Impact of much stronger Taranto raid, Nov 1940?

[SaparotRob]

The IJN put it all together. Especially since they were the first to be able put their carriers together for a combined airstrike.

 

[Admiral Beez]

As it was, the Taranto raid was an unresounding success....the Italians were never in a position to wrest sea control from the Royal Navy, especially following Matapan

My hope is to inflict sufficient damage that Matapan doesn't happen at all.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The IJN put it all together. Especially since they were the first to be able put their carriers together for a combined airstrike.

Minus up to date intel on their primary targets, the USN carriers. Japan had already come to the realization that naval aviation not battleships would decide this war, so hitting old and slow USN battleships was of tertiary importance. Once Japan discovered the USN's carriers were absent the strike should have been postponed.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Minus up to date intel on their primary targets, the USN carriers. Japan had already come to the realization that naval aviation not battleships would decide this war, so hitting old and slow USN battleships was of tertiary importance. Once Japan discovered the USN's carriers were absent the strike should have been postponed.

But that would likely interfere with the timetable for seizing NEI resources given the PI sitting astride the routes bring the oil and rubber home.

The Japanese were pretty firm about their desire to neutralize that threat on the flank, which means war with America. Delaying or scuppering the attack on PH would resonate on their planned operations: they'd either have to accept the PI as a flank threat, or accept war against the US without running its fleet down.

You're right that they valued the carriers above all else, but I'm having a hard time seeing how they might get through the conundrum I posit above. Remember, their naval stocks of oil in Oct 1941 were enough for 18 months of peacetime ops, and twelve or so for wartime. That puts a time limit on whatever delay they might deem acceptable.

 

[Admiral Beez]

But that would likely interfere with the timetable for seizing NEI resources

They'd only need to postpone a fortnight. Nov 28th USS Enterprise departed for Wake Island and was due in at Pearl on Dec 8th. Dec 5th USS Lexington sailed for Midway, due to return the following week. USS Saratoga was in San Diego embarking her aircraft in preparation for the voyage to Pearl Harbour.

The challenge is at best the IJN could have waited and caught these three carriers at Pearl, but that doesn't account for the four carriers in the Atlantic, Yorktown, Ranger, Wasp and Hornet. But regardless, the Japanese knew there were no carriers at Pearl and still undertook the attack.

Carrier Locations - Pearl Harbor Attack

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

They'd only need to postpone a fortnight. Nov 28th USS Enterprise departed for Wake Island and was due in at Pearl on Dec 8th. Dec 5th USS Lexington sailed for Midway, due to return the following week. USS Saratoga was in San Diego embarking her aircraft in preparation for the voyage to Pearl Harbour.

The challenge is at best the IJN could have waited and caught these three carriers at Pearl, but that doesn't account for the four carriers in the Atlantic, Yorktown, Ranger, Wasp and Hornet. But regardless, the Japanese knew there were no carriers at Pearl and still undertook the attack.

Carrier Locations - Pearl Harbor Attack

1) How would they know how long the wait might be, if they'd already gotten the intel about carrier absence wrong?

2) Did they have the tankers to refuel KdB while it was waiting a week or two for US carriers to return to port, and then get KdB back to port or safer refueling? Did they have that tonnage? I don't believe they did.

3) How would they know the carriers were in port? Recon by air is clearly unacceptable, risking their surprise. The spy on the ground, sure, could spot and report to Tokyo, Tokyo could then relay to KdB. But that also introduces added risk of discovery through SIGINT. What are all these messages? would be a logical question for the Americans monitoring the net.

4) Staying within strike range of PH for two weeks, or even just three or four days, would put that force at great risk.

The die was tossed somewhere in the North Pacific, I believe. That's where we'll find our go-no go point. Waiting for the perfect opportunity risks one's own fleet with no promise of success. Strike while the surprise is hot.

 

[The Basket]

The main problem is the concept of the Italian Navy. Sink a battleship but you still have cruisers and destroyers.

The effectiveness of the Regia Marina was not affected by Taranto.

Cape Matapan or the Battle of Sirte was after so to say Taranto was descive or crushed the Regia Marina is not true. Taranto was only part of the bigger Mediterranean war and not war winning or deserving of greater important than it needs to be.

