Impact of much stronger Taranto raid, Nov 1940?

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Yes or no

Did Japanese have more territory 31st December 1942 than 31st December 1941?

If the answer is yes then that's called a win.

Now compare 31st December 1945?

Are Japan winning more or less than 31st December 1942?

So the Japanese Empire is in good shape 31st December 1942.
Outside of losing a few islands, did the IJA lose any significant territory until 1944? The IJA's positions in Korea, China, FIC, Malaya, Burma, Formosa, Philippines and DEI were secure nearly to the end.

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Yes or no

Did Japanese have more territory 31st December 1942 than 31st December 1941?

If the answer is yes then that's called a win.


That's quite the narrow and limited metric you have there.

Yes or no:

1) Did the Japanese have more or fewer fleet carriers at the end of 42?

2) Did the Japanese have more or fewer trained aviators for those fleet carriers?

3) Did the Japanese have more or fewer battlecruisers by the end of 42?

4) Did the Japanese have any successful campaign in the Pacific after June of 1942 when they captured the Aleutians?

After Stalingrad, the Germans had more territory than at the start of Fall Blau ... but no one would claim that for that reason they were "winning." You metric is narrowly carved -- cherry-picking deployed to rescue a weak point.
 
A weak point?

Churchill said the fall of Singapore as "the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history."

So doesn't sound like a weak point to me cos I got Winnie giving the love.

If you ain't willing to lose ships and lots of them then maybe this war thing isn't for you.

Maybe things were going wrong but 1942 was a good year to be a Japanese Imperial and no mistake.

Japan lost Guadalcanal but America lost the Philippines. The fact that Japan even got to Australia and Guadalcanal is a sign of overwinning.

Hubris is never good
 
Churchill said the fall of Singapore as "the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history."
Which is just plainly wrong on Churchill's part.

With its capitulation at the Siege of Yorktown (1781), Britain lost the entirety of its American colonies outside of what would become Canada, never regaining them. At Singapore, Britain lost a small island city and naval base, which it regained 3 years, 6 months later, and held for another 20 years until independence in 1965.

Britain's loss of the American Revolution had far more ramifications for Britain and the world than the fall of Singapore. Had Singapore held on Japan would have still taken Burma, and regardless Indian independence was already a known inevitability in pre-war Britain - the fall of Singapore did not spark the end of the British Empire, the financial, industrial and moral bankrupting of the First World War did that.

I suspect Churchill's obsession and love for all things American clouded his view.
 
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The Basket does bring up some good points. I got to give you that.
I am a generous god.

I was reading about Burma in 44-45.

Japanese soldiers were diseased, half starved, and they kept on trucking.

The only military advantage the Japanese had in 1945 is the fact they were willing to die. And that's it. Not jets or rockets but a willingness to fight to the end.

The Japanese didn't hear no bell.
 
A weak point?

Churchill said the fall of Singapore as "the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history."

So doesn't sound like a weak point to me cos I got Winnie giving the love.

If you ain't willing to lose ships and lots of them then maybe this war thing isn't for you.

Maybe things were going wrong but 1942 was a good year to be a Japanese Imperial and no mistake.

Japan lost Guadalcanal but America lost the Philippines. The fact that Japan even got to Australia and Guadalcanal is a sign of overwinning.

Hubris is never good

This isn't "hubris" on my part, and I'd appreciate it if you wouldn't impute feelings to me I don't hold. Thanks in advance.

My point is that by the end of 1942, the fortunes of war, while generous to the Japanese in Yamamoto's "six months or a year", by the time that year had run out, the Japanese had lost the initiative, had lost six irreplaceable capital ships, lost irreplaceable pilots, and were firmly on the defensive with very little hope of regaining the initiative. So they owned more territory by June 42 ... so what? That was area they had to defend, or lose, and that process started over the summer, first along the Kokoda, then in the Solomons.

Checked at Coral Sea.
Defeated heartily at Midway, with heavy losses.
Defeated along the Kokoda, and at Guadalcanal, by Dec 1942, again with heavy losses.

