Impact of Me262 timeline moved up 12 months?

[GregP]

According to Adolph Galland, there were no more than about 300 Me 262's flown and never more than about 100 to 125 at any one time.

1,300 seems formidable. 125 means there were probably no more than 4 to 8 in any "big" formation, and they were NOT easy to find in the air and maybe attackable. Lest we forget, they weren't flying along looking for opportunities. These early jets had a very short range and very probably KNEW where they were going when they launched and were probably back within 25 - 35 minutes mostly.

 

[stona]

Jets used diesel fuel, which the Germans had in abundance, not avgas that normal flight training used.

But those jet pilots are going to start on 'normal training flights'. I even highlighted the point that jet pilots don't start their flying on jets, even today.

Incidentally diesel fuel was not available 'in abundance'. I just happen to have been reading about the crisis in supply of both diesel and automotive fuel to German forces in Italy in September 1944 and there were other shortages elsewhere.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Denniss]

Historically, the Me262 could have shown up sooner than it did, had the German leadership not insisted that the Me262 be a bomber. The Ar234 would fill that role far better anyway.

That's a bad old myth, Me 262 introduction was limited by availability of reliable engines. Fuselage hardpoints and release mechanism were already present, intended for drop tanks.

 

[drgondog]

If the Me 262 is introduced operationally in August 1943, that is a game changer. Even October with 40 operational into one well led JG located on Dutch/German border

First, the available pool of pilots includes the far better average pilots available in the West during the late summer of 1943 - to the point that the drawdown of units and pilots occurring from East and South may not have been necessary.

Second, the fuel reserve and pilot training capacity was far higher before the attrition of the Battle of Germany that sapped the LW from October, 1943 through D-Day or making critical attacks on the Petro-Chemical industry.

Third - the tactics to engage the bombers (or fighters) could be developed without the mess resulting from the very long range Mustangs ambushing pilots taking off and landing all over Germany. As the tactics developed a far higher toll of daylight bombers would result - including the effect of conventional day fighter strength as it existed in August 1943.

Fourth - the losses of US fighter pilots would also increase dramatically, diminishing the 8th AF in important ways that were so important in 1944 - namely a very large pool of experienced and talented fighter pilots when the Mustangs arrived in force.

IMO - daylight strategic bombing is halted and not necessarily able to re-start even when the Mustang arrives. The MiGs over N.Korea basically stopped USAF daylight bombing with B-29s, the 262 with early start in tactical deployment would have done the same. Given drop tank development and bases near the coast, the 262 might have altered the ability of US and RAF Bomber Command's ability to essentially operate Intruder free over England. I don't think any invasion of France would have been possible in 1944.

Europe might be speaking Russian, and given time bought by delaying Invasion - may have given Germany enough time to develop nuclear capability..in which case, who really knows?

 

[stona]

First point does not allow for the failure to maintain standards and sufficiently large numbers of experienced pilots in 1942/3. It's why so many Luftwaffe 'experten' remained at the sharp end until they were killed or incapacitated, unlike their Anglo-American counterparts. This was largely due to point two which is simply incorrect. I've posted at length with all the figures the cut backs in fuel and Luftwaffe training which took place in 1942 following 'Barbarossa'.

Third point can only happen with sufficient pilots and crews.

Fourth, single engine fighters do not seem to have been particularly vulnerable to attack by Me 262s as they could easily evade them, and continue to do so for some time. One RAF Mosquito (not the most agile aircraft) avoided attacks by two Me 262s for twenty minutes, until they gave up, either short of fuel, ammunition or both.

I agree that IF the Luftwaffe can field large numbers of Me 262s then the daylight bombing campaign would be severely curtailed or halted. I just don't believe that the Luftwaffe had the capability to field enough Me 262s, even if the aircraft were available.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

I just find that very hard to see happening, though impact is undeniable. Out of the 150 or so on strength in 1945, about 20 at any time might be ready. Sure, things were far more dicey for the germans in 1945, but the 43 force we are looking at are a collection of prototypes and half baked new birds coming off the production lines with average engine lifes of just 10 hours.

Performance wise, yes, if you get airborne the 262 is a formidable opponent, but of that force of 40 odds and sods cobbled together you might have an operational rate of 10 a/c, if your lucky and your 262 airbase(s) is not under constant harassment.

if the Germans have a fully fledged production line going, then the allies will have responded with like for like and have an accelarated program of there own. If the German have , say, 500 262s on order for delivery by say February '44, beginning in say June '43, its inconceivable to me that the Allies will not have responded in some way to that. Everything from switching all bomber assets to flattening the factory, including BC (which for the moment would be unnaffected by the 262 menace) through to accelarating their own jet programs to match the german advances. 262s certainly arent going to stop, or even slow down the cross channel crossing or the advance into Germany

 

[tomo pauk]

Hmm - USAF joins the RAF in the night bombing job?

 

[wiking85]

According to Adolph Galland, there were no more than about 300 Me 262's flown and never more than about 100 to 125 at any one time.