 

[nuuumannn]

The effectiveness of the Regia Marina was not affected by Taranto.

Cape Matapan or the Battle of Sirte was after so to say Taranto was descive or crushed the Regia Marina is not true. Taranto was only part of the bigger Mediterranean war and not war winning or deserving of greater important than it needs to be.

Materially, maybe not, but the psychological impact of these battles on the Italian high command was something else. They were regarded as significant defeats by the Italians. The efforts to raise and refurbish the damaged battleships were considerable and the time period of their unavailability was a distinct weakening of Italy's perceived position in the Med in terms of the navy's overall strategy. The fascist leadership had extolled Italy's superiority over the British to the Italian public and to lose three ships in one fell swoop was a huge dent in that pride that the government had established. Perception was everything to fascist governments, it was the same for the Nazis - Goebbels' role in government was paramount in keeping people on side, and for the Italian government to suffer such defeats, and the sinking of their ships was considered a huge material defeat, regardless over the overall strategic implications across the conflict, was untenable.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The main problem is the concept of the Italian Navy. Sink a battleship but you still have cruisers and destroyers.

The effectiveness of the Regia Marina was not affected by Taranto.

Cape Matapan or the Battle of Sirte was after so to say Taranto was descive or crushed the Regia Marina is not true. Taranto was only part of the bigger Mediterranean war and not war winning or deserving of greater important than it needs to be.

It gave the Brits some breathing space in the Med, but given its oil situation, I don't know that the RM could really mount a credible threat. For much of Italy's involvement, their BBs especially were hampered by a lack of fuel. That's my understanding, at least.

ETA: I just finished watching up Drachinifels's series on the recovery efforts at Pearl Harbor. Recovering the ships at Taranto must have laid much burden on the RM's recovery capabilities.

 

[The Basket]

If you look at U-47 sinking Royal Oak it is easy to say wow that's astonishing.

But it don't affect ww2 one minute.

Without context or seeing the big picture then it's not important.

Even Midway is only a bump in the road. By late 1942 only Enterprise was operating in the Pacific theater. So it could easily be argued that IJN was the victor in the carrier war in 1942.

It all about context. The Regia Marina had it's destroyers and subs and cruisers and smaller craft so a loss of a battleship did not affect the bread and butter which was convoy escort.

Remember that the Royal Navy couldn't risk air attack in daylight so to blockade Taranto day and night giving it the old college try throwing in Swordfish and torps every half hour was not happening. And one or two mass raids is not going to have a lasting effect other than a few months of issues

Taranto must be seen as part of the larger Mediterranean war and not a decisive battle.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Even Midway is only a bump in the road. By late 1942 only Enterprise was operating in the Pacific theater. So it could easily be argued that IJN was the victor in the carrier war in 1942.

Disagree. As you say, put it into context: the Americans could replace their losses, the Japanese, not so much. If that's a victory at all -- and I don't see how that could be argued -- it's the epitome of a Pyrrhic victory.

 

[The Basket]

The general idea that Midway turned the tide and the IJN was done for.

Which is not factually born out. Yes the IJN were defeated but they were not out.

A good example is Trafalgar. Britain loves Nelson but here is something.... Austerlitz happened after Trafalgar. So if Napoleon was defeated after Trafalgar he had a funny way of showing it.

The Essex cut and paste was going to happen regardless of Midway or Santa Cruz so the outcome of victory or loss was not decisive because sheer American fire power was decisive.

So yes IJN lost Soryu Hiryu Kaga and Akagi but the USN lost Yorktown Wasp Hornet and Lexington so it was even in the first half. So it could be argued the IJN win 1942. And then it goes downhill.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The general idea that Midway turned the tide and the IJN was done for.

[...]

So yes IJN lost Soryu Hiryu Kaga and Akagi but the USN lost Yorktown Wasp Hornet and Lexington so it was even in the first half. So it could be argued the IJN win 1942. And then it goes downhill.