I'll ask you again: What successful campaign did they undertake in the second half of 1942 in the Pacific? The tide had turned in June, as it was going to inevitably; the turning tide coming at that time surprised both Americans and Japanese, but that doesn't mean that it did not happen. By the end of 1942, the Japanese were in stasis in most places, and defeated in two. All those grand victories were macht nicht by the end of the year.
 
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Which is just plainly wrong on Churchill's part.

With its capitulation at the Siege of Yorktown (1781), Britain lost the entirety of its American colonies outside of what would become Canada, never regaining them.

[...]

I suspect Churchill's obsession and love for all things American clouded his view.

I suspect that Churchill was considering the raw numbers lost at Singapore. You're right that Yorktown carried much larger ramifications than Singapore.
 
I suspect that Churchill was considering the raw numbers lost at Singapore. You're right that Yorktown carried much larger ramifications than Singapore.
Then Churchill, if being honest needs to own his biggest failure, the Gallipoli campaign, where 160,000 British Empire troops were killed or wounded and four RN battleships sunk in one of Churchill's worst ill thought out plans, having massive ramifications to both the Middle East and Britain's relationship with its Dominions.

One need only watch Mel Gibson in the movie Gallipoli to understand why Australians, after seeing their boys, this time at Singapore once again abandoned by Winston, Aussies said f#ck you to Britain postwar. Once HM expires I expect Oz to break that historic tie. The anger of Gallipoli and Singapore runs deep.
 
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Then Churchill, if being honest needs to own his biggest failure, the Gallipoli campaign, where 160,000 British Empire troops were killed or wounded and four RN battleships sunk in one of Churchill's worst ill thought out plans, having massive ramifications to both the Middle East and Britain's relationship with its Dominions.

One need only watch Mel Gibson in the movie Gallipoli to understand why Australians, after their boys, this time at Singapore once again abandoned by Winston why Aussies said f#ck you to Britain postwar. Once HM expires I expect Oz to break that historic tie. The anger of Gallipoli and Singapore runs deep.

Churchill had issues with the truth in many points through his career.

I can't speak to current Australian sentiment, but I wouldn't blame them a bit of anger over their treatment in that era. Curtin, indeed, had already started speaking to it, to Whitehall and Downing Street, in 1942, from what I've read.

I was simply trying to provide some context behind a simple quote.

Evacuating the Singapore force to Australia and/or eastern India would -- after destroying the infrastructure of the harbor-- would probably have been smart money.
 
Evacuating the Singapore force to Australia and/or eastern India would -- after destroying the infrastructure of the harbor-- would probably have been smart money.
Put all five Australian combat divisions into Malaya along with effective leadership in early 1941 and evacuating Singapore might not be necessary.

Churchill was a politicians and great inspiration to his people, but he should have left strategy and especially execution planning to the professionals.
 
This isn't "hubris" on my part, and I'd appreciate it if you wouldn't impute feelings to me I don't hold. Thanks in advance.

My point is that by the end of 1942, the fortunes of war, while generous to the Japanese in Yamamoto's "six months or a year", by the time that year had run out, the Japanese had lost the initiative, had lost six irreplaceable capital ships, lost irreplaceable pilots, and were firmly on the defensive with very little hope of regaining the initiative. So they owned more territory by June 42 ... so what? That was area they had to defend, or lose, and that process started over the summer, first along the Kokoda, then in the Solomons.

Checked at Coral Sea.
Defeated heartily at Midway, with heavy losses.
Defeated along the Kokoda, and at Guadalcanal, by Dec 1942, again with heavy losses.

I'll ask you again: What successful campaign did they undertake in the second half of 1942 in the Pacific? The tide had turned in June, as it was going to inevitably; the turning tide coming at that time surprised both Americans and Japanese, but that doesn't mean that it did not happen. By the end of 1942, the Japanese were in stasis in most places, and defeated in two. All those grand victories were macht nicht by the end of the year.
Attu and Kiska?
 

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