1,300 seems formidable. 125 means there were probably no more than 4 to 8 in any "big" formation, and they were NOT easy to find in the air and maybe attackable. Lest we forget, they weren't flying along looking for opportunities. These early jets had a very short range and very probably KNEW where they were going when they launched and were probably back within 25 - 35 minutes mostly.

Very short range? They had longer range than any other German SE fighter.

 

[wiking85]

I just find that very hard to see happening, though impact is undeniable. Out of the 150 or so on strength in 1945, about 20 at any time might be ready. Sure, things were far more dicey for the germans in 1945, but the 43 force we are looking at are a collection of prototypes and half baked new birds coming off the production lines with average engine lifes of just 10 hours.

Performance wise, yes, if you get airborne the 262 is a formidable opponent, but of that force of 40 odds and sods cobbled together you might have an operational rate of 10 a/c, if your lucky and your 262 airbase(s) is not under constant harassment.

if the Germans have a fully fledged production line going, then the allies will have responded with like for like and have an accelarated program of there own. If the German have , say, 500 262s on order for delivery by say February '44, beginning in say June '43, its inconceivable to me that the Allies will not have responded in some way to that. Everything from switching all bomber assets to flattening the factory, including BC (which for the moment would be unnaffected by the 262 menace) through to accelarating their own jet programs to match the german advances. 262s certainly arent going to stop, or even slow down the cross channel crossing or the advance into Germany

What is the Meteor going to do? It doesn't have the range to reach any significant targets in Germany and they are far below the Me262 in performance.

 

[drgondog]

Hmm - USAF joins the RAF in the night bombing job?

Tomo - the 8th AF had formed 482nd Bomb Group designated to train with RAF, and then train other 8th AF BG's. On September 27, 1943 the 'trained' 96th and 385th BG's flew an RAF "Bulls Eye" practice night mission. By this date the 8th had modified 30+ B-17s with H2S radars and placed them into the 95th, 96th, and 385th BG's - 'just in case'. They became PFF ships.

 

[drgondog]

The key to defeating the LW was a high performance escort fighter capable of meeting LW day fighters with at least break even results to win war of attrition - over critical central and east Germany/Poland and Czechoslovakia.

No Allied jets then, (and few today) absent mid air refueling or extremely high capacity external tanks (i.e 600 gallon tanks for F-105), were going to engage Me 262s over Germany from English bases. No amount of re-emphasis on prioritizing US/RAF jet production would be able to significantly change the numbers or dates of operations.... but a 500 mile combat radius range was always an issue for Jets in 1943-1955.

The gating factor for the 262 was the engine, specifically lack of critical materials.

The ability to prioritize Me 262 production over Bf 109 production would have been an easy one to make so numbers could be easily ramped up if the tooling and production methods preceded operational deployment. Pilots could be drawn from both fighter and bomber pools as ACM training was not nearly as critical with the overwhelming speed advantage. Longer training cycles would be required due to the speed variance for landing, more care to single engine procedures, more time to adjust to closing speeds during firing passes, etc.(IMO).

 

[wiking85]

But those jet pilots are going to start on 'normal training flights'. I even highlighted the point that jet pilots don't start their flying on jets, even today.

Incidentally diesel fuel was not available 'in abundance'. I just happen to have been reading about the crisis in supply of both diesel and automotive fuel to German forces in Italy in September 1944 and there were other shortages elsewhere.

Cheers

Steve

Italy was a backwater and had the lowest priority for everything by 1944. The bombing of fuel production in 1944 caused the fuel crisis even though there were reductions in training hours before hand, diesel wasn't an issue until late 1944 in Germany due to the break down in production and transport. So from 1942-44 there is plenty for jets, in fact that was their biggest selling point, using cheap fuel.

 

[stona]

Hmm - USAF joins the RAF in the night bombing job?

They'd need a lot more bombers. They didn't carry a big enough load to create the devastation of a successful RAF area raid. They didn't carry enough to create the desired effect (a Dresden or Pforzheim) with 300 aircraft. You need a LOT of incendiaries concentrated in space AND time. The USAAF did carry increasing percentages of incendiaries, but nothing comparable to the RAF.
That's before we get into the doctrinal and other issues at higher levels. Even when the USAAF was bombing on radar through 10/10 cloud it was pretending to be carrying out precision strikes. Official histories are at the very least disingenuous and arguably dishonest in the language they use to describe this phase of daylight operations. 'Area type raid' is the euphemism closest to the truth.

Re:fuel for training:
In 1941 training command received an average of 27,000 tonnes/month. For the five week period, starting September 1942, the total allocation was just 3,000 tonnes. In July 1942 Goering was informed that training command could only produce 40% of required S/E fighter pilots and just 20% of required bomber crews. In January 1943 there was discussion about cutting the number of bomber Geschwader from 17 to 4 or 5 as a result!

Cheers

Steve

 

[nuuumannn]

My understanding is the Allies had no knowledge of the German jet engine program until it was leaked in 1943 by Fritz Kolbe and their own program was run independent of German efforts.

