Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature may not be available in some browsers.
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Erich Hartmann took his advanced flight training during 1942. Quality of that training appears ok to me.
This is a good point that has been made but often overlooked.Any Allied jet, especially the non-refined earlier types, can't provide any good or early solution to this problem.
Right and you'd phase out all the daylight Bf110 and Me410 daylight destroyers because they'd have been replaced by the Me262, thus yielding hundreds of pilots.And yet,historically, in the real world, the first to convert to the Me 262 were in fact twin engine, often instrument qualified, pilots from zerstorer units. The reasons seem fairly obvious.
Cheers
Steve
Out of all the Allied jets just mentioned, only one had any significant range and that would be the (X)P-83, which had provisions for external tanks that gave it a max. range of 2,050 miles (3,300km) although it's range with internal fuel allowed it a range of 1,700 miles (2,785km).
Because it wasn't needed...First flew in February 1945 and cancelled in 1947 before becoming operational. So it would not be a viable option during the war.
Because it wasn't needed...
So it's continued development and similar projects were shelved post-war and the US jet program changed course slightly with the influx of captured German data.
Had the war continued and/or Japan's jet and rocket programs advanced beyond their historical timeline, then the XP-83 program would have most likely matured.
AAF bombers as night bombers is interesting. As night bombers they could strip out the waist gunner position and probably the top turret (go with a single mount) along with heavy nose gun protection. With a two man flight deck like the Lancaster the bomb weight could increase though they would be somewhat volume challenged. Wasn't the Grand Slam Lancaster a special?They'd need a lot more bombers. They didn't carry a big enough load to create the devastation of a successful RAF area raid. They didn't carry enough to create the desired effect (a Dresden or Pforzheim) with 300 aircraft. You need a LOT of incendiaries concentrated in space AND time. The USAAF did carry increasing percentages of incendiaries, but nothing comparable to the RAF.
That's before we get into the doctrinal and other issues at higher levels. Even when the USAAF was bombing on radar through 10/10 cloud it was pretending to be carrying out precision strikes. Official histories are at the very least disingenuous and arguably dishonest in the language they use to describe this phase of daylight operations. 'Area type raid' is the euphemism closest to the truth.
Re:fuel for training:
In 1941 training command received an average of 27,000 tonnes/month. For the five week period, starting September 1942, the total allocation was just 3,000 tonnes. In July 1942 Goering was informed that training command could only produce 40% of required S/E fighter pilots and just 20% of required bomber crews. In January 1943 there was discussion about cutting the number of bomber Geschwader from 17 to 4 or 5 as a result!
Cheers
Steve
No Allied jets then, (and few today) absent mid air refueling or extremely high capacity external tanks (i.e 600 gallon tanks for F-105), were going to engage Me 262s over Germany from English bases. No amount of re-emphasis on prioritizing US/RAF jet production would be able to significantly change the numbers or dates of operations.... but a 500 mile combat radius range was always an issue for Jets in 1943-1955.
(IMO).
Right and you'd phase out all the daylight Bf110 and Me410 daylight destroyers because they'd have been replaced by the Me262, thus yielding hundreds of pilots.
This is just not correct DG, even though you are a pilot to whom I have a LOT of respect.
77 sqn in Korea, after it received its meteor F-8s in November '51, operated from Iwakuni, somewhere between Osaka and Kyoto. offensive patrols were undertaken on a regular basis as far north as the Yalu River. Im not 100% certain of the distances, but the entire Korean peninsula is 684 miles, to which you should add about 250 additional miles to get to Iwakuni. Loiter time was never a problem at those ranges, though they were forced to carry additional tankage.
Parsifal - Range and combat radius are two distinct operational distinctions. Combat radius is dictated by a standard mission profile of warm up, take off, forming up, climbing, cruising, engaging in combat at max permissible throttle for "X" minutes (as determined by AF mission planners) after dropping any external stores, returning with only internal fuel remaining on optimal cruise, descent and loiter for 30 minutes or land with 30 minutes reserve. Range OTOH is warm up, take off and Cruise as far as you can go in a straight line.
As the communists advanced down the peninsula 91 composite wing (including the RAAF meteors) were carrying underwing FFAR rockets instead of fuel up to the 38th parallel, about 4-500 miles by my reckoning.
I won't dispute your historical representation but recognize that at that time there were a lot of alternate intermediate bases to make emergency low reserve landings after combat. If combat engaged at the extreme Yalu, then they only had to get back to Kimpo, etc. Those conditions including long range drop tank making Berlin a feasible escort mission based on returning only on internal fuel - but certainly also no 'intermediate bases' for emergency low fuel landings) existed for any Allied jet fighter.
