Impact of Me262 timeline moved up 12 months?

[bobbysocks]

I could see the nightfighter version being able to take advantage of brakes but not a day fighter. the biggest advantage of the plane was it went ~100 faster than the escorting mustangs. if you are going to slow it down with brakes why not just attack with 190s?

 

[davebender]

Bear in mind they would be attacking B-17s cruising straight and level @ 180mph. That makes for a relatively easy aerial gunnery solution.

 

[davebender]

A fully operational Jagdgeschwader equipped with about 100 Me-262s would certainly rip up some heavy bombers. And it keeps getting worse as you can expect an additional jagdgeschwader to complete conversion to the Me-262 every month or so during 1944.

During summer 1944 units like JG52 and JG54 are likely to be flying Me-262s on the Russian front too.

 

[GrauGeist]

Eric Brown said the roller coaster method didn't allow for aiming and the air brakes would allow for a couple extra seconds to acquire the target and fire accurately. But the historical dive method didn't protect from defensive fire or enemy fighter counter tactics. The safest method turned out to be the R4M fired from the flank outside of defensive fire range.
There is a ton of first hand info into operations here from both sides:
Amazon.com: The Me 262 Stormbird: From the Pilots Who Flew, Fought, and Survived It (9780760342633): Colin D. Heaton, Anne-Marie Lewis, Jorg Czypionka, Barrett Tillman: Books

You do realize that Eric Brown didn't fly the Me262 in combat? His assesment is formed in a post-war world where they have the leisure to make evaluations under ideal conditions.

Now if you go and read that book "Stormbirds", you find where pilots like Nowotny, Galland and others had to rethink their tactics because at first, they were approaching the bombers as they had in their Sturmbocks and this was causing a great deal of trouble both for targeting and in receiving defensive fire. The "diving" or "slashing" attack was the result and offered a great deal of success.

Also, I might suggest reading experiences from the other side of the fence, a good summary can be found in "Hell's Angels: The True Story of the 303rd Bomb Group in World War II" by Jay A. Stout.

So long as it's pilots flew high-speed slashing attacks, the jet was virtually untouchable. And armed with four 30-millimeter cannons or R4M rockets it was a superb bomber killer.

And

The jet's speed also made it less vulnerable to aerial gunners. Frank Boyle remembered that the fast new jets largely negated the effectiveness of his ball turret. "The Me-262s were so fast that we couldn't traverse the ball fast enough to pull the right amount of lead-we couldn't get our guns in front of them. And it really didn't matter anyway because the computing gun sight couldn't handle such high speeds. If they attacked us from the rear, we could pull enough lead but the firing time was so short that they were extremely difficult to hit."

The book also covers first-hand accounts of the devestation the Mk108 did to the bombers...in many cases, they tell about the bomber suddenly suffering catastrophic damage, death and debris everywhere and their only indication of what just happened, was a brief glimpse of a jet diving out of view.

 

[Balljoint]

180 mph indicated?

 

[GrauGeist]

180 mph indicated?

According to Boeing, the B-17G had a cruising speed of 150mph.

Not sure what the bombers cruising speed was set at, during a bombing mission at typical altitudes, but it would be close to that, especially with a full bombload.

Boeing: Historical Snapshot: B-17 Flying Fortress

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal the problem with that suggestion of an earlier Whittle engine is that the Me262 showing up a year early doesn't accelerate the TL of the British program, because that would require a 1920s change, not the 1943 surprise appearance of the Me262. As it was they found out about the Me262 in 1943 historically and tried to rush the Meteor, but couldn't get it out there anywhere soon enough.

I should start my reply by pointing out that this is all a matter of opinion and extrapolation, so there is no right or wrong answer. But in my opinion, not only is pushing the Me262 forward a year a big ask, it also has multiplying effects on the R&D effort. If you want Me262s in 1943, there are a lot of hurdles to overcome, and that just doesnt mean a 1 year advancement at the beginning. It means either a greatly increased time frame for the critical elements of the design, or a much greater investment of resources, both of which would not go unnoticed in the allied camp

The critical factor holding the 262 back was its engine development, followed by the political interference. Early in the piece the germans had a similar problem to the British in that interest in the concept of turbojets within the RLM was conspicuously lacking.

The history of the Jumo 004 development as i understand it goes something like this (quoting from wiki again)...."The feasibility of jet propulsion had been demonstrated in Germany in early 1937 by Hans von Ohain working with the Heinkel company. Most of the Reich Air Ministry (RLM) remained uninterested, but Helmut Schelp and Hans Mauch saw the potential of the concept and encouraged Germany's aero engine manufacturers to begin their own programmes of jet engine development. The companies remained skeptical and little new development was carried out".

Throughout 1939 a lot of time was wasted as resources were witheld from the plan, and largely because of German inactivity, the RAF saw no great need for development of Whittles concept. Whittle had bench tested his engine in 1937, and from there until 1941 (I think) nothing happened in the British camp. Junkes did not bench test their engine until the end of 1940. Once they did, it gave motivation for the British to start their development. Once the British began development, it gave others, particularly the US to follow suit, particularly after tizard.

