had improved accuracy of bombings. On the other hand, P51s, beside escort missions, carried out their own local bombings as well as gun fires across their enemy country. The suburbs of urban areas were also not safe places for us any longer.


In early April, the base commander gathered all the members of the base.
(He always tried to let all the members, including even a private, know all necessary informations about the ongoing operation and mission).

Outline of the order he had received from the headquarters was explained as follows.

"The Defense Forces Headquarters are to create an attack plan against the occupied airfields of Iwo-jima as a joint IJA-IJN operation. I have been ordered to join the work as a strategic planning staff by our headquarters earlier.

This was because our special efforts for early grasping the enemy flight routes and intercepting the communications of their aircrafts etc as other teams cannot carry out have been highly evaluated. This is the request by our headquarters saying 'We request you and your team to participate this operation'.

Not so many staff officers in the headquarters, except Commander and a few personnel, know our team's secret missions very well. If there is anything we need to let them understand in particular, say it now."


Sergeant-major addressed his opinion,
"We are not informed of the outline of operation plan and what type of aircraft will be used yet but I think the Navy's heavy bombers will be more suitable than our Army's. I'm afraid that our pilots are not so familiar with a guess-flight which relys on a compass on the ocean.

Also, here are two major problems.
The biggest one is our mutual code books are different.
Accordingly, under the present circumstances that we have no sufficient time to integrate them at all, we need such able telegraph operators who can send and receive as fast as a hundred twenty letters of the Morse code in raw text for a minute.

At that speed, it will be too fast for a U.S.military radio soldier to catch them perfectly even if it is a raw text.

The other is our Army is adopting different numeric coordinates from the Navy. We must think how to solve and unify them. That's all."


In case of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force today, I heard that an excellent pilot is requested nothing but to concentrate on the superior air-combat skills. He is not being bothered with such technical differences among the forces anymore. In the former military, technical issues were not consistent.


Chief of Communication Room suggested,
"P51s being deployed on Iwo-jima are estimated more than fifty. If we may adopt a head-on attack, our heavy bombers, even if they are escorted by their fighters, will easily fall a victim to the P51s and unable to obtain the performances we expect with no doubt.

Accordingly, if our bombers takeoff to sally shortly after the P51s takeoff for their air-raids on our mainland and we reach the airspace of 150 degrees East longitude 30 degrees North latitude where the U.S.military patrol is relatively low and also

take the ultra-low-altitude flight, avoiding the enemy radars, toward Iwo-jima and DO carry out bombings against those targets of runways, communication facilities, fuel storage tanks plus remaining P51s under maintenance if any at once,

Homing P51s after mission and B29s under emergency if any will be placed in the state of no landing.

Flight range of a P51 is nominally 2,100miles. Provided the round distance between Tokyo and Iwo-jima is 1,600miles and their duration of flight above our mainland is about sixty minutes, they are to fly as distant as about 1,900miles.

When they sally, they are fully armed with the maximum bullets and bombs. This means they are fuelled with the minimum gallons to cover the round course plus two hours or so flight at most.

Homing P51s will be unable not only to land the island but to fly further to Saipan or Guam which are located more than 600miles away. They will have no choice but ditch on the sea or land by the parachute abandoning the plane.

Even if all the U.S.fleets around Iwo Jima were mobilized for the rescue of those pilots, the probability they can save would be less than fifty percent.

The supplement of new aircrafts will be easy but, when we take it consideration that a military needs five years at least to train the new expert pilots, I think we can give them a big blow.

In any case, if we do not perform the operational examination completely with the Navy in advance, this operation will be resulted in failure. That is all." Then added, "In addition, we can identify easily which the radio communication comes from, B29 or P51, when they have transmitted the wave soon after each take-off."

.........

Base Commander concluded,
"Everybody's opinions are very useful. I will try to reflect them fully in the operation meeting at the headquarters. Thanks guys. Remember we make this matter a secret treatment. That's all."


The suggestion by the chief of communication room sounded as if a thief tactics. However, if we should take the honest head-on attack against the island, only the vain damages were expected. This was a peculiar tactics but convinced us.

By the way, when the chief had been campaigning at the southern front of the Pacific, the U.S.military had also been developing the operation like this.

Points were to grasp the precise period when P51s took off and to judge their exact numbers from their A3 radio communications. This was extremely important. If our count on their take-offs were not close to all the aircrafts on the island, furious resistance by the U.S.fighters would be expected then there.

Another point was interception by the carrier-based fighters was also expected if enemy carriers were deployed in the neighboring waters of Iwo-jima. Our stay in the sky above the island had to be limited within forty to fifty minutes at longest. Otherwise, the carrier-based planes would chase to attack us.

Specialists at the headquarters would make up tactical details anyway but I was excited too much to sleep that night.



/End of Article No.46

Story to be continued to No.47

Good stuff!...please continue....

Great work Shinpachi. Enjoy reading it.

Old allies enjoy a story of thief operation by one of the old axis.
Good days have come at last!

Thank you Wayne and Aaron

Article No.47

Attacking the U.S. military airfields of Iwo-jima (2 of 3)
=========================================
Author: Mr. Teruo Miyoshi


Two days after the operation meeting had been held at the headquarters, our base commander gathered again all the members of the base.