1) Your point is unconvincing. The Japanese losses could not be easily replaced (especially pilot losses). The Japanese advances in CenPac and SWPac had been halted by 1942's end. You're also making no mention of IJN losses in the Solomons, which include Hiei and Kirishima.

By the end of 1942, the Japanese had made the decision to withdraw from Guadalcanal. They'd been stalemated in New Guinea, too.

That is not victory. At best -- at best -- it is a draw; and even that assessment ignores the real difficulties Japan will have replacing ships and pilots.

2) I'm unsure why you're arguing to me that Midway wasn't decisive. I made no mention of that at all; I only took disagreement with this notion that Japan could be considered to have "won" 1942.

 

[Dana Bell]

The general idea that Midway turned the tide and the IJN was done for.

Which is not factually born out. Yes the IJN were defeated but they were not out.

A good example is Trafalgar. Britain loves Nelson but here is something.... Austerlitz happened after Trafalgar. So if Napoleon was defeated after Trafalgar he had a funny way of showing it.

The Essex cut and paste was going to happen regardless of Midway or Santa Cruz so the outcome of victory or loss was not decisive because sheer American fire power was decisive.

So yes IJN lost Soryu Hiryu Kaga and Akagi but the USN lost Yorktown Wasp Hornet and Lexington so it was even in the first half. So it could be argued the IJN win 1942. And then it goes downhill.

I agree - not an unreasonable point of view. I tend to factor in the losses of aircrews and aircraft (also harder for Japan to replace), the number of allied carriers that can be called upon in an emergency, and the number of new hulls that are working up or on the ways. For an imagined major sea battle in December 1942, I'd suspect the Japanese might still hold an edge, but the edge was already -- and inevitably -- dulling at that point.

Cheers,



Dana

 

[The Basket]

I would say 1942 was more successful for the IJN than USN.

Yes there was setbacks but look at what was achieved.

If things were going wrong then that was a 1945 problem and not a 1942 problem.

So as seen by the evacuation of Guadalcanal it was still possible to be effective.

 

[SaparotRob]

How would the failure to capture Port Moresby be a success? The American fleet and all its carriers weren't eliminated which was Admiral Yammato's primary goal for attacking Pearl Harbor. That was not very successful to me. Evacuating Guadalcanal is somewhat less successful then capturing it.

 

[The Basket]

Depend on what you see as successful. Not all gravy but enough gravy to get by.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I would say 1942 was more successful for the IJN than USN.

Yes there was setbacks but look at what was achieved.

If things were going wrong then that was a 1945 problem and not a 1942 problem.

So as seen by the evacuation of Guadalcanal it was still possible to be effective.

With the hope of putting this derail to an end, they were very successful the first six months, and had some successes later, but it's safe to say that the last four months of 1942 started their defeat. Hence pretty much a draw, at best. They'd lost not only 2/3 of KdB, but also two battlecruisers, several conquests, and most importantly, the strategic initiative.

How would the failure to capture Port Moresby be a success? The American fleet and all its carriers weren't eliminated which was Admiral Yammato's primary goal for attacking Pearl Harbor. That was not very successful to me. Evacuating Guadalcanal is somewhat less successful then capturing it.

As Churchill said on another occasion, "Wars are not won by evacuations." By November of 1942, the Japanese had reached high tide and were thereafter ebbing, in both PNG and on the 'Canal.

 

[SaparotRob]

With the hope of putting this derail to an end, they were very successful the first six months, and had some successes later, but it's safe to say that the last four months of 1942 started their defeat. Hence pretty much a draw, at best. They'd lost not only 2/3 of KdB, but also two battlecruisers, several conquests, and most importantly, the strategic initiative.



As Churchill said on another occasion, "Wars are not won by evacuations." By November of 1942, the Japanese had reached high tide and were thereafter ebbing, in both PNG and on the 'Canal.

That's a quote I'm gonna' remember.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

That's a quote I'm gonna' remember.

Ole Winnie's got a bunch of 'em. He said that one in the process of relaying the news of Dunkirk to Parliament.

Anyway, I agree with Basket here that Taranto wasn't decisive. I don't agree about Midway, because I think the Solomons campaign would've been much harder for the USN with an intact KdB.