German progress did set the pace, but it was never possible for them to "get the jump" so to speak. Whittles design was simpler and more reliable, but had less promise than the Junkers design but at no stage until the very end did the germans pull ahead markedly from the allies. The Germans had a greater sense of urgency for such aircraft, and this might have yielded them a few weeks or even months if they were lucky, but allied R&D was always in the game as far as timing was concerned.

The assumption youve made is that the Me 262 shows up a year earlier and the Allied progression has not changed from the historical. But to get the 262 into service that 12 months earlier a lot more timer and resources than one year would be needed, more than enough time for the Allies to respond.

If your hypothetical is simply to rely on the existing prototypes, this would make virtually no difference to the air campaign, and probably would expose the greatest weakness of the 262, its reliability, and probably skew and distort the RLMs view of it as a useless piece of junk (which it was not)

 

[wiking85]

Bear in mind they would be attacking B-17s cruising straight and level @ 180mph. That makes for a relatively easy aerial gunnery solution.

Actually no, the closing speed is too high, which is why the roller coaster method was devised, because it slowed them down enough to get some seconds to aim while still being difficult to intercept.

 

[wiking85]

I should start my reply by pointing out that this is all a matter of opinion and extrapolation, so there is no right or wrong answer. But in my opinion, not only is pushing the Me262 forward a year a big ask, it also has multiplying effects on the R&D effort. If you want Me262s in 1943, there are a lot of hurdles to overcome, and that just doesnt mean a 1 year advancement at the beginning. It means either a greatly increased time frame for the critical elements of the design, or a much greater investment of resources, both of which would not go unnoticed in the allied camp

The critical factor holding the 262 back was its engine development, followed by the political interference. Early in the piece the germans had a similar problem to the British in that interest in the concept of turbojets within the RLM was conspicuously lacking.

The history of the Jumo 004 development as i understand it goes something like this (quoting from wiki again)...."The feasibility of jet propulsion had been demonstrated in Germany in early 1937 by Hans von Ohain working with the Heinkel company. Most of the Reich Air Ministry (RLM) remained uninterested, but Helmut Schelp and Hans Mauch saw the potential of the concept and encouraged Germany's aero engine manufacturers to begin their own programmes of jet engine development. The companies remained skeptical and little new development was carried out".

Throughout 1939 a lot of time was wasted as resources were witheld from the plan, and largely because of German inactivity, the RAF saw no great need for development of Whittles concept. Whittle had bench tested his engine in 1937, and from there until 1941 (I think) nothing happened in the British camp. Junkes did not bench test their engine until the end of 1940. Once they did, it gave motivation for the British to start their development. Once the British began development, it gave others, particularly the US to follow suit, particularly after tizard.

German progress did set the pace, but it was never possible for them to "get the jump" so to speak. Whittles design was simpler and more reliable, but had less promise than the Junkers design but at no stage until the very end did the germans pull ahead markedly from the allies. The Germans had a greater sense of urgency for such aircraft, and this might have yielded them a few weeks or even months if they were lucky, but allied R&D was always in the game as far as timing was concerned.

The assumption youve made is that the Me 262 shows up a year earlier and the Allied progression has not changed from the historical. But to get the 262 into service that 12 months earlier a lot more timer and resources than one year would be needed, more than enough time for the Allies to respond.

If your hypothetical is simply to rely on the existing prototypes, this would make virtually no difference to the air campaign, and probably would expose the greatest weakness of the 262, its reliability, and probably skew and distort the RLMs view of it as a useless piece of junk (which it was not)

My understanding is the Allies had no knowledge of the German jet engine program until it was leaked in 1943 by Fritz Kolbe and their own program was run independent of German efforts.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_Kolbe

 

[davebender]

Four 30mm shells will normally kill any aircraft. Which means one shell from each of the four nose mounted 30mm cannon. Essentially just a tap of the trigger.

It's not just high speed which makes the Me-262 lethal to B-17s. It has cannon firepower far in excess of a typical Me-109 or Fw-190.

 

[stona]

Are we going to make other assumptions too?
I'd like to know where the highly trained aircrew to fly all these jets is going to come from. Someone mentioned night fighters, that's a crew of two highly trained air crew, trained to a much higher standard, and over a much longer period, than was required for daylight operations
Where and how are they going to be trained? The Luftwaffe suffered drastic fuel reductions to training command from 1942 and jet pilots don't start on jets. You can hardly transfer all your experienced pilots from piston engine fighter units, it became evident in 1944/5 what happens when units are staffed largely by inexperienced pilots, they become cannon fodder.
There is also a common misconception that the kerosene type fuels required for the Me 262 were readily available as if there were no other uses for light fuel oils, particularly in the domestic sector which was also strictly rationed from 1942.
The problem is not producing the aircraft, assuming that the Me 262 and its engines are a viable proposition a year earlier than historically they were. The Germans never struggled to produce enough fighters until the dying weeks of the war. The problem is producing the pilots and aircrew to fly them and to maintain the support infrastructure to maintain them.
Cheers
Steve

 

[GrauGeist]

My understanding is the Allies had no knowledge of the German jet engine program until it was leaked in 1943 by Fritz Kolbe and their own program was run independent of German efforts.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_Kolbe

I'm sure they were aware that Germany was working on it, as von O'Hain was known in the aircraft community just as Whittle was. Just as Jack Northrup was aware of the Horton brother's pre-war projects (and visa-versa).

