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You do realize that Eric Brown didn't fly the Me262 in combat? His assesment is formed in a post-war world where they have the leisure to make evaluations under ideal conditions.Eric Brown said the roller coaster method didn't allow for aiming and the air brakes would allow for a couple extra seconds to acquire the target and fire accurately. But the historical dive method didn't protect from defensive fire or enemy fighter counter tactics. The safest method turned out to be the R4M fired from the flank outside of defensive fire range.
There is a ton of first hand info into operations here from both sides:
Amazon.com: The Me 262 Stormbird: From the Pilots Who Flew, Fought, and Survived It (9780760342633): Colin D. Heaton, Anne-Marie Lewis, Jorg Czypionka, Barrett Tillman: Books
AndSo long as it's pilots flew high-speed slashing attacks, the jet was virtually untouchable. And armed with four 30-millimeter cannons or R4M rockets it was a superb bomber killer.
The jet's speed also made it less vulnerable to aerial gunners. Frank Boyle remembered that the fast new jets largely negated the effectiveness of his ball turret. "The Me-262s were so fast that we couldn't traverse the ball fast enough to pull the right amount of lead-we couldn't get our guns in front of them. And it really didn't matter anyway because the computing gun sight couldn't handle such high speeds. If they attacked us from the rear, we could pull enough lead but the firing time was so short that they were extremely difficult to hit."
According to Boeing, the B-17G had a cruising speed of 150mph.180 mph indicated?
Parsifal the problem with that suggestion of an earlier Whittle engine is that the Me262 showing up a year early doesn't accelerate the TL of the British program, because that would require a 1920s change, not the 1943 surprise appearance of the Me262. As it was they found out about the Me262 in 1943 historically and tried to rush the Meteor, but couldn't get it out there anywhere soon enough.
Bear in mind they would be attacking B-17s cruising straight and level @ 180mph. That makes for a relatively easy aerial gunnery solution.
I should start my reply by pointing out that this is all a matter of opinion and extrapolation, so there is no right or wrong answer. But in my opinion, not only is pushing the Me262 forward a year a big ask, it also has multiplying effects on the R&D effort. If you want Me262s in 1943, there are a lot of hurdles to overcome, and that just doesnt mean a 1 year advancement at the beginning. It means either a greatly increased time frame for the critical elements of the design, or a much greater investment of resources, both of which would not go unnoticed in the allied camp
The critical factor holding the 262 back was its engine development, followed by the political interference. Early in the piece the germans had a similar problem to the British in that interest in the concept of turbojets within the RLM was conspicuously lacking.
The history of the Jumo 004 development as i understand it goes something like this (quoting from wiki again)...."The feasibility of jet propulsion had been demonstrated in Germany in early 1937 by Hans von Ohain working with the Heinkel company. Most of the Reich Air Ministry (RLM) remained uninterested, but Helmut Schelp and Hans Mauch saw the potential of the concept and encouraged Germany's aero engine manufacturers to begin their own programmes of jet engine development. The companies remained skeptical and little new development was carried out".
Throughout 1939 a lot of time was wasted as resources were witheld from the plan, and largely because of German inactivity, the RAF saw no great need for development of Whittles concept. Whittle had bench tested his engine in 1937, and from there until 1941 (I think) nothing happened in the British camp. Junkes did not bench test their engine until the end of 1940. Once they did, it gave motivation for the British to start their development. Once the British began development, it gave others, particularly the US to follow suit, particularly after tizard.
German progress did set the pace, but it was never possible for them to "get the jump" so to speak. Whittles design was simpler and more reliable, but had less promise than the Junkers design but at no stage until the very end did the germans pull ahead markedly from the allies. The Germans had a greater sense of urgency for such aircraft, and this might have yielded them a few weeks or even months if they were lucky, but allied R&D was always in the game as far as timing was concerned.
The assumption youve made is that the Me 262 shows up a year earlier and the Allied progression has not changed from the historical. But to get the 262 into service that 12 months earlier a lot more timer and resources than one year would be needed, more than enough time for the Allies to respond.