"From now, I'll tell you all the details of our sudden attack operation on the Iwo-jima which I have explained you before. Flight crews and communication soldiers to take note."

1. Attackers are nine Navy Type 1 land attackers (*G4M2 Betty) as bombers and they gather in the naval Kisarazu base.

2. Escort fighters are twelve Navy Type 0 fighters (*A6M5 Zeke) with external fuel tanks attached.
(Regular tanks capacity: 525litters. Additional tank: 330litters)
Each four will escort a formation of three bombers.

3. Formation leaders of the naval bombers and fighters group will visit our team tomorrow to discuss further details and to intend the consciousness unification lest we should overlook anything on the operational accomplishment.
Therefore, Chief of Communication Room to prepare the necessary data concerning how to capture P51s.

4. Concerning the coordinates issue, values which our team has originally developed are to be used.
Sergeant-major T to explain in details lest there should be any inconsistency.

5. Aircraft of Sergeant-major T to guide the bombers making use of your good experience about monitoring the trend of the U.S.aircrafts and to verify their war-results.

6. Aircraft of Sergeant N to assist Sergeant-major T and to prepare for an unexpected incident.

7. To use the long-wave and the medium-wave as common radio frequencies.
To use the short-wave for communication with our base only (as it was scarcely used by the Navy).

8. Radio contacts to be carried out by the high-speed communication in raw text style.
We have no other choice because it is difficult on consistency to integrate the both forces' different telegraph codes.

Also, radio dispatchments from the naval planes are banned except the leaders or any in emergency.
Frequent dispatchments will bring a wonder at the U.S.military side.

9. Junction with the naval aircrafts is --miles offshore the Boso Peninsula.

１０. Call-signs for Army. "Plum one" and "Plum two". Official signs never to be used.

１１. Call-signs for Navy. "Cherry one" for the leader of bombers. "Cherry two" for the leader of escort fighters.

１２. Our route for the south is along the 150degrees line of the east longitude. At the 24degrees of the north latitude, we turn to the west at ultra-low-altitude and aim at Iwo-jima directly.

１３. Exact attacking targets have already been examined by the Navy side.

１４. Aircrafts of Sergeant-major T and Sergeant N to be refuelled at a naval base of Haha-jima on the way home.

Aboves are all. Is there any question?"


I asked,
"Studying a range of their past air-raids by the U.S.military, we can know that they are making full use of detailed tactics of bombing/attacking. Besides, on the rescue of crew, they are setting up a broad network in the sky and sea.
For our operation this time, I believe that our naval flight crews are the best of the bests selected among the Navy's.
Then, how is our rescue plan for these precious crews in case?"


Base Commander answered,
"We had discussion about that point too. In consideration of large influence by frequent appearances of U.S. submarines in Japanese waters, we are to deploy a life boat in the south of Hachijo-jima island. In addition, it has also been decided to dispatch a patrol plane from a naval base of the Boso Peninsula in case."


Next day, two Navy officers(*leaders) came to assure the consciousness unification.
I was also permitted attendance in the form of hearing.

Lieutenant junior grade asked,
"How do you grasp the takeoff of P51s?"

Chief of Communication Room replied,
"When they take off, they always transmit radio wave individually to adjust sensitivity. So, we capture and observe the ripple mark to estimate almost how many they are. Also, their leader issues instruction to his subordinates soon after they have united formation and reached cruising speed. By catching it, we can know their direction, route and others. Our English translation soldiers are intercepting under twenty-four-hours system."

Lieutenant junior grade asked,
"How do you judge their aircraft type?"

Chief of Communication Room explained,
"In case of B29, letter V is attached to the head of each squadron number and they use the Morse code to adjust their radio equipments. Therefore, we can judge the other radio phone communications are belonging to fighters.

In addition, identifying which they took off, a carrier or land, can be estimated by interpretting their communication contents."

Lieutenant junior grade asked,
"We heard that your team had solved the coordinates values the U.S.military use. How did you do it?"

Assistant Second Lieutenant for Chief of Communication Room replied,
"We searched to find the datum point for their coordinates and applied it with the actual values that they use to elucidate."

Lieutenant junior grade was convinced,
"We heard summary about your team from your base commander in advance and now fully understood that your main missions are rather intelligence activities than being called a reconnaissance team. We do request your cooperation in order to succeed this operation."

For the rest of time, we had discussed more other details so that both forces could unite efforts in the duty execution.


My number of sortie times for patrolling and searching exceeded a hundred times since I had been assigned to this team in June 1944. But when I thought of the seriousness of the mission we were about to sally this time, I wondered if I woould be able to give a hundred percent power as expected.

I knew that this would be an opportunity for me to test myself but I had often been unable to think anything at all before the sally.

The face of a translation soldier who were intercepting the U.S. communications days and nights also looked a little cramped.

However, the person who were becoming nervous most would be Chief of Communication Room.
Whenever he had time, he had chats with Sergeant-major T frequently and I felt it was to quiet the surge of his heart.

Four days after we had discussion with the Navy, a translation soldier had shouted,

"P51s get ready to take off!"


/End of Article No.47
Story to be continued to No.48