Impact of much stronger Taranto raid, Nov 1940?

[The Basket]

A more shocking quote is someone agrees with me.

I try my best, goddamit.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

A more shocking quote is someone agrees with me.

I try my best, goddamit.

You're pretty thought-provoking. I enjoy reading things I don't agree with, because it forces me to reconsider my own views.

But yes, Taranto was not decisive. Useful? Absolutely. But the decisive factor in Med naval combat was the Italian lack of fuel for their heavy ships, imo. IIRC, Roma's trials were limited due to low fuel-oil reserves in backstock. That is one hell of a crunch for a navy to suffer, because ships without fuel are generally called "targets".

To be sure, the Italians still had fuel at the time of the British raid, as later ops showed. But with such little domestic production (what, a couple thousand tons a year from Albania?), and low imports, the RM had to look at every operation through the lens of fuel.

Whether sunk in Taranto, or floating in Taranto, those BBs weren't going anywhere unless something very important was up.

I also wonder how much maintenance facilities and resources raising and refurbishing those ships cost the RM. That could have been almost as important as removing them from the order of battle, by delaying the refits/repairs needed by other ships.

 

[The Basket]

Thought provoking? Hmmm.
At least I am disagreeable so I can live with that.

Regia Marina was ok. I guess. I always thought that the Regia Marina would have nice meals on board ship. With red wine. On a cool Mediterranean evening. Pleasant way to pass a war.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Thought provoking? Hmmm.
At least I am disagreeable so I can live with that.

Regia Marina was ok. I guess. I always thought that the Regia Marina would have nice meals on board ship. With red wine. On a cool Mediterranean evening. Pleasant way to pass a war.

I'll say this: even their rebuilt WWI BBs were handsome.

 

[nuuumannn]

Without context or seeing the big picture then it's not important.

In hindsight, yes, but d'you reckon that after Taranto and Matapan that Cunningham and Churchill just sat back and said, yup, we're good? Nope, not for a minute. Big picture is great in hindsight and yup, you're right, the material impact wasn't great but both hit the Italians hard. This affects how ops are conducted. The Germans felt the same way about things. The scuttling of the Admiral Graf Spee made little difference to the outcome of the war but was a major coup for the Royal Navy and British Intelligence and a psychological blow to the Kriegsmarine, the Germans even renamed its sister the Deutschland for fear of the lost prestige of it being sunk. When you're eye-deep in sh*t it's hard to see anything but sh*t.

Taranto must be seen as part of the larger Mediterranean war and not a decisive battle.

Yup, agree, but in the context of what impact it had on the Italians at the time it was decisive. It also taught a lesson to those willing to learn, hint hint...

 

[nuuumannn]

Ole Winnie's got a bunch of 'em. He said that one in the process of relaying the news of Dunkirk to Parliament.

Anyway, I agree with Basket here that Taranto wasn't decisive. I don't agree about Midway, because I think the Solomons campaign would've been much harder for the USN with an intact KdB.

Agree, Taranto not decisive bigger picture-wise, but certainly influential. Midway was definitely decisive. It affected how the Japanese continued henceforward. They were never able to replace those big fleet carriers lost, which arguably affected their ship-building capacity and amphibious operations in terms of support provided. Imagine if the US landings at Guadalcanal had the opposition of four Japanese fleet carriers. Also, after Midway, Japanese expansion began its decline and the strategic map began to show this.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Agree, Taranto not decisive bigger picture-wise, but certainly influential. Midway was definitely decisive. It affected how the Japanese continued henceforward. They were never able to replace those big fleet carriers lost, which arguably affected their ship-building capacity and amphibious operations in terms of support provided. Imagine if the US landings at Guadalcanal had the opposition of four Japanese fleet carriers. Also, after Midway, Japanese expansion began its decline and the strategic map began to show this.

Exactly. Santa Cruz against six Japanese carriers in the hypothetical, the Americans look to be in for a hard slog indeed. I bet Enterprise would probably be lost as well. That would certainly affect the November battles.

I think American victory was inevitable, for reasons of industry. I also think Midway appreciably shortened the war. It's not a binary thing to me. Seems to me war rarely is, right?

 

[The Basket]

We, as the greatest of men, always must separate the wheat from the chaff.

So did something affect something so the outcome of something was a new something.

So the real question is always the big one. Did Taranto raid change the strategic balance in the Mediterranean that the Regia Marina was unable to function as a fighting force?

Was the convoys to North Africa disrupted? No

Did the Italian battleships still come out? Yes

Was the convoys to Malta disrupted? Yes.

Did the Italian Navy still come out to contest the outcome of the war? Yes.

Example is the failure to resupply fighters to Malta which failed due to the presence of 2 battleships. This was days after Taranto.

So if the idea was to destroy the Regia Marina and keep the Italians quaking under their beds and never come out again then that failed.

 

[nuuumannn]

Did Taranto raid change the strategic balance in the Mediterranean that the Regia Marina was unable to function as a fighting force?

Someone is guilty of hyperbole, I think. Did anyone actually say that the raid was supposed to stop the RM from functioning as a fighting force? That wasn't Cunningham's objective. There was no way that he had a force capable of doing that.

So if the idea was to destroy the Regia Marina and keep the Italians quaking under their beds and never come out again then that failed.