What im not sure of are the ranges for these earlier marks of Meteor. F8 published data is as follows:
Performance
Maximum speed: 600 mph (522 knots, 965 km/h, Mach 0.82) at 10,000 ft (3,050 m)
Range: 600 mi (522 nmi, 965 km)Note: this is straight line - not combat radius with operational assumptions noted above
Service ceiling: 43,000 ft (13,100 m)
Rate of climb: 7,000 ft/min (35.6 m/s)
It would be valid to say the F8 was an addition that was many years after the war. but does that really make a difference. it was essentially an F4, aerodynamically cleaned up with an extra 30 inches added to the fuselage. The published characteristics of the F4 are:
GLOSTER METEOR F.4:
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
spec metric english
_____________________ _________________ _______________________
wingspan 11.3 meters 37 feet 2 inches
wing area 32.51 sq_meters 350 sq_feet
length 12.5 meters 41 feet
height 3.96 meters 13 feet
empty weight 5,090 kilograms 11,220 pounds
loaded weight 6,600 kilograms 14,550 pounds
maximum speed 930 KPH 580 MPH / 505 KT
service ceiling 12,200 meters 40,000 feet
range (no tanks) 980 kilometers 610 MI / 530 NMI
The range data is without any additional internal or external tankage. I cant see any problem though in extrapolating this to over 1000 miles with fuel tanks fitted. not exactly all the way to berlin, but deep enough into Germany to be a headache if they were needed.
Wing loading: 44.9 lb/ft² (218.97 kg/m²)
Thrust/weight: 0.45
Time to altitude: 5.0 min to 30,000 ft (9,145 m)
The F8 is described as a greatly improved version with substantially increased tankage
Hundreds? many of the most experienced zerstorer pilots had been moved to the night fighter arm, others to reconnaissance units. You surely don't want to transfer them too. In 1942/3 the handful of Bf 110 units were operating principally in North Africa and the East. They need replacing with something if you take their crews to train on the Me 262. You don't have unlimited resources.
Priorities would dictate how many Ju 88, He 111, Do 217, Me 110/210/410 pilots would be selected to augment the original core of Bf 109/FW 190/Me 110 pilots selected for the Me 262s.
You need to consider the manpower shortages at the zerstorer units. The first batch of pilots came from Stab and III Gruppe of ZG 26. It provided just fourteen pilots, ten of whom were retrained.
All the selected pilots would have to be 'retrained'
Phase out the Me 210/410? You've got to be joking. That's a political matter, and again, historically it didn't happen for reasons which have been discussed at considerable length elsewhere.
The Me 262 would replace all the day fighter roles and several CAS roles of the 210/410.
Your assumption that the availability of the Me 262 twelve months earlier can lead to a realistic operational impact is dependent on a large number of other assumptions which are even less historically likely, or even impossible.
Cheers
Steve
But, that was the question to be answered - not the how but the 'what if'
That was a huge error, though, dedicating the Me262 to a fast bomber role/configuration. This job was better suited to the Ar234 and would have freed up a good deal of much needed interceptors.If we assume that the Luftwaffe had unlimited resources in fuel, pilots, aircraft, electronics, infrastructure and everything else it needed, and was free from political interference (how many Me 262 units were KGs ?) then it wouldn't need the Me 262 to thwart the combined bomber offensive in the first place
Cheers
Steve
But the original proposition was that the Me 262 development moved forward by 12 months. I asked earlier if we were going to make a lot of other assumptions. My argument is essentially that historically having the Me 262 available 12 months earlier would not be a game changer because the Luftwaffe did not have the resources or ability to exploit its potential properly.
The LW did not have the resources to grow more than 1000 aircraft per month for all types, but under Milch's consolidation he centralized into a few high efficiency factory and re-furbishment centers to boost production by 65% in 1943. Key to the stimulus was the July strike on Hamburg by US and RAF, then the August strike on Ploesti. Following those attacks by re-prioritizing, Milch increased day fighter production from 600 to ~ 1000/month
If we assume that the Luftwaffe had unlimited resources in fuel, pilots, aircraft, electronics, infrastructure and everything else it needed, and was free from political interference (how many Me 262 units were KGs ?) then it wouldn't need the Me 262 to thwart the combined bomber offensive in the first place
Cheers
Steve
That was a huge error, though, dedicating the Me262 to a fast bomber role/configuration.