Not strictly speaking true; yes, little was known about the existence of German jets before 1943, but RAF photographic reconnaissance unveiled the existence of the Me 262, the '163, the V 1 and the V 2 in the spring of that year. The person largely responsible for identifying the new aircraft was one Constance Babington Smith:

Obituary: Constance Babington Smith | World news | The Guardian

Constance Babington Smith - Telegraph

https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/736x/f5/7b/48/f57b481fe782433242b0358a88c76341.jpg

- who worked as a photographic interpreter at RAF Medmenham and was tasked with looking for anything unusual on the advice of one Frank Whittle. Babington Smith noticed scorch marks on the ground at Rechlin and from their pattern was able to determine that the new aircraft were twin engined. She was also responsible for identifying the Me 163 the same way (she wrote a book about her experiences called Evidence in Camera, which was the motto of the unit at Medmenham).

Before these aircraft were actually captured in images, the British were aware of the existence of such weapons from spies, POWs and other sources, but of course, little concrete evidence existed that detailed exactly what the Germans were up to and little credence was placed on reports of these things, although in mid to late 1943 based on the images and various unreliable sources, the British built a reasonably accurate picture of what the Germans had designed. In the summer of 1944, a crashed Me 262 wreck was investigated and experts made an assessment of its capabilities, which, along with their previous assessments proved surprisingly accurate.

According to the book British Intelligence in the Second World War Vol 3 Pt 1, at the end of 1939 a former Heinkel employee brought to British Intelligence's attention the existence of jet propulsion projects by that firm and in April 1940, the designation He 280 became known to the British, along with a calculated speed of around 495 mph by a jet powered aircraft. In May 1942 an He 280 was actually photographed by RAF PR aircraft at Rostock. None of this had any impact on Britain's own jet programme and it really wasn't until the existence of the '262 became known that an escalation of effort behind getting the Meteor into production sooner was undertaken.

It's worth taking this into consideration if we are going to examine any instances where '262 production was advanced by a year; it is almost certain that British Intelligence would have known about it along the same time frame before the type entered service - more jets on airfields means a higher likelihood of them being spotted from the air - approximately a year earlier, so basing what might happen on what actually did happen, we can argue that the Me 262 threat might not have been as sweeping as we might like to assume if they had entered service a year earlier.

In late 1943 - early 1944, the British had fears that the Germans might be able to field some 1,000 jet and rocket powered aircraft by early 1945, but by the end of the year it had softened its stance on the threat and began to disregard it when more intel on both types became known from combat experience and from examining crashed examples, as well as the absence in large numbers, of the kind that were ominously predicted - of both types. These fears of large numbers of jets led to the bombing of the Junkers factory that produced jet engines and of Rechlin by the Americans, so there was effort put in place to counter the threat, which did play a part in lessening the jets' impact.

 

[stona]

diesel wasn't an issue until late 1944 in Germany due to the break down in production and transport. So from 1942-44 there is plenty for jets, in fact that was their biggest selling point, using cheap fuel.

In 1942 the Luftwaffe was using horses or oxen to position its training aircraft and not using diesel tractors because that fuel was needed for agricultural tractors. There were other demands (like feeding and heating the population) on fuels apart from military fantasies.
Cheers
Steve

 

[GrauGeist]

Italy was a backwater and had the lowest priority for everything by 1944...

For having a "lowest priority", there sure was a great deal of men and material dedicated (and lost) to the savage battles being waged in that "backwater"...

Also, correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't the jet fuel being used a #2 Kerosene and not standard vehicle diesel?

 

[wiking85]

For having a "lowest priority", there sure was a great deal of men and material dedicated (and lost) to the savage battles being waged in that "backwater"...

Also, correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't the jet fuel being used a #2 Kerosene and not standard vehicle diesel?

Backwater fighting can't be fierce?
Yes, you're right it was often kerosene, but also a special blend of diesel.

 

[stona]

The Jumo turbojets could run on automotive diesel, but according to the Americans, not as well as on other fuels. J2 was a synthetic fuel, similar to diesel but with some lighter fractions. The Luftwaffe also ran the Jumos on a mixture of kerosene and aviation fuel (B4) when neither of the other two was available.
Cheers
Steve

 

[davebender]

Erich Hartmann took his advanced flight training during 1942. Quality of that training appears ok to me.

 

[GrauGeist]

Backwater fighting can't be fierce?

The front in Italy was of serious strategic importance and can be hardly called a "backwater". If the southern front collapsed, the Allies had a straight shot at Germany's underbelly.

Perhaps it seems as if it were a "backwater" because it didn't get as much attention as the Normandy landings (and the Allied fight across northern Europe) and the Eastern front, but the Wehrmacht committed a great deal of effort (with deadly results) to the effort and the Luftwaffe sank and damaged a great deal of Allied shipping as well as put up a significant fight in the air. In addition, loyalist Italians (army and air units) added to the German's strength (16 German divisions as of 1943).