It wasn't the idea behind the raid; its aims were more immediate and more achievable. Cunningham knew that the RM was at its strongest at the time, exceeding the RN count of available ships in theatre and he suspected (rightly) that the Italians might launch their ships on the offensive, so he launched Taranto to nullify the Italian numerical advantage in capital warships and in that, Taranto succeeded, even if only momentarily. Tangible results that swung the advantage of available heavy units in British favour. Tactically and strategically, Taranto was nothing more than a victory to the RN in altering the balance of power in the Med at that time.

No one has ever claimed that the Italian navy was supposed to cease functioning after Taranto. Let's not be too dramatic.

 

[The Basket]

When I reply to a question, I deal with other sources other questions from other places.

So I don't necessarily answer an individual but to history.

Everything I write will last for ever as long as the internet survives. So my words will echo for eternity.

So I answer the question for the future generations who will not even be born who are reading this a thousand years from now.

That is my audience.

And I am their tutor.

Also the Regia Marina was designed to fight the Frenchies not the Royal Navy.

The fact that 2 battleships sailed a week later showed that Taranto was not a huge success.

 

[Admiral Beez]

As Churchill said on another occasion, "Wars are not won by evacuations."

Meanwhile under Churchill's lead the British undertook massive evacuations. There's nothing wrong with withdrawing your troops to fighter another day.

338,000 British/CW and French troops evacuated from Dunkirk in 1940. These same troops would fight on in North Africa, Sicily and return to France in 1944.
50,000 British/CW troops fled from Greece in 1941. These same troops would go on to win Britain victory in North Africa.
45,000 British/CW plus Chinese troops and up to half a million civilians fled from Burma into India. These same troops would go on to win the British victory over Japan in 1944.

The one evacuation Churchill should have executed was of Singapore. Until the last days in early Feb 1942 troop and merchant ships were arriving at Singapore. These ships should have first been loaded with every British civilian and wounded soldier possible, plus any Chinese employees of the British. Leave Percival and a rifle.

 

[SaparotRob]

Weren't those evacuations what prompted Churchill to say "wars are not won by evacuations."?

 

[Admiral Beez]

Weren't those evacuations what prompted Churchill to say "wars are not won by evacuations."?

IDK, but campaigns if not wars can be lost without them.

Hitler demanded that General (later Field Marshall) Friedrich Paulus and his men stay put at Stalingrad instead of ordering the army to evacuate to fight another day, costing Germany 400,000 dead and captured and the irretrievable initiative on the eastern front.

Churchill demanded that General Percival and his men stay put instead of evacuating on the many ships that were arriving in Singapore right up to the end, costing Britain 85,000 dead and captured and igniting the beginning of the end of Britain's place east of Suez. Even the civilian evacuation was an organizational failure. Singapore's garrison could have been evacuated in January with the troops sent to Rangoon, Calcutta or PNG.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Meanwhile under Churchill's lead the British undertook massive evacuations. There's nothing wrong with withdrawing your troops to fighter another day.

My point was that of the two major land ops the Japanese undertook after Yamamoto's six-month prediction, both were stymied, one in retreat and one by naval evacuation. I do wonder how many of the Japanese on the 'Canal fought elsewhere, compared to how many "withered on the vine" to use the American phrase.

In either event, I take issue with the idea that the Japanese can be said to have "won" 1942. IMHO it is at best a draw for them. I'd note that after their defeat on and around the 'Canal in November of 1942, they saw no offensive success worth mention in CenPac or SWPac, and precious few defensive successes.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Weren't those evacuations what prompted Churchill to say "wars are not won by evacuations."?

The one at Dunkirk, specifically.

To put it into context: He was reporting to Parliament on the completely unexpected scale of success for Operation Dynamo, the evacuation of Dunkirk; they'd saved ten times the number of men they'd expected to, albeit sans most equipment heavier than a .303. In the middle of his report to Parliament, positive though it was about the evacuation itself, he inserted that phrase about not winning wars by evacuations because he knew that his nation was still in dire straits, and didn't want to be seen as gilding the lily. He wanted to convey, I think, cautious optimism, while at the same time preparing both the public and especially the Parliament for further hardships and further defeats, which were certain to come -- as they did.

Linked here is the entirety of Churchill's speech containing the quote about evacuations. It is the famous "We shall fight on every beach" speech. For those interested, it will put the evacuations snippet into its proper context as envisioned by Churchill.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

<Yikes!>

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

<inadvertnet double=post deleted>

 

[SaparotRob]

Been there too.

 

[SaparotRob]

IDK, but campaigns if not wars can be lost without them.

Hitler demanded that General (later Field Marshall) Friedrich Paulus and his men stay put at Stalingrad instead of ordering the army to evacuate to fight another day, costing Germany 400,000 dead and captured and the irretrievable initiative on the eastern front.

Churchill demanded that General Percival and his men stay put instead of evacuating on the many ships that were arriving in Singapore right up to the end, costing Britain 85,000 dead and captured and igniting the beginning of the end of Britain's place east of Suez. Even the civilian evacuation was an organizational failure. Singapore's garrison could have been evacuated in January with the troops sent to Rangoon, Calcutta or PNG.

I think you missed my point.

 

[The Basket]

Yes or no

Did Japanese have more territory 31st December 1942 than 31st December 1941?

If the answer is yes then that's called a win.

Now compare 31st December 1945?

Are Japan winning more or less than 31st December 1942?

So the Japanese Empire is in good shape 31st December 1942.