If your hypothetical is simply to rely on the existing prototypes, this would make virtually no difference to the air campaign, and probably would expose the greatest weakness of the 262, its reliability, and probably skew and distort the RLMs view of it as a useless piece of junk (which it was not)
I'm sure they were aware that Germany was working on it, as von O'Hain was known in the aircraft community just as Whittle was. Just as Jack Northrup was aware of the Horton brother's pre-war projects (and visa-versa).My understanding is the Allies had no knowledge of the German jet engine program until it was leaked in 1943 by Fritz Kolbe and their own program was run independent of German efforts.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_Kolbe
This is an excellent point and look at the fact that there were well over 1,400 Me262s built but less than half ever took to the sky. Aside from the lack of fuel and parts, they simply did not have enough pilots to fly them and by war's end, there were even Feldwebels piloting them.Are we going to make other assumptions too?
I'd like to know where the highly trained aircrew to fly all these jets is going to come from. Someone mentioned night fighters, that's a crew of two highly trained air crew, trained to a much higher standard, and over a much longer period, than was required for daylight operations
Where and how are they going to be trained? The Luftwaffe suffered drastic fuel reductions to training command from 1942 and jet pilots don't start on jets. You can hardly transfer all your experienced pilots from piston engine fighter units, it became evident in 1944/5 what happens when units are staffed largely by inexperienced pilots, they become cannon fodder.
There is also a common misconception that the kerosene type fuels required for the Me 262 were readily available as if there were no other uses for light fuel oils, particularly in the domestic sector which was also strictly rationed from 1942.
The problem is not producing the aircraft, assuming that the Me 262 and its engines are a viable proposition a year earlier than historically they were. The Germans never struggled to produce enough fighters until the dying weeks of the war. The problem is producing the pilots and aircrew to fly them and to maintain the support infrastructure to maintain them.
Cheers
Steve
Are we going to make other assumptions too?
I'd like to know where the highly trained aircrew to fly all these jets is going to come from. Someone mentioned night fighters, that's a crew of two highly trained air crew, trained to a much higher standard, and over a much longer period, than was required for daylight operations
Where and how are they going to be trained? The Luftwaffe suffered drastic fuel reductions to training command from 1942 and jet pilots don't start on jets. You can hardly transfer all your experienced pilots from piston engine fighter units, it became evident in 1944/5 what happens when units are staffed largely by inexperienced pilots, they become cannon fodder.
There is also a common misconception that the kerosene type fuels required for the Me 262 were readily available as if there were no other uses for light fuel oils, particularly in the domestic sector which was also strictly rationed from 1942.
The problem is not producing the aircraft, assuming that the Me 262 and its engines are a viable proposition a year earlier than historically they were. The Germans never struggled to produce enough fighters until the dying weeks of the war. The problem is producing the pilots and aircrew to fly them and to maintain the support infrastructure to maintain them.
Cheers
Steve
I'm sure they were aware that Germany was working on it, as von O'Hain was known in the aircraft community just as Whittle was. Just as Jack Northrup was aware of the Horton brother's pre-war projects (and visa-versa).
This is an excellent point and look at the fact that there were well over 1,400 Me262s built but less than half ever took to the sky. Aside from the lack of fuel and parts, they simply did not have enough pilots to fly them and by war's end, there were even Feldwebels piloting them.
CorrectNot all Luftwaffe pilots were officers, correct?
Understand that in front line fighter units, commissioned officers were typically assigned while non-commissioned officers flew other missions. As the pilot pool dwindled, they started drawing from the lesser ranks, first the Oberfeldwebels, then Feldwebels and even Unteroffizieres.What's wrong with that?
During WWII most nations used some NCO pilots and they appear to have performed just fine.
There's no need to magically advance jet engine development. Just make different aircraft production decisions during 1938. That gives 1944 Germany the Fw-187 powered by 1,800ps engines. Not as fast as Me-262 but plenty fast enough to engage and disengage at will. Nose mounted weapons would be same as for Me-262.