 

[GrauGeist]

Are we going to make other assumptions too?
I'd like to know where the highly trained aircrew to fly all these jets is going to come from. Someone mentioned night fighters, that's a crew of two highly trained air crew, trained to a much higher standard, and over a much longer period, than was required for daylight operations
Where and how are they going to be trained? The Luftwaffe suffered drastic fuel reductions to training command from 1942 and jet pilots don't start on jets. You can hardly transfer all your experienced pilots from piston engine fighter units, it became evident in 1944/5 what happens when units are staffed largely by inexperienced pilots, they become cannon fodder.
There is also a common misconception that the kerosene type fuels required for the Me 262 were readily available as if there were no other uses for light fuel oils, particularly in the domestic sector which was also strictly rationed from 1942.
The problem is not producing the aircraft, assuming that the Me 262 and its engines are a viable proposition a year earlier than historically they were. The Germans never struggled to produce enough fighters until the dying weeks of the war. The problem is producing the pilots and aircrew to fly them and to maintain the support infrastructure to maintain them.
Cheers
Steve

This is an excellent point and look at the fact that there were well over 1,400 Me262s built but less than half ever took to the sky. Aside from the lack of fuel and parts, they simply did not have enough pilots to fly them and by war's end, there were even Feldwebels piloting them.

 

[wiking85]

Are we going to make other assumptions too?
I'd like to know where the highly trained aircrew to fly all these jets is going to come from. Someone mentioned night fighters, that's a crew of two highly trained air crew, trained to a much higher standard, and over a much longer period, than was required for daylight operations
Where and how are they going to be trained? The Luftwaffe suffered drastic fuel reductions to training command from 1942 and jet pilots don't start on jets. You can hardly transfer all your experienced pilots from piston engine fighter units, it became evident in 1944/5 what happens when units are staffed largely by inexperienced pilots, they become cannon fodder.
There is also a common misconception that the kerosene type fuels required for the Me 262 were readily available as if there were no other uses for light fuel oils, particularly in the domestic sector which was also strictly rationed from 1942.
The problem is not producing the aircraft, assuming that the Me 262 and its engines are a viable proposition a year earlier than historically they were. The Germans never struggled to produce enough fighters until the dying weeks of the war. The problem is producing the pilots and aircrew to fly them and to maintain the support infrastructure to maintain them.
Cheers
Steve

Jets used diesel fuel, which the Germans had in abundance, not avgas that normal flight training used.

 

[wiking85]

I'm sure they were aware that Germany was working on it, as von O'Hain was known in the aircraft community just as Whittle was. Just as Jack Northrup was aware of the Horton brother's pre-war projects (and visa-versa).

Ohain had little influence on production German engine, he was just proof of concept and it was the Jumo project that did much of the technical work to even get the real Jumo 004 project started, which took really until 1940 to begin. Knowledge of Ohain's pre-war work may have been known, but the advanced once the war started were no due to no being associated with Ohain, nor internationally publicized due to their sensitive war work. Knowledge of Jumo's work certainly was not known until it was leaked in 1943 AFAIK.

 

[Milosh]

This is an excellent point and look at the fact that there were well over 1,400 Me262s built but less than half ever took to the sky. Aside from the lack of fuel and parts, they simply did not have enough pilots to fly them and by war's end, there were even Feldwebels piloting them.

Not all Luftwaffe pilots were officers, correct?

 

[davebender]

What's wrong with that?

During WWII most nations used some NCO pilots and they appear to have performed just fine.

 

[davebender]

There's no need to magically advance jet engine development. Just make different aircraft production decisions during 1938. That gives 1944 Germany the Fw-187 powered by 1,800ps engines. Not as fast as Me-262 but plenty fast enough to engage and disengage at will. Nose mounted weapons would be same as for Me-262.

 

[GrauGeist]

Not all Luftwaffe pilots were officers, correct?

Correct

What's wrong with that?

During WWII most nations used some NCO pilots and they appear to have performed just fine.

Understand that in front line fighter units, commissioned officers were typically assigned while non-commissioned officers flew other missions. As the pilot pool dwindled, they started drawing from the lesser ranks, first the Oberfeldwebels, then Feldwebels and even Unteroffizieres.

So in the end, you had basically the equivellent of a Corporal flying fighter aircraft.

 

[wiking85]

There's no need to magically advance jet engine development. Just make different aircraft production decisions during 1938. That gives 1944 Germany the Fw-187 powered by 1,800ps engines. Not as fast as Me-262 but plenty fast enough to engage and disengage at will. Nose mounted weapons would be same as for Me-262.

No argument there, but by the time the Me262 is ready its the better choice. The problem with the Fw187 was that putting it into production didn't offer enough performance advantage to justify it as the same time the Me410 was in production in the same role (with more wide weapon selection choices) and getting it as a destroyer would mean a pre-war choice between the Bf110 or Fw187.